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Executive summary: Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 
 
The economic and financial crisis that has been affecting Europe for several years may very 
well cause a profound and long-lasting upheaval in Industrial Relations institutions and 
practices.  While Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 noted that social dialogue had been a 
factor for resilience in overcoming the early effects of the crisis, this 2012 edition concludes 
that the impact of the sovereign debt challenge and the budgetary consolidation policies being 
pursued in a wide range of countries are producing more fundamental changes to industrial 
relations in Europe. 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 noted that in the early part of the recession, when the 
main impact of a shrinking economy was felt by the private sector, governments and social 
partners often worked together to mitigate negative impacts on employment. Despite 
significant differences between countries and sectors already in evidence in 2010, such 
solutions were most often based on extensive use of internal flexibility and focussed on short-
time working schemes as well as support for the banking system and for specific industries – 
such as  the car industry – through special fiscal arrangements.  Social dialogue, both bipartite 
and tripartite, was seen as a useful, flexible and efficient mechanism which contributed 
positively to promoting resilience and generating social consensus in the face of the crisis.   
Since then, the crisis has deepened and spread to further sectors of the economy, including the 
public sector, as the financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis, making fiscal 
consolidation a key objective of macroeconomic adjustment policies. This has resulted in an 
unfavourable setting for social dialogue, which became more conflictual in many countries 
and sectors, a trend which has been particularly visible in the public sector. One main 
characteristic of the public sector is that the employment relationship is regulated by laws that 
are different from those governing the private sector. A key characteristic of industrial 
relations in the public sector is the status of employees with employment tenure and life-long 
careers, and the status of the state as a single employer. This implies different rights and 
duties for public sector employees, including some limitations on collective bargaining and 
the right to strike. This different legal regulation and the special role of the public sector go 
some way towards explaining the differences between the two sectors in terms of the main 
dimensions of industrial relations, such as collective bargaining and the organisation and role 
of the social partners.  In this report, the public sector is considered as covering central and 
local government, with the health and education sectors.   
In response to the public debt crisis, the approach of national governments for the public 
sector has been to dramatically accelerate and intensify existing long-term structural reforms, 
and the methods chosen to implement decisions have often excluded the use of social 
dialogue.  Two situations can be identified: the first covers a limited number of countries in 
which the long-term trend towards public sector restructuring, with a view to seeking 
efficiency gains, continues with a more balanced approach and limitation of conflict, and 
preserves the scope for collectively agreed solutions between trade unions and public sector 
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employers. The second covers countries in which fiscal consolidation programmes are being 
implemented, and not just in those countries receiving financial assistance from the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund. For countries hit by the debt crisis, fiscal 
consolidation, financial stability and structural reforms are conditions to restore confidence, 
re-establish fiscal solvency and foster economic growth over the medium term. In these 
countries the measures are necessarily more severe than those taken by private companies 
during the 2008-2010 recession.  
Sound public finances facilitate the ability of governments to carry out policies that are 
distinguishing elements of the European Social Model such as the promotion of social 
cohesion and substantial financing for key public services such as health and education. Thus, 
many measures were designed to correct fiscal imbalances and to restore confidence of 
financial markets in the capacity of national governments to undertake responsible and 
sustainable fiscal policies. In some countries, these measures included reforms of collective 
bargaining systems where they were seen as part of the problems to be addressed. Even if the 
Commission has always stressed the importance of social dialogue, of the autonomy of social 
partners and of the respect for national circumstances and practices, reforms were not always 
accompanied by a fully effective social dialogue. 
These reforms have pointed to the lack of flexibility of the classic tools of collective 
bargaining mechanisms and other systems for conflict prevention, such as indexation and 
extension clauses.  In such circumstances, there is little negotiating space for social dialogue 
to operate, and the more positive overall assessment of Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 
cannot be repeated for the subsequent period. 
The impact of the crisis on industrial relations in the public sector is severe, particularly for 
the trade unions.  For some time now, the public sector has provided a core group of trade 
union members; trade union density in many Member States has been considerably higher in 
the public than in the private sector, and the combination of austerity policies leading to a 
shrinking public sector and demographic trends is likely to further reduce trade union density 
in services overall in the coming years.  As a result of the reforms in the public sector and the 
current conflictual environment, industrial relations in the public sector have almost certainly 
changed fundamentally.   
While recent trends in industrial relations across Europe are worrying, the evidence is clear 
that well-structured social dialogue can produce positive outcomes and some of those are 
documented in this report. As was already the case in 2010, the countries where social 
dialogue is well-established and industrial relations institutions strong are still generally those 
where the economic and social situation is more resilient and under less pressure. This also 
reflects the historically path-dependent nature of industrial relations.  
This report argues that social dialogue mechanisms and instruments, which have served 
Europe well over many decades, are still relevant means of addressing the crisis and 
contributing to creating favourable conditions for growth and employment. Beyond all the 
diversity of national industrial relations systems, social dialogue is a key component of the 
European social model and its vital role is recognised by the European Treaties, including the 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights. Industrial relations – whether in the public or the private 
sector – are key to managing conflict and finding agreed solutions in difficult circumstances; 
yet to be effective industrial relations need to develop in a climate of mutual trust and 
understanding, conducive to economic efficiency and motivation, productivity and 
development of workers. For its part, the Commission has emphasised the need for 
modernising wage-setting systems while respecting the role of social partners and collective 
bargaining in the process. The Commission is engaged to promote and support social dialogue 
throughout the EU, while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners and the 
diversity of national systems of industrial relations. 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2012 takes a broad view of the state of industrial relations in 
the EU at the present time.  It is in part based on expert contributions and summarises views 
expressed by stakeholders, which may differ from the Commission's position. Chapter 1 
presents an overview of the principal quantitative trends in industrial relations indicators 
across the EU.  Chapter 2 of the report looks in detail at industrial relations in the 'new 
Member States' of Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 3 presents a typology of the structure 
of industrial relations in the public sector on the basis of specific characteristics and a cluster 
analysis. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the adjustment process in the public sector during 
the crisis in terms of its intensity and the forms of social dialogue that are most affected.  
There is also an update on the way in which the social partners are addressing the issue of 
green jobs, (Chapter 5) and an examination of the role that the social partners play in 
discussions on reforms of the benefit and pension systems in Member States (chapter 6).  The 
publication is completed by a round-up of developments and responses in European-level 
social dialogue (chapter 7) and a description of the principal developments in European labour 
law (chapter 8). 
 
Chapter 1 - Overview of European, national and public sector industrial relations 
This chapter presents an overview of industrial relations in the EU, noting the main trends and 
key differences. It sets the scene for the rest of this report by providing an overview of 
industrial relations in the public sector and comparing it with the private sector across the EU. 
Industrial relations in the 27 EU Member States are usually portrayed as comprising large 
differences between countries. By contrast, public sector industrial relations are characterised 
by a higher degree of homogeneity across countries, albeit with a range of differences 
between countries, due to factors such as national traditions and the precise nature of the role 
of the state.  
Industrial relations in the EU have generally followed the secular trends identified in earlier 
Industrial Relations in Europe reports.  Collective bargaining has tended to become more 
decentralised, with the index falling from 2.15 to 1.98 since the 2010 report. Collective 
bargaining coverage varies widely across the EU, from around 20% to 100%, depending to a 
certain extent on the typology of the industrial relations model in each country (see IRE 2008, 
Table 2.2). The average for the EU-27 is 66%, but only 44% in the CEECs. The secular 
decline in trade union membership, which has been underway since the 1980s, has continued 
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as has trade union fragmentation, despite several high-profile mergers as a strategy to restrict 
the decline. Trade union density has stabilised somewhat at 24%, and remains much lower in 
the private sector than in the public sector in most Member States.  On the other hand, the 
situation of employers' organisations has remained largely stable, particularly in those 
countries where membership of such organisations is quasi-compulsory, despite some 
loosening of such arrangements.   
As a general feature, collective bargaining coverage and the degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining in the public sector is higher in almost all EU Member States compared 
with the private sector. Higher collective bargaining coverage can be explained by factors 
such as greater recognition of the state as an employer for collective bargaining per se and of 
trade unions as partners in particular. The higher degree of centralisation of collective 
bargaining rests on the prevailing interest of central state authorities in maintaining their 
influence and control in the wage formation process. Further, union density in the public 
sector is generally higher than in the private sector, which can be explained by the collective 
definition of their employment status and a greater recognition of the role of trade unions by 
public sector employers.  
In recent years, industrial relations developments have been increasingly characterised by 
certain secular trends: the decline in membership of social partner organisations, 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, and less coordination and concentration.  Industrial 
relations in the public sector have been pushed into profound structural reforms aimed at 
greater cost efficiency, mostly under the pressure of fiscal consolidation objectives, but also 
as a result of the introduction of new technologies. Such reforms have led to cuts in public 
services, as well as outsourcing of public services to privately-run organisations, or 
privatisation of parts of the public sector, and have contributed to the transformation of 
industrial relations in the public sector. Most notably, there have also been trends in recent 
decades towards differentiation between groups of workers and decentralisation. However, 
these trends have moved at different speeds and magnitudes in different EU Member States 
and in the private and public sectors. The crisis of the past few years has served to accelerate 
some of the reforms already underway in the public sector, although the speed at which it has 
hit has had a severe impact on employment and significant implications for the future of 
public sector industrial relations. 
 
Chapter 2 - Industrial relations developments in the new member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 increased the diversity of industrial relations systems 
across the EU. In particular, the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe (the 
Central and Eastern European Countries, CEECs) increased the variation in structural and 
institutional characteristics of industrial relations in the EU. In comparison with the EU-15, 
the CEECs are characterised by weaker trade unions and a faster erosion of trade union 
density, a lack of established employers’ associations, no tradition of bipartite multi-employer 
collective bargaining, persistently lower bargaining coverage (partly due to an under-
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developed system of collective agreement extension), and finally strong formal tripartism that 
partly substitutes for under-developed sector-level collective bargaining systems.  
However, the role of tripartism and social pacts, and employee information and consultation 
at the workplace also vary among the CEECs, reflecting the different interests of governments 
in introducing stable bargaining structures as well as the extent of membership of all social 
partner organisations. While it is customary to refer to CEECs as having similar industrial 
relations systems, this chapter highlights the diversity of regimes and models. Some CEECs 
(Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) are best characterised by weakly-
established or -enforced tripartite institutions, fragmented bargaining (with the exception of 
Romania), and varying union density between the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and the 
Balkan (Bulgaria, Romania) countries. The Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia) all have strongly entrenched tripartism, institutions for collective 
bargaining and employee representation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia tend to have more 
of a tradition of social dialogue and a higher level of bargaining coordination than Poland and 
Hungary. Nevertheless, while Hungary and Poland are examples of countries with 
decentralised and fragmented bargaining coverage, Hungary is also characterised by its 
national-level concertation structure. Slovenia, which is the only corporatist CEEC, has gone 
furthest in institutionalising coordinated bargaining, employee representation, social pacts and 
bargaining coverage.  
While there is wide diversity between countries, industrial relations institutions (and actors) in 
CEECs remain weak and fragmented, and some developments in this respect are worrying, in 
particular as some reforms underway undermine the consensus which is needed for an 
effective involvement of social partners in the adaptations to change: in a number of these 
countries responses to the crisis are generating increasingly conflictual industrial relations. 
There is a need to revitalise national industrial relation systems and to support their actions in 
order to promote and restore consensus to ensure the long term sustainability of the economic 
and social reforms underway. 
The chapter explores the potential of the social partners in the CEECs to stabilise and 
innovate with regard to their industrial relations structures by responding to labour market 
developments after EU enlargement and the economic crisis. One of the main challenges of 
the post-enlargement period has been migration from the CEECs to the EU-15, which has led 
trade unions in some CEECs and sectors to negotiate improved working conditions in order to 
curb the migration flow. Further, after joining the EU, transnational companies provided 
incentives for Europeanising industrial relations across the CEECs, to the extent that they 
have set up European Works Councils (EWCs) and these are active. While evidence on the 
transposition of social standards to the CEECs through transnational companies and EWCs is 
still scattered, there are some positive examples of such companies increasing the capacities 
of employer organisations across the CEECs.  
The economic crisis has also provoked social partner responses at the national, sectoral and 
company level in these countries both in the public and private sectors. While a few of them 
have seen some negotiated responses to the crisis through social pacts and consolidation of 
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collective bargaining, in other countries and cases industrial relations became more 
conflictual and trade unions have opted for industrial action in order to press their claims after 
having been excluded from direct negotiations. These trends mirror those in the EU-15 
countries in the first phase of the crisis in 2008-2010, and indicate that there has been 
something of a delay in the responses in the CEECs by about one to one-and-a-half years. The 
chapter discusses how such action can help to reconfigure the role of social partnership and 
industrial relations institutions in the CEECs.  On the one hand, the chapter documents the 
potential for organised action in countries where trade unions are structurally weak and their 
membership base is declining. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that not all such 
action has brought substantive improvements for employees, victories for trade unions, and 
consolidation of bargaining institutions and social dialogue. A critical element is the capacity 
of social partners: both employer's organisations and trade unions need to improve both their 
administrative and organisational capacity. The extent to which the social partners have 
engaged in post-enlargement and post-crisis action, as well as the substantive outcomes of 
such action, is often contested or limited in time. The CEEC social partners need to further 
strengthen their structural position and develop additional capacity in order to produce 
sustainable results in consolidating social dialogue and national industrial relations systems 
towards a predominantly bipartite collective bargaining model. 
 
Chapter 3 - Public sector industrial relations in transition 
Industrial relations in the public sector are more uniform than in the private sector but differ 
between countries in terms of size and structure of public sector employment, employment 
status of public employees, trade union and employers’ organisations, wage setting systems, 
degree of centralisation/decentralisation of collective bargaining, industrial conflict and 
settlement of disputes. Even the notion of the public sector itself is evolving due to structural 
changes in the organisation and delivery of services of general interest.  
A central feature is whether the employment contract is determined by public law statute or 
employment law. This distinction is linked to the two traditional approaches to public sector 
employment relations, the ‘sovereign employer’ and the ‘model employer’. In the first case, 
civil servants enjoy special prerogatives, such as employment security, but have to comply 
with specific service obligations and may face some limitations on the right to bargain 
collectively, and also the right to strike. This is typical of countries with a Rechtsstaat 
tradition, and to a varying extent in some other countries, including those in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The second approach is typical of the common law framework of the UK, 
where no fundamental division between public and private sector employment legislation 
exists: collective bargaining is here the main method of determining conditions of 
employment, within a traditionally more ‘benign’ employer attitude towards trade unions than 
in the private sector. 
The structure of industrial relations in the public sector has very specific features, but there 
are many aspects which are comparable to the private sector. Public sector collective 
bargaining and wage setting systems have undergone two connected trends: decentralisation, 
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within or outside of a centrally co-ordinated framework; and partial substitution of automatic, 
seniority-based pay and career systems with performance-based systems, leading to 
differences in the careers and terms and conditions of public employees.   
Public sector employment relations still display a great diversity across the EU27, rooted in 
country-specific legal and institutional traditions despite some trends towards convergence, 
both between countries and between the public and private sector within each country.  
Five clusters of countries can be identified. First the Nordic countries, which are characterised 
by: a high proportion of public sector employment; a significant female presence; 
harmonisation between career civil servants and employees under ordinary contracts; very 
high trade union density; wide-ranging collective negotiations practices with forms of 
performance-related pay, within a decentralised, two-tier bargaining system with strong 
coordination mechanisms; and few restrictions to the right to strike, but special machinery for 
collective dispute resolution.  
The second group comprises Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, 
characterised by a Rechtsstaat tradition and a strong component of career civil servants, with 
severe restrictions of bargaining rights, and in some cases of the right to strike. In all countries 
the wage determination system is relatively centralised, the public sector employment share is 
high in some but low in others, the female employment share is high in all cases, and there are 
varying rates of part-time and temporary work.  
The third cluster comprises the southern European countries, with features such as the special 
employment status of a large share of public employees and no or limited scope for collective 
bargaining, although Italy has in recent years moved towards the Nordic cluster. Trade union 
density is high or medium-high and the public sector employment share is comparatively 
medium-low. The female and part-time employment shares are generally low, while the 
incidence of temporary workers varies. 
The final cluster is that of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The majority 
have a comparatively small public sector employment share, with a relatively high female 
presence. There is limited part-time and temporary working. Trade unions are generally weak, 
especially in central administration. The practice of collective bargaining is very limited; 
where bargaining exists, it often takes place only at the individual employer level. Bargaining 
coverage is consequently very low. Social dialogue institutions exist in some countries, but 
their role has been significantly reduced in recent years. There are also restrictions on the 
right to strike, especially in central administration.  Overall, this group is characterised by 
weakness of industrial relations institutions and practices, with Slovenia as the main 
exception.  
The UK is a case apart, due to several peculiarities: it has no special status for public 
employees, civil servants included. It has widely diffused bargaining practices, within a single 
level bargaining structure, flanked however by the pay review bodies system, and no special 
limitations on the right of association and the right to strike, with the exception of a few 
groups. Negotiations are decentralised in the civil service, although measures to reduce 
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fragmentation and pay dispersion have been adopted since the late 1990s. Trade union density 
is medium-high in comparative terms and almost four times higher than in the private sector.  
Within this diversity, the crisis has exercised some common pressures: a return to 
unilateralism on the part of governments and public employers to the detriment of forms of 
social dialogue, at times instrumental to the introduction or strengthening of private-sector-
style human resources management practices; a weakening of special prerogatives of public 
employees, where they existed; top-down determination of wages and a reduced role of trade 
unions, in terms of density rates and of capacity to influence government and public 
employers’ policies.  
 
Chapter 4 - The consequences of the crisis for public sector industrial relations 
The economic and financial crisis has put industrial relations in the public sector under strain. 
A stronger scrutiny on the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure has emerged; the 
role of key stakeholders such as public sector trade unions has been challenged and formally 
autonomous employers, with devolved authority, have been subject to tight financial and 
managerial control from the centre of government. It is indisputable that while initially the 
response to the first phase of the crisis involved mainly the private sector, governments have 
targeted the public sector as a key sector for adjustment, also to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of the burden of the adjustment and to promote sectoral reallocation in favour of 
tradable sectors.  
With fiscal consolidation in mind, governments have attempted to reduce expenditure by 
extensive recourse to wage freezes, wage cuts, reductions in employment and changes to 
pension arrangements. In addition working time has been reformed and work organisation 
patterns reviewed to enhance cost effectiveness.  By their very nature, these measures have 
not always been enacted with the full consensus of trade unions.  More generally, the process 
of adjustment has been very different from the strategies pursued by the private sector as 
described in Industrial Relations in Europe 2010. Even if some of the measures can be 
justified by the need of fiscal adjustment in some instances the climate of industrial relations 
has deteriorated. 
Although all Member States have been impacted by the crisis, the process and severity of 
adjustment has differed between countries. There is no straightforward North European versus 
Mediterranean country divide as is often assumed. A first cluster of countries, exemplified by 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, have the largest programmes of adjustment because they face a 
complex challenge of pursuing fiscal consolidation and enhancing the effectiveness of public 
services. Since there is a limited tradition of structural reform of the public sector in these 
countries, the impact of fiscal consolidation has been comparatively greater and social 
dialogue in the public sector more difficult. In a different political and economic context, 
austerity programmes in the Baltic states, but also in Hungary and Romania, exemplify this 
pattern of adjustment. In these cases, with the exception of Ireland, governments have not 
brought about agreed changes in public sector industrial relations by a process of social 
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dialogue. Instead, unilateral changes in pay and working conditions, usually on more than one 
occasion, have been imposed on the public sector workforce.  
A second cluster of countries have not been immune from fiscal consolidation pressures but 
the timing and form of  adjustment programmes has been more directly under the control of 
their own national governments. It has usually involved the adaptation or continuation of  
structural reforms that have sought to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of the public 
sector. Due to the severity of the economic and financial crisis, austerity measures still impact 
markedly on the public sector workforce, but there is less discontinuity with previous 
organisational and managerial reforms. These countries have made some use of economy 
measures but they are in more dilute forms – pay freezes rather than pay cuts and restrictions 
on hiring rather than immediate reductions in staffing. An important difference with the first 
group of countries is not the size of the public sector, but the legacy of modernisation. This 
cluster is exemplified by Germany and the Nordic countries but also France, The Netherlands 
and with some caveats the UK. These countries have not faced immediate fiscal crisis and 
market turbulence, but have continued longer-term reforms of public sector industrial 
relations. Social dialogue has often been strained but there have been more concerted efforts 
to consult and negotiate with the public sector workforce.  
The response to austerity indicates major shifts in longer term trends. The range of austerity 
measures deployed consolidates moves towards top-down unilateralism in public sector 
industrial relations.  This has consequences for both the employers and workers in this sector. 
On the employers' side the room for manoeuvre of public managers is being substantially 
reduced because public managers have fewer resources to invest but are under pressure to 
meet fiscal targets. This is encouraging strategies that reduce labour costs with fewer staff 
who are employed under less advantageous terms and conditions, raising questions about the 
extent to which the public sector remains a model employer. In addition, regulation of the 
employment relationship through collective bargaining is highly constrained because of the 
reduction in available resources, wage freezes and the suspension of normal bargaining 
mechanisms. A new centralised unilateralism is emerging, which resembles the traditional 
unilateral regulation of public sector industrial relations by central political authorities, with a 
new emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency, rather than impartiality and equity.  
For the trade unions, the public sector has not abandoned attempts to be a model employer but 
this principle has a far lower priority than in the past. Public sector trade unions have been put 
under pressure and with regard to most of the reforms underway their role has been 
weakened. The risk is that with lack of mutual understanding, reforms will only promote 
savings, leaving open the question of the quality of services and the capacity to deliver them. 
 
Chapter 5 - Greening the social dialogue 
A major commitment of the Europe 2020 strategy is to achieve the transition towards climate 
and environmental sustainability, especially in terms of energy sourcing. The aim is to 
achieve this goal by implementing a “policy-driven” pathway, to achieve lower greenhouse 
gas emissions, source more energy from renewables and reduce energy consumption. 
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Generating new jobs and transforming existing jobs into “green” and “greener” ones will 
require new skills and a change in attitudes. A key issue is the role that social partners could 
play in this respect, on their own initiative or at the invitation of the public authorities. Social 
partners’ involvement in this agenda has been gradually increasing, but the European picture 
is far from homogenous, with a broad spectrum of practice in terms of levels of engagement 
and mobilisation. Little is known about the potential impact of the process of greening on job 
quality, but a positive impact should not be taken for granted. Social actors believe that 
greening will first and foremost have the greatest impact on the skills and training dimension 
of job quality, while career and employment security, working and non-working time, health 
and safety and the social infrastructure will be less affected.  
Examples of social dialogue around these issues are predominantly found in sectors in which 
the social partners are already well represented. Little or no dialogue is found in newly-
emerging industries. In the electricity sector, and electricity generation from renewable energy 
sources, it is determined by the degree to which the energy source is ‘established’. Only in 
cases where electricity generation from renewable energy sources had already been carried 
out for a relatively long period of time within a country (for example hydro-electric energy 
generation) or where established energy providers increasingly source from renewables, is the 
subsector well-represented by the traditional actors in established companies. In the newly-
emerging industries (such as energy generation from biomass, wind and photovoltaic 
sources), companies are very heterogeneous. Many are very small entities in remote areas and 
are therefore outside the reach and interest of the social partners. On the employers’ side 
many business associations have formed with the intention of representing companies in the 
sector, but these associations have not yet developed into fully fledged social partner 
organisations with the right to bargain. On the trade union side, there are examples of active 
recruitment strategies in the newly emerging sectors in only a few countries, such as 
Germany, Portugal and the UK. In other countries, such as Malta and Cyprus, the renewable 
energy sector is still in its infancy and no attempts to create representation can be detected. 
While Europe’s commitment to the move to a low-carbon economy is clear, recent austerity-
led reductions in public subsidies, tax incentives, feed-in tariffs and other public support 
measures might slow down the process of greening. Data from the European Restructuring 
Monitor (ERM) show that as any young industry, green sectors are facing significant levels of 
turbulence. This mostly concerns companies in the solar and wind power generation industry, 
which have come under some pressure due to overcapacity and increased competition from 
China, compounded by the fact that some Member States have changed their support schemes 
for these industries. Yet at the same time, job growth in the green economy has been positive 
throughout the recession and is forecasted to remain quite strong. Cases of knowledge-
intensive job creation within the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors have been 
registered. 
Reinforcing and promoting social partners’ activities at all levels (European, national, 
sectoral, regional and company level) is crucial for the successful transition towards a low 
carbon economy. There are interesting social partner initiatives at different levels, in order to 
highlight what can be done. However, there remain major challenges. Providing vocational 
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training and retraining facilities at sectoral level, for example, is a promising approach and the 
availability of such measures ensures that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) also 
have access to these facilities. Inclusion of SMEs is crucial, bearing in mind that newly-
emerging subsectors are often fragmented. A further challenge will be to mainstream low 
carbon skills into all kinds of training, curricula and apprenticeships. Finally, organisational 
‘eco-innovations’ in participation might usefully be sought at company level. This approach 
could consist of involving employee or trade union representatives in green management 
structures with responsibility for environmentally-related training or energy audits or by 
including in collective agreements energy-efficiency targets and benefits for employees. At 
the European level, the European Social Fund is an important tool to support the transition of 
labour force towards greener skills and jobs. 
 
Chapter 6 - Social partner involvement in unemployment benefit and pensions systems 
in the EU 
There are wide differences between national systems of unemployment benefits and pensions, 
but common to all are issues surrounding the perceived advantages and disadvantages of 
social partner involvement in policy formulation. Nevertheless, the precise nature of this 
depends on issues such as the relationship between the social partners and policymakers, and 
the exact role that they play. The involvement of the social partners in social policy 
development sits at the interaction between industrial relations and social policy, as many 
outcomes of social policy, such as social charges, have a direct effect on net pay. This 
therefore binds the social partners more tightly into discussions on social policy and benefit 
reform. In the past, there was a trade-off between wage moderation and social rights (i.e. 
lower wage increases in exchange for improvements in social rights), but today’s international 
economic competition and limits on state welfare spending no longer permit such an 
exchange. A balanced view of the role of employers and unions is necessary in order to 
understand the ongoing challenges facing employers and unions, shifts in responsibility 
between state and non-state actors, and the repercussions of this for income inequality and 
social security. 
There are common trends and challenges for social partner involvement in and influence over 
unemployment benefit systems, such as trying to adapt to the labour market and economic 
developments of the past 20 years, and the reaction of the social partners to this. Most 
recently, the economic crisis has posed a huge challenge to unemployment benefit systems. 
Social partner involvement in pensions and pension reform is a policy area that, in the light of 
changing demographics, is deemed to be an extremely high priority for governments. There 
are clear advantages in encouraging the social partners to become involved in pension reform, 
linked to ensuring sustainable solutions to this key long-term policy issue. However, there are 
fears that the social partners may not be able to deliver the radical reforms that are needed in 
some cases. Certainly, the past few years have seen major opposition to pension reform plans 
on the part of trade unions in many EU Member States. In some cases, governments have 
taken on board social partner counter-proposals, but in others social partner influence has 
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been negligible. Second- and third-tier pension provision is a clear growth area, filling the gap 
left by declining state provision, and this represents an opportunity for the social partners to 
become much more active in the formulation and management of provision, particularly in the 
case of occupational pensions.  
Key challenges remain, however, not least the ongoing impact of the crisis. Governments 
have been under pressure to carry out cost-saving reforms in the context of austerity, within 
the context of a need to respond to demographic developments. Trade unions and sometimes 
employers’ organisations have in many cases been opposed to government plans, and have on 
occasion managed to influence policy, but the sheer speed of events and the need to push 
through reforms immediately has meant that the influence of the social partners sometimes 
has been limited.  
All of these developments represent significant challenges for the social partners. 
Governments are clearly under pressure to find solutions to, on the one hand the very acute 
challenges posed by the crisis, and on the other hand the longer-term challenges posed by 
demographic and economic shifts. Seeking consensus with stakeholders such as the social 
partners is one way of achieving this. Nevertheless, the social partners will need to develop 
strategies to ensure that they remain at the negotiating table when governments are 
formulating rapid responses to the crisis. The development of second- and third-pillar pension 
provision represents a real opportunity for the social partners to become major stakeholders in 
reform. However, they need to carve out a longer-term strategy in response to this, in order to 
ensure their position as players in the development of this kind of provision, rather than 
relying simply on state regulation.  
 
Chapter 7 - European social dialogue developments 2010 – 2012 
The social dialogue structures at the European level remain an important forum for 
discussions and negotiations between the social partners at cross-industry as well as sectoral 
social level across the EU. During the past two years the representatives of management and 
labour have agreed on more than 70 joint texts, conducted numerous projects and started to 
cooperate in new economic sectors. Overall, 2012 saw a significant number of agreements 
signed by the social partners. Two of these, establishing minimum standards in inland 
waterways transport, and hairdressing, were requested by the social partners to be 
implemented through EU legislation under article 155.2 of the TFEU, and the same request is 
expected from the social partners of the sea fisheries sector once their agreement is finalised. 
These requests, particularly concerning the agreement in the hairdressing sector, became the 
subject of some media attention and political debate in 2012. For its part the Commission is 
assessing both agreements impartially and has not taken a decision on whether or not to 
propose their legislative implementation. By contrast, a new agreement in the professional 
football sector will be implemented autonomously by the social partners according to the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States. 
Furthermore, the cross-industry social partners have been conducting negotiations on the 
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revision of the Working Time Directive since December 2011; however these negotiations 
ended at the end of 2012 without an agreement.  
The employment and social effects of the financial and economic crisis remained a priority 
for the cross-industry social partners as well as for many sectoral social dialogue committees. 
In particular, the effects of the restructuring of the public sector triggered by the severe debt 
crisis were addressed by several committees representing public sector employers and 
employees. In late 2012, the social partners in the central government administrations sector 
adopted a framework of action on quality services, in which they commit themselves to 
implementing the core values of general interest services in order to enhance the 
development, visibility and adaptability of public services in a context of crisis. Also in 2012, 
the social partners of local and regional government adopted a series of recommendations that 
form a framework for action to contribute to a social and sustainable Europe at the local and 
regional level that supports the public sector as an employer. The overarching objective is to 
better prepare employees and local and regional governments in their role as employers for 
changing workplace scenarios. The social partners from central government administrations 
and from local and regional governments also adopted joint opinions on the impact of the 
economic crisis. The representatives of the education, hospitals and healthcare sectors worked 
on the broader restructuring processes. 
The social partners from the energy sector actively responded to the European Commission's 
climate change mitigation policies. The social dimension of the Energy 2050 Roadmap and a 
smooth and just transition towards a more "green" and sustainable energy sector were the key 
issues. The energy sector is expected to undergo a sweeping transformation in the coming 
years and the sectoral social partners have highlighted the importance of the social dialogue 
and consultations in these turbulent times. 
Apart from challenges resulting from the crisis and the "greening" of the economy, other 
issues have played a significant role in the work of social dialogue committees. In addition to 
own initiatives of social partners, the Commission consultations and social partners' 
involvement in impact assessments act as triggers for the work of the social dialogue 
committees.  Health and safety remained an important policy area for many committees and 
the past two years have seen several new initiatives in this field, including projects, common 
statements, joint declarations and exchanges of information in sectors ranging from 
agriculture through construction to public services. The related theme of working conditions 
was discussed by the social partners in the private security, civil aviation and road transport 
sectors. The social partners also continued their work on capacity-building, especially among 
the New Member States. Capacity-building measures, usually in the form of different projects 
and training sessions were organised among others in the construction, agriculture, banking 
and insurance sectors. 
Employment policies, vocational education and skills were the subjects addressed both in 
cross-industry and sectoral social dialogue committees. A joint study on flexicurity, which 
was conducted by the cross-industry social partners, proved that if implemented in the right 
way, flexicurity can constitute a win-win solution satisfying both trade unions and employers. 
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Nevertheless, the study indicated many challenges associated with flexicurity and brought 
worrying results from several Member States. 
Gender equality remained an important topic for the social partners. There is a need to further 
strengthen commitments and actions to advance gender equality through social dialogue and 
tripartism. Projects on the employment of women in the urban public transport sector and on 
women in rail transport were conducted in order to gather data, highlight good practices and 
formulate recommendations. In the audio-visual sector, a framework of actions was adopted 
to address issues such as equal pay or the reconciliation of work and personal life. Equal pay 
between women and men was also the main focus of a common statement agreed by the 
social partners in the central government administration sector. It is however necessary to 
broaden the coverage of sectors, and to encourage the European social partners to keep gender 
equality high in the agenda as a horizontal priority and implement specific actions not only in the 
gender pay gap area but also in the other priorities previously included in the Framework of 
Actions. In particular, steps to reduce gender segregation, to improve work-life balance in sectors 
mostly male-dominated and also to tackle gender pay gap in sectors mostly female-dominated are 
needed. 
In addition, the social partners from different sectors decided to jointly address some 
problems of supra-sectoral importance. As a result of these initiatives, common guidelines 
were signed by the European social partners in the hospitals, regional and local government, 
education, commerce and private security services sectors in order to tackle third-party 
violence and harassment at work. Similarly, the social partners from the cleaning, catering 
and textile industries joined the initiative of the social dialogue committee for private security 
to adopt a joint opinion on the social obligations of tenderers. 
The number of social dialogue committees continued to increase.  The 41
st
 sectoral social 
dialogue committee was established in 2012, in the food and drink industry. With this 
development, European sectoral social dialogue committees now exist for virtually all 
industrial sectors. The social partners from the graphics, ports, sports and active leisure 
sectors are also working on setting up social dialogue committees in the near future. 
 
Chapter 8 - Review of European labour legislation 2010 – 2012 
In the framework of the overall Europe 2020 strategy and specifically the “Agenda for new 
skills and jobs”, EU legislative initiatives launched in 2010-2012 aimed to improve the 
functioning of the labour market and improve job quality against the background of record 
high unemployment, deteriorating working conditions during the crisis, but also mixed results 
on job quality in Europe over the past decade. In this context the Commission focused firstly 
on a review of EU legislation and the promotion of ‘soft’ instruments as parts of a ‘smarter’ 
EU legal framework for employment and, secondly, a review of European strategy on health 
and safety at work. At European level, social partners were very active and successful in 
concluding several European agreements (see chapter 7 for details). This chapter also looks at 
the interpretation of the provisions of EU Directives, giving examples of multiple judgements 
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of the European Court of Justice in the field of labour law implementation, as well as health 
and safety at work.  
Major cross-sector developments in EU labour law include the Commission’s legislative 
proposal on improving the enforcement of the Posting of Workers Directive and the ongoing 
revision of the Working Time Directive. As regards the latter, the main cross-sector social 
partners at the EU level had been conducting negotiations on the review, which finished 
without an agreement at the end of 2012. The sectoral agreements concluded between sectoral 
social partners, in the inland waterway transport and the hairdressing sector, are currently 
being assessed by the Commission services with a view to their possible submission to the 
Council for adoption (see chapter 7 for details).  Directive 2009/13/EC, which implements the 
social partners’ agreement on the Maritime Labour Convention (ILO, 2006), will enter into 
force on 20 August 2013, i.e. simultaneously with the entry into force of the above 
Convention. Following the second stage consultation of the social partners on the review of 
the exclusion of seafaring workers from the personal scope of application of a number of EU 
labour law Directives, the Commission is currently finalising its impact assessment and 
considering a proposal regarding follow-up initiatives in this area. The temporary agency 
work directive and the recast directive on European Works Council were both implemented in 
Member States.   
In line with ‘smart’ regulation principles, the Commission assessed the operation and effects 
of several Directives in order to evaluate whether they are fit for purpose, or alternatively 
whether they need to be clarified or updated. In the labour law domain, a first fitness check is 
currently being carried out in the area of information and consultation of workers at work. Six 
different reviews of the implementation of Directives have been carried out over the past two 
years.  
The 2011 Commission staff working document on the mid-term review of the EU strategy in 
the area of health and safety reported that over 5,500 workers in the EU die every year 
because of work-related accidents, demonstrating that action in this area remains of high 
importance. The current 2007-2012 European strategy on health and safety at work is being 
evaluated, and the findings are to influence setting of the strategic priorities for the period 
2013-2020. This is the first time ex-post evaluation covers a whole area of social policy.  
Finally, the Commission is pursuing its work on adapting current legislation to emerging or 
specific risks (e.g. electromagnetic fields, tobacco smoke at the work place, musculo-skeletal 
disorders) and took part in development of ‘soft’ policy instruments such as guidelines on 
exposure to asbestos or best practices in agriculture. 
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Chapter 1: Overview of European, national and public sector 
industrial relations 
 
Industrial relations in Europe are characterised by two main trends.  A continuation of 
long-term secular developments, combined with significant changes in industrial relations 
practices and institutions in some Member States.  Industrial relations in the public sector 
differ significantly from private sector industrial relations, due to factors such as the types 
of actors and collective bargaining practices. Nevertheless, some recent trends and most 
recently the impact of the crisis are playing a part in blurring this distinction to some 
extent.  
Based on a draft by Barbara Bechter and Bernd Brandl (University of York) 
 
1.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of recent developments in industrial relations in the EU.  
The period since the last Industrial Relations in Europe (2010) has been marked by a 
continuation of the crisis and its extension to the public sector as Member State governments 
have been increasingly obliged to undertake fiscal consolidation measures.   
In the European Union, taken as a whole and compared to other world regions, the collective 
relationship between workers, employers and their respective representatives is based on 
representative actors, institutionalised processes and established practices.
1
 However, the 
picture is not uniform across all EU Member States or across sectors and has changed over 
time.  Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 highlighted a high degree of variation of industrial 
relations systems among the EU Member States. The main reason for this is that industrial 
relations are deeply embedded in national economic, political and societal environments. This 
also explains why differences among countries persist even though there are common trends 
in terms of the transformation of national industrial relations systems. 
This chapter reports on the current state of industrial relations in the EU, and then looks at the 
impact on industrial relations in the public sector, which has become the main focus of the on-
going changes in industrial relations practices and institutions in many Member States. (For 
data sources, see Box 1.1) 
 
Box 1.1: Data sources 
 
The source of data at a national level used for this chapter is the ICTWSS – Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts – database, 
which contains data on some 90 variables from 1960 to 2010 in 34 countries. The database 
was developed by Jelle Visser and can be consulted at the website of the Amsterdam Istitute 
for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS (http://www.uva-aias.net/). Integrated in the database is 
information from national surveys, the European Social Survey 
(http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org), administrative data obtained from the unions and 
                                                          
1
 See Industrial Relations in Europe 2008, chapter 1. 
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from the European IndustrialRelations Observatory (EIRO) of the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Livingand Working Conditions, in particular the EIRO country profiles 
(http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/), the OECD's Labour Force Statistics and other 
sources. In addition to the ICTWSS, the ILC –Internationalization, Labor Relations and 
Competitiveness - database, developed by Franz Traxler and maintained and updated by 
Bernd Brandl is used (Brandl and Traxler, 2012). 
Data for industrial relations in the public sector is based to a large extent on data collection 
from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) and in particular its 
representativeness studies and national country profiles. Another EIRO source was the report 
on Industrial Relations in the Public sector (Bordogna, 2007). 
Data on the structure of collective bargaining in the public sector was derived from the report 
for the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) by the Labour Research 
Department in 2008 (http://www.epsu.org/a/4443), the European Public Administration 
Network (EUPAN) survey (Bossaert and Kaeding, 2009) and the report on Institutional 
Representativeness of Trade Unions and Employers’ Organisations in the Central and Public 
Services (Mormont, 2004). 
 
1.2 Industrial relations indicators 
The principle of voluntary collective bargaining is a cornerstone of the governance of labour 
in the EU. Even though the organisation, structure and relevance of collective bargaining 
varies widely across the EU Member States, the principle of free, independent and voluntary 
collective bargaining is a key element of industrial relations in each country. 
 
Chart 1.1: Bargaining coverage rates, 1997/99 and 2007/09     
 
              
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2011. 
The coverage remains the same as in the 2010 report because of lack of new data         
 
Collective bargaining coverage 
The importance of collective bargaining is indicated by collective bargaining coverage, as this 
indicates the number of employees that are covered by collective agreements. Operationally, 
collective bargaining is defined as the number of employees covered by a collective 
agreement as a proportion of all employees. As highlighted in the Industrial Relations Report 
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2010, collective bargaining coverage varies considerably across the EU Member States over 
all sectors. 
Bargaining coverage remained stable for the EU as a whole during the decade preceding the 
crisis. The indicator dropped from about 68% at the end of the 1990s to approximately 66% in 
the years 2007-2009. How far this is due to the impact of the crisis cannot yet be confirmed 
due to lack of recent data. However, the relative stability of bargaining coverage at EU level 
masks significant changes in some Member States. In Portugal but also in Ireland, Cyprus or 
Bulgaria bargaining coverage fell substantially.  There are also marked differences between 
the EU-15 and CEE countries. The new Member States, with the exception of Slovenia and 
Romania, have a bargaining coverage below the EU average. Slovenia is the only CEEC 
among the 10 Member States where at least 80% of employees are covered by collective 
bargaining. 
Bargaining coverage is determined by several factors, among which the density of employers' 
organisations plays the most significant role
2
. While trade union density is important at 
sectoral level, the effective implementation of collective agreements will be determined 
principally by the number of employers who recognise the agreements.  Chart 1.2 shows the 
association between bargaining coverage and the density of trade unions and employers' 
organisations in the EU. While trade union density is also associated with the degree of 
bargaining coverage, the link is much weaker. As can be seen from the chart, in all countries 
with the exception of Malta and Cyprus trade union density is lower than bargaining 
coverage. In some countries, particularly in France, Spain and the Netherlands, these 
differences are striking. In these countries, bargaining coverage exceeds not only trade union 
density, but also the density of employers' organisations. This is due to the extension of 
collective agreements, either voluntarily or provided by legal regulations. 
 
Chart 1.2: Bargaining coverage, union and employer density, 2007/09 
     
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2011. 
 
Some 2008 data was revised. Newer data for 2009 on employer density and showing significant 
changes in relation to 2008 is available only for Slovenia, where density decreased from 70% to 55%. 
For the other countries, data is either unavailable or show no differences (AT, BE, CZ) or marginal 
differences (EE, SE) and was therefore not used. Bargaining coverage remains the same as in the 2010 
report because of lack of new data. 
                                                          
2
 See Industrial Relations in Europe 2008 and 2010  
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Trade Unions 
Trade unions are present and active in all the EU Member States unions at different levels 
(e.g. sectoral/cross-sectoral, regional/national, European).  
Trade union membership and density has been on a downward secular trend since the 1980s, 
which is one of the main factors determining the ability of trade unions to take part in 
collective bargaining and to negotiate with employers from a position of power and authority. 
 
Chart 1.3: Union density, membership and non-membership, EU-27, 2000-2008 
 
      
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2011. 
Figures are the same as in the 2010 report because of lack of new data 
 
Chart 1.4: Union density by country, 2000 and 2009 
       
            
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2011 
 
Note: the averages for the EU-27, EU-15 and 12 new Member States are weighted. SE, CY, SI, RO, 
EL, SK, HU, LV, FR: 2008 
 
Trade union density fell in the EU-27 countries from about 28% in 2000 to 23% in 2008. The 
drop in density was particularly severe in the CEECs – from 29% to 20% in the relatively 
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short period of eight years. In Estonia and Lithuania the indicator dropped to single-digit 
figures and in Poland the density rate decreased from 24% to 16%. The development in the 
EU-15 countries was less marked, but the general trend remained the same – a general fall in 
membership numbers and density rates. Only one country did not follow this pattern – in 
Belgium trade union density rate increased slightly from 2000 to 2008. Interestingly, it also 
continued growing in 2009. 
It is not possible at this current stage to fully examine the impact of the crisis on trade union 
membership and density rates. The data for 2009 and 2010 is available only for a limited 
number of countries and it presents a mixed picture. The density rate increased in countries 
such as Sweden, Finland or Italy during the two crisis years, while the opposite trend was 
visible in Portugal, Austria and Germany. In Ireland too, there is some evidence of a 
stabilisation in the trade union density rate, although much of this can probably be attributed 
to the massive fall in employment, particularly in traditionally unionised sectors such as 
construction (i.e. a fall in the denominator). 
There is wide diversity in union density rates across the European Union. In all three Nordic 
countries, despite the fall during the past decade, the trade union density rate remains well 
above 60%. Meanwhile, in some Baltic States and France the indicator is below 10%. Even 
though the density rate provides important information about the strength of unions, it can be 
misleading to overestimate this indicator. France and Spain are good examples of countries 
where trade unions play an important role despite very low density rates. 
Employers' Organisations 
Employers' associations play the same role as trade unions in the collective bargaining 
process: they represent their members, and in some cases can enter into agreements with 
representatives of workers.  As noted in earlier Industrial Relations in Europe reports, the 
nature of employers' associations is changing in line with the increasing trend towards more 
decentralised bargaining and away from sectoral or national bargaining.  In this context, they 
are focussing increasingly on lobbying and industry representation rather than industrial 
relations.  
It is less easy to measure the organisation rate of employers than the density of trade unions, 
due to lack of data, difficulties of definition and firms that join two or more organisations.  
Unfortunately there is no recent data on this indicator. 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 provided information on the changes in the organisation 
rate of employers' organisations between 2002 and 2008. The rate for the EU-15 remained 
stable during these years and substantially higher than in the EU-12.  At that time, 
approximately 106 million employees, or 58% of the EU total, worked in firms affiliated to 
employers' organisations.  This was more than double the rate of unionisation, highlighting 
the differences between the two types of organisations in maintaining existing membership, 
which tends to be somewhat easier for employers' organisations (even leaving aside the issue 
of countries where membership of employers' organisations is, to all intents and purposes, 
compulsory). 
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Chart 1.5: Organisation rate of employers’ organisations, 2002 and 2008 
      
 
 
          
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2011. 
 
Some 2008 data was revised. Newer data for 2009 on employer density and showing significant 
changes in relation to 2008 is available only for Slovenia, where density decreased from 70% to 
55%. For the other countries, data is either unavailable or show no differences (AT, BE, CZ) or 
marginal differences (EE, SE) and was therefore not used.         
 
   
 
Decentralisation and organisation of collective bargaining 
Decentralisation of the level of collective bargaining has been one of the main trends in 
collective bargaining over the last 20-30 years, as the focus for negotiations on wages and 
working conditions has moved away from the national and sectoral level to the company 
level. As noted in IRE 2010, this tends to lead to more multi-level bargaining in the place of 
single-level bargaining, and has implications for the collective organisations outside the firm, 
namely, trade unions and employers' organisations. 
The most recent data indicates that the trend to decentralise collective bargaining continued 
and accelerated during the economic crisis both among the EU-15 and EU-12 countries.  
Bargaining centralisation was lower in 2010 compared with the average for 2007-2009 in ten 
Member States. The most significant changes occurred in Ireland and Slovenia, where 
centralisation dropped substantially.  In four other countries, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and 
Denmark, the centralisation of collective bargaining increased slightly during the same period. 
Interestingly, the centralisation index for these countries was above the EU average even 
before these recent increases.  Bargaining centralisation in the European Union remains very 
diverse with eight member states in which bargaining at local and company levels completely 
predominates - the UK, Ireland and six new Member States. In the majority of countries, 
however, bargaining still takes place primarily at the sectoral or industry level, often with 
additional local or company bargaining. In 2010 Belgium was the only Member State where 
cross-sectoral bargaining prevails. 
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Chart 1.6: Bargaining centralisation, 2000s        
  
   
          
 
 
 
         
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2011 
         
 
   
Bargaining centralisation indicator is scored on a five-point scale: 5 = national (cross-sectoral) 
bargaining; 4 = national (cross-sectoral) bargaining with derogation and additional sector or 
company bargaining; 3 = sector- or industry-level bargaining; 2 = sector- or industry-level, with 
additional local or company bargaining; and 1 = local or company bargaining. 
 
       
 
   
N.B. 1997-1999 averages are weighted by 2000 data for Wage and Salary Earners in Employment.  
2007-2009 and 2010 averages are weighted by 2009 data for Wage and Salary Earners in 
Employment.  
 
       
 
Box 1.2: Collectively agreed wages in Europe (CAWIE)* – statistical and political 
challenges 
Collective bargaining plays a key role in the determination of wages and wage developments 
in Europe. On average about two-thirds of all employees in the European Union are directly 
covered by a collective agreement. Within the Eurozone average collective bargaining 
coverage is even higher, reaching 80% or above. 
The statistical challenge 
Considering the importance of collective bargaining for wage-setting in Europe, it is 
noteworthy that there is no official European-wide database or statistics on collectively agreed 
wages. The only exception is the indicator of negotiated wages which is calculated by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) as an aggregate figure for the whole Euro area. However, since 
the ECB does not publish the underlying national data, this indicator provides no scope for a 
European-wide comparative analysis. The indicator is considered by the ECB itself as 
‘experimental data’: statistics that are not yet developed in terms of coverage, rely on different 
sources, and are not based on Euro area-wide harmonised definitions. 
The CAWIE project aims to improve knowledge on the development of collectively-agreed 
wages in Europe. It is based on the available national indicators on collectively agreed wages 
for ten European countries (AT, BE, FIN, FR, DE, IT, NL, PT, ES and UK). There are 
significant differences but also similarities in the statistical definition of collectively-agreed 
wages, the methods of calculation and the coverage of the data. However, there is a 
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predominance in the use of index-based indicators, similar to the methodological approach for 
consumer price indices.  
The political challenge 
In response to the challenge of the financial and economic crisis, European economic 
governance has significantly gained importance through a series of new EU policies. As 
emphasised in the Euro Plus Pact, wages and collective bargaining systems are seen as one of 
the main instruments for the European coordination of economic policy. A better knowledge 
of collectively-agreed wages is therefore highly relevant to understanding to what extent 
overall wage developments in Europe are the result of negotiations and directly influenced by 
social partners’ organisations. 
According to the ECB data, during the 2000s the overall development of collectively-agreed 
wages in the Euro area was relatively stable with only moderate increases. While nominal 
growth rates varied between 2.1 and 2.7 per cent, there was only a minimal increase in real 
wages. By the end of the decade, however, this changed: 2008 saw a relatively high increase 
in nominal but a freeze in real wages followed by a relatively high increase in real wages in 
2009. Since 2010 nominal wage growth was again rather moderate, leading to a significant 
decrease in real wages in 2011 and 2012. To sum up, in the Euro area as a whole, 
developments in collectively-agreed wages have been unproblematic both for competitiveness 
and for price stability. On the contrary, minimal increases in real wages have contributed to a 
rather weak development of consumer demand. 
 
Chart 1.7: ECB indicator of negotiated wages for the Euro area, 2000-2012 (annual 
percentage change) 
 
Source: ECB, calculations by WSI 
Note: real wages are adjusted by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HCPI) 
Behind this rather stable picture for the overall Euro area, national wage developments show 
some significant differences. In the period 2001-2010 the increase in nominal collectively-
agreed wages varied between 23 per cent in Germany and 41 per cent in Spain. These 
differences were much less pronounced if compared in real terms ( with a difference of only 
10 percentage points). With the exception of Finland and Italy, real wage developments were  
below productivity growth, leading to a further decline of the wage share and a re-distribution 
from labour to capital. 
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A core aim of the CAWIE project has also been the analysis of ‘wage drift’, which is the 
difference between the average development of collectively-agreed and actual wages. Wage 
drift can be seen as an indicator that identifies additional factors that influence wage dynamics 
in Europe. Among them are compositional factors, such as upskilling or growth of the service 
sector, cyclical factors such as company bonus payments and changes in working time, as 
well as industrial relations factors such as the coverage and level of collective bargaining and 
the possibility of derogating from national or sectoral standards at company level. 
A comparison of the development of collectively-agreed wages and compensation per 
employee as measured by national accounts shows that during the 2000s in most countries 
there was a more or less pronounced ‘positive’ wage drift, which means that average increase 
of actual wages was above that which was concluded in collective agreements. The two 
exceptions were Austria and Germany where wage drift was ‘negative’. 
 
Chart 1.8: Nominal collectively agreed wages and nominal compensation per employee, 
2010 (2000=100) 
 
Source: TURI-database  on Collectively Agreed Wages; AMECO database 
In none of the countries considered by the CAWIE project is there any evidence that wage 
developments determined by collective agreements have been ‘too expensive’ and have 
created problems of competitiveness. The remarkably low wage development in Germany is 
nevertheless significant. It is to a large extent the result of a strong negative wage drift, which 
indicates a partial erosion of the German collective bargaining system. However, there is a 
limit to the extent to which this can serve as a ‘model’ to overcome the economic crisis for all 
EU countries, as not all European countries can become surplus countries at the same time. 
Instead of promoting a “race to the bottom scenario” in European wage developments, the 
COWIE project concludes that it might be economically more reasonable to strengthen 
collective bargaining institutions in order to promote adequate wage increases for a more 
balanced and sustainable economic development. 
Based on a draft by Guy van Gyes (HIVA-KU Leuven) and Thorsten Schulten (WSI 
Düsseldorf) 
*The CAWIE project is carried out by ten research institutes and has been funded by the 
European Commission call for proposals on social dialogue and industrial relations. For more 
information see: http://hiva.kuleuven.be/nl/extra/CAWIE.php 
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1.3 Industrial relations in the public sector 
Among the different sectors in each economy the public sector stands out not only because in 
almost all EU Member States special industrial relations regulations exist in this sector, but 
also due to its key role for the functioning of the economy and society. Against a background 
of the public sector per se and public sector industrial relations in particular being 
characterised by specificities, not only across countries but also across different parts of the 
public sector, this chapter develops a comparison along these two dimensions. This chapter 
will therefore present a comparative overview of public sector industrial relations across 
sectors and EU-27 countries. 
From an empirical perspective, this chapter draws mostly on cross-sectional data (across 
countries and sectors) which refer to the end of 2000s. This is the period during which the 
public sector in most of the EU-27 countries experienced sustained cost-efficiency pressures, 
resulting in the number of public administration employees (civil servants) being reduced 
and/or replaced by more flexible private law employment relationships. As in all 
industrialised countries in the world (OECD, 2011a, 2011b), in addition to this, varying forms 
of the “new public management” (NPM) concept have been introduced in many Member 
States, which aim to transform public sector employment relationships into employment 
relationships that are more akin to those in the private sector (Adam, 2011; Bach and 
Bordogna 2011). This chapter therefore also examines whether public sector industrial 
relations are now displaying similarities to industrial relations in the private sector. Overall, 
this chapter attempts to set the scene for the entire report, focusing on recent developments in 
public sector industrial relations and a discussion of the main trends and issues, which will be 
explored in more detail later in the report.  
1.3.1 Definition and size of the public sector 
The definition of the public sector and public sector employment depends on the point of view 
of analysis. From an industrial relations perspective, the ideal criterion for classification is 
probably the type or ‘nature’ of the employment relationship, assuming that public sector 
employees are subject to distinctive employment regulation. However, while this was once 
quite a common feature for the employees of many government functions, at least in 
continental European countries with a legalistic Rechtsstaat tradition, it is ever less so. The 
relative weight of the proportion of public employees with a special employment statute, 
although this has certainly not disappeared, has shrunk in many countries, and the special 
prerogatives traditionally attached to this status have been weakened in many ways (see also 
OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, “Public Sector”; also OECD 1997). In addition, and 
decisively, comparative data based on this criterion are available for a few individual 
countries, but not on a wider scale. 
A second possibility, used by the OECD Public Sector Pay Trends, would be to define the 
scope of the public sector on the basis of the employer’s identity, that is on the criterion of 
“who pays?”. While this is a better solution for the analysis of wage bill trends, it has 
weaknesses from the point of view of the comparison of public sector employment. It would 
exclude, for instance, the employees of the UK National Health Service Trusts, which have 
changed their status and operate with independent financing arrangements (OECD, Glossary 
of Statistical Terms, “Public Sector”). On the other hand, definitions and classifications of the 
public sector based on the functions of government (COFOG), such as that used in the OECD 
Government at a Glance (2009 and 2011, Annex B), or based on economic activities, such as 
that used in the Labour Force Survey provided by Eurostat, are not entirely suitable for the 
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purposes of the present analysis. These definitions and classifications are unable to draw a 
clear demarcation between private and public sector organisations and employees, and are 
therefore too wide and inclusive. These drawbacks are especially relevant with regard to 
services related to education, health and social work activities, which in most countries are 
provided not only by public organisations, but to a significant extent also by private sector 
for- and non-profit organisations, with personnel on ordinary employment contracts. This 
prevents a precise identification of the boundaries of the public sector, and consequently of 
the size of public sector employment and its variation over time. Nonetheless, these are the 
only data that allow systematic comparisons between countries and sectors. Therefore, it is on 
these Eurostat NACE Rev.2 data that our analysis on public sector employment size and 
structure is based, unless differently specified. For a discussion of definitions, see box 1.3.  
Box 1.3: Statistical classifications for the public sector 
The statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community 
(NACE) represents the basic reference for all analysis of the economic structure in the 
EU. However, NACE is organised along activity rather than ownership lines and 
therefore it is not possible to distinguish between the private and the public sector when 
looking at the different statistical data which are classified according to the NACE 
taxonomy, such as employment levels. In the case of NACE Rev.2, the present version 
of the classification system, which has been used since 2008, the core of the public 
sector is to be found in section O (Public administration, defence; compulsory social 
security), since most of these activities are performed directly by public employers and 
public employees – although not exclusively.  
Other important activities for the public sector – which are usually also quite relevant in 
terms of employment – are sections P (Education) and Q (Human Health and Social 
Work), since the public sector typically directly provides an important share of overall 
education and health services. However, private organisations are widely present in 
these activities, with a relative importance which depends on both national traditions as 
well as on the national regulatory framework. This framework may in some cases 
distinguish between the formal responsibility and possibly the funding of certain 
services and the legal form as well as the substantive nature of the provider of the 
service, so that it is not rare to find private organisations which operate within the 
public education and health systems according to ‘accreditation’ rules, for instance. This 
latter possibility points to a second very important issue when looking at statistical data 
on the public sector: their cross-country comparability. Not only should data and 
indicators be regarded in general as ‘proxies’ of the public sector size, because the 
classification is built around activities, but also, in the various national settings, the 
relative importance in each NACE section of public and private organisations and 
employment is different. 
1.3.2 The changing structure, role and functions of the public sector and of public 
services 
The public sector is of special relevance for the functioning of any economy and society and 
for many decades after World War II the public sector was the main provider of fundamental 
and vital economic and societal services such as education, public transport, 
telecommunications, healthcare, postal services. During the past decades the public sector has 
been faced with major challenges such as budget constraints and the need to cut public 
services, which have led to profound structural reforms of the sector. These reforms are well 
documented for the EU (e.g. Ferner, 1995; Schulten, Brandt and Hermann, 2008, Vaughan-
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Whitehead, 2012) and have led both to changes for public sector employees, such as wage 
cuts, changes in human management practices, and adjustments of operations to facilitate 
economies of scale, and quantitative adjustments of the sector, such as employment cuts and 
outsourcing of services to private sectors.  
Privatisation and outsourcing 
One major trend in all EU Member States has been the continuing privatisation of public 
services and the transfer of public service provision to the private sector via selling public (i.e. 
state-owned) companies completely or partially to private owners. Usually, this has been 
achieved by transforming public sector organisations or companies into joint-stock 
companies. Before privatisation, many of these public sector organisations held a monopoly 
for their (sub-) sector or market respectively. Simultaneously with privatisation, a 
liberalisation of the sector (or market) was carried out so that the new private companies were 
able to enter the previously protected market. In some cases, (sub-) sectors or markets have 
also been opened up to private service providers even though the previous public provider 
firm has remained under state ownership. Most notably, services in electricity, public 
transport, postal services and hospitals have been privatised and outsourced by the state.
3
 
In terms of the consequences for industrial relations, the liberalisation of (sub-) sectors and 
the emergence of new companies has frequently led to a two-tier system of industrial 
relations, with relatively centralised structures in the former public organisation but 
decentralised and fragmented structures in the new companies. As a consequence, collective 
bargaining coverage is substantially higher in the former public organisations compared with 
the new companies (Schulten, Brandt and Hermann, 2008). The reason for the prevailing 
structure in the previously public and in the companies that remain in state ownership was that 
many employees still enjoy public sector employment conditions and contracts regulated by 
public law, and public sector trade union structures remain. However, the presence of two 
different types of companies with different types of industrial relations in one sector has 
blurred industrial relations and undermined sector-wide regulation and coordinated bargaining 
(Doellgast and Greer, 2007). 
In the hospital sector, for example, these changes in industrial relations due to privatisation 
are well documented. As was shown by Hermann and Flecker, (2009), one main characteristic 
after privatisation has been that union density has remained relatively high in public hospitals 
but is low in new companies, where unions often do not have the power to push for collective 
agreements. Employees in the new companies do not enjoy the same employment security 
and often receive lower salaries than workers in the older companies. For example, in Austria 
wages in private hospitals are approximately 20 % below those wages paid in public hospitals. 
On the other hand, in some countries, such as Sweden, trade unions have negotiated via 
collective bargaining similar standards for private and public hospitals. 
In parallel with outsourcing of whole sectors via liberalisation and privatisation, outsourcing 
of certain internal services for the public sector has become increasingly widespread in the 
past decades. Services for the operation of public services such as cleaning, IT and catering, 
which were previously performed internally by public sector organisations, have been 
increasingly bought in from private companies. As a consequence, public sector employees 
                                                          
3
 Whether or not former public (sub-)sectors and now privatised and liberalised (sub-)sectors are categorised as 
part of the public sector is a question of definition. See box 1.3 for the problems of defining the public sector. 
In the following part of this chapter, privatised sectors and (previously) state owned companies are not 
considered as part of the public sector.  
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have been substituted by contracting private sector employees. Outsourcing and privatisation 
mean that a growing division between “old” and “new” employees and between a core and 
peripheral workforce has emerged (Brandt and Schulten, 2007) which has caused frictions and 
conflicts among these different groups of employees. This has also provoked protests against 
the processes of privatisation, liberalisation and outsourcing.  
Conflict and strike action 
All these developments in the public sector have led both to changes for public sector 
employees, such as wage cuts, changes in HRM practices, and adjustments of operations to 
facilitate economies of scale, and to quantitative adjustments of the sector, such as 
employment cuts and outsourcing of services to private sectors. As a consequence this has 
provoked many protests and strikes. For an overview of strike action in the public sector from 
2008 to 2012, see chapter 4 of this report.  
Three main patterns in terms of strike action emerge. First, public sector strikes are found in 
almost all EU Member States. Second, education, healthcare, social work, and public 
administration are the segments in which strikes have been particularly frequent. The reason 
is that these segments have suffered most in terms of budget cuts. Third, strike activity was 
triggered by the start of the economic crisis in 2008 because this led to further public sector 
budget cuts and restructuring reforms (Carley, 2010). 
The level of industrial actions in the public sector all over the EU, which has been significant, 
is remarkable for two reasons. First, the right to strike for many groups of public sector 
employees is limited in many countries - see section 1.4 of this chapter for an explicit 
overview of these restrictions. Second, in almost all European Member States mechanisms for 
the prevention of strikes are in place. Usually these aim to resolve conflicts through 
arbitration, mediation and/or conciliation provided by the state or the social partners 
(Warneck and Clauwaert, 2009). However, the extent to which the state intervenes in 
industrial conflicts and makes use of these mechanisms varies among EU Member States. In 
some countries these conflict resolution mechanisms have prevented further strikes or further 
strikes. On the one hand they have led to state concessions in reforming public transport 
sectors in Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania and Spain and on the other hand trade unions have 
agreed not to carry out strike action (Carley, 2010). For more details on conflict and strike 
action in the public sector, see chapter 3 of this report. 
However, the process of public sector transformation, reform and protest continues and 
further changes can be expected. Moreover, the process of public sector transformation can be 
expected to accelerate as public deficits need to be cut further because of the global economic 
crisis and the need for fiscal consolidation in all EU Member States, thus increasing the 
pressure for reforms. The burden of public deficit cuts is likely to impose major changes on 
the public sector and public sector industrial relations. As in past decades, public sector 
reforms may lead to an increasing shift in the provision of services away from the public 
sector towards the private sector.  
1.3.3 National variation in the role, structure and function of the public sector 
Differences in industrial relations between the public sector and the private sector, such as 
higher unionisation rates, greater collective bargaining coverage, and a more fragmented 
union system, have been well-documented (see e.g. Bach, Bordogna, Della Rocca, and 
Winchester, 1999; Ferner, 1995; Olsen, 1996; Traxler, 1999; Visser, 2008; 2010). 
In the private sector the main industrial relations actors are the representatives of employees 
(i.e. trade unions), the representatives of employers, and the state. While the first two actors 
represent the collective interests of their members, the role of the state is to regulate the 
interaction between them under consideration of state’s interests, i.e. the state defines the 
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rules. However, in the public sector the state plays a double role in the relationship between 
the employee and employer sides in the sense that in general the state is the authority that 
defines the rules in regulating the relationship and is also a party in the relationship (Adams, 
1992). Basically, the power of the state in its role as an employer is higher compared to a 
private sector employer, as the state has the option of enforcing its interests as a legal 
authority. Further, the role of the state as an employer, compared to private sector employers, 
consists of many stakeholders and a multiplicity of interests (public and private) have to be 
considered. In addition, state interests are exposed to various pressures from competing 
political parties, public opinions and various interest groups.  
Even though this double role of the state is a general feature of public sector industrial 
relations, country differences exist as there is significant variation in terms of which bodies 
represent the state as employer in the relationship (e.g. at federal, regional or departmental 
level).  
Levels of public sector industrial relations 
From a comparative perspective, the degree of centralisation of public sector industrial 
relations activity of actors and institutions shows significant variation across the EU-27 as it is 
organised differently between the central, regional, local and even departmental level. In 
addition, the relevance of these levels is also mixed in a multi-level framework – in some 
countries there are separate industrial relations regulations for different occupational and/or 
sub-sectoral groups (e.g. public administration, health, education, police, defence, and postal 
services). Furthermore, in a number of countries differentiations between employees with 
special status (i.e. civil servants) and private employees in the public sector are made.  
All these differences across countries can be explained by the different role of the state for the 
economy and society in different countries which lead to different institutional arrangements 
on different levels of public sector industrial relations. For many countries no exclusive level 
or arena of social partners’ interaction exists. Nevertheless predominant levels of public sector 
industrial relations, defined by the share of employees that are affected by social partners’ 
interaction at this level, can be identified. These predominant levels of industrial relations for 
all EU Member States are shown in Table 1.1 in which a classification of national public 
sector industrial relations along the degree of centralisation and along a differentiation 
between different groups of public sector employees is made. 
Table 1.1: Employment regulation in the public sector – classification of countries 
Predominant level of 
regulation 
All employees Group specific differentiations  
Central AT, CZ, FR, MT, PT BG, EL, IE, LU, PL, SI 
Mixed  BE, CY, DE*, DK FI,HU,IT, ES, RO, SK 
Decentralised  EE, LV, LT, NL, SE, UK 
Notes: Central = regulation of employment relationship predominantly at national level; 
Decentralised = regulation of employment relationship predominantly at (either or) regional, local, 
departmental level; Mixed = regulation at central and decentralised level;  
All employees = No separation in the regulation of the employment relationship between groups of 
employees (in Germany there is a distinction between statutory civil servants and other public 
employees);  
Group specific differentiations = different regulations for different groups (between sub-sectors 
and/or public/private servants; * In Germany a formal separation at regional level exists but the 
regional level mirrors the central level which implies a de facto predominance of the central level. 
Data source: see box 1.4. 
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Table 1.1 shows that in 11 countries the governance of the employment relationship in the 
public sector is predominantly organised on a centralised level in the sense that the scope of 
industrial relations has a national perimeter and encompassment. Various differences in the 
industrial relations institutions still exist among these countries, notably whether or not labour 
relations are fixed for all groups of employees jointly or whether a differentiation is made 
between different groups of employees (e.g. between sub-sectors and/or public/private 
servants). Table 1.2 gives an overview of the main characteristics of countries’ public sector 
regulations. For a full discussion of the different types of employment relationship in the 
public sector, see chapter 3 of this report. 
 
Table 1.2: Characteristics of the level and differentiation of employment regulation in 
the EU-27 
Country Main characteristics 
AT 
Highly centralised, wages are bargained jointly for three levels: state, federal 
state and local state level. 
BE 
Central framework agreement. Negotiations take place in different committees: 
Committee A negotiates for the entire public sector. Committee B covers federal 
services and community and regional services. Committee C represents 
provincial and local administrations. 
BG 
Centralised social dialogue is carried out by the National Council for tripartite 
partnership. Negotiations for contractual employees are conducted at local level. 
CY 
Central bargaining for all employees in the public sector. Results affect all public 
sector employees. 
CZ  
Wages are regulated centrally by law but trade unions are consulted by 
government officials. There is some scope for minor issues to be regulated at 
local level through negotiations. 
DE 
National level pattern bargaining. Highly centralised, industry-wide bargaining. 
Bargaining committees consist of representatives from: central, regional (Länder) 
and local administration. 
DK 
Collective bargaining and central and de-centralised levels. National framework 
agreement. Negotiations also at local level, within strong coordination 
mechanisms. 
EE 
No collective bargaining at the central level. Bargaining at the local level (where 
unions are strong enough) with individual local authorities. 
EL 
Social dialogue is centralised. Conditions for employees with no special status 
are negotiated at the central level. 
ES 
Framework agreement at the central level. Lower level bodies (regions and 
municipalities) can agree higher pay increases than agreed at the national level. 
National level agreements cover non-pay and pay issues.  
FI 
Collective bargaining at two levels, for the state sector and the municipal sector. 
Collective agreements for civil servants are concluded at the national level. 
Specifying agreements concluded between agencies or administrations and trade 
unions can alter central agreements. 
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FR 
Central negotiations cover the whole public sector. Social dialogue at inter-
ministerial level (national negotiations) and at intra-ministerial level (within 
central and local committees). The right of collective bargaining introduced in 
1983  has been very weak on wage issues, and the government holds the ultimate 
power of decision. The situation has only partially changed after the 2010 
collective bargaining reforms: the right of collective bargaining has stronger 
legal recognition, but the agreements are not binding for the government. 
HU 
Current rules regulating the conclusion of collective agreements stipulate that 
only public service employees can conclude workplace-level collective 
agreements.  
IE 
Centralised wage bargaining under tripartite social partnership arrangements. The 
extent of decentralised dialogue depends on the nature of issue. 
IT 
National bargaining involves two types of negotiation: framework bargaining and 
divisional or area bargaining. The divisions are homogeneous sectors of the 
administration, (such as public schools of all grade; public universities;  national 
health service; ministries; regions and territorial authorities; and compulsory 
social security) while the areas relate mainly to managers in the various 
divisions. Salary increases are defined at the national level for all the divisions 
(including the employees of regions and territorial authorities), and are 
integrated, within limits,  by collective agreements at decentralized, single 
employer level.  
LV 
Collective bargaining is very limited at central administrative level. 
Decentralised bargaining where unions are strong enough, negotiations with 
individual local authorities.  
LT 
Collective bargaining in public administration only at sectoral level for some 
professions (e.g. public sector teachers). 
LU 
Centralised social dialogue at the government level, local public sector 
employees are represented in central committees. 
MT Central agreements for public sector employees (central and local government). 
NL 
Central level de facto negotiation. Pension issues are subject to discussions at 
sectoral level. Collective bargaining predominately takes place at the sectoral 
level.  
PL 
Central decision for civil servants. With the exception of civil servants with 
special status, public sector employees can be covered by single employer 
agreements or multi-employer agreements, covering several local authorities. 
PT Two level of negotiations: public administration in general and the sectoral level.  
RO 
Joint consultation at national level takes place within the Tripartite Economic and 
Social Council. The council examines the economic situation of the country and 
makes recommendations to the government. Such committees exist at ministerial 
and territorial level with a consultation role. 
SE 
Two bargaining levels: Central government encompasses all government 
agencies and public enterprises that are regulated by public law. The second level 
comprises local government, including municipalities and county councils 
responsible for education, health care and elderly care. Central agreements leave 
room for substantial further negotiations.  
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SI 
Central level agreements. General collective agreement for the public sector, 
collective agreements for individual sectors within the public sector, and a 
special collective agreement for the public radio and television organisations. 
SK 
National agreement sets minimum conditions. Collective bargaining with local 
and regional authorities follows. 
Separate agreements for employees working for municipal and local 
governments.  
UK  
In the case of the senior civil service, pay is determined centrally by the 
government on the recommendation of the Senior Salary Review Body; the pay 
review bodies system covers about 35% of all public employees, including 
teachers, nurses  and all employees of the National Health Service. Civil 
servants’ pay determination and HRM have been delegated to lower levels. The 
majority of civil service conditions of service, including pay, are the 
responsibility of the individual government departments and agencies. 
Sources: Mormont (2004), Hessel, (2008), Bossaert and Kaeding (2009), Adam (2011), Vaughan-
Whitehead (2012) 
 
Restrictions on industrial action in the public sector 
Another peculiarity of the public sector is that in many EU Member States public sector 
employees are often excluded from exercising the right to strike. Table 1.3 provides an 
overview of different regulations regarding the right to take industrial action in the EU-27. 
The rationale behind limiting industrial action is that public sector employees are expected to 
have a special relationship with their employer and/or provide essential services for society.  
As can be seen in Table 1.3, restrictions among the EU Member States vary in terms of the 
type of ban on industrial action and the employees groups affected. On the one hand there are 
countries where some groups of public sector employees (such as career civil servants 
(‘Beamte’) in Germany) have no formal right to strike, such as Austria, Estonia, Germany and 
Lithuania (for more details, see Chapter 3 of this report). On the other hand, as in Portugal, 
the right to strike is recognised for all workers, including public employees. However, in most 
other countries certain sectors and employee groups face some restrictions. Usually the right 
to take industrial action is often applied in conjunction with the principle of the uninterrupted 
operation of the public service and with the protection of the health and safety of persons and 
the protection of property. For example, in Italy, no particular restrictions on the right to strike 
for public servants exist but services at minimum level must be guaranteed. In Romania, 
certain services such as health services, social assistance and public transport must be 
maintained during the strike at a defined level of normal activity. Others restrictions on the 
right to strike include a high vote threshold in strike ballots (e.g. 50% in Romania). In the UK 
collective industrial action is limited to disputes between workers and their employer. In some 
countries civil servants and municipal officials cannot call strikes in pursuance of objectives 
that are not covered by collective agreements (Hessel, 2008; Warneck and Clauwaert, 2009). 
Apart from these differences, one main trend can be identified: in most EU Member States 
members of armed forces and the police are faced with the strictest limitations. There are only 
a few exceptions, among them Belgium, where police officers are entitled to strike, and the 
Netherlands, where both military personnel and police officers have the right to strike (see 
Warneck and Clauwaert 2009). For a fuller discussion of restrictions on industrial action in 
the public sector, see chapter 3 of this report. 
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Table 1.3: Constraints on collective industrial action in the public sector 
Country 
 
Limitations on the right to take action 
AT There is no specific legislation concerning the right to strike for public 
employees. In practice strike action is considered to be part of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to association and assembly. But a restriction 
in practice derives from their duty of loyalty to the employer. 
BE The right to strike is not explicitly recognised by law. Apart from in the case of 
armed forces, there are certain restrictions on the right to strike in the case of 
civil servants in general, including police officers. 
BG Right to strike is laid down in law. Military personnel do not have the right to 
strike. Public officials may only take symbolic strike action. 
CY Existence of right to strike is stated in the constitution, but judges and 
members of armed forces the police and fire brigades do not have the right to 
strike. 
CZ  The right to strike exists for civil servants with exception of: judges, 
prosecutors, armed forces, security corps, employees in nuclear power stations 
and oil and gas pipelines, air traffic controllers and fire fighters. Public sector 
workers with restricted rights to strike are: health care, social care, 
telecommunication operators. 
DK Statutory civil servants do not have the right to strike. Strike bans exist for 
groups of civil servants: members of army, navy, police, the judiciary and 
high-ranking civil servants, and also for employees in railway and postal 
services. 
EE Estonian law denies the right to strike to almost all civil servants. 
EL Restrictions on strike action relate to essential services: members of police, the 
judiciary, and security corps. 
ES The right to strike does not apply to members of the armed forces, civil guards, 
judges, magistrates and district attorneys. 
FI Civil servants and municipal officials cannot call strikes in pursuance of 
objectives which are not covered by collective agreements. 
FR Restrictions for some specific civil servants: Strike bans exist for state 
security, police, and other police bodies. The right to strike in public service is 
applied in conjunction with the principle of the uninterrupted operation of the 
public service and with the protection of the health and safety of persons and 
the protection of property. 
DE The right to strike is limited to issues which can be settled by collective 
agreement. Blue and white collar workers have the right to strike, but civil 
servants do not, based on their “loyalty and service status”. 
HU According to the labour code, the right to strike is curtailed by requiring prior 
agreement between employer and employees on “adequate services”. Strike 
action is forbidden for employees in the judiciary, armed forces, armed corps, 
organs of law enforcement and the national civil service. 
IE The right to strike is guaranteed in all branches of the public sector except the 
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armed forces. 
IT There are no particular restrictions on the right to strike for public servants but 
services at minimum level must be guaranteed in ‘essential’ public services. A 
ban on strike action exists for military personnel and state police. 
LV A ban on strike action exists for: judges, prosecutors, police, fire-fighters with 
public service status, border guards, state security, prison warders, and armed 
forces. 
LT Strikes are forbidden in public electricity, district heating and gas supply 
enterprises, as well as in the case of heads of department and senior civil 
servants, employees in internal affairs, national defence and state security 
organisations. 
LU Prohibited from striking are: diplomats, members of the judiciary, senior civil 
servants and managers, armed forces, police, medical and security personnel. 
MT Restrictions to strike action are in place for: doctors, surgeons, armed forces, 
police, fire-fighters, prison officers, and air traffic controllers. 
NL The vast majority of the contracting parties grant the right to strike to civil 
servants. Military personnel and police officers also have the right to strike. A 
Dutch judge may determine whether recourse to a strike is premature. 
PL Civil servants may not participate in strikes. The right to strike is restricted 
when a work stoppage entails a danger to human life, public health and to state 
security. Members of the armed forces, the police, border guards and prison 
services are, as area all categories of civil servants, denied the right to strike. 
PT The right to strike is recognised for all workers including public employees. 
Exceptions are: Members of armed forces and police are prohibited from 
striking. 
RO Public servants in the ministry of defence and interior do not have the right to 
strike. Further, the vote threshold in strike ballots is very high - 50%. Certain 
services such as health services, social assistance and public transport must be 
maintained during the strike at the level of at least 1/3 of normal activity. 
SE Virtually unlimited right to strike, but in the private and public sector the 
parties to a collective agreement may not initiate labour disputes on the issues 
covered by collective agreements during the period of validity (statutory peace 
obligation). The only restriction is that industrial action must not be directed at 
influencing Sweden’s’ political situation. Restrictions exist for public 
employees engaged in work involving decision making, workers involved in 
the exercise of public authority (for example, the courts).  
SI Strikes are not permitted when they are not related to the negotiation or 
amendment of a collective agreement. Only national or local branches of 
unions are allowed to call strikes. The following groups are prohibited from 
taking strike action: judges, prosecutors, armed forces, fire-fighters and air 
traffic controllers.  
SK Strikes must be linked to collective agreements. Strikes are prohibited for: 
judges, prosecutors, armed forces and armed corps, fire-fighters, air-traffic 
controllers. The right to collective action is also restricted in social services, 
health care, telecommunications, gas and oil production and the nuclear sector. 
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UK Collective action is limited to disputes between workers and their employer. 
Since 1981 a number of laws have restricted the right to strike. 
Sources: Hessel (2008), Warneck and Clauwaert (2009). 
 
 
Box 1.4: Empirical details 
Chapter 1 focuses on industrial relations in Member States’ public sector as a whole, rather 
than on sub-sectors. This broader focus causes difficulties in the comparison between 
countries because of the significant country variation of the public sector as outlined in Box 
1.3. If sub-sectors are referred to, explicit sources and definitions are provided.  
Public sector data on industrial relations that is comparable across countries and across 
sectors is scarce. For this reason a number of different data sources were used and integrated 
into a dataset which allows both a comparison across countries and across sectors. The first 
challenge here is that different data sources use different definitions of the public sector (see 
Box 1.3). The second is that in the different sources, the time of reference for the data varies 
even though the majority of data refer to observation for the year 2008. Some data for other 
industrial relations variables refers to the years 2006 or 2007. Thus, both the definitional and 
period leeway inherent to a comprehensive use of data demanded that all data is rounded, i.e. 
percentages are rounded in 10%-intervals. Given the inherent stickiness of industrial 
relations variables (for a period of 2 or 3 years) as well as variations in the definition of the 
public sector, the 10%-interval is large enough to ensure that the probability that roundings 
are wrong is marginal. 
Data on the development of public sector industrial relations over time for all EU Member 
States is even scarcer. Given this, the chapter concentrates on a cross-sectional analysis on 
the basis of recent data. When illustrating and discussing changes over time, a selection of 
countries is made for reasons of availability of data. 
Some public sector industrial relations indicators are compared with other private sectors 
rather than with national level indictors. In order to allow a comparison on the same domain 
level in this chapter, public sector industrial relations are explicitly compared with private 
sector industrial relations rather than national level industrial relations. For reasons of 
availability of data the same nine private sector sample as used by Bechter, Brandl and 
Meardi (2011, 2012) is used for sector comparisons. Nevertheless, these nine sectors allow 
general conclusions as the sample covers both manufacturing and services, and both 
internationalised and less internationalised sectors: steel, sugar, tanning and leather, civil 
aviation, railway infrastructure, sea and coastal water transport, hospitals, hairdressing and 
other beauty treatment, and telecommunications. 
 
 
Collective bargaining 
The conventional approach in European industrial relations is for free and voluntary collective 
bargaining based on the principles of freedom of association and the autonomy of the social 
partners.  These principles are enshrined in the EU Treaties.  However, while this is certainly 
true for the private sector, in a number of countries there are restrictions on this principle in 
the public sector as it conflicts with the role of the state as employer and simultaneously as 
legislative authority. In this section, the differences in the EU-27 in mode and coverage of 
collective bargaining between the private and public sector are presented and discussed. 
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Across the EU the magnitude of the double role of the state as employer and legislator in the 
process of collective bargaining varies as different state bodies at various levels and with 
different sovereignties over the employment relationship act as employers. In addition, there 
are variations in the differentiation of collective bargaining issues, e.g. wage determination is 
sometimes regulated differently to other issues such as, for example, working time and 
vocational training .However, three broad patterns with respect to the role of the state in 
collective bargaining in the public sector can be identified (Traxler, 1999): 
 countries in which collective bargaining is the most important and most frequent mode 
of regulation of the employment relationship in the public sector.
4
  
 countries in which the employment relationship is unilaterally set by respective state 
authorities. In the EU-27 countries this pure form does not exist (any more) as in 
practice unions are usually involved, consulted and informed by government 
authorities. Therefore the second pattern is characterized by de facto collective 
bargaining; and  
 countries in which there is a combination of these two patterns, which means that there 
is co-existence of collective bargaining and unilateral state regulation. 
For details, see table 1.4. 
 
 
Table 1.4: Mode of regulation of the employment relationship in the public sector 
Predominant regulatory pattern Countries 
Collective bargaining (CB) BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, FI, , HU, IE, IT, MT, NL, PT, 
SK, SI, SE  
Unilateral state regulation (USR) AT, FR, LU 
Mixed: CB and USR EE, EL, LV, LT 
 CB and USR PL, RO, ES 
 CB and USR DE, UK 
Note: Bold CB and USR indicates that the mode is higher than the other but still not predominant for 
the whole country. Sources: Brandl and Traxler (2012), European Federation of Public Service 
Unions (2008), Traxler (1999). UK: collective bargaining is mainly national and by local government. 
Pay Review bodies in health, education, prisons). LU: Indexation of wages. 
 
The first and second patterns represent extreme forms and given that various exceptions (i.e. 
for certain sub-sectors or groups of employees). Nevertheless by concentrating on the 
predominant form of collective bargaining, a classification of all EU-27 member countries 
along these three regulation modes can be identified and is shown in Table 1.5.  
                                                          
4
 In countries in which collective bargaining is the predominant mode, exceptions to the rule can nevertheless be 
found. Frequently certain key sub-sectors such as the armed forces and the police are characterised by 
exceptional regulations. 
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Table 1.5: Main characteristics of public sector collective bargaining in the EU-27 
Country Main characteristic of collective bargaining 
 
AT 
Unilateral pay determination by the responsible government authorities. In 
practice: de facto negotiations between the authorities and public sector unions. 
BE 
Joint consultation and negotiations. There is a legal right for collective 
bargaining but the agreements are not legally binding (they have the value of 
political commitment). 
BG 
Civil servants do not have the right to collectively bargain and conclude 
collective agreements in the strict sense. The government sets pay and working 
conditions for public sector officials unilaterally.  
CY 
Together with its Permanent Sub-Committee, the Joint Consultative Committee 
is the official agency for collective bargaining between the government and the 
trade union. 
CZ  
Social dialogue is characterised by its informal nature. There is limited scope for 
wage bargaining in central administration. Collective agreements cover working 
conditions but not pay. 
DE 
Civil servants’ pay and working conditions are determined unilaterally. Trade 
unions have some role in the preparation and adaption of regulations on working 
conditions: they are heard at early stages of legislative procedures.  
DK 
For public officials employment conditions are regulated by law. Agreements for 
civil servants and central organisations are concluded by state authorities. Local 
agreements are concluded by local branches of institutions. 
EE 
There is a minimum wage agreement between the government and the trade 
union for education and cultural professionals in government and local 
municipality institutions. 
EL 
Employment conditions for public servants are set unilaterally by government. 
Negotiations between the state and employee representatives take place a) 
between the state and the Supreme Administration of Greek civil Servants’ trade 
union (ADEDY) and b) between the state and trade union federations. 
ES 
Highly centralised social dialogue. Legislation in 2006 introduced a new top-
level negotiating committee. Civil servants’ pay is subject to collective 
bargaining. Negotiations cover the whole public sector. Similar negotiation 
bodies were established in the regions and each municipality. 
FI 
Status of collective agreements is regulated separately for contract employees 
and civil servants. 
FR 
Working conditions are set by legislation and regulations. Trade union 
organisations do not have the right to initiate negotiations. Trade unions are 
entitled to conduct negotiations on the development of pay with the government, 
but the government has the ultimate power of decision. 
HU 
Wages and working conditions for civil servants are set unilaterally. Civil 
servants are not entitled to conclude collective agreements. The topics on which 
the employer’s side is obliged to consult with trade unions are laid down by law. 
Consultation at the national level takes the form of tripartite social dialogue.  
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IE 
Joint consultation procedures are in place. Intense social dialogue. Collective 
bargaining every three years, although the crisis has put this system under severe 
pressure. Ireland is the only country in Europe with a constitution which does not 
contain provisions on the public service. 
IT 
The procedural rules for collective bargaining are established by law. National -
level framework agreements deal with issues regarding two or more divisions, 
such as telework, the use of temporary agency workers, or the definition of 
national level bargaining units or divisions, within limits established by the law.  
Industry/sub-sector-wide national collective agreements regulate employment 
conditions and industrial relations and set rules and subject for lower-level 
negotiations (integrative, decentralised contracts).  
LV 
There is no obligation to negotiate collective agreements in the public sector. 
Different regulations for different sectors (such as health, education, internal 
affairs) are in place. 
LT 
Joint consultation at the national level takes place at the Tripartite Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania. Legislation gives central agreements effect for public 
servants and non-manual workers.   
LU 
Existence of both genuine and de facto collective bargaining. For civil servants 
and white collar staff unilateral regulations (on basis of proposals of professional 
organisations of employees) exist while for blue collar workers collective 
bargaining is important. Existence of joint consultation procedures at national 
level within the Economic and Social Council. On the governmental level a very 
centralised dialogue is characteristic. 
MT 
A tripartite consultation body acts as industrial tribunal and a Joint Negotiation 
Council in matters concerning the service conditions of public servants. Trade 
unions are consulted in sectoral specific matters and engage in collective 
bargaining. 
NL 
Joint consultation at national level takes place twice a year between the 
government and the social partners. Formally the state has the power to set 
employment conditions unilaterally. Formally, statutory civil servants have no 
right to collective bargaining but informal negotiations practices exist. 
Consultation of public sector union confederations is obligatory. 
PL 
Civil servants with special status are denied the right to bargain collectively. At 
enterprise level, collective agreements may be concluded with the exception of 
those employed in units under state budget. 
PT 
The government can make unilateral decisions on public sector terms and 
conditions. Consultation is foreseen for issues such as employment programmes, 
human resource policy, retirement regulations. Sectoral level negotiations focus 
on matters such as remuneration, overtime, and training. Public sector unions can 
engage in negotiations but final decisions are taken by government. 
RO 
No bargaining on pay in central government; wage levels and increases are 
established by government regulation. Separate negotiations for public servants 
and contractual staff.  
SE 
Separate agreements for different groups of employees in county councils and 
municipalities. For example, the actual pay of each employee is negotiated 
locally between the agency and the local trade unions.  
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SI Centralised social dialogue. 
SK 
Voluntary negotiations in the civil service cover the terms and conditions of 
performance of civil service duties, working time, leaves, salary scales and social 
security coverage. 
UK  
Joint consultation and voluntary negotiations are more common in the public 
sector than in the private sector. Most unions focus on the representation of a 
particular occupational group. 
Sources: Mormont (2004), Hessel (2008), Bossaert and Kaeding (2009), Adam (2011), Vaughan-
Whitehead (2012). 
Further discussion of country clustering can be found in chapter 3 of this report. 
 
Trends in bargaining regulation 
Since the 1970s, a trend away from unilateral regulation towards collective bargaining or 
towards mixed regulation systems can be observed (Traxler, 1999). This process started with 
Finland shifting from unilateral regulation to collective bargaining in the early 1970s, 
followed by Belgium in the mid-1970s and France to a very limited extent in the early 1980s. 
The Italian public sector system of collective bargaining also shifted from a unilateral to a 
mixed system in the early 1980s (the right to collective bargaining was introduced in Italy in 
1983, although with several limitations, see Bordogna and Neri 2011), followed by Spain at 
the end of the 1980s. Considering that in the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs), the mode of regulation in the public sector was similar to unilateral regulation and 
shifted in the 1990s to collective bargaining or a mixed system, the dominance of public 
sector collective bargaining is a “recent” phenomenon.  
The Industrial Relations in Europe Report 2010 reported for the majority of the CEECs highly 
decentralised collective bargaining structures in the private sector. This highlights a major 
difference between private and public sector collective bargaining as the majority of public 
sector collective bargaining systems in the CEECs  are characterised by relatively centralised 
collective bargaining. The reason for this difference between private and public sector 
collective bargaining can be explained by well-established tripartism in the public sector in 
many CEECs. According to the country case studies documented in Hessel (2008), in many 
CEECs employer and employee organisations have built up forms of cooperation and 
consultation from scratch in which central state authorities have a key role in collective 
bargaining. See also chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of collective bargaining 
structures in the CEECs.  
In many countries the level and structure of collective bargaining has also changed 
considerably over time. Frequently these changes are the direct result of various forms public 
sector reforms, or liberalisation and privatisation of public services in the same period (see 
Hessel, 2008). These changes lead to an increasing fragmentation of the collective bargaining 
system which is expressed by a diffusion towards multiple levels of collective bargaining and 
by differentiating within collective bargaining between different occupations and/or sectors 
(e.g. public administration, health, education) and second, by an increasing relevance of 
decentralised levels of collective bargaining. The main rationale behind this trend towards de-
concentration and decentralisation of collective bargaining is guided by the idea that it allows 
more flexibility in regulating employment relationships and conditions, which in turn 
increases the efficiency of the public sector as a whole. However, not all EU Member States 
follow this idea of increasing the efficiency of the public sector by restructuring collective 
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bargaining in the same way so that different developments can be expected. These trends are 
explored more fully in chapter 3 of this report.   
 
The importance of collective bargaining 
 
Chart 1.9: Public sector and national collective bargaining coverage, 2009     
             
For details about reference year see Box 1.4. 
Source: National collective bargaining coverage: J. Visser, ICTWS database 3.0. Public sector 
collective bargaining coverage: Adam (2011) 
Note: The red dotted line is the 45 degree line which indicates points where the two %s are equal. The 
black line is the least squares regression line indicating the average relationship between the two. 
 
Collective bargaining coverage rates continue to exhibit a high degree of variation across 
countries in both  the overall economy and in the public sector. Chart 1.9 shows collective 
bargaining coverage for the public sector, and compares public sector collective bargaining 
coverage with collective bargaining coverage in the entire economy. On the whole-economy 
level, collective bargaining coverage is low in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the 
UK, where fewer than 30% of all employees are covered by a collective agreement. On the 
other hand, there are countries in which collective bargaining coverage is higher than 85% 
(i.e. Finland, France, Slovenia and Sweden) and in some countries almost all employees are 
covered by a collective agreement (i.e. Austria and Belgium). 
This variation in collective bargaining coverage can also be found in the public sector. In 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania public sector collective bargaining coverage does 
not exceed the 30% margin. On the other hand, in a number of countries public sector 
collective bargaining is almost 100%, which indicates that collective bargaining coverage is 
usually higher in the public sector compared to other sectors in the economy. 
However, the most striking issue shown by Chart 1.9 is the fact that collective bargaining is 
generally higher in the public sector compared to the whole economy. In many countries the 
gap between public and national sector collective bargaining coverage is significant. For 
instance public sector collective bargaining is more than 40 percentage points higher in 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta, Slovakia and the UK, compared to the national 
figure. There are only a few countries in which public sector collective bargaining coverage is 
not substantially different to the overall economy, e.g. in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania 
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and Poland. Further, there are even fewer countries in which public sector collective 
bargaining is lower, compared with the national figure, e.g. Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain.  
The reason why collective bargaining coverage is higher in general in the public sector in 
comparison with national figures is twofold. First public sector industrial relations are more 
centralised than in other sectors of the economy because central state authorities are involved 
in collective bargaining as they want to keep control over the employment issues for the 
whole country. This explains why the gap in collective bargaining coverage between the 
public sector and the rest of the economy is exceptionally high in the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovakia. In all of these countries private sector collective bargaining is 
predominantly held on a local or company level (see Industrial Relations Report, 2010) while 
collective bargaining in the public sector is highly centralised (see Table 1.1). The second 
reason can be found in the attitude of the state in its role as employer regarding collective 
bargaining and unions, which is usually different to the attitudes of private employers. A good 
example for the greater recognition of unions as partners in regulating employment issues by 
state authorities compared to private employers is the UK, where the gap between public and 
national collective bargaining coverage figures is around 60 percentage points. As argued by 
Brown, Bryson and Forth (2008) the state recognition of unions as partners exceeds the 
recognition by private sector companies significantly in the UK. 
 
1.4 Trade unions  
While all EU Member States recognise the right of trade unions to exist and to participate in 
collective bargaining, the public sector shows some peculiarities regarding the right to 
association. In some countries and for some groups of employees, such as civil servants, 
associational rights are restricted. Further, several studies stress that public sector unions 
differ from private sector unions according to the characteristics of their (potential) members. 
For example in the Industrial Relations in Europe Report 2004 as well as by Keller, Due and 
Andersen (2001) it is highlighted that the share of female employees is usually higher in the 
public sector and that a high proportion of staff is employed in white-collar and professional 
occupations. For a full discussion of trade unions in the public sector, see chapter 3 of this 
report. 
 
The fragmentation of the union system 
There are a total of 256 public sector-related trade unions in the EU-27 
5
 (Adam 2011) and 
usually more than one union represents public sector employees. Table 1.6 provides a 
comprehensive overview of major public sector unions (i.e. the largest and second largest) 
and of the number of active public sector unions in each of the EU Member States.
                                                          
5
 Representativeness in the public administration sector embraces three basic elements: the membership domain 
and strength of the social partner organisations, their role in collective employment regulation, and their role 
in public policymaking (Adam, 2011). 
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Table 1.6: Major unions in the public sector 
Cou
ntry 
Largest* sector-related 
union 
Sectoral 
domain 
density
** 
 
 
Affiliated to 
 EPSU    CESI 
Second sector-related union Sectoral 
domain 
density 
 
 
Affiliated to 
 EPSU    CESI 
Total 
number of 
sector-
related 
unions 
AT Union of Public Employees 
(GÖD) 
70% 
+ + 
Municipal Employees’ and Arts, 
Media, Sports and Liberal 
Professions’ Union (GdG-KMSfB) 
71% 
+ + 
4 
BE Federation of Christian 
Public Service Unions 
(FSCSP/FGSOD) 
n.a. 
+ - 
General Confederation of Public 
Services (CGSP/ACOD) 
n.a. 
+ - 
4 
BG National Police Union  
(NPU) 
n.a. 
- - 
Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions of Governmental 
Organisations (FITUGO) 
n.a. 
+ - 
6 
CY Pancyprian Union of Public 
Servants (PASYDY) 
78% 
+ - 
-  - 
- - 
1 
CZ Trade Union of State 
Bodies and Organisations 
(STATORG) 
7% 
+ - 
Czech Firefighters’ Union (OSH) 48% 
+ - 
5 
DE German Civil Service 
Association (DBB) 
37% 
- + 
German Police Union (GdP) n.a. 
- - 
7 
DK Union of Commercial and 
Clerical Employees in 
Denmark (HK) 
80% 
+ - 
Christian Trade Union (KF)  n.a. 
- + 
24 
EE Confederation of Trade 4% + - Estonian Employees’ Unions, n.a. - - 2 
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Unions of State and Local 
Government Employees 
(ROTAL) 
Confederation (TALO) 
EL Supreme Administrative 
Council of Greek Civil 
Servants (ADEDY) 
87% 
+ - 
Panhellenic Federation of Public 
Employees governed by Private Law 
(POEIDD) 
20% 
- - 
2 
ES Federation of Citizen 
Services of the Trade 
Union Confederation of 
Workers’ Commissions 
(FSC-CCOO) 
11% 
+ - 
Confederation of Independent and 
Civil Servants’ Unions (CSI-CSIF) 
9% 
- + 
6 
FI Federation of Salaried 
Employees Pardia (Pardia) 
37% 
+ - 
Public Sector Negotiating 
Commission of AKAVA (JUKO) 
35% 
+ - 
8 
FR n.a. n.a. + - n.a. n.a. + - 7 
HU Union of Employees of the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs 
and Law Enforcement 
(BRDSZ) 
23% 
- + 
Public Service Trade Union 
Federation(KSZSZ) 
48% 
- + 
8 
IE Impact 
 
n.a. 
+ - 
Civil and Public Services Union 
(CPSU) 
n.a. 
+ - 
9 
IT Public Service Union – 
affiliated to General 
Confederation of Italian 
Workers  - CGIL (FP 
CGIL) 
11% 
+ - 
 100% 
- - 
56 
LT Lithuanian Trade Union of 
Constables and Police 
Employees (LVRSRPS) 
12% 
- - 
Lithuanian Trade Union of Civil 
Servants (LVTPF) 
20% 
+ - 
4 
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LU General Confederation of 
Civil Servants (CGFP) 
80% 
- + 
Local Government Civil Service 
Union (FGFC) 
15% 
- + 
5 
LV Trade Union of Employees 
of State Institutions, Self-
governments and the 
Finance Sector (TUSSF) 
5% 
- - 
Latvian United Trade Union of Police 
Workers (LAPA) 
19% 
- - 
6 
MT Union of United Workers 
(UHM) 
76% 
- + 
General Workers' Union (GWU) 41% 
- + 
4 
NL Public Service Workers’ 
Union – affiliated to the 
Dutch Trade Union 
Federation - FNV 
(Abvakabo FNV) 
n.a. 
+ - 
Union for Managerial and 
Professional Civil Servants (CMHF) 
n.a. 
- - 
15 
PL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 
PT Union of Local Authority 
Workers (STAL) 
31% 
+ - 
Union of Public Administration 
Workers of the South and the Azores 
(STFPSA) 
n.a. 
- - 
14 
RO National Trade Union of 
Policemen and Contractual 
Personnel (SNPPC) 
64% 
- + 
National Federation of Local 
Administration Trade Unions (FNSA) 
n.a. 
+ - 
17 
SE Union of Civil Servants 
(ST) 
n.a. 
+ - 
Association for University Graduates 
in Economics, Social Science, Social 
Work etc.(Akademikerförbundet 
SSR) 
65% 
+ - 
9 
SI Trade Union of State and 
Societal Bodies of Slovenia 
(SDDO) 
29% 
- - 
Police Trade union of Slovenia (PSS) 70% 
- - 
9 
SK Slovak Trade Union of 20% - + Police Trade Union in the Slovak 40% - - 8 
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Public Administration 
(SLOVES) 
Republic (OZP SR) 
UK Public service trade union 
(Unison) 
51% 
+ - 
Public and Commercial Services 
Union (PCSU) 
72% 
+ - 
9 
Source: Adam(2011): Representativeness of the European social partner organisations: Public administration 
* Based on members in the sector (Adam, 2011) 
**Sectoral domain density indicates the total number of members of an organisation in the sector in relation to the number of employees who work in that part of 
the sector as covered by the organisation’s domain. 
Members of Eurocop: German Police Union (GdP), Lithuanian Trade Union of Constables and Police Employees (LVRSRPS), Police Trade union of Slovenia 
(PSS), Police Trade Union in the Slovak Republic (OZP SR). 
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As shown by Visser (2010) for the national level and by Bechter, Brandl and Meardi (2011) 
for private sectors in the EU Member States, both the number of existing union 
confederations as well as union organisations differs substantially across countries. Chart 1.10 
shows the fragmentation of the union system in the public sector and compares it with the 
number of unions in other private sectors in terms of the number of unions. 
 
Chart 1.10: Union fragmentation in the public sector and in other private sectors, 2009  
            
 
 
For details about reference year see Box 1.4.            
Source: Number of public sector unions: Adam (2011). Number of private sector unions Bechter, 
Brandl and Meardi (2011). 
Note: The blue bars are the number of unions in the public sector. These unions are compared to the 
ones in nine private sectors. The sample covers manufacturing and services, and both 
internationalised and less internationalised sectors: steel, sugar, tanning and leather, civil aviation, 
railway infrastructure, sea and coastal water transport, hospitals, hairdressing and other beauty 
treatment, and telecommunications. The black dotted lines with balls indicate the maximum and the 
minimum number of unions from the selected nine private sectors. Public sector union fragmentation 
is higher than in each of nine private sectors if the blue bar exceeds the ball on the top of the dotted 
line.  
 
As can be seen in Chart 1.10, for the majority of countries the fragmentation of public sector 
unions does not significantly differ from the private sector. Only in four countries is 
fragmentation in the public sector significantly higher than in private sectors. Among these 
four countries in Italy the number of unions in the public sector exceeds the number of unions 
in the private sectors by far. But also in Denmark, the Netherlands and in Romania the public 
sector union system is characterised by a higher degree of union fragmentation than in the 
private sector.  
Another reason for union fragmentation in the public sector is the differentiation between 
public sector employees with special status (civil servants) and employees with no special 
status, with private sector employment contracts (blue and white collar workers). Most EU 
Member States employ personnel with different statuses in their public administrations. The 
distinction between employees under public law and those under private law is a fundamental 
characteristic of the public sector in Germany (ie Beamte and contractual staff), Denmark, 
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Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands and Austria. In other countries, such as Ireland and the 
UK, differentiating between these two statuses is of less importance. For a fuller discussion of 
trade union structures in the public sector, see chapter 3 of this report. 
Union strength 
Union density is the most common indicator of union strength. Chart 1.11 provides an 
overview of the strength of unions in the public sector and compares it with the national level. 
 
Chart 1.11: Public sector and national union density, 2009      
            
            
For details about reference year see Box 1.4. 
 
Source: National union density: J. Visser, ICTWS database 3.0 (Visser, 2011). Public sector union 
density:  Bordogna (2007), Adam (2011), Visser (2011), Brandl and Traxler (2012) 
Note: The red dotted line is the 45 degree line which indicates points where the two %s are equal. 
The black line is the least squares regression line indicating the average relationship between the 
two. 
Differences in union density in levels across the EU Member States and between the public 
sector and the private sectors are quite marked. One main characteristic of Chart 1.11 is that 
in the majority of countries union density is higher in the public sector compared to the 
national figure for union density. Only in the Czech Republic, Estonia and in Poland is union 
density slightly lower in the public sector than the national figure. In Belgium, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia public sector union density equals the national 
level. However in all the other countries, density is higher in the public sector, and in a 
number of countries the gap is substantial. This is particularly the case in Greece (70 
percentage points) but also in Austria and in Luxembourg (in both 40 percentage points). 
In the near future, it is likely that the gap in union density between the private and public 
sector will prevail, for many reasons. First, the recognition of unions is more common in the 
case of public employers compared to private employers. Second, public sector managers are 
often unionised as well, which implies that fewer disadvantages can be expected due to union 
membership. Third, union representatives are more actively involved in the public sector in 
the processes of hiring, promotion, and organisation of work, so that further incentives for 
employees exist to join a union (Keller, Due and Andersen, 2001). See chapter 3 of this report 
for further discussion of trends in union density. 
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1.5 Employers’ associations 
In contrast to the private sector, where employers’ associations organise and represent the 
interests of companies, the associational structure of public sector employers is more 
complex. This is because the public sector is characterised by a multi-layered structure of 
political and administrative actors with different responsibilities on different levels and in 
different regions (Keller, Due and Andersen, 2001). One main difference between the public 
and the private sectors is that in the public sector no employers’ associations exist in the 
majority of the EU Member States.  
The reason for this lack of public sector employer associations is that state authorities - which 
act directly as employers - are organised under national public administrative systems. Thus, 
the more centralised, coordinated and organised these administrative systems, the more 
coordinated the employer side in the public sector.  There is therefore no need to organise 
employers’ interests in an association in countries with well organised, coordinated and 
centralised administrative systems. In general, that is why employer associations exist only in 
countries in which the national public administrative system does not enable enough 
coordination of central states’ employment and wage strategies (Adam, 2011). This is 
frequently the case in countries with a decentralised system for regulating the employment 
relationship (as shown in Table 1.1). 
Nevertheless, compared to the private sector, collective bargaining in the public sector is still 
characterised by a high degree of centralisation as central state authorities are actively 
involved in collective bargaining in almost all EU Member States. Thus the employer side is 
represented in collective bargaining by central state authorities. These are usually important 
ministries themselves who represent state interests as an employer or spin-offs of ministries. 
See Table 1.7 for an overview of public sector state authorities who represent states interests 
as an employer.  
Table 1.7: Main actors in the public sector on the employer side in the EU (employer 
organisations are in italic) 
Country   
AT State Secretary for Civil Service and Administrative Reform in the Federal 
Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt BKA) 
BE Committee composed of the Prime Minister and ministers (no central public sector 
employer organisation) 
 
BG National Council for Tripartite Partnership 
 
CY Government, represented by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Director of Public Administration and Personnel Department and acting in 
the Joint Staff Committee (J.S.C.) 
 
CZ Joint Consultative Committee (MEP) 
 
DE Ministry of the Interior (BMI) at national level. Federation of Municipal 
Employers Association at local level. Municipals Employer’s Association (VKA) 
 
DK Ministry of Finance: State Employer’s Agency. Local Government Denmark (KL) 
 
EE Inter-Ministerial Committee chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs 
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EL Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
 
ES Ministry of Public Administration; three main committees: Public Administration 
Committee (for working conditions), one committee responsible for statutory civil 
servants and one for other public sector employees 
 
FI Ministry of Finance: State Employer’s Agency (VTML). Commission for Local 
Authority Employers (KT) 
 
FR Ministry of the Budget, of Public Accounts and of the Civil Service (Ministère du 
Budget, des Comptes Publics et de la Fonction Publique; Direction Générale de 
l’Administration et de la Fonction Publique DGAFP); Minister of Health (fontion 
publique hospitalière); Minister of Subnational Entities (fonction publique 
territoriale) 
 
HU Relevant ministries 
 
IE Department of Finance. Local Government Management Board (LGMSB) 
 
IT Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Department of Public Administration) for 
public employees that has not been privatizsed and contractualised. Agency for the 
Representation of Public Administration (national level) Negotiation (ARAN) 
 
LT Government 
 
LU Ministry of Civil Service and of Administrative Reform. Association of 
Luxembourg Towns and Municipalities (Syvicol) 
 
LV Relevant ministries. Latvian Association of Employers of Municipalities (LPDDA) 
 
MT Ministry of Finance (principal permanent secretary). Office of the Prime Minister 
(permanent secretary). Joint Negotiation Team. Collective Bargaining Unit. Malta 
Employers Association (MEA) 
NL Ministry of the Interior 
 
PL Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Director-General of the Civil Service Office 
(for working conditions) 
 
PT Ministry of Public Administration. Ministry of Finance 
 
RO Ministry of Labour, Family and Equal Opportunities. Ministry of Health. Ministry 
of Education. National Agency for Public Servants (ANFP) 
SE Swedish Agency for Government Employers (SAGE). Federation of Social 
Insurance Offices. Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKL) 
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SI Governmental bargaining group, composed by representatives of all ministries, 
agencies, governmental offices, the Parliament and the associations of 
municipalities 
SK Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. Ministry of the Interior Ministry of 
Finance. Association of Towns and villages of Slovakia (ZMOS) 
UK The most significant bargaining units are the: Cabinet Office; Treasury; 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP); HM Revenue and Customs; Home 
Office; Ministry of Defence. In addition, the pay review bodies system covers 
around 35% of public sector employees. 
Source: Adam (2011), Hessel (2008). 
As presented by Adam (2011), organisational density in the countries in which employers’ 
associations exist is exceptionally high, at 100%, in all associations, and has remained stable 
over decades (Keller, Due and Andersen, 2001). However, this strength can be assumed to be 
identical in countries in which no employers’ associations exist as the central states unites the 
whole employer interests. Thus, the employer side in the public sector reflects a strength 
which is comparable to a 100% (quasi-)density in all countries. For a fuller discussion of 
employer representation in the public sector, see chapter 3 of this report. 
 
Box 1.5: Public services in the EU: key trends 
Public services, also known as services of general interest (SGIs), are services whose 
provider is entrusted by a public authority with specific missions of general interest. They 
include energy, water, public transport, postal services, telecommunications, healthcare and 
social work, education, public administration and defence. 
Overall, public services in Europe provide services to around 500 million European 
inhabitants and provide the infrastructure for future growth and development. In total, around 
500,000 enterprises operate in public services. 
Around 30% of the European workforce – some 64 million employees – is employed in 
public services in the following sectors: 
 Health and social work (33% of all public services and 20.5 million employees) 
 Public administration and defence (24% of all public services and 15.4 million 
employees) 
 Education (23% of all public services and 15 million employees) 
 Public transport, railways, the postal sector and telecommunications (9.6% of public 
services and 5.9 million employees). 
Over the past 20 years, three basic trends have characterised the development of public 
services in the EU: 
 Europeanisation, under which SGIs are moving from the traditional national 
framework of definition and organisation to the Community level. This takes various 
forms, including harmonisation and the open method of coordination in education and 
health; 
 sectoral characteristics and trends, such as the Single Market, which has had an effect 
on telecommunication, electricity, water, transport, education and health. It should be 
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noted, however, that many of the former national monopolies have continued to 
operate and play an important role in their sectors; 
 national histories, traditions and institutions, which continue to shape markets in 
different ways in different countries.  
Another important trend is the delegated management of public services to private companies 
in many sectors and Member States. For example, private companies in France are world 
leaders in the water sector. In the UK, rail sector operators are private companies. Further, 
contracting out of elements of public services to private contractors has become 
commonplace in many sectors, such as cleaning. 
The development of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is another relatively recent feature in 
public service provision. Under PPPs, private companies are entrusted, under long-term 
contracts, with the conception, construction, ownership, maintenance or exploitation of 
structures and equipment. The UK uses this formula widely, employing it in the construction 
and operation of roads, hospitals and schools, and the general management of prisons. 
Ireland, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy,  France and Greece have also used PPPs. In the new 
EU Member States, this type of management is rarely used but it is encouraged by a specific 
legislative framework (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Czech Republic). In many 
countries, the services produced under PPP arrangements are “sold” back to the 
administration. 
For further information, see Public Services – supporting the very fabric of European society, 
CEEP; and Public Services in the European Union and in the 27 Member States. Statistics, 
Organisation and Regulations. CEEP, May 2010. 
 
 
1.6 Overview and classification of national and public sector industrial relations 
models 
Industrial relations are defined using many dimensions. Further, any sectoral, national or 
supranational industrial relations system is described by its own values over these dimensions 
which display differences and similarities with other sectoral, national or supranational 
industrial relations systems. The preceding sections have examined typical industrial relations 
dimensions such as union density, employers’ association density, union fragmentation, 
employers’ association fragmentation, collective bargaining coverage, and collective 
bargaining centralisation for the public sector and have highlighted and discussed the 
differences and similarities between sectoral and national industrial relations systems across 
the EU Member States. 
This multi-dimensionality of industrial relations makes it hard to identify overarching and 
general similarities and differences across sectors and countries over all dimensions 
simultaneously. Visser (2008) was the first to achieve this over different dimensions by 
identifying national industrial relations systems for all EU Member States. Visser provided a 
comprehensive classification of industrial relations systems (i.e. models or regimes) on a 
national level for all EU Member States in which five different models of industrial relations 
systems in the EU-27 countries are identified as follows:  
 
 Organised Corporatism, including Denmark, Finland and Sweden;  
 Social Partnership, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
and Slovenia; 
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 State-centred, including Greece, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal;  
 Liberal, including Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the UK; and  
 Mixed or Transitional, including Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland Romania and Slovakia.  
The Organised Corporatism model is characterised by a high degree of organisational density, 
high collective bargaining coverage and fairly high interaction of social partners with the state 
but also a relatively high fragmentation of the social partner system in terms of a high number 
of both unions and employers’ associations. The Social Partnership group clusters countries 
with a medium organisational membership density and high rates of collective bargaining 
coverage at high level of centralisation. Another characteristic is the relatively high 
fragmentation of actors and high levels of social partner interaction with the state. Countries 
in the State-centred group are similar to Organised Corporatism countries, with the exception 
that the involvement of social partners with the state which is quite low, and there is a much 
lower degree of centralisation of collective bargaining. The group of Liberal countries display 
average organisational density of actors, high collective bargaining coverage at a very 
decentralised level, low fragmentation of actor organisations, and almost no interaction with 
state authorities. The countries in the Mixed group are distinct from all former groups because 
the industrial relations system is characterised by low organisational density of actors, few 
actors (mainly because employers’ organisation do not exist), low collective bargaining 
coverage at a decentralised level and no interaction with state authorities.  
Bechter, Brandl and Meardi (2011, 2012) looked at whether the national classification holds 
for all private sectors in the EU Member States. They were able to show that many private 
sectors are substantially different in their industrial relations system characteristics from the 
national and identified sectoral systems of industrial relations for the EU-27 countries. For 
instance, it was shown that industrial relations in the majority of the EU-27 countries in the 
hairdressing and other beauty treatment sector share the characteristics of the Mixed system 
(which they labelled as an Empty system). This is due to the fact that collective bargaining 
coverage, the organisational density of social partners and their fragmentation is low or 
sometimes even non-existent, collective bargaining is rather decentralised and collective 
bargaining coverage low. They also showed, for example, that industrial relations in the sea 
and coastal water transport sector is described in the majority of countries by very similar 
characteristics to the Organised Corporatism system (which they labelled as a Dense system) 
as actors are strong and well organised (in particular, union density is high), the fragmentation 
of the union system is intermediate (compared to other sectors) and collective bargaining 
coverage is high. In order to enable a proper differentiation between the sectoral and national 
typology Bechter, Brandl and Meardi (2011, 2012) also rename the remaining three industrial 
relations systems: Social Partnership becomes Political, State-centred becomes Lean, and 
Liberal becomes Fragile. 
Similar to the Social Partnership system, the Political system is characterised by rather high 
levels of centralisation and high coverage of collective as well as an intermediate 
organisational density (especially of unions). The main characteristics of the Lean system are 
its intermediate organisational density of trade unions, the high fragmentation of actors, an 
intermediate level of collective bargaining but relatively high collective bargaining coverage. 
Finally, the Fragile system is described by an intermediate, but still relatively high, 
organisational density, relatively high collective bargaining coverage, an intermediate 
fragmentation of unions, and a relatively low degree of centralisation of collective bargaining. 
A similar identification for the public sector does not exist. Therefore, in this section of the 
chapter, public sector industrial relations systems are identified and compared to the 
  
60 
predominant national industrial relations system on the basis of seven key dimensions 
(Bechter, Brandl and Meardi, 2012). These are union density, union fragmentation, employer 
association density, fragmentation of employers’ associations, collective bargaining coverage, 
centralisation of collective bargaining, and the interaction of social partners with the state on 
questions of public policy. With the exception of the interaction dimension, all dimensions 
have already been discussed in the previous sections of the chapter. In the analysis here the 
interaction of both employers’ associations and unions is considered as a further key 
dimension of the industrial relations system as it expresses a further mode of actors’ activity. 
 
Box 1.6: Comparing sectoral and national industrial relations systems 
By comparing and classifying public sector industrial relations systems with national systems 
the Visser (2008) typology is used as a reference as it provides a classification of industrial 
relations systems for all EU-27 countries. The main advantage of the Visser (2008) typology 
is that it is empirical and linked to classifications of varieties of capitalism, welfare states and 
employment regimes. Three indicators of dimensions (union density, employer density, 
collective bargaining coverage) are identical between the public sector and Visser’s (2008) 
national level indicators. In order to compare public sector industrial relations and Vissers’ 
(2008) national industrial relations typology for two indicators slight definitional differences 
have to be considered. First, centralisation of collective bargaining and policy involvement 
are used as correspondents in the public sector for Visser’s indicator for corporatism. Also, 
Visser’s union concentration and sector organisation corresponds here with fragmentation of 
the actors. In addition to these definitional differences another difference has to be 
considered as the dimension workplace representation is excluded for the (public) sector 
level, due to missing data. Because of these definitional differences several robustness tests 
for the classifications have been made including the consideration of collective bargaining 
levels and indicators for coordination instead of centralisation. All robustness tests support 
the results shown here. Thus, given these peculiarities, it is possible to identify 
commonalities and peculiarities in public sector industrial relations and national industrial 
relations. 
 
By analysing public sector data in the EU-27 it is possible to test whether the types of 
industrial relations systems apparent at the public sector level holds any resemblance to the 
national typology. This also facilitates the classification of public sector industrial relations 
systems for the EU-27, and shows how far they deviate from the national-level 
correspondents. 
Public sector industrial relations systems in all EU Member States are classified using the k-
means clustering method in order to distribute public sector industrial relations alongside the 
same attributes of industrial relations dimensions at national level as Visser has done (2008). 
This means that the attributes of the national and (public) sector types correspond with each 
other, e.g. Organised corporatism system attributes correspond with Dense system attributes, 
Liberal system attributes with Fragile system attributes, etc. For the indicators that do not 
directly match the Visser (2008) indicators, the average of the national-level characteristics of 
the countries that belong, according to Visser, to that cluster is used. Chart 1.12 shows the 
classification first (a) of the EU-27 countries according to Visser (2008), and then (b) the 
distribution for the public sector.  
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Chart 1.12: Comparison between national and public sector industrial relations systems 
  
(a) national industrial relations systems (b) public sector industrial relations systems 
 = Organised Corporatism = Dense 
 = Social Partnership = Political 
 = State-centred = Lean 
 = Liberal = Fragile 
 = Mixed = Empty 
Source: Bechter, B., Brandl, B. and Meardi, G. (2011). 
 Note: Public sector industrial relations in the Czech Republic, Spain, and the UK can be considered 
as being classified on the margins of another system.  
 
As can be seen in Chart 1.12, public sector industrial relations rarely match the traditional 
national types. Only in the Nordic countries (i.e. Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and in 
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Slovenia do public sector industrial relations systems 
correspond to the national system (i.e. to the industrial relations system in the majority of all 
other sectors in the country). 
Further, in no country are public sector industrial relations characterised by an Empty 
industrial relations system which is typical of the national level in the CEECs. On the 
contrary, the analysis shows that public sector industrial relations systems are characterised 
by typically very centralised collective bargaining and high coverage, intensive interaction 
with the state (which is obvious for the public sector), a high (but not exceptionally high) 
fragmentation of actors and a relatively high degree of actors’ densities, which is the 
characteristic of the Dense and Political systems of industrial relations. 
A Dense-type public sector industrial relations system is found in Austria, Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania and the UK, which in all countries does not correspond 
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with the national system. While a Political public sector industrial relations system is present 
in the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain which is also not typical of 
the majority of all other sectors, i.e. for the country. In Poland and Latvia public industrial 
relations are described by the Lean model and in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary by 
the Liberal model which marks a difference of public sector industrial relations to the Empty 
characteristics of the majority of all other sectors in these countries. See also chapter 3 for 
further clustering of industrial relations models. 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that different industrial relations systems in the EU-27 and between the 
private and public sector can be considered as a main characteristic of European industrial 
relations. The main focus of this chapter has been an investigation of the differences between 
the public and the private sector and between the EU Member States, in addition to an 
exploration of the main recent trends in public sector industrial relations. It has also discussed 
and analysed differences and similarities as well as developments over time in many 
dimensions of industrial relations, with the objective of stimulating debate and policy action 
for the role of industrial relations in the current economic crisis.  
This chapter has shown that in almost all EU Member States industrial relations in the public 
sector are different to the private sector. The main reason for this is the different 
administrative and legal structures and practices in place. In many EU Member States the 
employment relationship in the public sector is regulated by different legislation, most 
notably concerning the right to bargain collectively and to take industrial action. The 
explanation for the existence of such differences lies in the fact that the public sector has a 
special role in each national economy and society as the public sector is the main provider of 
vital services such as education, health and security. As the role of the public sector is similar 
in all EU Member States almost the same differences between public and private sector in 
industrial relations are observable in individual Member States. A further common feature of 
public sector employment relations in all countries is the absence or weakness of market 
mechanisms of regulation. From an industrial relations point of view, this is one of the main 
distinctions from the private sector, and the main reason for the distinctiveness of public 
sector employment relations. 
The most striking differences are the higher collective bargaining coverage in the public 
sector and the higher degree of centralisation of collective bargaining. Further, in some 
countries, a significant proportion of public employees are either not covered by the right to 
bargain collectively, or have weak bargaining rights. Higher collective bargaining coverage 
can be explained by greater recognition of the state as an employer for collective bargaining 
per se and of trade unions as partners in particular. The higher degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining rests on the prevailing interest of central state authorities in maintaining 
their influence and control in the wage formation process. Other main differences between the 
public and the private sector include the higher degree of unionisation in the public sector, 
which can also be explained by a greater acceptance of trade unions by the state.   
Nevertheless, these prevailing differences do not mean that the situation is static. On the 
contrary, at this point in time the public sector has witnessed a long period of transformation 
in almost all EU Member States as cost-efficiency pressures lead states to cut public services 
and introduce more flexible private law employment relationships. Thus it could be argued 
that the industrial relations contexts for the public and private sectors are converging. Given 
that industrial relations adjust and transform along these contextual framework conditions, 
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this would imply that industrial relations in the public sector are now showing similar 
characteristics to private sector industrial relations. 
The main trends highlighted by this introductory chapter include the trend towards 
privatisation and outsourcing of parts of the public sector, the impact of this and the 
implications for industrial relations in the public sector. The crisis has also had an impact on 
employment and industrial relations in the public sector, and will in all likelihood continue to 
have an effect in the medium term. This issue is explored more fully in chapter 4 of this 
report. 
This chapter has also shown that across the public sector, industrial relations in each of the 
EU-27 are relatively homogeneous, characterised more by differences to other sectors than to 
other countries. It has been shown that two main systems of public sector industrial relations 
exist in the EU-27, characterised by very centralised collective bargaining and a high 
coverage rate, intensive interaction of social partners in the public sector with government 
authorities, high (but not exceptionally high) fragmentation of actors and a relatively high 
degree of actors’ densities. These characteristics correspond with Dense and Political sectoral 
industrial relations systems, regimes or models, or Organised corporatism and Social 
Partnership national industrial relations systems, respectively. 
This chapter has set the scene for the rest of this report by providing an overview of national 
and public sector industrial relations in all EU Member States at the end of the first decade of 
the new millennium. Looking to the future, the EU-27 has been struggling with a global 
economic, financial and budgetary crisis since 2008, both the economic and political context 
framework is likely to change in the future and neither public nor private sector industrial 
relations will be immune to these changes. Austerity policies in all EU Member States include 
the public sector and the burden of public deficit cuts will accelerate the transformation of the 
public sector in the EU-27 which can be expected to impose major changes on public sector 
industrial relations. Although the future is therefore uncertain, the diversity of the role of the 
public sector in different countries and the different embeddedness of the public sector in 
different countries serves to continue the diversity of public sector industrial relations systems 
in the EU-27. It is therefore likely that heterogeneity in both public and private sector 
industrial relations in the EU-27 will remain in the near future. 
The next chapter of this report looks in detail at industrial relations in a specific group of 
countries – the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) – examining their main 
characteristics, development, and future challenges. Chapter 3 examines the specific pressures 
that are being brought to bear on public sector industrial relations in the EU, while chapter 4 
highlights the impact that the current recession and in particular national austerity measures 
have had on public sector industrial relations. Chapter 5 continues the forward-looking theme 
by examining the growth of the green economy, the impact of this on skills needs and the 
labour market, and the role that social partners can play in greening the labour market. 
Chapter 6 continues this examination of the role of the social partners by highlighting their 
role in and influence over debates and policies in the area of welfare and pensions systems, in 
the context of the changing economic and social environment. Chapter 7 looks at the main 
recent developments in the European social dialogue at cross-sector and sector level, while 
chapter 8 presents the main legislative developments in the employment and social field. 
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Chapter 2: Industrial relations developments in the new member 
states in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
There is a large degree of heterogeneity across the different CEECs. Industrial relations 
structures and processes remain relatively quite weak in some, and the crisis has hit hard. 
Future challenges include building the social dialogue and national industrial relations 
systems. 
 
Based on a draft by Marta Kahancová (Central European Labour Studies Institute, Bratislava) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 increased the diversity of industrial relations systems 
across the EU. In particular, the 10 new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe (the 
CEECs) increased the variation in structural and institutional characteristics of industrial 
relations in the EU. Compared to the member states that joined by EU prior to 2004 (EU-15), 
CEEC industrial relations, with the exception of Slovenia, are characterised by weaker trade 
unions, a lack of employer willingness to organise in employers’ associations, a lower 
incidence of bipartite collective bargaining, persistently lower bargaining coverage, greater 
government involvement in social partnership but at the same time a contested position of 
tripartite concertation and social dialogue. This chapter presents an overview of industrial 
relations in the CEECs since the 1990s.  
 
The chapter argues that while there is wide diversity between these countries, industrial 
relations institutions (and actors) in CEECs remain weak and fragmented, and some 
developments in this respect are worrying, as some reforms underway undermine the 
consensus which is needed for an effective involvement of social partners in adapting to 
change: in a number of these countries responses to the crisis are generating increasingly 
conflictual industrial relations. In some cases, the question of the compatibility of these 
reforms with international agreements or conventions has been raised. There is a need to 
revitalise national industrial relation systems and to support their actions in order to promote 
and restore consensus to ensure the long term sustainability of the economic and social 
reforms underway. 
 
The focus is on the main differences in structural indicators between the EU-15 and the 
CEECs, as well as on the internal diversity among particular CEECs and country clusters. The 
chapter also explores the potential of CEEC social partners to stabilise and innovate on 
industrial relations structures through responding to labour market developments after EU 
enlargement and the economic crisis. Finally, the chapter evaluates the future of industrial 
relations in the CEECs with a particular focus on the capacity of industrial relations 
institutions to accommodate Europeanisation of social dialogue and collective bargaining 
practices.   
 
Industrial relations in most EU-15 Member States in Western Europe have evolved 
systematically since the post-war period in the context of democracy and a market economy. 
By contrast, industrial relations in the CEECs developed in the context of state socialism until 
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the end of 1980s and embarked on transition to independent social dialogue and collective 
bargaining under democracy and market economy in the course of the 1990s. Efforts aimed at 
European integration and joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 further shaped industrial relations 
developments in these countries, as a result of implementing the Acquis Communautaire and 
national-level social partner organisations joining EU-level organisations.  
 
Focusing on main industrial relations trends throughout the 1990s and 2000s in the CEECs, 
the first aim of this chapter is to highlight the most important characteristics of these 
countries’ industrial relations systems that have crystallised during the past two decades of 
transition and EU accession; identify the main differences of CEEC industrial relations 
systems in comparison with the EU-15; and address trends in the Europeanisation of social 
dialogue practices. The chapter’s second aim is to shed more light on industrial relations 
developments within the CEEC region. Although the CEECs share similar historical legacies 
and recent economic challenges, there are also significant differences in these countries’ 
political economies and industrial relations systems. Uncovering variation in economic 
structure, labour market performance and industrial relations helps to understand why certain 
countries have been more successful than others in implementing European standards in 
social dialogue, maintaining/building bipartite collective bargaining structures, or responding 
to the economic crisis through national-level pacts and greater involvement of the social 
partners in policymaking. Whereas the previous two aims draw on developments in the past 
two decades, the chapter’s third aim is to evaluate the capacity of the CEEC social partners 
to shape policies, labour market developments and employment conditions across the CEECs 
in response to recent economic challenges. The challenges considered are twofold: the first is 
the large-scale work-related mobility from some CEECs to EU-15 countries after EU 
enlargement, which led to labour shortages in domestic labour markets. The second challenge 
is the economic crisis, which had various impacts on CEEC labour markets through 
unemployment, employment flexibility and austerity measures. Several recent cases will be 
presented in order to highlight the responses of social partners and the role of social 
concertation for governing post-crisis labour market challenges. Attention will also be paid to 
developments in public sector industrial relations in the context of exposure to post-crisis 
austerity.  
 
The final, fourth, aim of this chapter is to evaluate future prospects for the role of social 
dialogue and collective bargaining in the CEECs. In order to do this, the author will not only 
rely on statistical evidence on trends in associational membership and bargaining coverage, 
but predominantly on the potential for action, organisational capacity, resource building, and 
policy influence, based on recent case study evidence on how bargaining institutions have 
responded to the challenges raised by EU enlargement and the economic crisis, and how 
industrial relations actors build diversified resources and are using recent economic 
challenges to improve their capacity and strengthen their legitimacy. 
  
 
Box 2.1: Data sources 
Given the general lack of comparative data on industrial relations in the CEECs, this chapter 
draws on several data sources. In addition to Eurostat, the most important source for 
indicators of union and employer density, bargaining levels and bargaining coordination is the 
latest version of the ICTWSS - Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts - database (version 3.0, 2011). Although the coverage of 
CEECs is more limited in this database than the coverage of EU-15 countries, the ICTWSS is 
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the only available source of comparative information on institutional and structural 
characteristics of industrial relations systems covering also the new member states. 
Information in the database comes from national surveys, the European Social Survey, and 
administrative data obtained from unions and from the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO) of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. Regular comparative EIRO reports are also a good source of evidence on 
developments in the CEECs. Additional sources include Eurobarometer, Eurostat, ILO’s 
Laborsta, the OECD Employment Outlook, and the UN Population Statistics. These data 
sources are supplemented by case studies of collective bargaining, trade union action, and 
industrial relations revitalization trends in the CEECs. Case studies derive from research 
conducted by the author and other dedicated researchers within various EU research projects, 
including the sixth and seventh framework programs (e.g., FP6 EQUALSOC
6
 and FP7 
GUSTO
7
) and other projects contracted by the European Commission (e.g., BARSORI – 
Bargaining for Social Rights: Reducing Precariousness and Labour Market Segmentation 
through Collective Bargaining and Social Dialogue). Finally, the chapter draws on a number 
of academic articles and books (e.g. Meardi 2012, Bohle and Greskovits 2012) that analyze 
developments in political economy and industrial relations in the CEECs. 
 
 
2.1 Economic performance of the CEECs 
 
To understand the context of recent industrial relations developments in the CEECs and the 
motivation for comparing them with the EU-15, this section provides a brief overview of 
economic and labour market performance of the CEECs. In short, the CEECs experienced 
GDP growth rates (see Chart 2.1), a significant inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) 
especially between 2000 and 2007 (see Chart 2.2), and significantly higher collectively agreed 
wage increases than many EU-15 countries (see Chart 2.3). The inflow of FDI to the CEECs 
derived from an attractive investment environment, new markets, proximity to markets in the 
EU-15 countries and also a significant gap in wages and earnings between the CEECs and the 
EU-15 countries (see Chart 2.4). Although wages are constantly rising in the CEECs, labour 
productivity (measured in terms of GDP per hour worked) in all CEECs, while improving, 
systematically lags behind that of EU-15 countries (see Chart 2.5). Based on an index of EU-
27=100, labour productivity per hour worked in the EU-15 reached 117.7 in 2000 and 113.8 
in 2010, while labour productivity in the CEECs reached only 44.83 in 2000 and 58.23 in 
2008. 
 
                                                          
6
 EQUALSOC: Economic Change, Quality of Life and Social Cohesion (FP6, 2005-2011) – See: 
http://www.equalsoc.org/ 
7
 GUSTO: Meeting the challenges of economic uncertainty and sustainability – through employment, industrial 
relations, social and environmental policies in Europe (FP7, 2009-2012) - See http://www.gusto-project.eu/ 
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Chart 2.1: Average GDP per capita and countries with highest/lowest GDP per capita 
(PPS) in the CEECs and the EU-15, 1995–2011 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: LU, which is included in the EU-15 total, has a much higher GDP per head as measured than 
NL (220 in 1995, 244 in 2000, 274 in 2007 and 271 in 2011) but the level is artificially increased by 
the large number of people who are employed in LU and contribute to GDP but live elsewhere and so 
are not counted in the calculation of GDP per head. 
 
Chart 2.2: Foreign direct investment inflows into the CEECs, 2000/2007 and 2008/2011 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Average value of inward FDI flows as % of  GDP 
 
Chart 2.3: Collectively agreed wage increases in the CEECs, average 2003-2008 
 
Source: EIRO reports on wage developments 
Note: Inflation adjusted averages; EU-27 refers to EU-25 before 2007 
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Chart 2.4: Annual net earnings in the CEECs as a percentage of the EU-15, 2002–2010 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: CEECs average, SI with highest annual net earnings and BG with lowest annual net earnings in 
the CEECs. Earnings for two-earner married couple with two children. 
 
 
Chart 2.5: Labour productivity in the CEECs before and during the crisis, average 
2000/2007 and 2008/2010 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Measured in terms of GDP per hour worked. 
 
 
The average employment rate across the CEECs between 2000-2011 is lower than the EU-15 
average (see Chart 2.6). Moreover, there is a dispersion in employment rates between 
particular CEECs, with the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia exhibiting the highest 
employment rates, while Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia have employment 
rates systematically below the EU-15 average. The economic crisis led to a significant 
increase in unemployment rates in 2009-2010 in several CEECs and also in the average 
unemployment rate in the CEECs (see Chart 2.7). Unemployment remains systematically low 
in Slovenia, Romania and the Czech Republic.  
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Chart 2.6: Employment rates of those aged 20-64 in the CEECs, average 2000/2011 
  
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Chart 2.7: Unemployment rates in the CEECs, 2007–2011 
  
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
In addition to the summary of main differences in economic performance between the CEECs 
and the EU-15, the CEECs are interesting in terms of analysis because of their large internal 
diversity despite facing similar economic challenges over the past two decades. All CEECs 
underwent major economic, labour market and social reforms during the 1990s and 2000s, but 
different countries adopted different policies to attract FDI, boost economic performance and 
address socio-economic questions during the transition from state socialism to a market 
economy and democracy (1990s), the post-transition period of development (2000s) and the 
period affected by the global economic crisis (after 2008). As a result, in the CEECs we find 
some of the best performing economies in the EU, with high GDP growth rates and low 
inequality rates (eg Slovenia (although the situation may have changed post-2010) and the 
Czech Republic, see Table 2.1 for income inequality coefficients in the EU), but also 
countries that experience the highest inequality rates within the EU (eg Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania).  
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Table 2.1 GINI coefficients for the total population based on equalised disposable 
income, 2005 – 2010*  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SI 23.8 23.7 23.2 23.4 22.7 23.8 23.8 
HU 26.0 25.3 25.3 24.7 25.1 24.9 25.2 
CZ 26.2 28.1 24.5 23.7 24.8 25.9 25.7 
SK 27.6 33.3 25.6 25.2 24.7 24.1 26.9 
CEECs 33.2 33.0 31.8 31.3 30.7 30.3 30.5 
EU-27 30.6 30.2 30.6 30.8 30.4 30.5 30.7 
EU-15 29.9 29.5 30.2 30.7 30.4 30.5 30.8 
PL 35.6 33.3 32.2 32.0 31.4 31.1 31.1 
EE 34.1 33.1 33.4 30.9 31.4 31.3 31.9 
BG 36.3 35.0 33.8 34.0 35.5 36.9 32.9 
RO 31.0 33.0 37.8 36.0 34.9 33.3 33.2 
LV 25.0 31.2 35.3 35.9 33.4 33.2 35.1 
LT 36.1 39.2 35.4 37.7 37.4 36.1 35.2 
* The GINI coefficient measures income inequality in a particular country. A lower coefficient means 
lower inequality; while a higher coefficient means higher inequality among the country’s population.  
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 
Note: Years relate to the income year in each case, the survey being carried out in the subsequent 
year. 
 
 
The CEECs also vary in their public sector size and employment. Table 2.2 documents the 
fact that Lithuania and Latvia had the highest levels of public sector employment among eight 
CEECs in 2008. This is mainly due to their high shares of government employment as a 
proportion of total public sector employment. In contrast, we find the lowest share of public 
sector employment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. With the exception of 
Slovakia, the share of government employment of total employment remained relatively 
stable across the CEECs between 1997 and 2008. In Slovakia, the share of government 
employment declined from 24% to less than 15% between 1997 and 2008. In contrast to 
government employment, all CEECs where data are available demonstrate a declining trend 
in the share of employment in publicly-owned enterprises, as a proportion of total 
employment. The greatest decline has been reported in Bulgaria, from over 26% in 1997 to 
5% in 2006.
8
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Source: data on public sector employment are from the ILO Laborsta database.  
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Table 2.2 Public sector employment as share of the  
total employed population in the CEECs, 2008* 
  General 
government 
employment  
Employment 
in publicly 
owned 
enterprises 
Total public 
sector 
employment 
LT 22.9% 5.3% 28.2% 
LV  22.1% 6.4% 28.5% 
HU 21.2% n/a n/a 
EE 20.1% 3.9% 24.0% 
SI 15.0% 8.6% 23.6% 
SK 14.8% 6.0% 20.8% 
BG 14.7% 5.3% 20.0% 
CZ 13.5% 7.0% 20.5% 
RO 13.0% n/a n/a 
PL 10.8% 13.0% 23.8% 
* 2007 for the Czech Republic and 2006 for Bulgaria.  
Source: calculations based on ILO Laborsta. The ILO defines public sector employment as the 
aggregate of employment in general government and in publicly owned enterprises.  
 
The shrinking size of public sector employment is related to an important trend across the 
CEECs, namely, the outsourcing of public services to private providers. As a consequence, a 
proportion of public sector employees have lost their public servant status during recent 
reforms and are no longer listed under public sector employment. For example, as a 
consequence of healthcare reforms in Hungary and Slovakia, employees in public hospitals 
lost their public servant status and are no longer covered by collective agreements applicable 
to public sector employees (Kahancová and Szabó 2012). While comprehensive data on the 
extent of outsourcing are not available, evidence on the final consumption expenditure in 
General Government as a percentage of GDP in the CEECs gives some indication of 
expenditure in this particular subsector of the public sector and the share of wages in 
government costs (see Chart 2.8).  
 
Chart 2.8: Final consumption expenditure of General Government (% GDP) in the 
CEECs, 2000 and 2011 
 
Source: Eurostat, Government statistics 
Note: ‘Costs of goods and services used and financed by General Government’ consist of 
‘Intermediate consumption’ plus ‘Social transfers in kind supplied to households via market 
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producers’ 
 
 
Finally, the government budget balance shows that almost all CEECs succeeded in decreasing 
their government deficit after 2009, which is a tendency shared with the EU-15 countries (see 
Table 2.3). In terms of the general government gross debt, all CEECs remained below the EU-
15 debt average in 2001. Although debt has been growing in several countries, Hungary is the 
only country whose gross debt as % of GDP approximates the EU-15 average in 2011 (ibid.) 
 
Table 2.3 General government deficit/surplus and general government gross debt as % 
of GDP in the CEECs, 2007-2011 
 General government  
deficit/surplus  
  General government  
gross debt  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
BG 1.2 1.7 -4.3 -3.1 -2.0 BG 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 16.3 
CZ -0.7 -2.2 -5.8 -4.8 -3.2 CZ 27.9 28.7 34.2 37.8 40.8 
EE 2.4 -2.9 -2.0 0.2 1.2 EE 3.7 4.5 7.2 6.7 6.1 
LV -0.4 -4.2 -9.7 -8.1 -3.4 LV 9.0 19.8 36.7 44.5 42.2 
LT -1.0 -3.3 -9.4 -7.2 -5.5 LT 16.8 15.5 29.3 37.9 38.5 
HU -5.1 -3.7 -4.5 -4.5 4.3 HU 67.0 73.0 79.8 81.8 81.4 
PL -1.9 -3.7 -7.4 -7.9 -5.0 PL 45.0 47.1 50.9 54.8 56.4 
RO -2.9 -5.7 -9.0 -6.8 -5.5 RO 12.8 13.4 23.6 30.5 33.4 
SI 0.0 -1.9 -6.0 -5.7 -6.4 SI 23.1 22.0 35.0 38.6 46.9 
SK -1.8 -2.1 -8.0 -7.7 -4.9 SK 29.6 27.9 35.6 41.0 43.3 
CEECs -1.8 -3.3 -6.9 -6.4 -3.7 CEECs 35.3 36.7 43.0 47.4 49.3 
EU-15 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -6.5 -4.5 EU-15 61.3 66.3 76.9 82.9 85.6 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Building on this brief presentation of selected economic and labour market indicators, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on industrial relations developments across the CEECs and 
their comparison with the EU-15.  
 
2.2 Comparing industrial relations in the CEECs and the EU-15 
 
The incremental and long-term character of evolution of particular industrial relations features 
in the EU-15 and the CEECs allow an examination of variation in industrial relations and 
prospects for convergence between these two clusters. Historically, industrial relations 
arrangements and their achievements in contributing to growth and social protection in the 
post-war period in most Western European democratic and capitalist states have rested on at 
least one of four institutional pillars: strong or reasonably established social partners (in 
particular, trade unions); solidarity wage setting based on collective bargaining at the sectoral 
or higher level of coordination;  fairly generalised arrangements of information, consultation 
and in some cases co-determination at the company level based on the rights of workers and 
unions to be involved in decision-making; and institutionalised or routinised practice of 
tripartite policy making and involvement of social partners in tripartite policy arrangements 
(EC 2008; Streeck, 1992; Traxler, 2002; Visser, 2006a). These pillars will be used to compare 
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the main features of industrial relations between the CEECs and EU-15.  
 
2.2.1 Trade unions and employers’ associations 
 
A strong position and legal recognition of associations representing employees and employers 
is the basic precondition for a functioning social dialogue between these social partners. Legal 
recognition, a sufficient membership base, organisational capacity to negotiate and the 
populations’ and companies’ confidence in these associations are among key preconditions 
for a strong position and a functioning social dialogue. Statistical evidence most commonly 
reports structural indicators such as membership base. 
 
To evaluate the trade unions’ position in the CEECs in comparison to the EU-15, Chart 2.9 
presents the developments in net union density rate, which indicates union membership as a 
proportion of wage earners in employment in a particular country across three time periods 
between 1990 and 2008. Evidence suggests a number of common characteristics between the 
CEECs and the EU-15. First, the whole EU has been facing a trade union membership 
decline. However, trade unions in the CEECs lost more members from the wage-earning 
population than their EU-15 counterparts.
9
 On average, union density in the EU-15 declined 
from almost 33% in 1990 to 24.2% in 2008. In the CEECs, however, union density declined 
from 59% in 1990 to 19% in 2008. This means that while in the EU-15 about every fourth 
wage earner is a trade union member, in the CEECs less than one in five wage earners join a 
trade union. In a comparative perspective, CEEC trade unions are therefore weaker than trade 
unions in the EU-15. 
 
Chart 2.9: Trade union density rates in the EU, 1990, 2000 and 2008 
 
Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011), Eurostat 
Note: Union density is based on members of trade unions as % of total employees (averages weighted 
by dependent employment) 
Data for 1990 relate to 1991 for RO, 1993 for CZ, SK and EE and 1995 for LV and LT  
          
 
                                                          
9
 It is however important to note that the initially high union density rates in the EU-10 in the early 1990s must 
be treated cautiously, because prior to the fall of state socialism in 1989 union membership has been 
artificially high. 
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A weakening membership base indicates that trade unions face a challenge in defending their 
position and reversing the trend in declining membership. Addressing this challenge is easier 
in countries where public acceptance of trade unions is higher. Chart 2.10 compares trade 
union confidence in the CEECs with the EU-15. In the EU-15, the social acceptance of unions 
remained stable on average between 2004 and 2010, with an almost equal share of the 
population trusting and not trusting trade unions. On average, the proportion of CEEC citizens 
with low confidence in unions is similar to the EU-15.  In contrast to the EU-15, evidence 
suggests that trust in trade unions has grown in the CEECs, which contrasts with the declining 
union membership discussed above. The factors explaining this interesting paradox deserve 
further empirical research. Finally, Chart 2.10 indicates that the share of CEEC citizens 
indifferent towards trade unions declined between 2004 and 2010, leading to a polarisation of 
citizens with a pro-union and an anti-union attitude. In this regard, the CEECs and EU-15 
have converged in crystallising citizen’s confidence in trade unions.  
 
 
Chart 2.10: Confidence in trade unions in the CEECs, 2004, 2007 and 2010 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Note: Percentage of population surveyed. The EU aggregates are averages weighted by population in 
2008. 
 
 
An additional indicator of the strength of trade unions is the unions’ capacity for industrial 
action. Strike activity is the most frequently used indicator of industrial action, although there 
is no clear relationship between strike activity and trade union strength. Trade unions opt for 
industrial action if striking is perceived as an influential channel of action to demonstrate 
union power or to reach desired results in bargaining and policymaking. In contrast, in 
countries with a tradition of negotiation culture industrial action may be a sign of negotiation 
failure and weak bargaining capacities of trade unions. Another factor influencing strike 
activity is country-specific legal regulation, which may serve as an enabling or obstructing 
force for the extent of industrial action. Despite this complexity, a comparison of strike 
activity between the CEECs and the EU-15 yields evidence on the general willingness of 
employees to voice their claims through organised collective action organised under trade 
union leadership. 
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Chart 2.11: Strike participants per 1000 of wage earners in dependent employment in 
the EU-15 and CEECs, 2003-2008 
 
Source: EIRO 
 
 
Most strike statistics report the average number of working days lost due to strike action per 
1,000 employees. However, due to limited data sources covering the CEECs Chart 2.11 
reports the number of employees involved in strike activity (per 1,000 wage earners in 
dependent employment). Although there is a large variation in strike activity between 
countries, several findings can be generalised. First, strike activity declined between the first 
and the last year of our sample (2003 and 2008) in both the EU-15 and the CEECs. Second, 
despite this declining trend, employees in the EU-15 countries engaged to a greater extent in 
strike activities than employees in the CEECs. Finally, since 2007, there is a converging trend 
in strike activity between the EU-15 and the CEECs through a continuous decline in strike 
activities in the EU-15 and a slight increase in strike activity in the CEECs. These findings 
suggest that trade unions in the CEECs engaged in industrial action less frequently than their 
EU-15 counterparts, which supports the labour quiescence argument. However, the slightly 
increasing strike involvement after 2007 suggests that there are possibly new incentives for 
trade unions to opt for industrial action even in countries where unions traditionally chose a 
different strategy. At the same time, the growth in strike activities can be linked to the 
following factors: an improved labour market performance in the CEECs (see Section 2.3), a 
greater diversification of union action in the CEECs after 2007, and the fact that other – more 
institutionalised – channels of influence, such as social dialogue at the national level or 
collective bargaining at the sector and company levels, have not yielded satisfactory results. 
 
Trade unions representing the interests of employees engage in social dialogue and collective 
bargaining with employer associations representing employer interests. Membership in 
employers’ associations is more difficult to assess than trade union membership because of a 
lack of official statistics, employer freedom to join more than one employers’ association, or 
because employers’ associations commonly cover only the private sector while the public 
sector also accounts for a significant share of employment in the economy. Similar to the 
trade union density rate, the most common indicator to assess the spread of employer 
associations over the economy is the employer organisation density rate, calculated as the 
share of employees working in companies that are members of employers’ associations. Chart 
2.12 presents recent employer organisation density rates across EU members. It indicates a 
variation between CEECs and EU-15; namely, a higher employer density in the EU-15 
countries (with the exception of Greece and the UK). In contrast, in the CEECs employers are 
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less eager to join an employers’ association, or these associations do not exist in particular 
sectors. Lowest employer density rates can be found in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland – 
countries where the low degree of employer organising is among the crucial factors of 
extensive bargaining decentralisation.  
 
Chart 2.12: Employer organisation density rates in the EU, 2008 
 
Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011) 
Note: FI: data 2006; CZ, LT and RO: 2007; BE and SI: 2009 
 
 
2.2.2 Collective bargaining at the sectoral or higher level of coordination 
 
The entrenchment of collective bargaining at the sectoral or higher levels of coordination is 
the second pillar of that allows a comparison between the CEECs and the EU-15. Table 2.4 
presents the extent of bargaining coordination across EU member states. With the exception 
of Slovenia, coordination of wage bargaining in the CEECs is in general more fragmented and 
decentralised than in EU-15 countries. Sector or industry-level bargaining only applies to 
Romania and Slovakia; however, even in these countries such bargaining coordination does 
not account for a regular pattern setting and is based on a weak involvement of central social 
partner organisations. Government involvement in wage bargaining does not yield a clear 
difference between the CEECs and the EU-15, because in most EU member states the 
government does not directly participate in (tripartite) wage bargaining. 
 
Legally stipulated extension mechanisms supplement institutionalised bargaining procedures 
in most EU Member States (for an overview of extension, see section 2.3.4 on extension of 
collective agreements). The aim of extensions is to broaden the coverage of collective 
agreements and thus foster solidarity wage setting also among employees in companies 
outside employers’ associations. Table 2.5 documents the fact that extension mechanisms are 
not widely institutionalised and used in the CEECs. Legal provision for mandatory extension 
of collective agreement coverage affecting more than 10% of the workforce is available only 
in Hungary; however, at the same time, Hungary suffers from a generally weak enforceability 
of collective agreements (see Table 2.4). In other CEECs, legal extension mechanisms are 
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Table 2.4 Degree of coordination and government intervention, 2000 – 2010* 
 
Coordination of and government intervention in 
 wage bargaining  
 
Coordination of wage bargaining 
1: fragmented 
bargaining, 
mostly at 
company level 
2: mixed or 
alternating 
industry- and 
firm level 
bargaining, with 
weak 
enforceability  
of industry 
agreements 
3: industry 
bargaining with no 
or irregular pattern 
setting, limited 
involvement of  
central 
organisations, and 
limited freedoms for 
company bargaining 
4: mixed industry 
and economy-wide 
bargaining: a) 
central 
organisations 
negotiate non-
enforceable central 
agreements 
(guidelines) and/or 
b) key unions and  
employers 
associations set 
pattern for the entire 
economy 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 i
n
 
w
a
g
e 
b
a
rg
a
in
in
g
 
4: The government participates directly in 
wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as  
in social pacts) 
   SI, FI,BE, IE 
3: The government influences wage 
bargaining outcomes indirectly through 
price- ceilings, indexation, tax measures, 
minimum wages, and/or pattern setting  
through public sector wages 
PL, LT, MT BG, CZ, HU, 
LU,FR 
RO, SK, PT  
 
 
EL, ES, NL 
2: The government influences wage 
bargaining by providing an institutional 
framework of consultation and information 
exchange 
EE, LV, UK  
 
CY 
 
 
DK, SE 
 
 
DE, IT, AT 
* Average for 2000-2010; CEECs in italics.  
Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011). 
 
either not available or not widely used due to various obstacles. For example, in Slovakia, 
extension is possible only upon consent of the employer concerned, which represents an 
additional institutional barrier to broadening the coverage of collective agreements (see Box 
2.2). 
 
Table 2.5 Collective bargaining levels and extension mechanisms, 2000 – 2010* 
Dominant level of collective bargaining 
and  
the presence of extension mechanisms 
(average of years 2000-2010, CEECs in 
red) 
Extension mechanisms  
0:legal provision  
for mandatory  
extension not available 
1: legal provision for 
mandatory extension 
available, but not regularly or 
widely used  
(<10%) 
2: legal provision for 
mandatory extension  
available, regularly applied 
and affecting 
 significant share of the 
workforce (>=10%) 
L
ev
e
l 
4: national or central level, with 
additional  
sectoral / local or company 
bargaining 
SI, IE  BE, EL, FI 
3: sectoral or industry level RO,DK, IT, NL, PT, SE DE AT, ES 
2: sectoral or industry level,  
with additional local or company 
bargaining  
CY,LU BG,CZ, SK  
 
HU, FR 
1: local or company bargaining LT,LV,PL,MT,UK EE  
* Average for 2000-2010; CEECs in italics.  
Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011). 
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The lower degree of bargaining coordination, coupled with weaker enforcement of collective 
agreements and a lower legal entrenchment of extension mechanisms in CEECs accounts for 
the fact that bargaining coverage across the CEECs is systematically lower than in the EU-15 
countries (see Chart 2.13). One exception is Slovenia, where coverage reached 100% prior to 
2006 due to mandatory employer membership in chambers and the legally binding nature of 
collective agreements. After the introduction of free collective bargaining employer density as 
well as bargaining coverage dropped and further bargaining decentralisation and decline in 
coverage is expected.  
 
Besides a gap in bargaining coverage, the trend of declining bargaining coverage has been 
more pronounced in the CEECs than in the EU-15. On average, coverage declined in the EU-
15 by 0.9 percentage points between 2000 and 2008, while the CEECs experienced on 
average a coverage decline of just over five percentage points. 
 
 
Chart 2.13: Adjusted bargaining coverage rates in the EU, 2000 and 2008 
Source: 
ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011).  
Note: % of employees covered. EU averages weighted by dependent employment. No data for 
Romania for 2000 - figure is assumed to be the same as for 2008 in calculating the CEEC average. 
Data for 2000 relate to 2001 for PL, Hu and EE, to 2002 for PT, LV, LT, CY and MT, and to 2003 for 
BG. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Information and consultation of employees at company level  
 
Information and consultation of employees at company level underwent major changes in the 
CEECs during EU accession. The Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees 
(2002/14/EC) established a set of minimum standards across all EU member states, thereby 
fostering a certain Europeanisation of practices of company-level information and 
consultation. Prior to the implementation of the above Directive, in most CEECs (with the 
exception of Hungary and Slovenia) trade unions served as exclusive employee representation 
organisations. Therefore, the Directive has influenced company-level employee rights to a 
greater extent in the CEECs than in EU-15 countries that have established company-level 
information and consultation through a dual channel (involving both trade unions and works 
councils). Five to seven years after the eastward EU enlargements, several researchers have 
evaluated the state of information and consultation of employees at the company level in the 
CEECs. The European Commission’s (2008c) review of the Directive’s implementation 
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documented little impact and a difficult implementation in six CEECs (BG, CZ, EST, LIT, 
PL, RO) and a positive impact in three countries (LAT, HU and SK). Other research found 
that information and consultation of employees at the company level is still weakly 
established (Meardi 2012). The Directive has not yet produced the expected positive effect on 
employees and convergence with the EU-15 establishment of this industrial relations pillar. 
One of the main reasons for this is weak trade union penetration, which proved to be an 
obstacle in the introduction of a dual representation channel at the company level. The fact 
that multi-employer bargaining in most CEECs is weakly established motivates a stronger 
trade union presence at the company level. However, evidence shows that instead of a smooth 
implementation of the dual channel of employee representation at the workplace, tensions 
between trade unions and works councils have emerged. Even in Hungary, where the dual 
system was institutionalised in the 1990s, works councils failed to play the expected role in 
company-level information and consultation in the absence of trade unions (Tóth and 
Neumann 2004, Meardi 2012). Finally, in several countries the Directive has been used as a 
resource to weaken, rather than strengthen, employee prerogatives through the introduction of 
legal proposals raising thresholds for trade union representativeness or limiting trade unions 
rights. In sum, the state of company-level information and consultation of employees in the 
CEECs demonstrates that all pillars of the industrial relations systems are closely interrelated. 
If trade unions are weak and bargaining is decentralised, Europeanisation of industrial 
relations through EC Directives has been more complex and has not yet produced 
convergence across the EU member states. Instead, national diversity persists in company-
level representation between the EU-15 and the CEECs.   
 
 
2.2.4 Tripartism and policymaking  
 
The role of tripartite consultation and involvement of the social partners in national-level 
policymaking is the fourth pillar of an industrial relations system. The importance of 
tripartism as a channel of influence within industrial relations differs between the CEECs and 
the EU-15 countries. In the course of transition to democracy and market economy during the 
1990s, all CEECs established formal tripartite consultation bodies. Partly compensating for 
underdeveloped sectoral or other multi-employer social dialogue and collective bargaining, 
tripartism became the hallmark of industrial relations across the CEECs. Some commentators 
argued that tripartism facilitated labour inclusion in policymaking during extensive reforms 
and therefore is a positive sign of emerging corporatism (Tatur 1995, Iankova 1998). Others 
have argued that social dialogue in the CEECs does not meet basic preconditions (Mailand 
and Due 2004), and the formal existence of tripartite bodies across the CEECs countries failed 
to produce corporatist policymaking, leaving the outcomes of tripartism contested, or 
‘illusory’ (Ost 2000, Avdagic 2005). Evidence from the ICTWSS database (see Table 2.6) 
documents the existence of tripartite councils across all CEECs, but at the same time confirms 
the weak influence of tripartism, measured through social partners’ impact on social and 
economic policy making, in all CEECs with the exception of Slovenia. 
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Table 2.6 Tripartite councils and the involvement of social partners in policy making 
  Involvement of unions and employers in government 
decisions on social and economic policy 
  
limited 
irregular and  
infrequent 
regular and  
frequent 
E
x
is
te
n
ce
 o
f 
 t
ri
p
a
rt
it
e 
co
u
n
ci
l 
 
co
n
ce
r
n
in
g
 s
o
ci
a
l 
a
n
d
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 p
o
li
cy
 
Council with only unions, 
employers and government 
representatives or 
independent experts 
 FI, CZ, LV, 
PL, RO, SK 
AT, BE, LU, 
NL, SI 
Council with various 
societal interest 
representatives 
FR IT, EL, MT, PT, BG, 
EE, HU, LT 
ES, IE 
No permanent council UK DE CY, DK, SE 
 
Source: ICTWSS database version 3.0 (2011). CEECs in italics. 
 
 
In sum, tripartism in the CEECs is strongly established but contested in terms of its real effect 
on policy making, resisting political pressures, and producing enforceable agreements. 
Developments in the 2000s suggest a slight improvement, namely tripartite negotiations in a 
number of CEECs producing broad national agreements, similar to social pacts in some EU-
15 countries. To evaluate the real role of tripartism, however, it is necessary to acknowledge 
not only the existence of tripartism as a structure, but also its outcomes, scope and 
enforcement. This chapter’s second section offers an insight into tripartite arrangements 
across particular CEECs. 
 
2.2.5 Interim conclusions 
 
The EU enlargement exercises of 2004 and 2007 increased the diversity of industrial relations 
systems across the EU not only because of different historical legacies, but also due to recent 
economic, political and societal developments across the CEECs and the EU-15. A 
comparison of indicators covering the main pillars of a stable industrial relations system 
allowed us to highlight the most important structural characteristics of industrial relations 
across the EU-15 and the CEECs. In comparison with the EU-15, CEECs are characterised by 
weaker trade unions and a faster erosion of trade union density, a lack of established 
employers’ associations, a lack of a tradition of bipartite multi-employer collective 
bargaining, persistently lower bargaining coverage (partly due to the underdeveloped system 
of extension of collective agreements), and finally a strong formal existence of tripartism that 
partly substitutes underdeveloped sector-level collective bargaining. At the same time, 
evidence suggests some convergence in industrial action between the EU-15 and the CEECs 
after 2007. Expected Europeanisation in company-level information and consultation of 
employees through the transposition of the EU law to the new member states in the CEECs 
did not yet bring convergence trends with the EU-15, but rather has strengthened the tension 
between trade unions and works councils in CEECs. 
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2.3 Varieties of industrial relations within the CEECs 
 
While several industrial relations indicators in the CEECs differ from those in the EU-15, 
there is also diversity in national industrial relations features across particular CEECs .This 
variation is the outcome of historical and recent developments, including domestic political 
and economic developments, interests of governments, business and labour, the particular 
transition trajectory on which a country has embarked, the current economic structure, 
international comparative advantages, and the country’s mode of economic, social and 
political integration in the European and world economy.  
 
To understand the emergence of current differences between industrial relations systems 
within the CEECs, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) identify three types of CEECs: the liberal 
Baltic and Balkan states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania), the welfarist 
Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), and the corporatist 
Slovenia. This comparative framework derives from particular institutions in CEECs’ 
political economies, acknowledging a long-term evolution of relations between domestic 
economic and political interest groups, the structure of the economy and its comparative 
advantages (e.g. manufacturing vs services), and historical path-dependency. Table 2.7 
presents the initial factors that help to understand the factors behind differences in CEECs’ 
industrial relations. The initial conditions for incorporating employee interests and an 
emergence of social partnership were determined by the extent of labour mobilisation and 
institutionalisation of bargaining in particular countries. Bohle and Greskovits (2012: 40-43) 
argue that bargaining institutionalisation is a function of state strength: institutionalised 
bargaining structures become one of the pillars of industrial relations in those countries where 
the government fostered the introduction of social dialogue and corporatist decision making.    
 
Table 2.7 Preconditions for variation in industrial relations across the CEECs 
 Labour mobilisation 
Low high 
Institutionalisation 
of bargaining  
high HU, CZ, SK, PL  SI  
low EE,LV, LT RO, BG 
Source: adaptation based on Bohle and Greskovits (2012) 
 
Slovenia is the only CEEC with high labour mobilisation and high institutionalisation of 
bargaining. Slovenia’s position is confirmed by its outlier position in most indicators on 
bargaining coverage, bargaining levels, and organisation of trade unions and employers. The 
liberal Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are at the other end of the spectrum, with 
low labour mobilisation and low bargaining institutionalisation. Initially strong and militant 
labour in Bulgaria and Romania was not matched by an equally strong state that would have 
been capable of building corporatism and including trade unions in policymaking. The 
capacity of the Bulgarian and the Romanian governments improved in the early 2000s with 
the prospect of EU membership to the extent that it pursued the creation of a well-functioning 
liberal state without a significant role of broader social partnership. However, unlike in other 
liberal countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), labour mobilisation rates in Bulgaria and 
Romania remain relatively high (typical also for a number of ‘southern’ countries in the EU-
15, such as France and Spain). Finally, governments in the Visegrad countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) initially aimed at building democratic corporatist 
institutions and a generous welfare state, but these efforts gradually vanished and the role of 
social partnership in economic governance became more limited. Instead of systematically 
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including trade unions in policymaking, Visegrad countries’ governments were more 
successful in compensating employees for job loss through generous welfare provisions. All 
these initial conditions set the base for structured industrial relations, which are characterised 
by a formally institutionalised but substantively rather weak system of tripartite institutions 
and social dialogue (Bohle and Greskovits 2012, Vanhuysse 2006). 
 
The above preconditions shaped the emergence of variation in industrial relations systems 
across particular CEECs, but also accounted for some degree of regional coherence within the 
liberal, welfarist and corporatist countries. Table 2.8 summarises the main industrial relations 
characteristics within each of these country clusters. Countries located in the same cluster 
share broad labour market characteristics and welfare state provisions. However, indicators of 
industrial relations structure (organisation of trade unions and employers’ associations, 
bargaining levels, extension mechanisms and the role of tripartite councils) and outcomes 
(bargaining coverage, union and employer density) document that there is variation also 
between countries located in the same cluster. For example, within the liberal country cluster, 
there are systematic differences between the Baltic States on the one hand and Romania and 
Bulgaria on the other hand. These differences can be ascribed to the long-term interplay of 
labour mobilisation and bargaining institutionalisation as presented in Table 2.7 above. 
 
 
Table 2.8 Labour markets, welfare states and main industrial relations characteristics in 
the CEECs after EU accession (2004-2008)  
 Liberal Baltics 
and Balkan 
countries 
( EE, LV, LT)  
Balkan 
countries 
(BG, RO) 
Welfarist 
Visegrad 
countries (CZ, 
HU, PL, SK) 
Corporatist 
Slovenia (SI) 
Labour 
markets 
Flexible, high 
work-related 
migration from 
these countries 
abroad 
Flexible, high 
work-related 
migration from 
these countries 
abroad 
Regulated 
flexibility, work-
related migration 
high from Poland 
and Slovakia, 
lower from 
Hungary, 
marginal from 
the Czech 
Republic 
Regulated, low 
migration abroad 
for work 
purposes 
Welfare state Minimalist Minimalist Generous but 
strict conditions, 
targeting the 
population 
outside of 
employment 
(mostly 
pensioners);  
Lack of active 
labour market 
policies  
Generous 
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Employee 
representation  
(trade union 
density, 
fragmentation) 
Fragmented trade 
unions; low 
union density 
(below 15%) 
Higher union 
density (20-
33%) 
Fragmented trade 
unions in 
Hungary, 
structured trade 
union hierarchy 
in the Czech 
Republic and 
Slovakia 
(historical 
legacy), 
fragmented but 
clearly delineated 
trade unions in 
Poland;  
15-18% union 
density  
Union density 
almost 30%, 
broader union 
presence, low 
union 
fragmentation  
Employer 
representation 
(organisation, 
interests, 
density) 
Significant 
foreign 
ownership 
(multinational 
companies), 
limited employer 
organisation, 
employer density 
20-35%, 
marginal interest 
in cooperation 
with labour – 
“impatient 
capital”  
Significant 
foreign 
ownership 
(multinational 
companies), 
limited 
employer 
organisation, 
employer 
density 20-
35%, marginal 
interest in 
cooperation 
with labour – 
“impatient 
capital” 
Significant 
foreign 
ownership 
(multinational 
companies), 
limited employer 
organisation, 
employer density 
20-40%, medium 
employer interest 
in social 
partnership and 
cooperation with 
labour  
Still significant 
domestic 
ownership, 
compulsory 
employer 
organisation 
(until 2006), 
significant 
interest in social 
dialogue, but 
recent 
decentralisation 
and more 
hostility, 
employer density 
55%  
Dominant 
bargaining 
level 
Fragmented, 
company-level  
 
Mixed 
company and 
sector/industry 
bargaining 
with weak 
enforcement of 
industry 
agreements 
(BG); 
Sector/industry 
bargaining 
(RO) 
Fragmented, 
company-level 
bargaining (PL); 
Mixed company 
and 
sector/industry 
bargaining with 
weak 
enforcement of 
industry 
agreements (CZ, 
HU); 
Sector/industry 
(SK) 
Sector/industry 
and economy-
wide bargaining, 
but recent 
decentralisation 
trends raise the 
importance of 
company-level 
bargaining 
Bargaining 
coverage 
15-25% 40% (BG) 
70% (RO) 
36% (HU), 38% 
(PL), 40% (SK), 
43% (CZ) 
92% 
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Legal 
extension of 
collective 
agreement 
coverage 
Not available 
(LV, LT); 
Available but 
limited use (EE) 
Not available 
(RO); 
Available but 
limited use 
(BG) 
Not available 
(PL); 
Available but 
limited use (CZ, 
SK); 
Available and 
extensive use 
(HU) 
Not available 
Importance of 
tripartite 
institutions 
only formal 
institutions as a 
result of EU-
accession 
pressures 
more tradition 
of tripartism, 
but declining 
role in the 
2000s 
Long-standing 
formal tripartite 
institutions, in 
most cases with 
limited power 
(consultation); 
Substantive role 
dependent upon 
the political 
environment, but 
in general 
declining 
importance since 
the early 1990s 
Encompassing 
tripartism, 
following the 
Western 
European small 
state corporatist 
model; with signs 
of recent 
disintegration  
 
Source: adaptation based on Bohle and Greskovits (2012), Stanojevic (2010) and the ICTWSS 
database, version 3.0 (2011). All percentages are for 2008 and adopted from the ICTWSS database.  
 
 
Typical features of the liberal countries include a marginal welfare state, flexible labour 
markets and weakly established trade unions and bargaining. The hallmark of the welfarist 
Visegrad countries is a combination of flexible labour markets, liberal policies, a more 
generous welfare state, attraction of foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and a more 
structured system of industrial relations. Finally, Slovenia is the only corporatist country in 
the CEECs, with a regulated labour market, generous welfare state provision and 
encompassing social partnership.  
 
2.3.1 Trade unions  
 
Trade unions have experienced a rapid decline in membership and density across the whole 
CEEC region since 1990 (see also Chart 2.9 in Section 2.2). Particular developments in union 
density align with the characteristics of liberal, welfarist, and corporatist country clusters. The 
most dramatic decline in union density took place in the welfarist countries, where, with the 
exception of Poland, union density has been as high as 65-80% in the early 1990s. A similar 
trend with great declines in union density also occurred in the liberal country cluster, 
especially in Bulgaria (from 81% to 20% between 1990 and 2008), Estonia (from 62% to 7%) 
and Romania (from 80% to 22%). Finally, although union density in Slovenia halved between 
1990 and 2008 to around 30%, the country still possesses one of the highest union density 
rates in the CEEC region.    
 
In countries with the most extensive industry/sector-wide bargaining (Slovakia and Slovenia) 
trade unions are more centralised than in countries with predominantly decentralised, 
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company-level bargaining. 
 
Chart 2.14: Trade union centralisation in the CEECs, 1998 – 2008 
 
Source: ICTWSS database, version 3.0, 2011 
Note: LT: 2001-2008, EE: 1998-2007, LV: 1995-2007. Union centralization is a summary measure 
derived from Iversen’s (1999) centralization index and taking into account union authority and union 
concentration at multiple levels. The measure ranges from 0-1 in EU-27.    
        
 
 
Latvia, with its highest degree of union centralisation and at the same time decentralised 
bargaining, is an exception. Hungary, with its six recognised peak trade union confederations, 
is an extreme case of union fragmentation given the low union coverage in the country. Chart 
2.14 shows that the challenge of bargaining decentralisation, which all CEECs face, brought 
further fragmentation in trade unions in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Latvia. By contrast, 
trade unions in most CEECs underwent a slight centralisation between 1998 and 2008. This 
trend suggests that the union landscape is stabilising, with fewer union organisations, while 
CEEC unions aim at strengthening their presence through concentration at the national level, 
e.g through engagement in tripartite concertation or political cooperation with government 
and parliament representatives/factions. Coupled with weak trade union presence at the 
company level, these trends complicate efforts to improve trade union penetration and extend 
their membership base.  
 
2.3.2 Employer organisations  
 
Trends in employer organisation reveal a low degree of employer interest in joining or 
forming employers’ associations. In all liberal and welfarist CEECs foreign investors are an 
important factor in terms of companies and employment. Empirical evidence does not support 
initial expectations that foreign investors would ‘import’ bargaining and social dialogue 
standards from the EU-15 (Meardi 2012). Although some exceptions exist, for example in the 
car industry, in general large foreign investors (multinational companies, MNCs) tend to 
benefit from the flexible labour markets and economic concessions they receive from host-
country governments in the CEECs. In other words, instead of the MNCs attempting to 
improve the structure of industrial relations and introducing collective bargaining in the 
CEECs, these employers adapt to local standards by not joining employers’ associations or 
not ascribing employers’ associations a significant interest representation role.  
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Descriptive statistical evidence (see Chart 2.12) shows that employer organisation density 
rates across the CEECs in 2008 were highest in Romania (60%), Slovenia (55%)
10
 and 
Bulgaria (55%), and lowest in Poland (20%), Estonia (23%) and Latvia (20%). In Slovenia, 
employer density reached 100% prior to 2006 when employer membership in the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Slovenia was mandatory. After the introduction of independent 
bargaining and the abolition of mandatory Chamber membership, Slovenia’s employer 
organisation density rates are on the decline.  
 
2.3.3 Bargaining levels and collective agreement coverage  
 
The character and level of employer and trade union organisation shapes the dominant 
bargaining level. Fragmented, company-level bargaining dominates in the liberal CEECs. In 
Bulgaria and Romania sector/industry-wide bargaining complements the company-level 
bargaining. In Romania, national-level bargaining also existed until 2010 when the previous 
four-year agreement came to an end and the social partners failed to conclude a new 
agreement.
11
 
 
Within the welfarist Visegrad countries, Hungary is an interesting combination of company-
level and national-level bargaining. The Hungarian National Interest Reconciliation Council 
(Országosérdekegyztetőtanács, OÉT) discusses wage increases and minimum wage setting on 
an annual basis. For example, minimum wages for 2010 were agreed after nine rounds of 
negotiations.
12
 In the public sector, a separate tripartite council approves the annual 
percentage increase and modified tariff tables for civil servants and public sector employees. 
However, none of the national-level agreements, including the public sector wage agreement, 
are legally enforceable. After extension, the national agreements therefore covered only 19% 
of private sector employment in companies with more than four employees. This practice 
leaves decentralised, mostly single-employer bargaining as the dominant bargaining level in 
Hungary.
13
 Sector-level bargaining is relevant only in the public sector and its coverage 
remains limited (in 2007, a total of 17 sectoral agreements with national scope and six 
sectoral agreements with a regional scope were in force). Reaching 36% in 2008 and 33.5% in 
2009
14
, bargaining coverage in Hungary is the lowest among the Visegrad countries.  
 
Finally, bargaining concentration in the corporatist Slovenia is documented through  100% 
bargaining coverage prior to 2006 and 92% in 2008. Company-level bargaining increased in 
importance after decentralisation on the employer side following the introduction of voluntary 
membership in employers’ associations in 2006.  
 
                                                          
10 The 55% employer organization density rate is from the ICTWSS database (adjusted for the size of dependent 
employment). EIRO reports that employer organization density rate for 2008 in Slovenia has been as high as 
80-90% (private sector density only). Source: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/09/articles/si0809039i.htm.  
11
 Source: EIRO Industrial relations and working conditions developments in Europe 2010, TN1105040. 
12
 Source: EIRO http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/02/articles/hu1002019i.htm 
13
 Source: EIRO http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/hungary_4.htm 
14
 Source: EIRO http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1004019s/hu1004019q.htm 
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2.3.4 Extension of collective agreements 
 
Bargaining coverage is closely related to legal extension mechanisms that may broaden the 
coverage of collective agreements to employees in companies that are not members of 
employers’ associations. In the liberal CEECs, with the exception of Romania, legal 
regulation of extensions does not exist or has never been put into practice. For example, the 
Lithuanian Labour Code provides for the extension of the coverage of sectoral collective 
agreements. Extension falls under the competence of the Minister of Social Security and 
Labour upon request of one or several trade unions or employer organisations that negotiated 
the sector-level agreement. Nevertheless, this provision of the Labour Code has never been 
put into practice and there has been no extension of a sectoral collective agreement in 
Lithuania.
15
 Bulgaria is a similar case: the Labour Code stipulates the extension of collective 
agreements by ministerial decree. However, the labour minister, despite some 16 claims from 
social partners, has not yet used this procedure.
16
 
 
Hungary is according to the ICTWSS database one of the few CEECs where extensions are 
widely used (see also Table 2.5). However, only four sectoral agreements were extended in 
2008.
17
 In the Czech Republic, three sector-level agreements were extended in 2008, covering 
about 23.2% of all employees.
18
 
 
Legal developments concerning extension mechanisms have taken place in only two CEECs: 
Romania and Slovakia. Slovakia, with its legal stipulation of a horizontal extension 
mechanism between 2007 and 2010, is an exception to the practice of extension procedure 
across the CEECs (see Box 2.2). In Romania, sectoral collective agreements were obligatory 
to all businesses in a particular sector irrespective of their membership in employer 
organisation until 2011, when the new Social Dialogue Code abolished this system. In the 
future, sector-level agreements will apply only to companies that are members of employer 
organisations.
19
 This new rule will mean a significant reduction in the use of extensions and a 
lower bargaining coverage, which aligns with the general trend in the CEECs. 
 
Box 2.2 Horizontal extensions of sectoral collective agreements in Slovakia  
 
Slovakia is an exception within the CEECs because it succeeded in introducing a horizontal 
(or erga omnes) extension mechanism. Although horizontal extension was used only 
temporarily between 2007 and 2010, it documents the capacity of social partners, especially 
trade unions, to pursue favourable regulation if they have strong political support. 
 
Prior to 2006, collective agreement extensions were voluntary and based on conditions in the 
relevant employers’ agreement. The post-2006 government, led by the social-democratic 
party Smer – sociálna demokracia, aimed to strengthen social dialogue and bargaining 
coverage, remove discrimination in employment conditions, and introduce equal business 
conditions for all employers, for example in public tenders. A horizontal mandatory extension 
                                                          
15
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/lithuania_4.htm 
16
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/bulgaria_4.htm 
17
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1004019s/hu1004019q.htm 
18
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/czech.republic_4.htm 
19
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/07/articles/ro1107029i.htm 
http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Romania/Collective-Bargaining 
  
91 
of sector-level collective agreements seemed to be a sustainable solution. While trade unions 
favoured horizontal extension, employers opposed it. However, reactions between individual 
employers and between peak (national, cross-sector) employers’ associations differed. 
Employers requested further development of rules applicable to the practice of horizontal 
extensions, such as conflict resolution procedures, mediator involvement, collective 
redundancies, and monitoring compliance with collective agreements at the workplace. 
However, the National Union of Employers of the Slovak Republic (Republiková únia 
zamestnávateľov SR, RÚZ SR) appealed to the Constitutional Court with the argument that a 
mandatory horizontal extension does not comply with the Slovak Constitution.  
 
Despite the above employer opposition, the principle of horizontal mandatory extensions was 
written into law: extensions initiated upon a joint written request of signatory parties of 
a sector-level agreement to the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Family and 
approved by the Ministry were legally enforceable. The 2009 amendment to the extension 
rule stipulated that the extension may apply to agreements concluded by a higher-level trade 
union organisation, which represents the largest number of employees in the sector where 
extension is requested. This amendment replaced the original provision that the extension 
possibility applies to agreements concluded by employers’ associations employing the largest 
number of employees in the sector where extension is requested. This amendment simplified 
the practice of extensions and contributed to a shift to more centralised bargaining and higher 
bargaining coverage. 
 
During (2007-2010), two trends can be identified: 
 The number of higher-level collective agreements declined (due to low unionisation, 
declining employer density rate, mergers/splits on the side of employers’ associations and 
unions) 
 The number of extensions increased compared to the pre-flat-extension period, but in 
general declined compared to the 1990s.  
 
After the formulation of a right-wing coalition, the mandatory horizontal extension 
mechanism was revoked. An extension request is again conditioned by a joint written request 
of the signatory employers‘ association and trade union(s); applies to individual employers 
only and not to the whole sector, and the concerned employers’ consent with the extension 
has been reintroduced. This stipulation resulted in fragmentation of bargaining coverage and a 
virtual impossibility of a flat extension across the whole sector.  
 
To sum up, with political support, the social partners achieved the introduction of a horizontal 
extension mechanism, which is unique in the CEECs. However, the practice of such 
extensions has been limited in time and scope. The main reasons for its failure can be 
summarised in the following points: 
 change in government 
 strong political orientation of trade unions onto support of a single party 
 employer dissatisfaction with basic legal conditions of the extension (the question of 
individual rights), and a diversity in employers’ interests 
 particular issues in the horizontal extension mechanism lacked detailed elaboration (i.e. 
rules of compliance for non-unionised companies onto which extensions have been 
applied) 
 lack of control mechanisms on compliance with extended collective agreements 
 the timing of flat extension: economic crisis and growing unemployment 
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In the post-2010 practice of bargaining, extensions have not been common. It remains to be 
seen whether the current government, formed exclusively of the Smer party, will re-open the 
issue of flat extensions.  
 
Source: Kahancová (2011).  
 
 
 
2.3.5 Tripartism and social pacts 
 
Although tripartism is formally established across the CEECs, its real capacity to produce 
enforceable agreements varies according to country. In the liberal Baltic States, EU accession 
facilitated the establishment of formal tripartite institutions despite the lack of any tradition of 
tripartite concertation. Bulgaria and Romania had more experience with tripartite social 
dialogue, but its importance declined over the 2000s. All welfarist Visegrad countries have 
long-standing formal tripartite institutions, but the power of tripartite bodies is in most 
countries limited to consultation rights. Finally, Slovenia follows a model of a small Western 
corporatist state, where tripartite concertation plays an important role for policymaking. 
However, with the disintegration of bargaining structures after 2006 in Slovenia, the role of 
tripartism has also declined.  
 
Table 2.9 Social pacts in the CEECs, 1991 – 2008 
Year 
Successfully concluded   
tripartite agreements  
Failed  
negotiations for tripartite 
agreement 
2008 EE (3)**, RO (3)*  
2007 SI (4) PL 
2006 BG (4), SK (3)  
2005 LT (3)  
2004 LV (3), RO (3)  
2003 SI (4) PL, RO 
2002 HU (3), RO (4)  
2001 RO (3)  
2000   
1999 EE (3), LT (3)  
1998  CZ 
1997 BG (3)  
1996 SI (4)  
1995 LT (3), SI (4)  
1994 CZ (2), SI (4) HU 
1993 CZ (2), PL (3) SI 
1992 CZ (2), EE (4), SK (4) SI 
1991 CZ (2), EE (4) SI 
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*  Italics indicate pacts addressing tax-based incomes policies. In all other cases, social pacts 
covered broader social policy issues (regulatory, reform or symbolic pacts according to the 
ICTWSS database coding). 
** Numbers in parentheses indicate the strength of the pact. Strength is defined as a composite 
measure of pact scope and pact structure. The maximum in each of these two categories is 2, 
therefore the maximum strength score is 4. In general, CEEC pacts are agreed upon by all the 
relevant peak social partners (which means a 2 in the structure score), but their scope is rather 
vague and do not reach to lower levels of industrial relations (1 on scope).  
Source: ICTWSS database, version 3.0, 2011. 
 
 
Despite the contested role of tripartism, a number of tripartite agreements, or national-level 
social pacts, have been concluded across the CEECs. International factors that have facilitated 
the conclusion of social pacts even in countries that lack a tradition of tripartite consultations 
(e.g., Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), or in countries with a weak substantive role of tripartism 
(e.g., Hungary, Poland and Romania) include EU accession, prospects for EMU membership 
and the economic crisis. In Poland, considered the weakest performer in terms of social pacts 
among the welfarist Visegrad countries, EU accession served as a motivating factor for the 
Labour Minister and later the Minister of Economics and Deputy Prime Minister (2001 – 
2005) to attempt a conclusion of several social pacts addressing EMU convergence, reforms 
of public finance, employment policy, healthcare and labour law (Meardi 2012: 46-53). This 
initiative also involved strengthening intersectoral social dialogue and improving the 
coordination of sectoral bargaining committees. Social dialogue was perceived as a policy 
alternative to those of previous governments. The most important pact initiative, known as the 
“Pact for Work and Development” was drafted in 2003. However, these proposals were later 
abandoned due to lack of domestic political commitment and lack of trust between the 
Solidarność trade unions and the post-communist party (Meardi 2012: 47). These initiatives 
are an important sign of the impact of EU accession and prospective EMU membership on 
CEEC social partners’ capacity building to strengthen tripartism despite hostile domestic 
conditions.   
 
In sum, table 2.9 offers an overview of tripartite agreements, but also of failed attempts to 
conclude agreements, between 1991 and 2008. More pacts have been concluded in the 2000s 
than in the second half of the 1990s. More recent evidence confirms this trend, especially in 
the post-crisis years of 2009 and 2010.  
 
 
2.3.6 Information and consultation of employees at company level 
 
Company-level employee representation in the CEECs underwent significant changes upon 
EU accession, mainly because of implementing the dual representation structure (including 
both trade unions and works councils) stipulated by the Directive on Information and 
Consultation of Employees (2002/14/EC). Table 2.10 documents the workplace presence of 
employee representatives across CEECs after the implementation of the Directive. 
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Table 2.10 Workplace presence of unions, works councils and individual employee 
representatives in the CEECs, 2009 
 
 
B
G
 
C
Z
 
E
E
 
H
U
 
L
V
 
L
T
 
P
L
 
R
O
 
S
K
 
S
I 
Presence of institutional 
representation  
- share in the total 
number of 
establishments 
- share in the total 
workforce* 
 
 
 
 
35% 
 
 
 
50% 
 
 
 
 
18% 
 
 
 
42% 
 
 
 
 
22% 
 
 
 
38% 
 
 
 
 
28% 
 
 
 
50% 
 
 
 
 
39% 
 
 
 
45% 
 
 
 
 
25% 
 
 
 
47% 
 
 
 
 
38% 
 
 
 
65% 
 
 
 
 
51% 
 
 
 
78% 
 
 
 
 
42% 
 
 
 
60% 
 
 
 
 
42% 
 
 
 
67% 
* Source: European Company Survey 2009: 47-48 (data estimated from graphs), Base = 
establishments with 10 or more employees; EIRO, ETUI  
 
The highest institutional representation applies to Romania, where unions, works councils or 
an individual employee representative was present in 51% of all establishments, covering 
78% of the total workforce. In contrast, the Czech Republic has the least established 
workplace representation  - present in only 18% of establishments. The coverage of 42% of 
the total workforce in the Czech Republic suggests that workplace representation is more 
common in large companies. The same is true for Poland and Slovenia, where employee 
representatives are not present in a high number of establishments, but cover a relatively large 
share of the total workforce. 
 
Distinguishing between the types of employee representatives is possible only in a limited 
number of CEECs where evidence is available.
20
 In the neoliberal Baltic States (EE, LT) with 
a generally weak union presence, works councils or individual employee representatives are 
better established than trade unions at the workplace level. The opposite is true for Slovakia, a 
welfarist Visegrad country with a tradition of stronger position of trade unions. In Hungary, 
trade unions remain the main channel of interest representation after 20 years of experience 
with dual representation of employees at the workplace, Unions are present in more 
establishments than works councils despite the fact that the union workplace coverage 
dropped from 37% in 2001 to 28% in 2009, while works council presence has stagnated at 
around 20 percent over the past 20 years.
21
 
 
A broader indicator of employee representation is the European Participation Index (EPI), 
which summarises the formal rights of workers and the extent of representation/participation 
at three levels: in the board, at the establishment level and through collective bargaining. The 
highest EPI value in the EU is 0.82 in Sweden and the lowest value is 0.11 for Lithuania.
22
 
Chart 2.15 shows the EPI scores for CEECs. The scores confirm that after the implementation 
of the Directive on information and consultation, employee participation remained weakest in 
                                                          
20
 Source: ETUI (www.worker-participation.eu) 
21
 Source: Neumann (2010) in:  http://www.employment.eutrio.be/uploadedFiles/Eutrio/events/Neumann.pdf. 
22
 Source: http://www.worker-participation.eu/About-WP/European-Participation-Index-EPI 
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the liberal CEECs (LT, LV, EE, RO and BG). The welfarist countries (CZ, HU, PL and SK) 
score higher, which aligns with their generally better institutionalised bargaining and 
employee representation. Finally, the corporatist Slovenia scores highest, which aligns with 
the general characteristics of industrial relations in this country. 
 
 
Chart 2.15: European participation index (EPI) in the CEECs   
SSource: 
ETUI in: http://www.worker-participation.eu/About-WP/European-Participation-Index-EPI 
Note: The participation index is a composite index which summarises both formal rights and the 
extent of participation on three levels: at the level of the board; at the establishment level; and 
through collective bargaining.           
 
 
To complement the above statistical evidence, Table 2.11 provides a qualitative overview of 
employee participation across the CEECs. 
 
Table 2.11 CEEC workplace representation of employees 
Liberal Baltic and Balkan countries  
Estonia 
Workplace representation is limited. The 2007 legislation allows for the election of employee 
representatives both in workplaces with and without a trade union. In union-free workplaces, 
representatives can be involved in collective bargaining. Employee representatives can be 
elected upon the support of a trade union or 10% of the employees. 
Latvia 
Unions are the main representation channel, but many workplaces have no representation at 
all. Since 2002 it has also been possible to elect authorised workplace representatives, but this 
practice is limited. 
Lithuania 
After the 2003 legislative changes, works councils and unions have almost identical legal 
powers. Since 2005 works councils have the right to organise strikes. Most workplaces have 
none of the two representation forms. The system of individual employee representatives is 
widespread in small companies. The 2007 Labour Inspectorate report documents that out of 
12,331 inspected organisations there were 2,978 with an individual employee representative. 
Bulgaria 
Unions are the main representation channel. The system of individual employee 
representatives, available since 2001, is not widely used. Representatives are only present in 
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about one-third of multinational companies, and most of them are union-nominated. In small 
companies, it is unusual to find either unions or elected employee representatives. The 
implementation of the Directive on Information and Consultation did not significantly change 
the above practices. Until 2010 only 8% of companies with 50 or more employees elected 
workplace representatives. 
Romania 
Almost exclusively union-based representation. Employee representatives can only be elected 
in union-free workplaces. This situation has not changed after the Directive’s implementation. 
Changes introduced by the 2011 Social Dialogue Code have made trade union operation more 
difficult as a union can now only be set up by at least 15 individuals in the same company 
instead of the same industry or occupation. 
Welfarist Visegrad countries  
Czech Republic 
The stipulation to dissolve the work council if a union is present at the workplace was 
declared unconstitutional in 2008. In practice, very few works councils have been set up and 
trade unions remain the dominant representation channel. The majority of companies have no 
employee representation at all. 
Hungary 
Dual representation channel exists since 1992. In most cases union members are part of works 
councils, especially because the Hungarian legislation links union bargaining rights to the 
results of works council elections. The balance of power between unions and works councils 
also depends on the political environment with leftist governments usually supporting trade 
unions while conservative governments favouring works councils. 
Poland 
Until the EU accession trade unions were the exclusive workplace representation body. The 
2006 legislation provided for the establishment of works councils. The slow implementation 
of the Information and Consultation Directive entrenched union powers in electing works 
councils until 2009. In 2009, 72% of works councils were set up in companies and 
organisations with trade unions. 
Slovakia 
The legal possibility of establishing works councils was introduced in 2002. The recent legal 
change (2011) increased representativeness thresholds for trade unions. In order to be 
representative, unions establishing themselves for the first time at a workplace shall (upon 
employer’s requirement) demonstrate that they represent at least 30% of the workforce. 
Works councils are less common than unions and can be established where at least 10% of the 
workforce requests this kind of representation. 
Corporatist countries 
Slovenia 
Dual channel of representation since 1993. Employees at the workplace are represented both 
through local union structures and, in workplaces with more than 20 employees, a works 
council. In practice works council members are frequently trade union activists, although the 
extent of trade union involvement varies from industry to industry. 
Source : ETUI (www.worker-participation.eu), EIRO. 
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2.3.7 Interim conclusions  
 
Unionisation, bargaining levels and practices, the role of tripartism and social pacts, and 
employee information and consultation at the workplace varies across the CEECs. Over the 
2000s, CEECs converged on the emergence of social pacts. The post-2008 economic crisis 
facilitated the conclusion of social pacts even in countries that lacked a tradition of tripartism, 
such as the liberal Baltic States. 
 
To assess prospects for Europeanisation of industrial relations within the CEECs, we need to 
understand why some industrial relations features differ across these countries. This section 
has showed that the extent of labour mobilisation and the government’s interests in 
introducing stable bargaining structures were the main preconditions for the emergence of 
social partnership across the CEECs. The liberal country cluster (EE, BG, LV, LT and RO) 
are best characterised as countries with weakly established or weakly enforced tripartite 
institutions, fragmented bargaining (with the exception of Romania), and a varying union 
density between the liberal Baltic (EE, LV, LT) and the Balkan (BG, RO) countries. The 
welfarist Visegrad countries (CZ, HU, PL and SK) all have strongly entrenched tripartism, 
institutions for collective bargaining and employee representation. The Czech Republic and 
Slovakia tend to have more of a tradition of social dialogue and a higher level of bargaining 
coordination than Poland and Hungary. While Hungary and Poland are examples of countries 
with decentralised and fragmented bargaining coverage, Hungary is also characterised by its 
national-level concertation structure. Slovenia, which is the only corporatist country in the 
CEECs, has gone furthest in institutionalising coordinated bargaining, employee 
representation, social pacts and bargaining coverage. 
 
 
2.4 Re-configuration of industrial relations in the CEECs after EU enlargement, the 
economic crisis and public sector austerity 
 
While the previous two sections have focused on developments in structural industrial 
relations indicators in the CEECs and their comparison with the EU-15, this section looks at 
the particular responses of CEEC social partners to the most important domestic labour 
markets challenges that have followed on from EU enlargement and the crisis. Among most 
important developments affecting the majority of the CEECs is the post-enlargement mobility 
from the CEECs to the EU-15 causing domestic labour shortages in some countries and 
sectors. The second major development is the economic crisis that has led to a growth in 
unemployment, employment flexibility, precarious employment forms and public sector 
austerity across the CEECs. Finally, the crisis has also affected the public sector and fuelled 
austerity measures across the whole EU. For more details on austerity measures, the crisis and 
the effects of this on public sector industrial relations, see Chapter 4.  
 
This section attempts to answer questions such as how have CEEC social partners dealt with 
these challenges in their national settings? Have they utilised opportunities derived from these 
developments in order to, for example, negotiate wage increases, strengthen social 
partnership, improve bargaining coordination and foster the Europeanisation of national 
industrial relations? Given the limited statistical evidence on this kind of social partner action, 
this section is largely based on examples and case studies that try to comprehensively cover 
developments across the CEECs.   
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2.4.1 Europeanisation of industrial relations through EWCs in MNCs   
 
EU integration, by removing barriers to the mobility of goods, capital and labour, promotes 
foreign direct investment and the transfer of the tradition of social dialogue and employee 
participation from EU-15 to CEECs (Meardi 2012: 62). Multinational companies (MNCs) are 
likely frontrunners of Europeanisation of industrial relations because of their capacity to 
transfer social dialogue practices across countries of their operation. Some research has 
detected positive efforts of MNCs to transpose social standards from the EU-15 to the 
CEECs. For example, foreign employers helped to develop the structure of employers’ 
associations in Poland, Bulgaria and Latvia, where they established their own associations. In 
Poland, MNCs took the leading role in creating a new employer organisation – the Polish 
Confederation of Private Employers Lewiatan (Polska Konfederacja Pracodawców 
Prywatnych Lewiatan, PKPP Lewiatan) in 1998. PKPP went on to become the leading 
employer confederation and now also organises a large number of Polish-owned companies 
(Marginson and Meardi 2009: 25). With regard to coordinated multi-employer bargaining, 
MNCs display a noticeably higher incidence of second-tier or company negotiations than 
local firms in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (Marginson and Meardi 2009). Despite these 
efforts, the overall impression is that MNCs are not yet ready and committed to transferring 
forms of employee representation (Meardi 2012). Instead of offering opportunities for 
coordinated industrial relations, therefore, MNCs have contributed to further bargaining 
decentralisation in the CEECs. Industrial relations transfers from the EU-15 to the CEECs 
seem to be an exception rather than rule and are contingent on specific conditions (Marginson 
and Meardi 2006, Meardi et al. 2009, Kahancová 2010). Workplace industrial relations in 
MNCs in the CEECs confirm a departure from the EU-15 models because of frequent anti-
unionism, the absence of works councils, the use of agency work, temporary contracts and the 
practice of restructuring without consultation with social partners.  
 
The 1994 European Works Council Directive (Directive 94/45/EC, updated by the recast 
Directive 2009/38/EC) aims to ensure that employees in MNCs are properly informed and 
consulted. Chart 2.16 presents MNCs by country of origin affected by the EWCs Directive. 
By 2008, there was still a discrepancy between the number of MNCs with operations in the 
CEECs and the EU-2 (Cyprus and Malta) and those that already introduced EWCs with 
CEEC and EU-2 representatives. In 2010, the total number of EWC bodies across the EU-27 
reached 969; and the number of EWCs including one or more representatives from the CEECs 
and the EU-2 reached 249.
23
 This means that 25.7 percent of EWCs have one or more 
representatives from the EU-12. This suggests that structural EWC implementation stretches 
over a long time period. It should be noted, however, that the actual role of the EWC may 
differ from company to company and is subject to case study research related to specific 
MNCs. 
 
                                                          
23
 Source: Database on European Works Council Agreements 
http://www.ewcdb.eu/documents/freegraphs/2010_10_EN.pdf 
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Chart 2.16: Multi-national companies affected by the EWC Directive with operations in 
the EU-12 by country of origin, 2008  
Source: 
European Works Councils Database, ETUI-REHS, March 2008; European Works Councils in 
practice: Key research findings. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (2008: 7)           
 
 
 
2.4.2 Post-enlargement mobility, labour shortages and trade union responses  
 
Since the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, intense labour mobility from the CEECs to the 
EU-15 led initially to a decrease in unemployment rates in the CEECs and labour shortages 
emerged in some countries and sectors (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010; see also chapter 6 
of the European Commission's Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2011 
review). Migrants from the CEECs were motivated by better-paid jobs in the EU-15 and most 
frequently targeted the UK and Ireland – countries that immediately opened their labour 
markets to CEEC workers (Bonin et al. 2008). Although outward mobility increased from all 
CEECs, cross-national differences persist. Over the period from 2003 to 2007, emigration as a 
percentage of the population has been highest in Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia (Brückner 
and Damelang 2009). In 2009, CEECs with the highest shares of migrant working in the EU-
15 included Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Latvia (Kahanec 2012). 
Outward mobility affected employment in both private and public sectors across the CEECs 
and caused shortages in some occupations. Outward mobility also influenced union 
membership and density in the CEECs. Meardi (2012: 97) found the CEECs with the highest 
number of migrants between 2003 and 2007 have been those with the strongest fall in union 
membership, especially Slovakia and Lithuania, while those with the lowest mobility have 
lost fewer union members, especially Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Post-
enlargement mobility effects on net union density can only be evaluated a few years later. 
However, even if net union density in these countries increases, this does not necessarily 
mean that unions have gained new members: an increase in net union density can originate 
from the fact that the total size of working age populations, over which union density is 
calculated, has decreased with outward labour mobility.  
 
Nevertheless, trade unions cannot be considered to be passive victims of these developments. 
From the limited empirical studies available, there is evidence that unions in some countries 
mobilised against migration through bargaining and public protests where they used the 
migration argument to improve their bargaining position and legitimacy as well as domestic 
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working conditions. Kaminska and Kahancová (2011) studied how trade unions in selected 
CEECs used mobility-induced labour shortages to negotiate wage increases, to reverse the 
trend of declining union membership/density, to improve the unions’ legitimacy in relation to 
governments and employers and finally to strengthen bargaining institutions. This study 
focused on public healthcare, which lost a significant number of qualified healthcare staff and 
faced serious domestic labour shortages. The findings show that Polish and Slovak trade 
unions did consider the post-enlargement mobility trend to be a development that could 
improve their situation. Union leaders showed good organising capacity, facilitating active 
responses, while union structures proved of little importance in this issue (Kaminska and 
Kahancová 2011). In Poland, the government disregarded the unions’ attempts to increase 
wages through collective bargaining, but made financial concessions to stop massive protests 
and strikes in response to healthcare mobility. In Slovakia, unions placed their action within 
the functioning bargaining system and achieved wage increases for lower-ranking healthcare 
employees through sectoral bipartite bargaining in public healthcare. This evidence shows 
that using available organisational capacities, CEEC unions are able to mobilise and respond 
successfully to trends derived from EU enlargement (in this case post-enlargement labour 
mobility).  
 
 
2.4.3 Responding to the crisis through active involvement of social partners  
 
One of the major recent challenges to CEEC economies is the economic crisis, which first 
affected the private sector and later the public sector through austerity measures. Recent 
evidence on how CEEC social partners have responded to crisis-induced challenges is limited 
to a few cases, which document two kinds of action:  
- CEEC social partners engaging in a negotiated response to face up to various challenges 
induced by the economic crisis;  
- CEEC trade unions mobilising members and supporters to openly voice their claims in 
response to government austerity measures. 
 
First, the crisis produced a new wave of tripartite negotiations and social pacts were adopted 
in several CEECs (see Box 2.3). The trend of meeting the challenges of the crisis through 
tripartite social dialogue is accompanied by an interesting paradox. While tripartite 
negotiations and social pacts increasingly emerged in countries without a strong tradition of 
tripartism, there is less evidence for a successful conclusion of social pacts in countries that 
do have a tradition of social dialogue (namely, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
The Czech social partners demanded to be included in post-crisis reform policies, but the 
post-2010 Czech government made it clear that it would not endorse the anti-crisis measures 
agreed by the previous government with the social partners.
24
 In Slovenia, the government 
and trade unions reached an agreement on wage moderation in the public sector (see Box 2.3), 
but the overall number and the character of social pacts in Slovenia did not significantly 
increase in the aftermath of the crisis. In Slovakia, trade unions enjoyed systematic political 
support from the post-2006 social-democratic government, which carried on during the crisis 
period until the government change in 2010.  
 
                                                          
24 Source: EIRO Industrial relations and working conditions developments in Europe 2010, TN1105040. 
  
101 
Box 2.3 Coping with the economic crisis through social pacts   
 
Latvia (2008) 
Since 2004, the Latvian government avoided state budget discussions with the social 
partners, which culminated in union protests and public demonstrations in 2007. In the 
context of the start of the crisis and a worsening economic situation, negotiations at the 
National Tripartite Cooperation Council reconvened in 2008 to discuss the state budget for 
2009. Both employers and trade unions prepared and submitted to the government concrete 
proposals on how to improve the country’s economic and social situation. Despite protest 
campaigns, the government, the Latvia Employers’ Confederation (Latvijas Darba 
Devējukonfederācija, LDDK) and the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (Latvijas 
Brīvo Arodbiedrībusavienība, LBAS) signed a tripartite agreement. This experience does not 
mean that tripartite negotiations will remain a standard part of Latvian policymaking, but it 
demonstrates that despite the government’s earlier reluctance to negotiate and ongoing 
protests, social partners were able to engage in a constructive discussion and conclude a 
tripartite agreement.  
 
Estonia (2009) 
Representatives of several ministries, the Estonian Trade Union Confederation (Eesti 
Ametiühingute Keskliit, EAKL) and the Estonian Employers’ Confederation (Eesti 
Tööandjate Keskliit, ETK) agreed on a pact addressing economic recession. The main 
purpose of the agreement was to maintain jobs and provide effective help for registered 
unemployed. After the pact’s conclusion, unemployment still kept rising, which forced the 
government to take further action. The Ministry of Social Affairs in cooperation with the 
Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund introduced a new national action plan for 2009–
2010, aiming at lower unemployment and support for the creation of new jobs. About €45 
million were assigned for an employment programme, which should help to create over 
5,000 jobs and boost the economy. This second plan was adopted with less involvement of 
the social partners than the first agreement. Employers welcomed the plan but trade unions 
expressed some concerns on the possible misuse of subsidies by employers.  
 
Poland (2009) 
In March 2009, Polish peak national social partners reached an autonomous agreement on 
combating the negative effects of the economic slowdown. This agreement received a public 
praise and was considered a success of social dialogue. The social partners’ anti-crisis 
package was then presented to the government, which was to incorporate its provisions into 
draft legislation and submit a legislative proposal to the parliament. In July 2009, the Polish 
parliament adopted the anti-crisis legislative package with some modifications to the general 
direction set out by the bipartite agreement reached by the social partners. Despite some 
critique by Solidarność, social partners accepted the outcome but continued to exercise 
pressure on the government to increase the efficiency of anti-crisis policy. The government 
acknowledged social partner claims and amended the anti-crisis legislation in October 2010. 
Changes included lowering the eligibility threshold for subsidizing the remuneration costs of 
part-time employees or employees that remained idle due to a temporary crisis-induced halt 
of their employer’s operation. This example documents that an initially autonomous 
agreement can be upgraded to national legislation.  
 
Slovenia (2009) 
Public sector trade unions in Slovenia were engaged in bringing forth the government’s 
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austerity pay deal in 2009. The government and the representatives of 23 public sector trade 
unions signed the austerity pay deal for the period 2009–2010 in order to cut public sector 
spending by 100–120 million EUR as part of the state’s anti-crisis efforts. Under the 
agreement, public sector wage growth in 2009 should have reached 7.1% instead of the 
earlier envisaged 9.9%. Most recently, in a compromise quickly agreed by the social partners 
in 2011, the Slovenian government froze pensions, public service salaries and social benefits. 
This proved to be inadequate and had to be supplemented by further austerity measures in 
2012. 
 
Bulgaria (2010) 
After intensive debates between the Bulgarian government and social partners, the National 
Council for Tripartite Cooperation reached an agreement on a new anti-crisis package aiming 
to support employment, households, business and state finances. Measures concerning 
employment and households were adopted mainly because of union requests, but employers 
also supported them. Such agreement over the proposed measures, including i.e. minimum 
wage growth, removal of the unemployment benefit upper limit, adjusting unemployment 
benefits and extending the system of food vouchers, enabled a constructive dialogue and a 
conclusion of a tripartite agreement.  
 
Source: EIRO 
 
For more details on issues such as the minimum wage, pay and pensions developments in the 
CEECs, see box 2.5. 
 
 
In addition to these attempts at a coordinated response to the crisis at the national level 
through social pacts, there is limited evidence on other kinds of a negotiated response at the 
sectoral and company levels. For example, in Slovakia, the sector-level social partners in 
sectors most affected by the crisis, such as the metalworking sector, found new incentives to 
consolidate sectoral bargaining coordination to meet the challenges of the economic crisis. As 
a consequence, bargaining procedures, as well as social partner commitment to a negotiated 
response to the crisis were not in danger of decentralisation. Sectoral and company-level 
bargaining continued following the same formal and informal rules and played a central role 
in the attempt to maintain employment during the economic downturn (Czíria 2011: 22). The 
most common collectively-agreed measures included wage moderation, work organisation 
changes, including less use of temporary/agency workers, redundancy pay, conflict settlement 
and prevention and application of flexible working accounts and short-time work. Although 
the social partners found it more difficult to conclude agreements during the crisis and 
negotiations took longer than before, in the most important subsectors of the metalworking 
sector (mechanical engineering, steel and electronics) the social partners managed to agree on 
specific anti-crisis provisions and incorporate them into collective agreements for 2008-2009 
and 2010-2011 (c.f. Kahancová 2013). For more details of social partner responses to the 
crisis and austerity measures in the EU, see chapter 4. 
 
We can also find exceptional negotiated responses to the crisis at company level, for example 
in some of the largest employers in the automotive industry in Hungary (Szabó 2013). 
According to the Hungarian Labour Code, trade union approval is not required for company 
crisis adjustment strategies, such as working time reductions (Neumann and Boda 2011: 92). 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of legal obligation to negotiate with unions, several large 
automotive companies signed agreements with unions on crisis relief measures. The main 
  
103 
motivation for employers was finding a common stance with trade unions on protecting the 
skilled workforce in the car industry and avoiding dismissals. For example, Audi’s 
management cooperated on the whole spectrum of employment-related decisions with unions, 
striking a deal of safe jobs at a price of working time and variable pay rescheduling. Other 
German MNCs in high value-added sectors also engaged in voluntary bargaining with trade 
unions. The most recent case is Mercedes, which launched its Hungarian subsidiary in 2012 
with a welcoming attitude towards unions.
25
 
 
Further company-level cases of negotiated responses to the crisis can be found in the Baltic 
States. In Estonia, concessions in collective agreements have been negotiated in some 
companies despite the general trade union strategy of maintaining the validity of collective 
agreements concluded prior to the crisis (Kallaste and Woolfson 2013). New collective 
agreements froze some provisions of existing agreements (e.g. postponed wage increases 
and/or bonuses), or introduced provisions to consolidate wages and employment (e.g. unpaid 
leave instead of wage decreases) (ibid.).  
 
In Bulgaria and Romania, countries with historically stronger labour mobilisation than in the 
Visegrad and  Baltic States (see Table 2.7),  trade unions were more eager to engage in strikes 
and protest actions in the post-crisis period. For example, Romanian trade unions engaged in 
several protest actions and strikes during 2009 and 2010 (see the next section). The preference 
for mobilising members rather than attempting a negotiated response derived from recent 
legal changes regarding union representativeness and the fact that all existing collective 
agreements were declared invalid at the end of 2011. An inability to negotiate new 
agreements at national and sectoral level in 2012 motivated unions to take other kinds of 
action. For example, FGS, the largest union federation in the construction sector, drew up 
guidelines regarding the procedure required to become representative for local unions and has 
also helped local unions in negotiating collective agreements. As a result, some company-
level agreements were concluded with provisions far above the legal minimum. Moreover, 
unions in construction and the healthcare sector succeeded in obtaining funding from the 
EU’s structural funds to provide training for union members and improve their competence 
and employability.
26
 In Bulgaria, workers at the country’s largest coalmines engaged in a one-
week strike in 2012 in support of better bonuses and working conditions. After lengthy talks, 
the unions and the management of the mines found a coordinated solution to improve working 
conditions and award bonuses.
27
 
 
To sum up, a first glance national-level social dialogue and a negotiated response of the social 
partners appears to have played an important role in the adoption of anti-crisis measures. 
However, many of these measures, such as union co-determination on flexible working time 
accounts, or the social partners’ role in implementing crisis-related policies, has turned out to 
be temporary and has lasted only until the unions benefitted from political support from the 
government, until legal changes or until governments reverted to unilateral action instead of 
adopting the measures agreed with social partners. This shows on the one hand that the CEEC 
social partners are capable of bringing forth negotiated responses even in hostile institutional 
                                                          
25
 Source: EIRO http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/02/articles/hu1102011i.htm 
26
 Source: discussion with a Romanian Industrial Relations expert Dr. Aurora Trif, (City University Dublin). 
27
 Source: Reuters at http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E8CM03H20120122) 
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conditions. At the same time, their capacities and the substantive results of negotiated 
responses at the national, sectoral and company levels remain contested. 
 
2.4.4 Responses of CEEC trade unions to public sector austerity 
 
The crisis has also induced government responses that aim to consolidate the public sector, 
public debt and state budgets. As a consequence, various public sector austerity measures 
have emerged across the CEECs. The extent to which consultation on these measures takes 
place with trade unions as social partners varies across countries and governments. The most 
common aim of trade union responses is to protect employment and working conditions in the 
public sector in the context of these austerity measures. Table 2.12 and the text below review 
the available recent evidence on responses to public sector austerity through collective action. 
In a small number of cases, the social partners have succeeded in being part of negotiating or 
revising austerity measures that governments have adopted. Other cases, where social 
partners, especially trade unions, have mobilised against announced austerity measures, this is 
in alignment with the overall view that mobilisation is the preferred strategy in conditions 
where social dialogue is weakly established or where the social partners are excluded from 
negotiating or consulting austerity measures with the government (see also chapter 6 for 
details on models of social partner involvement in the EU). 
 
Table 2.12 Public sector austerity measures in the CEECs since 2006 and social partner 
responses 
 
 Wage 
developments in 
the public sector 
Reform of pay 
system  
Job cuts  Social partner responses – 
collective action 
     
BG 2009-2011: 
wage freeze 
Reform of pay 
system in 
public 
administration, 
strengthening 
the role of 
performance-
related pay  
Jobs were cut  
to ensure 10% 
reduction  
of overall 
costs in 
ministries  
and publicly 
funded  
organisations 
06/2009: joint public-private 
national demonstration  
03/ 2010: doctors strike over 
delayed funds 
11/2011: three-week national 
railway worker strike 
CZ 2011: 10% 
reduction in 
public 
administration 
For parts of 
public sector 
(i.e.  
health care, 
artistic 
professions,  
manual 
workers and 
workers  
receiving 
lowest base 
pay rates) 
as a first step 
for 2010, 
cancellation of 
unfilled 
positions 
 
later on, 
dismissals to 
achieve a  
 10%-
reduction of 
the 
public sector 
wage bill 
12/2009: strike threat of 
Prague public transportation 
workers, strike averted 
through compromise: 
workers agree on wage cuts, 
in exchange  the local 
government halts outsourcing 
03/2010: doctors start 
resignation campaign 
09/2010: public sector 
workers, led by the police 
trade union, protest against 
austerity 
  
105 
EE rapid increase  
before the crisis  
2009: wage 
freeze for the 
overall public 
sector, cuts in 
certain 
professions (e.g. 
-8% for police 
and border 
guards) 
2010: some 
recuperation 
2012: slight 
minimum wage 
increase 
affecting the 
public sector  
  10/2009:  protest in local 
hospitals 
03/2011: railway workers 
successfully demonstrate for 
wage hike (5 percent) 
03/2012: teachers strike for 
higher wages. Transportation 
and energy sector workers 
hold solidarity strikes with  
teachers and protest against 
the anti-union amendment of 
the labour code. Biggest 
strike wave in the post-Soviet 
history of the country. 
Eventually, the government 
concedes a 15% rise for 
teachers. 
HU wage freeze in 
the general 
public sector 
since 2006 
(already before 
the crisis) 
cut of 13th 
month salary 
(2009) 
  12/2008 -01/2009: 
demonstrations in parts of the 
public sector (mostly 
healthcare and education) 
05/2011: firefighters and 
police  demonstration against 
the abolition of special 
pension rights 
10/2011: overall (public and 
private) national union 
demonstration against anti-
union measures of the new 
government, against the new 
labour code 
01/2012: resignation 
campaign of doctors, 
negotiated salary increase as 
a result 
LV 2008: 
withdrawal of 
bonuses and 
premiums 
2009: -15 to -
30% decrease in 
basic pay (e.g.  
monthly gross 
wages of 
teachers cut by 
almost a third) 
Reform of 
public sector 
teachers’  
pay system as 
part of reform 
of  
fnancing 
system of 
public schools  
(2009) and 
standardisation 
of pay  
structure 
across public 
sector 
job cuts in the 
public  
health services  
as a 
consequence 
of the  
reduction of 
health care  
budget by 21% 
 
school 
closures, 
resutling 
dismissal of 
teachers  
10/2008: strike of healthcare 
employees b/c of budget 
cuts. No direct effect on the 
government but the tripartite 
council endorses healthcare 
workers' demands 
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LT 2009:  - 10%–
15% for the 
lowest)qualificat
ion rating and 
by 30%–50% 
for the highest 
qualification 
rating in the 
public sector 
pay scale 
Reform of pay 
system in 
some  
ministries 
 01/2009:demonstration in 
parts of the public and 
private sector 
07/2009: hunger strike by 
public sector union activists, 
result:"the main burden of 
the salary decrease was 
placed on the highest paid 
public sector 
employees2009) 
PL 2008-2009: 28%  
increase for 
teachers 
2011: wage 
freeze for the 
overall public 
sector (planned) 
 Job cuts 
expected to 
reach  
goal of 
keeping public  
expenditure at 
max. of 1%  
above infation  
2009-2011: recurring protest 
against the acceleration of 
privatisation  (mining, 
pharmacies, restructuring of 
national airline) 
2009-2011: recurring protest 
of the police against longer 
service years, but finally 
compromise reached with the 
government 
10/2009, railway workers' 
hunger strike against 
downsizing  
09/2010: public sector 
protest against the cuts in the 
2011 budget 
03/2011: nurses  stage a 
demonstration within the 
parliament building, 
protesting against temporary 
contracts and reorganisation 
of hospitals 
08/2011: strikes in regional 
railways 
RO 2010: -25% , 
cuts in bonuses 
and other 
additional 
payments means 
cuts of up to 
50% 
(especially 
damaging after 
constant 
promises for pay 
rise before the  
crisis)  
2012: possible 
recuperation 
with the consent 
of the IMF 
New uniform 
remuneration 
system  
for employees 
paid from 
public  
funds (2009): 
limiting wage 
growth  
in highest pay 
scales, 
coupling  
wage increases 
to macro-
economic  
developments 
123000 (-8,8 
percent, 
official figure) 
10/2009: public sector strike 
02/2010:public sector strike 
05/2010:public sector strike 
10/2010: major public and 
private sector demonstration 
in front of the parliament 
01/2012: major nation-wide 
unrest triggered by proposed 
partial privatisation of 
healthcare services 
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SK 2011: 
cuts/freeze 
planned 
  10/2010: private and public 
sector demonstration 
11-12/2011: doctors' 
successful mass resignation 
campaign for higher wages 
and reversal of hospital 
corporatisation 
SI 2009: wage 
moderation 
agreement  
wage growth for 
2009  reduced 
from 9.9% to 
7.1% 
The 2012 Public 
finance balance 
act decreased 
wages in the 
public sector by 
8% on average. 
 
uniformisation 
of the pay 
scale 
2010-2011: 
partial 
measures for 
curbing 
employment in 
the public 
sector 
 
2012: Public 
finance 
balance Act: 
no new 
recruitment in 
the public 
sector foreseen 
10/2010: public sector strike 
04/2012:  general strike of 
teachers and  police 
demonstration, but major 
trade unions promised not to 
call a referendum on 
austerity measures (in 
Slovenia referendums are 
easy to call, this is also an 
often used weapon of unions 
against the government). In 
May 2012, after a month of 
negotiations, an agreement 
on austerity measures in the 
public sector was signed by 
government, employers and 
trade unions. 
 
 
 
After 2010, political action and strikes further intensified in healthcare, education and other 
subsectors of public service. In Poland, the fire fighters’ trade union voiced dissatisfaction 
with working time regulation concerning fire fighters. In Hungary, public sector trade unions 
protested against pension cuts for armed forces, police officers and fire fighters. In Slovakia, 
trade unions in the education sector went on strike before the government agreed to negotiated 
wage increases for teachers. In late 2011, the trade union representing medical doctors in 
Slovakia threatened a walkout of doctors in order to obtain wage increases and stop the 
process of transforming state-run hospitals into public corporations. Facing the threat of 
enormous shortages of hospital doctors, the government agreed to substantial wage increases. 
Following this action, the Chamber of nurses and midwives also submitted a petition for wage 
increases, which was successful. Czech trade unions in public healthcare engaged in similar 
action in 2010 and 2011 to obtain wage increases and secure funding for public hospitals.
28
 
 
In Romania, public discontent with austerity measures produced a large union-led protest in 
2010 against cuts in pensions and salaries. Earlier in 2010, the Romanian national trade union 
confederations set up a national crisis committee to harmonise the trade unions’ response to 
the government’s anti-crisis measures, especially those included in the agreement with the 
IMF, the European Commission and the World Bank.
29
 After the unions accused the 
government of ignoring social dialogue, more than 60,000 union members and supporters 
protested against the proposed wage and welfare cuts. The five largest trade union 
                                                          
28
 Source: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/12/articles/cz1112029i.htm  
29
 Source: EIRO at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/05/articles/RO1005019I.htm 
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confederations united in calling these measures socially unacceptable, arguing that the 
government should not target the poorest social groups with its austerity measures. Moreover, 
trade union confederations formulated alternative austerity measures, based on cutting state 
administration and related costs and more progressive taxation. 
30
 This union strategy proved 
to be successful in reaching the government’s declaration that it will not approve the list of 
intended austerity measures to be presented to the IMF without consensus with social partners 
in the country’s tripartite Economic and Social Council.31 Employer organisations initially 
agreed with the cuts, but two of the largest employer organisations, the Employer 
Confederation of Industry, Agriculture, Construction and Services Employers (CONPIROM) 
and the General Confederation of the Romanian Industrial Employers 1903 (UGIR 1903) later 
withdrew their support, arguing that cutting individual earnings would worsen the recession 
and the government should focus on creating jobs and generating economic growth.
32
 
 
Finally, Estonian trade unions in the education sector launched strikes and protests against 
austerity measures. Their action followed the government’s failure to acknowledge union 
demands concerning wage increases for teachers (see Box 2.4). The Estonian union response 
to public sector austerity documents that with strong cooperation and support, unions are able 
to gain concessions even in a weak structural position and hostile political environment. 
 
Box 2.4 Inter-sectoral and international cooperation of trade unions for fairer wages in 
Estonian education 
 
Industrial action of Estonian trade unions in early 2012 documents that By 2012, Estonian 
trade unions were pushed against the wall by the government, which saw further relaxation of 
labour standards and increasing austerity as the only way out of the crisis. The government 
introduced several unilateral changes in laws governing collective bargaining, raised 
unemployment insurance contribution and restructured unemployment funds without social 
partner consent. In terms of fiscal rigor, education was among the most affected sectors. 
Teachers’ basic salaries did not increase since 2008; therefore wages in education stood 30 
percent below the national average by 2012. The government rejected repeated calls from the 
teachers’ union to adopt a 20% wage rise. As a response, unions decided to launch a three-day 
national strike, which was the first of this kind since 2004. With over 17,000 participating 
teachers, this event has been the largest industrial action in the history of Estonia. Finally, the 
government agreed on a 15% rise in teachers’ salaries.  
 
Besides its sheer size, another remarkable feature of the teachers’ protest was the support it 
gained from other sectors and from international partners. Healthcare personnel and transport 
workers staged a solidarity strike, drawing attention to legal changes in the collective 
bargaining law. On the international side, the Nordic Teachers’ Council raised its voice, 
emphasising that a knowledge-based society cannot develop without providing fair wages to 
teachers. In April 2012, the Nordic Transport Workers' Federation and several other 
organisation announced that they will grant their Estonian counterparts over 120,000 EUR in 
a bid to help them implement new operating methods and recruit at least 1,000 new union 
members in fields related to transport. This move signals strengthening of cross-border union 
                                                          
30
 Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-05/19/c_13304262.htm  
31
 Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-05/19/c_13302283.htm 
32
 Source: EIRO at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/05/articles/RO1005019I.htm 
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cooperation within the EU, where better-off unions in the EU-15 realise that the best remedy 
against “social dumping” is to help the CEEC unions in getting fairer shares for the 
workforce. 
 
Source: EIRO, International Transport Workers’ Federation, European Trade Union Committee for 
Education, The Baltic Course, Estonian Public Broadcasting. 
 
 
 
2.4.5 Interim conclusions  
 
Although it does not comprehensively cover all CEECs due to lack of empirical evidence, this 
section has highlighted some recent actions of the social partners in response to the economic 
and social challenges of the post-enlargement and the post-crisis period. Among these is 
labour mobility from the CEECs to the EU-15, which motivated trade unions in some CEECs 
and sectors to negotiate improved working conditions in order to stem the migration flow. 
Next, after joining the EU, MNCs and the EWCs Directive can serve as an incentive for 
Europeanising industrial relations across the CEECs. While MNC-based evidence on the 
transposition of social standards to the CEECs is fragmented, there are some positive 
examples of MNCs increasing the capacities of employer organisations across the CEECs. 
The EWCs Directive stipulates the incorporation of CEEC representatives in MNCs’ EWCs. 
Establishing EWCs in the CEECs has proved to be a long-term structural process, which has 
not yet been fully accomplished.   
 
The economic crisis has motivated social partner responses at the national, sectoral and 
company level both in the public and private sectors. While some of the cases presented here 
document a negotiated response to the crisis through a new wave of social pacts and 
consolidation of collective bargaining, in other cases trade unions opted for industrial action 
in order to voice their claims after being excluded from direct negotiations.  
 
An examination of social actors’ responses leads to the question of how such action can help 
to reconfigure the role of social partnership and industrial relations institutions in the CEECs. 
On the one hand, the evidence presented here allows acknowledgement of the potential for 
organised action in countries where trade unions are structurally weak and their membership 
base is declining. On the other hand, not all of the above action has brought substantive 
improvements for employees, victories for trade unions, or consolidation of bargaining 
institutions and social dialogue. Several of the outcomes of crisis-induced social partner 
responses turned out to be limited in time. Therefore, this section concludes with an argument 
that the CEEC social partners are capable of mobilising and engaging in various (negotiated 
and individual) forms of action. In turn, this may contribute to strengthening the CEECs’ 
national industrial relations systems. At the same time, the extent to which social partners 
have engaged in post-enlargement and post-crisis action, as well as the substantive outcomes 
of such action, remains often contested or limited in time. This suggests that the CEEC social 
partners need to further strengthen their structural position and develop additional capacity in 
order to produce sustainable results in consolidating social dialogue and national industrial 
relations systems. As shown in box 2.3 and 2.5, the role of international trade union solidarity 
and support for demands of trade unions in a particular national context is a promising 
resource in terms of the capacity-building of CEEC social partners, especially trade unions. 
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Box 2.5 Selected examples of tri- and bi-partite initiatives in the CEECs 
Since the beginning of the current economic crisis in Europe, Eurofound has reported 
on relevant activities and developments through its European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO
33
). 
An analysis of recent EIRO articles focusing on tripartite and bipartite activities in the 
CEECs considered in this report (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) shows activity in the areas of 
labour market activation measures, pensions, social benefits, minimum wage 
agreements, education, health, improving the business climate and dealing with 
austerity measures. Proposals to promote economic and employment growth have 
been put forward by the social partners in countries such as Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic. However, attempts to conclude collective agreements have not always been 
successful. The Estonian social partners concluded an agreement on minimum wages 
(see below), but negotiations in Lithuania to renew the first national collective 
agreement which expired in 2011 were postponed to 2012. 
Minimum wage 
The minimum wage is the prime wage policy focus for many countries. No more so 
than in Estonia and Slovakia, where minimum wage rates are amongst the lowest in 
Europe.  In Estonia, the social partners have agreed to increase the monthly national 
minimum wage by 4%, from €278 to €290, from the beginning of 2012. Employers 
had been quick to reject the 15% rise demanded by unions, although the minimum 
wage was last increased in 2007. However, the 4% increase was regarded positively 
by all social partners, with a view to future increases, depending on economic 
performance.  On the other hand, a government-supported demand for a 4% rise in 
minimum wage (€10 per month) was rejected in Slovakia. Here, failure to agree 
meant that the government imposed a solution, based on legislation. The Slovakian 
cabinet approved a 3.2% increase that came into effect in January 2012.  
 
In many countries, calls for increases in the minimum wage have been rejected due to 
anticipated adverse effects on the economy. In Lithuania, dialogue on this issue is at 
a standstill, while the government in the Czech Republic refused to consider a 
minimum wage increase despite employer organisation requests. Hungary has 
changed the tripartite interest reconciliation system which obliged it to consult unions 
on matters such as minimum wages. Under the new system, a new National Economic 
and Social Council may only propose change, an innovation that has been opposed by 
both employers and unions.  Latvia will not increase minimum wages for as long as 
the economic crisis remains.  A 2003 agreement had aimed for a 50% of the average 
gross monthly wage by 2010, although this was never reached.  Many public service 
employees receive the minimum wage in Latvia. In a complex situation that forced a 
                                                          
33
 EIRO (www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro) is a monitoring instrument aimed at providing news and analysis on 
industrial relations in the European Union. It is based on a network of researches and experts in all the EU 
countries and Norway, it also reports on developments at EU level.  
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cabinet resignation, Romania reneged on a minimum wage agreement signed by all 
partners in 2008.  
 
Pay, pensions and austerity 
Amongst the austerity measures implemented in many countries, pay and pensions 
are now arenas of conflict in the context of government austerity measures, 
undertaken in response to the economic crisis. In the teeth of considerable opposition, 
the Polish government raised the general retirement age for men and women to 67 for 
those in army, police and uniformed services.  Generalised reductions and freezes in 
social benefits introduced by a recent fiscal austerity bill in Romania provoked 
widespread demonstrations among wide-ranging sectors of the population, resulting 
in a cabinet resignation in early 2012.  
 
Combating the effects of the crisis 
More positively, interventions on economic regeneration are providing a way of 
combating the effects of the economic crisis. Lithuania has introduced a series of 
ESF-funded initiatives aimed at capacity building in social dialogue for unions and 
employers and designed to feed into economic growth. Additional programmes of 
vocational training and certification also seek to reduce unemployment. Lithuania is 
joined by Bulgaria in adopting an approach that acknowledges the importance of the 
social economy in stimulating the “real” economy. Crucially, the perennial theme of 
young people’s insertion into the labour market is also addressed by Bulgaria, not 
merely to ease transition from school to work and reduce youth unemployment from 
its current high of 30%, but to provide benefits to employers. This First Job National 
Agreement is supported by all social partners. 
 
Source: EIRO 
 
For more information on social pacts in selected CEECs, see box 2.3. For a round-up 
of public sector austerity measures and social partner responses in the CEECs, see 
table 2.10. 
 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions and prospects for the future development in industrial relations in 
CEECs 
 
This concluding section evaluates the future prospects for industrial relations in the CEECs, 
based on past and present developments. When taking into account the structural indicators 
(such as union/employer density, bargaining coverage, industrial conflict), the future of 
industrial relations in CEECs is contested. However, the evaluation of future prospects should 
not be based on structural indicators alone. It is important to reflect on two key issues, which 
proved to have a large impact on the future of industrial relations in the CEECs. These are the 
coordinated Europeanisation of social standards and industrial relations across the EU 
Member States on the one hand, and individual revitalisation strategies of national social 
partners across the CEECs on the other hand. 
 
The differences between the CEECs and the EU-15 presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3 have 
fuelled various discussions on coherence and convergence across the EU after recent 
enlargements. It became clear that Europeanisation as an upward harmonisation of social 
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standards is unlikely to take place in a bottom-up, endogenous process. This is because 
differences in the national constellations of industrial relations actors and structures are too 
great between the EU-15 and the CEECs. In an actor-oriented perspective on convergence, 
Meardi (2002) acknowledged that employers in the EU-15 joined forces with trade unions in 
the CEECs to support the Europeanisation of social standards upon EU enlargement. CEEC 
trade unions welcomed an improvement of social standards for workers, while EU-15 
employers welcomed Europeanisation in order to eliminate competition in wages and working 
conditions between the EU-15 and the CEECs. At the same time, employers in the CEECs 
and trade unions in the EU-15 preferred to maintain the diversity in social standards between 
the CEECs and EU-15 in order to protect domestic competitive advantages. Given such 
varying interests of the different social partners, a coordinated Europeanisation through EU-
level ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulation aims at fostering convergence and more cohesion across the 
EU despite differing national standards. In particular, the transposition of the ‘hard’ EU law 
into national legal systems, the transfer of ‘soft’ regulation (such as the open method of 
coordination, engagement of national partners in European-level social dialogue, or the 
exchange of information through international networks of trade unions and employer 
federations) and a company-level transfer of social dialogue standards within MNCs can serve 
as the main channels for Europeanising the industrial relations pillars presented here in the 
CEECs. These mechanisms certainly have the potential to improve the trade union position in 
the CEECs, strengthen the company-level presence of employee information and consultation, 
foster bipartite social dialogue and multi-employer bargaining procedures with the conclusion 
of sector-level collective agreements, institutionalise the use of extension mechanisms to 
widen the bargaining coverage to non-organised employers, and to encourage a greater extent 
of policy-making through tripartite concertation.  
 
However, the extent to which the potential of Europeanisation been already translated into 
improvements in social standards and national-level industrial relations in the CEECs is 
unclear. Empirical evidence is still scarce, with the exception of two studies (Visser 2008 and 
Meardi 2012), which both argue that the initial evidence after a few years of joining the EU 
suggests that none of the above channels could so far account for extensive convergence in 
industrial relations systems between the CEECs and the EU-15. Visser (2008) raised a 
number of questions on the sustainability of diversity in the EU rather than straightforward 
convergence or Europeanisation, which proved to be difficult to achieve in the initial years 
after EU enlargement. He suggests that Europeanisation through extension of social standards 
to CEECs may be possible only if the level of these standards is at the same time adjusted to 
the European diversity of national industrial relations standards and their implementation in 
different national conditions is less contested.  
 
Next to coordinated Europeanisation, for the future of industrial relations in the CEECs it is 
important to consider the potential for action and improvements in social standards, 
bargaining procedures, and other industrial relations features within particular CEECs. Earlier 
sections of this chapter documented that in most CEECs the social partners are in a weaker 
position, the role of tripartite social dialogue is contested and industrial relations institutions, 
such as collective bargaining, are less developed than in a number of EU-15 countries. At the 
same time, this chapter presented evidence that even in such contested conditions for 
industrial relations, the CEEC social partners are not passive victims of structural 
developments in their particular countries. In several cases, the evidence presented here has 
documented potential for action where the social partners, especially trade unions, were able 
to voice their demands deriving from the post-enlargement labour mobility to the EU-15, the 
economic crisis, and crisis-induced austerity measures. Such actions of the social partners are 
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important for building additional resources, e.g. through a capable leadership, changes to 
established formal and informal bargaining practices, and international cooperation with other 
national and EU-level social partner organisations. In turn, additional resources help to 
revitalise the social partners’ capacity for mobilising, and in the long run also strengthen 
national industrial relations. The revitalisation of the social partners as central industrial 
relations actors in the CEECs is a particularly important issue in this regard. This chapter has 
offered various evidence on real and possible revitalisation strategies, which we summarise 
below.   
 
Revitalisation of CEEC employers’ associations is possible, based on the employers’ 
perception of increased benefits from bargaining coordination. In most CEECs employers are 
fragmented and employers’ associations weakly developed. Therefore, the recent crisis led 
commentators to assume that employers will prefer individualised, decentralised action 
(which was widespread in many CEECs even before the crisis). However, this chapter has 
provided evidence that in exceptional cases employers have showed commitment to 
coordinated, for example sector-level, bargaining despite legally absent preconditions for this 
type of bargaining (HU, SK). MNCs as important employers across the CEECs generally 
prefer fragmented company-level bargaining, but at the same time have contributed to 
increasing the capacities of employers’ organisations in a few CEECs (BG, LV, PL). 
Moreover, MNCs have the largest potential for Europeanising company-level industrial 
relations and transposing social dialogue practices across borders from the EU-15 to the 
CEECs. This chapter has argued that MNC actions in the CEECs have not yet brought about a 
significant Europeanisation of social standards, because MNCs tend to prefer to adapt to local 
conditions. The role of EC Directives for establishing harmonised principles for employee 
information and consultation at the workplace also has an effect on motivating coordinated 
action on the side of employers. Despite this potential, the evidence has documented that the 
implementation of EC Directives in the CEECs is a long-term process and has not yet 
accomplished its goals.  
 
Revitalisation is also central for trade unions as social partners. Frege and Kelly (2003) 
argued that union revitalisation can address and possibly reverse the trend in membership 
decline, and erosion of trade union presence at the workplace, maintain and improve trade 
union mobilisation capacities, and bring about institutional change in the established practices 
of social dialogue and collective bargaining. They identified the following trade union 
revitalisation strategies in the EU-15: organising, organisational restructuring, coalition 
building, partnership with employers, political action and international links (Frege and Kelly 
2003). Meardi (2012) tested the relevance of these revitalisation strategies in the CEEC 
context and argued that revitalisation is more likely to appear and succeed at the company and 
workplace level. This is because of the rather decentralised nature of industrial relations 
across most of the CEECs. This chapter supports Meardi’s argument in presenting workplace-
level action taken by social partners, mainly but not only in MNCs. Slovenia is an interesting 
paradox in this regard, because trade unions are relatively strong overall, but not in the 
MNCs’ sites (Meardi 2012: 151). In addition, this chapter has documented that union 
revitalisation can also originate through action at sectoral and national levels, targeting 
sectoral employers’ associations (in bargaining demands) and/or the government (in austerity-
related demands). In general, systematic evidence on such revitalisation in the CEECs is 
scarce; and the case studies presented in section 2.4 suggest that concessions that unions 
gained at the sectoral and national level after EU-enlargement and in the post-crisis period 
were often temporary in character. In several CEECs unions engaged in political action, 
especially where they found it more important to concentrate on national-level tripartite action 
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instead of strengthening their position at the company and workplace levels. However, Meardi 
(2012) found that union popularity in the CEECs increases when trade unions stay out of 
politics. This has been confirmed by the growing legitimacy of the Solidarność trade union in 
Poland after re-configuring the unions’ focus from politics to representing workers’ interests 
at the company level.
34
 Finally, international links have proved to be essential for union 
revitalisation, as documented in the case of Estonian unions’ demands in the education 
subsector and the Romanian unions’ efforts to obtain international funding for training union 
members in competence and employability. 
 
In sum, this chapter has documented the revitalisation potential of CEEC social partners. At 
the same time, it acknowledges that social partner efforts to respond to post-enlargement and 
post-crisis developments through coordinated action at the European, national, sectoral and 
company levels have not yet brought forth significant changes to the decentralised, 
fragmented industrial relations structure in place in most CEECs. Nevertheless, activities 
undertaken by social partners across various CEECs, supported by EU-level efforts to 
harmonise industrial relations structures across the EU, may in the long run contribute to 
incremental changes in the state of industrial relations in the CEECs. Against the backdrop of 
a weakening membership base of trade unions and employers’ associations and declining 
bargaining coverage, this is an important argument. Forces operating against revitalisation 
include employer and trade union fragmentation, and relatively underdeveloped international 
networks of CEEC social partners.  
 
                                                          
34
 See Meardi (2012) for elaboration.  
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Chapter 3: Public Sector Industrial Relations in Transition 
 
The economic environment of recent years has had a transformatory effect on public sector 
industrial relations, with the crisis serving to accelerate and deepen changes that were already in 
train. The effects of this include a revival of unilateralism in the public sector, a recentralisation 
of wage-setting systems, an acceleration of the introduction of private sector-style HRM 
practices, and a general weakening of trade union influence over governments struggling to 
adapt to tough economic conditions. 
 
 
Based on a draft by Lorenzo Bordogna, University of Milan and Roberto Pedersini, University of 
Milan 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In most EU Member States government responses to the economic and sovereign debt crises, which 
had their origins in 2007-2008, have severely hit the public sector. Traditional patterns of 
employment relations have been challenged, past trends in employment levels have been reversed, 
and public sector wages and pension systems have been cut and reformed in order to curb overall 
public sector pay-bill and reduce public debt. 
This chapter provides an overview of the structure of the public sector, employment trends and the 
basic features of public sector employment relations in the EU-27, highlighting transformations in 
collective bargaining and wage setting systems.  
The chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 2 deals with the size of the public sector. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of some 
structural features of public sector employees, in terms of gender, part time/full time, 
temporary/open-ended employment and age. Section 4 analyses the employment status of public 
sector employees across the EU countries, with a distinction between those whose employment 
relationship is (still) regulated through a special statute, often under public and/or administrative 
law, and those with ordinary employment contracts under civil or commercial law, like their private 
sector counterparts. The right to collective bargaining of public employees and possibly also the 
right to strike is linked to this distinction. Section 5 deals with trade unions and employers, with 
sub-sections devoted to trade union density and structure, employers’ representatives, and the 
European sectoral social dialogue. The wage setting systems prevailing in EU Member States are 
the topic of Section 6, with the main distinction between systems based on unilateral government 
determination, systems where collective bargaining is the main method of wage determination, and 
hybrid or mixed systems. A topic to which the traditional issue of centralisation/decentralisation of 
industrial relations is linked, as well as recent trends towards the differentiation and, possibly 
individualisation, of treatment (Section 7). Section 8 deals with the issue of industrial conflict in the 
public services and the settlement of disputes. In the final Section, building on previous analyses, 
five country clusters are identified, summarising the main features that characterise public sector 
industrial relations systems across the EU-27. 
3.2 Size of the public sector 
For an overview of the issues surrounding the definition of the public sector, see chapter 1. In 
particular, box 1.3 explains that data based on a classification of activities can only serve as a proxy 
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and not an exact measurement of the public sector. Based on this, in this chapter we use the sections 
O, P and Q of the Statistical classification of economic activities of the European Community 
NACE Rev.2, from 2008 onwards
35
. These sections include respectively: public administration and 
defence, compulsory social security; education; human health and social work activities
36
. The 
share of total employment of employees in these activities in 2008 and 2011 for the EU-27 
countries plus Norway is reported in Appendix 3.1, while Table 3.1 below, first column, reports the 
share of all public sector activities (O+P+Q) of total employment as an average during 2008-2011. 
Great variation across countries in the relative size of public sector employment is immediately 
apparent. Overall, four groups of countries can be identified (Table 3.2). At the two extreme poles, 
those with a very large public sector, with an employment share above 29% of total employment, 
and those with a much smaller public sector, with an employment share below 20%. The first group 
includes, in decreasing order, three out of four of the Nordic countries - Norway, Denmark, Sweden 
- in connection with the traditional large extension of the welfare state, immediately followed by 
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, UK, and the Netherlands. The opposite group comprises five of the 
former communist, eastern European countries, including Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, plus Cyprus. 
 
                                                          
35
 A similar choice in Vaughan-Whitehead 2012, ch. 1, while in Glassman 2010 only section O (Public administration 
and Defence; Compulsory social security) is considered. 
36
 In detail: 
Section O – PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENCE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY 
84.1: Administration of the State and the economic and social policy of the community; 
84.2: Provision of services to the community as a whole (Foreign affairs; Defence activities; Justice and judicial 
activities; Public order and safety activities; Fire service activities); 
84.3: Compulsory social security activities; 
Section P – EDUCATION 
85.1: Pre-primary education 
85.2: Primary education 
85.3: Secondary education 
85.4: Higher education 
85.5: Other education 
85.6: Educational support activities 
Section Q – HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK ACTIVITIES 
86.1: Hospital activities 
86.2: Medical and dental practice activities 
86.9: Other human health activities 
87.1: Residential nursing care activities 
87.2: Residential care activities for mental retardation, mental health and substance abuse 
87.3: Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled 
87.9: Other residential care activities 
88.1: Social work activities without accommodation for the elderly and disabled 
88.9: Other social work activities without accommodation 
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Table 3.1. Share of public sector employment in relation to total employment: comparison 
between different sources 
 
1 
LFS-Eurostat 
2008-2011 average 
(O+P+Q) 
 
2 
OECD 
General Govern. 
2008 
a, b 
3 
OECD 
General Gov. + 
Public Corporations 
2008 
a, b 
4 
EIRO 
2004 or 2005 
 
EU27 24.4    
EU15 25.8    
EU12 25.7    
NO 34.7 29.6 34.5 33.9 
DK 32.6 28.7 31.5 30.4 
SE 32.1 26.2   
BE 31.5 17.1  24.9 
LU 29.8 17.6 17.6 10 
FR 29.7 21.9 24.4 20.3 
UK 29.7 17.4 18.6 20.2 
NL 29.5 12.6 21.4 11.5 
FI 27.2 22.9 22.9 27.5 
MT 25.4   32.1 
DE 25.1 9.6 13.6 12 
IE 25.1 14.8 16.7 17.9 
LT 23.1   27.6 
HU 22.6 19.5 19.5 20.8 
AT 22.2 11.4  10.7 
EE 21.7 18.7 22.3  
LV 21.4   34.7 
EL 21.2 7.9 20.7 22.1 
SK 21.1 10.7 19.3 22.5 
ES 20.5 12.3 13.0 15.2 
PT 20.4 12.1  15 
IT 20.2 14.3 14.3 14.5 
PL 19.8 9.7 21.4 26.2 
SI 19.6 14.7 22.6 23.2 
CZ 19.1 12.8 19.4 14.7 
CY 18.8   17.3 
BG 18.5   26.2 
RO 13.6   10.4 
Also see chapter 1 and box 1.3 for a discussion of the definition, size and statistical classification of the 
public sector and public services. See appendix 3.2 and chapter 4 (table 4.6) for a discussion of the change 
in public sector employment. 
Sources: 1) Eurostat LFS 2008-09-10-11, sections: O. P. Q; 2 e 3) OECD, Government at a Glance 2011, 
Fig. 21.1 and 21.2, based on ILO, LABORSTA database; 4) EIRO: Bordogna 2007. 
Notes: a) France and Portugal: 2006; b) Austria, Italy, Czech Republic, Netherlands and Poland: data are 
expressed in full-time equivalents. 
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Of the remaining countries, four – Finland, Malta, Germany, and Ireland – are closer to the group 
with the largest public sector, with an employment share around 25-27%, while 10 are closer to the 
lowest pole, with an employment share between 20 and 24%, including Lithuania, Hungary, 
Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Portugal, and Italy; only one case within the latter 
group, Lithuania, is slightly over 23%. 
A simplified scheme would stress a divide between a group consisting of all the central and 
northern European countries of the former EU-15, with the exclusion of Austria and the inclusion of 
Malta, characterised by a relatively large public sector in terms of employment share, and a group 
of all the southern and eastern European countries, which have a lighter public sector. 
It should be noted that the hierarchy would change significantly if only public administration and 
compulsory social security are considered. In this case all the Nordic countries (DK, NO, SE, FI) 
would be situated in the lowest part of the ranking, along with Ireland, Romania, and Lithuania, 
with up to 6% of total employment, while at the top, with 8% or over, we would find Luxembourg, 
France, Belgium, Malta and Greece, the remaining ones being in between. 
 
Table 3.2 Public sector employment share of total employment, average 2008/2011 
Public sector share on total 
employment 
Countries 
Over 29% Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, UK, 
Netherlands.  
25% - 29% Finland, Malta, Germany, Ireland. 
20% - 24% Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy. 
Below 20% Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania. 
The grouping of countries is based on 5 percentage-point intervals of public sector employment share as 
shown in table 3.1, column 1. 
Source: LFS Eurostat. NACE Rev.2. Sections O, P, Q. 
 
However, as specified in chapter 1, while the activities included in section O should certainly 
belong to the public sector, with few exceptions and uncertainties, sections P and Q include also 
private sector providers, to an extent that might significantly vary across countries, and there is little 
scope for controlling for this feature (see Box 1.1 in chapter 1). 
To partly remedy these inaccuracies, due to the unavailability of more focused data, the three 
remaining columns in Table 3.1 report data coming from different sources: the OECD Government 
at a Glance 2011, related to employment in General Government and in General Government plus 
Public Corporations, and a comparative study on public sector industrial relations for the European 
Foundation of Living and Working Conditions (Bordogna 2007). In two cases the data of the three 
sources overlap almost perfectly: Norway and Denmark, at the top of the ranking, with a public 
sector employment share always around or above 30%. In another group of countries the available 
sources are also quite convergent, including Hungary, Estonia, Portugal, Cyprus, Romania, and, if 
public corporations are also included in the OECD data, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, and the Czech 
Republic. However, for the remaining countries there are significant differences between the three 
(or two) sources. Among these, particularly remarkable are the discrepancies regarding Belgium, 
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the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Most notable is 
probably the case of Germany, which in both the OECD and EIRO ranking has one of the leanest 
public sectors in the EU, half or even less than in the Eurostat source. This feature has been 
confirmed by national case studies (Keller 2011; also Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010). Similar 
discrepancies are confirmed by case studies regarding France, Italy and the UK (Bordogna and Neri 
2011; Bach and Givan 2011). 
Relative size of public sector employment apart, in about half of the countries the number of public 
employees has decreased since 2008 in the public administration, defence and social security sub-
sector. The decrease is particularly notable in Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, UK, Denmark, and 
Portugal, being more than 8%. These countries are followed by Belgium, France, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Netherlands, with a decrease between 3 and 7%. However, in the education and health and social 
work activities the number of employees has increased in many cases, so that, overall, only seven 
countries registered in 2011 a reduction in aggregate public sector employment levels compared to 
2008, namely Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, and, to a very limited extent, 
Italy and France. Only in two countries, Cyprus and Luxembourg, was the public sector 
employment share in 2011 (slightly) lower than in 2008. In France and Italy the share remained 
unchanged, while in all the other countries it was higher, to a varying degree, which might also be 
due to the fact that job losses have affected the private sector in particular (for details, see Appendix 
3.2; see also Glassner 2010: 8). Arguably the main effects on employment levels, and possibly on 
employment share, of the austerity programs that many countries have recently adopted will be felt 
in the years to come (see chapter 4). 
 
3.3 Employment structure 
A number of features traditionally characterise public sector employment in comparison with the 
entire economy: a higher female employment share, a greater proportion of part-time work, more 
widespread use of temporary employment, and a relatively older workforce. Further, the proportion 
of employees with tertiary education is relatively higher in the public sector (for similar 
considerations, Giordano et al. 2011: 14-5). 
Female employment. The participation of women in public sector employment is much higher than 
in the entire economy: in all countries the public sector female employment share is at least 10 
percentage points higher than in the entire economy, and in many cases more than 20 percentage 
points higher. While in the economy as a whole female employees always represent less than 50% 
of total employment, with the notable exceptions of the three Baltic countries, the percentage of 
women in the total public sector is always largely higher than 60%, with the exception of Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Malta. In the three Baltic countries, the four Nordic countries, UK, Ireland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia the figure is over 70% (Table 3.3). 
There is, however, wide variation between the three subsectors of the public sector. In public 
administration, defence and social security, the percentage of female employees is in most countries 
close to that in the entire economy, and in several cases even lower. This is due to the significant 
presence of some functions and roles that are traditionally exercised by men and where women are 
usually still a minority - not only police, armed forces and defence in general, but also prison 
guards, diplomatic services, and in some countries the judiciary. By contrast, education, health and 
social work activities are characterised by occupations with a very high female density - teachers, 
social workers, nurses, and increasingly medical doctors. In such sectors women are in all countries 
the absolute majority. In education, female employees (mostly teachers) always represent at least 
two thirds of the entire workforce, with the exception of Finland, Malta, Spain, Greece, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. This feature is even more marked in the health and social work 
sector, where in 14 countries more than four out of five employees are women. Further, in other 
nine countries women represent more than three out of four employees. 
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In some cases this is linked to employment and welfare policies deliberately aimed at promoting 
female participation in the labour market, as is the case in the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, a very 
high female density can also be observed in the UK and in several Central and Eastern European 
countries, such as the three Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Poland. 
In most of the Mediterranean countries – Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Malta – this tendency is less 
pronounced, although with differences between the education and the health and social work sector. 
 
Part-time employment. A feature connected with the high female share of public sector employment 
is the widespread use of part-time work, although with wide variations across countries and 
between the three subsectors (Table 3.4). Looking at the public sector as a whole, only in eight out 
of the 23 countries that provide relevant data is the percentage of part-time workers lower than in 
the entire economy, including five Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta and 
Greece), two Eastern European countries (Poland and Slovenia), and Finland, which, with its 
modest 14%, is a peculiarity for a Nordic country. In all the remaining cases part-time work is more 
widespread than in the entire economy, and in some countries markedly more so. At the top of this 
ranking we find the Netherlands, with an astonishing 64% of part-timers. But also in many central 
and northern European countries at least one out of three public sector employees has a part-time 
job, including Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Germany, the UK, and, at a little distance, Austria and 
Denmark. A comparative assessment of the weight of public sector employment on total 
employment should therefore take into consideration these differences. 
Variations across subsectors are also very relevant. The incidence of part-timers is predictably 
lower in the public administration, defence and social security sector, given the roles and 
occupations prevailing in these activities. In effect, in all the countries that provide data, with the 
only exception of Slovakia and Hungary, the percentage of part-time work is systematically and 
notably smaller than in the public sector as a whole, in several cases even less than half (Norway, 
Finland, Denmark, Poland, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Czech Republic). Likewise predictable, for the 
same reasons, is the higher incidence of part-timers in the education, health and social work sectors, 
especially in the latter sector. A sort of polarisation between countries is, however, observable. At 
one extreme, in a country like the Netherlands, these sectors appear to be the real reign of part-time 
workers, as these employees represent by a large margin the absolute majority, with respectively six 
and almost eight units of personnel out of every 10. But, this outlier apart, in another group of 
countries the incidence of part-time work is also very significant, close to, or above, respectively 
30% and 40% of the workforce. This group contains all the Nordic countries (with the exception of 
Denmark and Finland) Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the UK. At the opposite pole, however, 
there are countries where the percentage of part-timers is surprisingly low even in these activities – 
it is below, and in some cases largely below, 10%. These countries are Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia and partly Latvia, Cyprus and the Czech Republic. The line 
of division is apparently between central and northern European countries on the one hand, and 
southern and eastern European countries on the other hand. 
Part-time employment increased between 2008 and 2011 in most countries where data are available. 
While in many cases there is apparently still a large margin for a greater use of part-time work, in 
some countries its presence is so high that there seems to be little room for any further, significant 
increase. 
Finally, in all countries part-time work in the public sector is mostly, and in some cases almost 
exclusively, a female phenomenon, especially in the education, health and social work activities, 
where women are often 90% of all part-timers, or even more (Table 3.5). 
 
Temporary employment. The incidence of temporary employment in the public sector as a whole 
varies strongly across EU countries, ranging in 2011 from around 7-8% in the UK, Luxembourg, 
and Greece to more than 20% in Spain, Portugal and Finland (Table 3.6). This reflects more general 
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differences in national economic structures and regulatory systems across Europe. Despite these 
variations, temporary employment is systematically more widespread in the public sector as a 
whole than in the entire economy, with the exceptions of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the 
Netherlands and Poland. The difference between the public sector and the entire economy is 
particularly high in countries such as Finland (8 percentage points in 2011, respectively 21.6% and 
13.5%), Germany (16.8% and 12.9%), Norway, Denmark, Portugal, partly Austria and Belgium and 
until recently Cyprus, Greece and the Czech Republic. One obvious hypothesis of why this is the 
case could be the search for numerical flexibility in contexts where the regulatory framework of the 
employment relationship is particularly rigid, including employment security. A second hypothesis 
could be linked to attempts to contain labour costs. In other cases, the use of temporary employment 
could be a way of bypassing strict rules on hiring new employees on permanent contracts, as in 
some periods in Italy (Pedersini and Coletto 2009). 
 
However, wide variations also exist between the different public sector activities. While temporary 
employment is in all countries less widespread in the public administration, defence and social 
security sub-sector, it is usually notably more commonly used in the education, health and social 
work activities, with only three exceptions regarding education (Spain, Hungary and Slovakia) and 
a few more cases with reference to health activities. 
 
In some countries, such as the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, France, Italy, Poland (with 
wide variations over time), and Norway, a decreasing trend in the proportion, and at times also in 
the number, of temporary employees can be observed in recent years. This might have occurred 
because of two very different reasons, converging however towards the same result. On the one 
hand, government ‘stabilisation’ policies adopted within programs to reduce precarious 
employment, at times under trade union pressure, as has been the case to some extent in France and 
Italy, in the latter country especially in the education sector. On the other hand, and more recently 
(2011 and 2010), job cutting measures adopted within austerity programmes as a reaction to the 
economic crisis, that have first of all affected temporary employees, whose contracts have not been 
renewed (see also chapter 4). Some countries, such as Italy and France, have experienced both 
measures in different years. 
 
In other countries, however, the incidence of temporary employment has significantly increased, for 
example in Slovakia, Hungary, Portugal, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, Germany and the UK. In 
Slovakia, Hungary, Portugal and Austria this increase has been greater than in the entire economy. 
As already mentioned, this may be linked to the search for numerical flexibility within particularly 
rigid regulatory frameworks (including hiring rules) and to attempts to contain or reduce labour 
costs. 
 
Age. A final feature regards the structure of public sector employment is age. In Table 3.7 this 
feature is measured by the ratio between young employees, from 15 to 39 years, and older 
employees of 50 years or over. Three characteristics are worth stressing. First, in the large majority 
of countries the ratio between young and older employees is lower in the public sector as a whole 
than in the entire economy, and in several cases much lower. This means that public sector 
employees are relatively older (see also OECD, Government at a Glance 2011: 106-07). The 
exceptions are Romania and partly Luxembourg, while Portugal, Cyprus and Slovenia in recent 
years have markedly reversed their previously younger public sector employment structure; in 
Cyprus this coincided with a sharp decrease in temporary employment. A few countries, including 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Finland, and, until 2010, Sweden, display a ratio of below 1, 
which means an employment structure clearly biased towards older employees. This bias is 
particularly marked in Italy. Second, in all countries there is wide variation within the public sector, 
between the different activities. While in several EU-15 countries the public administration, defence 
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and social security activities have an older employment structure than the education and health 
subsectors (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and Norway) the opposite is true for all the eastern European countries, 
plus the UK. In other cases the picture is less definite, such as in Italy, where the oldest employment 
structure is found in education activities. Third, in the majority of countries a decreasing trend in 
the public sector young/older employees ratio is observable, resulting in part from cuts in temporary 
employment and in the replacement ratio, albeit not always more pronounced than in the entire 
economy. The few exceptions include Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta, and partly Sweden, while in 
another group the ratio remains stable (Denmark, Luxembourg). Exceptions apart, on the whole 
younger workers seem to be harder hit by the crisis than their older counterparts. 
 
In connection with measures recently adopted by many governments in response to the crisis – such 
as replacement freezes, cuts in temporary employment, worsening wage and working conditions 
that make public sector jobs less attractive, cuts in training expenditure, reforms of the pension 
systems that raise the general retirement age of public employees (see also chapter 6) while at the 
same time temporarily encouraging early retirement to reduce employment levels and labour costs - 
this age structure might lead to unexpected and problematic consequences. Depending on national 
conditions and specific mix of measures, one consequence could be a further ageing of the public 
sector workforce. A second consequence might be a change in the skills composition of public 
sector employees, with a loss of human capital. Other possible consequences include staff 
shortages, mobility to the private sector or migration abroad, which has happened in the case of 
health professions from several eastern European countries such as Estonia, Hungary, Romania, 
Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia (Masso and Espenberg 2012: 69; Hámori and Kӧllὄ 2012: 
175). A final consequence is a potential worsening of the quality of public services (Vaughan-
Whitehead 2012: 15, 17, 20). Some of these potential outcomes, of course, depend on how reforms 
are designed and implemented, while the expected results are enhanced levels of efficiency. 
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Table 3.3 Employment of women, 2011 
% total employed in sector, 15 years and over 
 
 
Total 
economy 
Total Public 
sector  
Public 
administration, 
defence, social 
security Education 
Health and 
social work 
activities 
EU-27 45.5 66.9 46.1 71.3 78.0 
EU-15  45.5 66.7 45.7 69.9 77.7 
CEECs 45.4 66.3 45.5 69.8 77.3 
Belgium 45.4 67.0 47.9 69.7 77.7 
Bulgaria 47.9 66.7 45.1 80.9 81.0 
Czech Republic 43.0 68.5 47.8 76.5 81.5 
Denmark 47.4 70.3 54.0 58.2 81.0 
Germany 46.1 66.9 47.6 69.4 76.8 
Estonia 50.5 75.8 54.3 85.3 84.8 
Ireland 46.6 72.2 47.8 74.7 81.3 
Greece 40.3 52.8 34.8 65.0 64.3 
Spain 44.8 61.5 42.3 65.8 77.2 
France 47.5 66.9 51.2 66.4 78.6 
Italy 40.7 60.5 34.0 76.3 68.6 
Cyprus 45.3 59.9 38.3 72.3 74.1 
Latvia 50.7 75.5 56.6 82.5 84.7 
Lithuania 51.4 73.9 51.3 78.4 87.0 
Luxembourg 43.4 56.8 34.7 65.2 76.0 
Hungary 46.0 67.7 49.3 76.7 77.8 
Malta 34.6 51.7 31.5 65.4 57.7 
Netherlands 46.2 68.8 39.1 62.8 83.1 
Austria 46.2 65.3 43.6 70.4 77.3 
Poland 44.9 69.7 50.3 77.4 81.7 
Portugal 46.8 66.3 37.0 76.7 80.7 
Romania 45.0 62.4 38.6 74.6 78.3 
Slovenia 45.9 70.8 49.3 79.0 82.1 
Slovakia 44.3 70.3 51.6 79.9 83.2 
Finland 48.3 76.2 54.0 66.3 87.2 
Sweden 47.4 73.9 54.9 72.9 82.0 
United 
Kingdom 46.4 70.2 50.0 72.0 78.4 
Norway 47.5 71.9 48.8 63.7 81.2 
 
Source: LFS Eurostat 
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Table 3.4 Part-time employment, 2011 
% in each sector, 15 years and over 
 
 
Total 
economy 
Total Public 
sector 
Public 
administration, 
defence, social 
security Education 
Health and 
social work 
activities 
      
EU-27 19.5 24.8 13.1 25.9 32.1 
EU-15  22.5 28.2 15.2 30.0 35.2 
CEECs 22.4 28.1 15.1 30.1 35.1 
Belgium 25.1 35.4 23.5 31.2 46.1 
Bulgaria 2.4         
Czech Republic 5.5 8.0 3.8 12.2 8.2 
Denmark 25.9 31.3 15.0 24.6 39.3 
Germany 26.6 34.1 17.9 40.7 40.1 
Estonia 10.6 18.9   3.5 19.8 17.5 
Ireland 23.5 26.3 11.6 24.4 33.8 
Greece 6.8 4.9 1.6 9.6 3.9 
Spain 13.8 12.0 5.4 17.0 14.5 
France 17.9 23.8 17.9 24.0 28.1 
Italy 15.5 13.7 7.3 12.6 20.1 
Cyprus 10.0     16.8 8.8 
Latvia 9.2     10.3 10.1 
Lithuania 8.7     11.9 7.6 
Luxembourg 18.3 26.7 18.1 23.2 39.6 
Hungary 6.8 7.6 10.0 6.6 6.0 
Malta 13.2 12.9 5.4 13.5 20.4 
Netherlands 49.1 63.9 32.6 61.0 77.4 
Austria 25.2 32.2 19.9 30.5 42.2 
Poland 8.0 7.2 3.0 9.7 8.9 
Portugal 13.3 6.0 2.1 10.4 5.0 
Romania 10.5         
Slovenia 10.4 8.9 5.1 11.1 9.7 
Slovakia 4.1 7.8 13.8 4.8 3.6 
Finland 14.9 14.0 6.0 15.6 15.7 
Sweden 25.9 36.5 18.2 32.2 46.7 
United 
Kingdom 26.8 33.4 18.4 38.4 36.6 
Norway 28.1 37.5 13.3 31.0 46.5 
 
Source: LFS Eurostat 
  129 
Table 3.5 Women as a percentage of total employed part-time in each sector, 2011 
15 years and over 
 
 
Total 
economy 
Total Public 
Sector 
Public 
administration, 
defence, social 
security Education 
Health and 
social work 
activities 
      
EU-27 74.8 85.6 80.1 81.0 89.7 
EU-15  76.1 86.0 81.4 81.4 89.8 
CEECs 76.3 86.0 81.5 81.3 89.9 
Belgium 78.6 88.0 83.7 82.6 91.9 
Bulgaria 52.4     
Czech Republic 73.8 80.7 65.3 81.5 86.6 
Denmark 68.9 83.2 77.1 71.3 87.5 
Germany 79.2 86.4 87.3 80.9 88.9 
Estonia 73.6   82.3  
Ireland 70.8 88.5 84.9 83.1 91.4 
Greece 60.7 75.1 62.1 77.2 76.6 
Spain 76.0 80.5 70.7 75.1 89.4 
France 79.8 86.1 81.9 81.2 90.2 
Italy 77.2 83.3 71.8 83.4 86.8 
Cyprus 59.0   83.7 92.3 
Latvia 59.5   75.0  
Lithuania 61.6   72.0 91.4 
Luxembourg 85.2 89.4 83.3 85.7 94.4 
Hungary 62.3 64.4 55.2 70.5 74.2 
Malta 67.3   76.2 86.2 
Netherlands 72.2 86.0 71.3 76.1 91.7 
Austria 80.9 88.2 85.7 85.0 90.6 
Poland 62.3 75.6 63.8 71.8 85.6 
Portugal 57.3   71.5 71.9 
Romania 49.5     
Slovenia 58.9 69.4 60.0 65.5 81.1 
Slovakia 62.6 65.0 51.9 87.3 94.8 
Finland 63.5 81.8 78.6 74.2 85.6 
Sweden 72.1 85.4 75.1 82.6 88.4 
United 
Kingdom 74.7 87.4 83.1 84.7 90.7 
Norway 72.3 84.4 62.7 73.7 88.8 
 
Source: LFS Eurostat 
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Table 3.6 Number employed in temporary jobs as % of total employees in each sector (15 years and over) 
 All sectors Public sectors Public administration Education Health 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU-27 11.8 11.3 11.6 11.7 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.1 11.4 11.7 11.6 11.2 15.7 15.5 15.4 15.4 13.0 12.8 12.8 12.8 
EU-15 12.2 11.7 11.8 12.0 14.1 13.9 13.8 13.8 11.7 11.9 11.7 11.5 17.3 16.9 16.8 16.9 13.6 13.4 13.3 13.3 
CEECs 12.3 11.7 11.8 12.0 14.0 13.8 13.7 13.7 11.8 12.0 11.8 11.6 17.2 16.8 16.7 16.7 13.3 13.1 13.0 13.0 
Belgium 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.7 8.9 9.3 9.0 9.5 5.4 5.8 5.6 5.9 15.7 16.7 16.2 16.8 7.0 6.8 6.4 7.0 
Bulgaria 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.6     5.2 5.1 4.3 6.1     4.7 5.1 4.6 5.4 
Czech Republic 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.0 10.2 10.1 9.3 8.9 10.2 10.0 10.5 10.0 12.1 12.3 10.6 9.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 7.2 
Denmark 7.8 7.9 7.7 8.0 10.8 11.0 10.2 10.7 7.1 7.0 7.7 8.3 13.8 13.0 12.5 13.3 10.8 11.5 9.9 10.2 
Germany 13.0 12.8 12.9 12.9 16.3 16.6 16.6 16.8 12.7 12.9 12.9 13.2 20.3 21.4 21.1 21.3 16.4 16.4 16.5 16.5 
Estonia 2.2 2.3 3.4 4.1                 
Ireland 6.9 7.0 7.7 8.2 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 4.2 2.8 2.9 2.7 14.8 14.8 14.8 15.6 8.9 9.5 9.3 9.0 
Greece 7.4 7.8 7.9 7.3 9.3 9.6 9.4 7.7 9.0 9.7 8.7 6.2 10.0 10.5 10.4 8.6 8.9 8.4 9.0 9.0 
Spain 24.1 21.1 20.7 21.1 26.4 25.1 23.7 24.3 22.1 22.6 20.7 21.5 26.4 24.9 22.9 23.3 30.7 28.0 27.4 27.9 
France 13.3 12.8 13.3 13.5 16.0 15.7 15.6 15.0 15.7 15.4 14.8 14.1 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 15.0 14.6 14.8 14.0 
Italy 9.9 9.3 9.5 10.0 11.9 10.9 10.3 10.3 8.2 7.4 7.3 7.1 18.2 17.1 15.9 15.6 8.9 7.9 7.5 8.1 
Cyprus 11.1 10.7 11.0 11.1 18.0 16.8 14.6 13.8 16.7 15.9 13.5 11.3 21.0 19.8 17.9 19.2 15.3 13.6 11.0 7.5 
Latvia 3.0 3.8 6.0 5.7                 
Lithuania 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.5                 
Luxembourg 5.8 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.4 8.5 8.6 7.6 4.6 6.5 6.7 5.3 10.6 12.0 11.6 9.9 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.4 
Hungary 6.9 7.4 8.5 7.9 8.2 10.7 12.8 10.7 14.7 20.2 23.9 19.2 5.3 6.7 8.2 7.3 4.5 4.6 5.3 5.0 
Malta 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.7                 
Netherlands 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.5 12.4 13.3 13.2 12.3 9.7 10.4 10.1 7.8 13.6 13.6 15.2 14.1 12.9 14.3 13.6 13.4 
Austria 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.9 9.7 9.7 10.1 6.8 7.1 6.6 7.5 13.1 14.2 14.8 14.7 7.7 8.7 8.4 8.9 
Poland 20.8 20.4 21.1 20.8 15.4 15.9 16.0 14.1 15.4 16.1 15.3 12.8 14.5 15.6 15.6 14.3 16.5 16.2 17.4 15.3 
Portugal 17.4 16.8 17.8 17.5 20.1 20.8 22.9 21.8 14.4 14.7 19.8 16.3 24.0 25.7 26.5 27.2 22.2 21.7 21.9 21.1 
Romania 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.0     2.1 1.5 1.4  2.1        
Slovenia 14.9 13.7 14.3 15.1 16.5 16.2 15.7 16.4 15.9 16.8 12.8 13.5 18.0 17.3 17.9 18.5 15.0 13.9 15.7 16.6 
Slovakia 4.0 3.7 4.8 5.6 3.9 5.4 6.9 8.4 5.1 9.1 11.9 16.2 3.0 3.8 4.8 4.6 3.4 2.7 3.1 2.9 
Finland 13.1 12.6 13.4 13.5 21.8 21.9 21.7 21.6 12.4 12.4 11.9 13.2 28.5 28.1 27.3 25.9 21.8 22.1 22.0 22.2 
Sweden 14.4 13.6 14.1 14.7 17.1 16.2 16.1 17.2 12.9 12.3 12.3 12.4 17.7 16.5 16.3 18.1 18.2 17.5 17.6 18.6 
United Kingdom 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.3 6.8 6.7 7.1 7.1 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.7 10.7 9.5 10.6 10.5 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.5 
Norway 8.3 7.4 7.7 7.4 12.5 11.0 10.8 10.8 8.9 8.0 7.4 6.5 13.8 12.1 11.4 13.2 13.0 11.5 11.5 11.0 
Source: Eurostat. LFS 
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Table 3.7 Ratio of number employed aged 15-39 relative to number employed aged 50 and over in each sector, 2008-2011 
 All sectors Public sectors Public administration Education Health 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU-27 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 
EU-15 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 
CEECs 1,9 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,2 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,3 
Belgium 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Bulgaria 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Czech Republic 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Denmark 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Germany 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 
Estonia 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.4 2.0 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Ireland 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4 
Greece 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.5 
Spain 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 
France 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Italy 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 
Cyprus 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.6 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.6 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.9 
Latvia 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7 
Lithuania 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Luxembourg 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.8 2.2 2.2 
Hungary 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 
Malta 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.6 
Netherlands 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 
Austria 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 
Poland 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 
Portugal 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 
Romania 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 
Slovenia 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.7 
Slovakia 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 
Finland 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Sweden 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
United Kingdom 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Norway 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 
Source: Eurostat. LFS
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3.4 Employment status and the right to collective bargaining 
The nature and the regulation of the employment relationship of public employees are crucial 
features that directly affect collective bargaining and industrial relations in the sector. Put simply, it 
makes a difference whether all or a significant part of public employees are denied the right to 
collectively negotiate terms and conditions of employment, or the right to take industrial action. 
These features, in turn, are linked to the legal and administrative tradition in each country. 
In the comparative public administration literature a standard distinction is made between countries 
with a Rechtsstaat tradition, either of Napoleonic or Prussian origin, and the Anglo-Saxon model 
(Kickert 2007, 2008; Peters 2010; Painter and Peters 2010; Ziller 2003). Within the first tradition, 
typical of many continental European countries, despite considerable differences among them, a 
basic feature was the primacy of the law, whereby laws and regulations were the exclusive source 
of administrative action and administration was mainly restricted to executing legislation and 
administering regulations based on the law (Kickert 2007: 28-9). Linked to this strongly legalistic 
conception was a body of state officials whose tasks were to fulfil sovereign functions on behalf of 
the authority of the state (external defence, internal order, administration of justice, administration 
of taxes). Within such a framework, it was hardly conceivable that these functionaries could have 
interests in contrast to the general interest of the state of which they were servants. Hence a 
distinctive model of employment regulation derived, separated from that prevailing in the private 
sector and characterised by two essential elements. On the one hand, they were denied collective 
bargaining rights (and at times also the right to strike and the right of association), in favour of the 
unilateral regulation of terms and conditions of employment through laws or administrative 
measures. On the other hand, they enjoyed a special employment status consisting of various 
substantive and procedural prerogatives, in terms of recruitment procedures, employment security, a 
career path based on seniority, pension treatment, and other guarantees. In case of dispute, their 
regulation was subject to administrative law and administrative tribunals. The employment relations 
approach linked to this framework is often labelled in the literature as the ‘sovereign employer 
model’, to stress the unilateralism that characterises it (Beaumont 1992). 
By contrast, within the common law tradition of the British experience, there is no fundamental 
division between public and private sector employment legislation: the legal boundaries between 
the two areas of employment have never been clearly demarcated. The distinction between 
administrative law and administrative tribunals, on the one hand, and civil law and ordinary courts, 
on the other hand, is absent. Also the formal status of civil servants has been uncertain for many 
decades, until the High Court in 1991 recognised that they were employed by the Crown under 
contracts of employment (Winchester and Bach 1999: 22-3). Despite this absence of legal 
distinction, even in the British public services, for decades employment relations followed a 
different pattern from that prevailing in the private sector, often summarised as the “model 
employer” approach (Beaumont 1992). The main feature of this model is the preference for joint 
regulation and a generally more ‘benign’ attitude of the employer towards the employees and trade 
unions than in the private sector (see section 5). 
In no country has either of these two approaches been implemented in their full ideal-type 
configuration (Bordogna 2003 and 2007). Leaving aside important differences, however, both 
models identified a distinctive relationship between the state and its employees which differed in 
important respects from the regulation of employment in the private sector. A distinction based on 
the acknowledgment of the unique role of the State as employer, and of the particular context - the 
set of incentives and constraints - in which the public sector employer operates (Ferner 1985; 
Beaumont 1992). 
This distinctiveness of public sector employment regulation partly weakened in the 1960s and 
1970s as the number of public employees involved in education, health and social work activities 
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increased rapidly in connection with the expansion of the welfare state, and soon exceeded the 
workforce employed in the traditional functions of the state (Treu 1987). As a consequence, in 
several countries where collective bargaining was previously banned, the right to bargain started to 
be recognised for various groups of public employees, although at times with a number of 
limitations. 
Further challenges to this separate regulation came in connection with the bureaucratic reform 
agenda pursued in many countries in the 1980s hand 1990s, often along the guidelines of the New 
Public Management (NPM) doctrine. NPM aimed to remove any difference between the public and 
the private sector as a way of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of public services (OECD 
1995; Hood 1991 and 1995; Bordogna 2008; Pedersini 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 
2011). Beside the UK, moves in this direction have taken place in several continental European 
countries, such as Italy and the Nordic countries. Italy, for example, used to share the legalistic 
administrative tradition of France and of German Beamte, with a separate system of employment 
regulation and the unilateral determination of pay and working conditions. However, after a partial 
change in 1983, Italy went through a major reform in 1992-1993, reinforced in 1997-1998. The 
employment relationship of more than 80% of Italian public employees was privatised and 
contractualised, including for managers (and top level managers since 1998). Collective bargaining 
became the main method of regulating terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusive 
method with regard to pay, possibly supplemented by individual negotiations for top managers. 
Jurisdiction shifted from administrative law and courts to the civil code and ordinary tribunals, 
reducing the scope of the special prerogatives enjoyed by public employees in relation to the private 
sector workforce. The traditional career-based system for managerial staff was also partially 
amended, allowing the recruitment of a certain proportion of personnel on a contractual basis from 
outside the public administration (Bordogna and Neri 2011).  
Similar developments have taken place in the Nordic countries, with reductions in special statutory 
employment protection for civil servants and the determination of parts or all of their terms and 
conditions of employment via collective negotiations at central and local level (Ibsen et al. 2011). 
In the Netherlands as well, a shift from unilateral regulation of terms and conditions of employment 
on the part of the government (Minister of the Interior) towards collective negotiations at sectoral 
level took place since 1993, meaning that that central government can no longer unilaterally change 
existing conditions (Steijn & Leisink, 2007). 
However, despite several institutional and policy changes implemented over the past three decades, 
along the above-mentioned guidelines, it is generally recognised that the “set of rules that govern 
pay and working conditions still differ significantly across private and public sectors in most EU 
countries”, as recently stressed by a ECB working paper (Giordano et al. 2011: 7). Other 
comparative studies confirm this feature, stressing that the NPM-inspired reforms were less 
widespread than expected (Pollitt et al. 2007; Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011; Pollitt 2011), and have had differentiated effects on public service employment relations 
(Bordogna 2008; Bach and Bordogna 2011). In particular, in several countries the special status of 
employment has not been abolished for large sections, or even the totality of public employees. The 
clearest examples in point are Germany and France. In Germany, civil servants, or Beamte, to 
whom the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining are denied, still make up around 38-
40% of total public employees, unevenly distributed in all the three levels of government – federal, 
state and municipal, with a greater density at the first two levels (Keller 2011; EPSU 2008). This 
group is still governed by public law, with a special service and loyalty relationship with the 
administration. Career public servants are appointed with, in principle, permanent tenure, not hired 
on a contractual basis. Their status is clearly separated from the group of white- and blue-collar 
  134 
employees (Angestellte and Arbeiter
37
), governed by private law and with the same rights as their 
private sector counterparts. The ratio between the two groups has been relatively stable over time 
(Keller 2011). Even after privatisation, a large number of German railways and postal service 
employees retain the status of Beamte, with the privileges and restrictions attached to this (ETUI 
2008). In France, all the fonctionnaires publiques titulaires, which are almost the totality of public 
employees, still have a special employment status subject to administrative law and with rather 
weak bargaining rights, even after the 2010 law on the renewal of social dialogue in the public 
sector (Bordogna and Neri 2011; Tissandier 2010). To a lesser extent, in many other continental 
European countries there is a group of public employees with a special employment status (Austria, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Romania), although precise employment conditions may vary from country to country, 
and a reduction in special prerogatives, in the direction of harmonization with the private sector, has 
recently taken place, driven partly by economic pressures (see for instance Greece, in Ioannou 
2012). Further, the proportion of this group in terms of total public sector employment, while 
usually higher in the central government/public administration sector, varies across countries (see 
also various national studies in Vaughan-Whitehead 2012). 
In brief, while the right to organise is most unproblematic and the right to strike is most problematic 
for public sector employees throughout the different countries, the picture is more varied and 
uncertain with regards to collective bargaining rights. In many countries this right, at least for 
certain groups of public sector workers, “is widely restricted or is embedded in specific structures 
and procedures that do not allow for the same bargaining rights, coverage and results as in the 
private sector” (Clauwaert and Warneck 2008: 22-23; also Gernigon 2007; Casale 2008). 
 
3.5 Trade unions and employers 
Public sector industrial relations often display peculiar features not only in terms of the regulation 
of employment relations, but also with reference to representation, both on the employee and the 
employer sides. 
First, union densities are systematically higher than in the private sector (see for instance Visser 
2006, Pedersini 2010a). Of course, this concerns the sections of public sector employment with full 
right of association (which, as mentioned above, is the least problematic element of industrial 
relations in the public sector and can be regarded as generally available). The main reason for this is 
the positive attitude that public employers typically have with respect to recognition of the role of 
trade unions, which often takes the form of promotional measures in terms of special union rights 
and prerogatives, for example time off to carry out union activities (Clegg 1976). In practice, public 
employees are unlikely to encounter negative attitudes concerning union affiliation from their 
employer (while this can happen in the private sector), which may affect their career prospects. 
Moreover, given the traditional homogeneous character of terms and conditions of employment in 
the public sector, with less room for individual bargaining – although increasing in recent decades, 
at least for certain occupations – improvements in terms of higher wages and better working 
conditions can be attained essentially by collective action and representation through trade unions. 
In other terms, in the public sector, participation costs are lower and the ‘free riding’ alternative is 
weaker, as individual advancements are difficult to achieve. In some cases, being part of a union 
                                                          
37
 The legal distinction between white and blue-collar employees (Angestellte and Arbeiter) was abolished in 2005 by 
collective agreement (TVöD), and since then a new uniform classification system exists for the two groups 
(Arbeitnehmer), separated from career civil servants (Beamte). 
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can also bring specific benefits in terms of a better capacity to protect individual interests through 
the pressure union representatives can exert on a politically sensitive employer. 
Second, union representation tends to be more segmented than in the private sector. This reflects, 
on the one hand, the significant presence in the public sector of relatively strong professional 
groups and identities, such as those involved in the medical professions, teachers and professors, 
and higher functionaries. On the other hand, the absence of market constraints, the political 
sensitivity of employment issues, and the relevant bargaining power that certain groups of public 
employees hold, such as those of a particular contract type, can encourage the creation of a plurality 
of professional trade unions, which in some cases may pursue particularistic objectives, that is the 
improvement of the conditions of their specific constituency without considering the impacts of 
their demands on other groups of workers or on the public at large. 
Third, on the employer side, with particular reference to the bargaining table, there are political 
entities and representatives (such as ministries and ministers) or independent agencies. Again, the 
absence of market constraints makes political decisions crucial, for instance in terms of the 
economic resources available for wage bargaining. However, there can be important differences 
depending on whether the responsibility of negotiations and consultation with trade unions lies with 
direct political representatives or administrative officers and managers (the ‘employers’ in practice) 
or independent agencies. This latter solution increases the distance between the political sphere and 
the regulation of public employment relations – and it is therefore often proposed in order to 
emulate private sector conditions; however, this has some potential drawbacks linked to the loss of 
direct knowledge of organisational features and day-to-day work issues and practices. 
Trade union density 
The issue of trade union density in the public sector was introduced in chapter 1 of this report. 
Table 3.8 shows trade union density in the public and private sectors at the end of 2000s and, where 
available, variations since the beginning of the decade. As the data illustrate, trade union density in 
the public sector is systematically higher than in the private sector. The difference can be very wide, 
as in the UK (57% vs. 15%), Greece (64% vs. 19%), and Ireland (67% vs. 21%). The difference is 
particularly significant in some of the Nordic countries: in Norway it is more than 40 percentage 
points (80% compared with 38%) and in Finland it is above 30 percentage points (82% compared 
with 50%). 
Further, the trend in the most recent decade seems to indicate a stronger capacity of public sector 
unions to contrast the erosion of density. However, in this case there are several exceptions and the 
difference is not always wide. The stronger position of the public sector is clearly evident in 
Denmark, Finland (where private sector unionisation fell by nearly 20 percentage points in the 
2000s) and Norway (two percentage points less in the public sector and five in the private sector). 
Ireland even shows a positive trend in the public sector (+11 percentage points) and a negative trend 
in the private sector (-10 percentage points). But in the other cases there is no substantial difference 
(Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK). France shows a decrease of public sector union 
density which compares to  stability in the private sector. However, this takes place in the context of 
a very low density rate in the private sector (4.5%), so that it may be considered a sort of minimum 
level, with limited scope for further decrease. The importance of the public sector for trade unions is 
also apparent when looking at the share of members in total national union membership. It is 
usually above one third of all union members, with a peak of 61% in the UK and other countries 
where it exceeds 50% (Greece, France, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway). 
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Table 3.8 Trade union density in the public and private sectors in selected EU countries, 2000-
2009 
 Public sector 
(% employees) 
Private sector 
(% employees) 
Public sector 
(% national union 
membership) 
Public sector 
%-point change 
2000-09 
Private sector 
%-point change 
2000-09 
AT 53.0 33.0 40.0 -7.0 -6.0 
BE n.a. n.a. 25.0 n.a. n.a. 
DE 36.0 17.0 40.0 -6.0 -6.0 
DK 83.0 62.0 40.0 -3.9 -9.6 
EL 63.8 19.4 55.9 n.a. n.a. 
ES n.a. n.a. 31.2 n.a. n.a. 
FI 81.6 50.4 40.1 -7.4 -19.6 
FR 15.0 4.5 57.0 -2.0 0.0 
IE 66.6 21.1 54.2 10.6 -9.9 
IT 50.0 32.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
LU n.a. n.a. 30.7 n.a. n.a. 
NL 38.0 15.0 51.0 -4.0 -4.0 
NO 80.0 38.0 52.0 -2.0 -5.0 
PT 45.0 37.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SE 84.0 65.0 49.0 -8.0 -9.0 
UK 56.6 15.1 61.1 -3.7 -3.7 
Source: ICTWSS (Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts), http://www.uva-aias.net/208. 
 
It must be mentioned however, that density rates are often lower in the countries not covered by 
Table 3.8, because data are not available. According to a recent study (Bordogna 2007), 
unionisation, at least in central government, is “quite often close to zero […] in most of the former 
communist countries of central and eastern Europe”. This refers in particular to the three Baltic 
countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), where union membership was practically non-existent in 
in 2006, and to the Czech Republic, Poland (3%) and Slovakia (10%). The exceptions are Hungary, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, where union density was generally above 25% and exceeded 50% 
in Romania. 
Trade union structure 
An indication of the fragmentation of trade union representation in the public sector can be derived 
from the representativeness studies carried out by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions. In recent years, a number of sectoral representativeness studies 
have been published, including three on significant parts of the three sectors under review here: 
public administration (2011), education (2011) and hospitals (2009). Table 3.9 indicates the number 
of trade unions covered by the studies. All three studies include a high number of trade unions 
(private sector studies usually include a far lower number of unions, often under 100 and rarely only 
slightly above this threshold). The fragmentation of representation is particularly evident in public 
administration and the health sector. It is also interesting to note that the representational domain of 
the trade unions in both sectors is often ‘sectional’ (50% in public administration and 62% in 
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education), that is it includes only part of the sector, for instance some special occupational groups. 
This is contrary to the tendency emerging in the private sector, where, following mergers between 
industrial unions and in presence of broad representational domains (such as all blue- or white 
collar workers), the most common situation is ‘overlap’ – membership spanning different sectors. 
Multi-unionism is particularly present in certain countries (Italy, Portugal, and Denmark), but in the 
public administration sector especially, it appears as a common feature across EU countries. See 
also chapter 1 of this report for details of the individual unions operating in the public sector. 
 
Table 3.9 Number of trade unions covered by the Eurofound Representativeness studies 
(public administration, Education, Hospitals) 
 Public administration Education Hospitals 
AT 4 4 5 
BE 4 12 8 
BG 6 4 2 
CY 1 8 7 
CZ 5 3 3 
DE 7 6 5 
DK 24 10 18 
EE 2 3 4 
ES 6 9 5 
FI 8 8 7 
FR 7 12 8 
EL 2 4 5 
HU 8 7 6 
IE 9 6 8 
IT 56 24 19 
LT 4 4 4 
LU 5 6 2 
LV 6 1 2 
MT 4 4 4 
NL 15 10 3 
PL 7 5 4 
PT 14 36 11 
RO 17 4 4 
SE 9 10 10 
SI 9 3 5 
SK 8 3 1 
UK 9 10 12 
Total 256 216 172 
Mean 9,5 8,0 6,4 
Source: EIRO, Representativeness studies, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/representativeness.htm 
Employer representatives 
As suggested above, the nature of the bargaining party in the public sector can be quite different and 
this can have important consequences on the negotiation process and outcomes. Basically, we can 
  138 
distinguish between ‘technical’ bodies, established either as an independent entity or within a 
government structure, ‘managerial’ representatives, which means that the relevant senior manager 
of the public organisation is directly responsible for negotiations, or ‘political’ representatives, 
when the bargaining process is conducted directly by a political representative (such as a minister or 
mayor). 
If we concentrate, in this case, on the public administration, the above mentioned representativeness 
study (Adam 2011a: p. 33) shows that the presence of “independent agencies/separately managed 
bodies” which bargain on behalf of public authorities is quite limited and involves only Denmark, 
Finland, Italy and Sweden. In other countries, or for distinct sections of the public administration, 
“associations of regional/local state level administration” are present. This is the case, for instance, 
in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg and Sweden. It is interesting to note 
that some of these bodies and associations are public law bodies with compulsory membership. This 
is the case in Italy, where Aran bargains on behalf of all public administrations at national level, 
Denmark, with SEA, the State Employer’s Authority, Finland, where KT groups together local 
authorities and VTML covers central government, and Sweden, where AV is the Swedish Agency 
for Government Employers. 
However,  in 17 of the 26 countries covered by the study (France was excluded from the study) , “it 
is the central state or regional authorities themselves rather than separate employer associations 
which conduct negotiations with organised labour or unilaterally determine the employment 
conditions” (Adam 2011a, p. 33). Therefore, we can consider that, in the majority of cases, the 
regulation of the employment relationship within the public administration sector remains very 
close to political responsibility and authority. 
European sectoral social dialogue 
In addition to national bargaining, there are a number of European sectoral social dialogue 
committees which cover the public sector. For example, the committee for Local and Regional 
Government involves the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) and the Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions (CCRE-CEMR). Although it started to work formally in 
2004, the parties had already been working together since 1998. For example, CEMR and EPSU 
adopted a joint declaration in 1998 on equality between men and women at work. Building on this 
experience and on the actions taken by member organisations following this joint declaration (such 
as positive action programmes; diversification of women's educational and professional choices; 
campaigning against sexual harassment; encouraging work-life balance and supporting equal pay 
for work of equal value), CCRE-CEMR and EPSU agreed in 2007 a set of joint guidelines for 
equality action plans in local and regional government. In 2004, they identified four themes to 
structure their cooperation over the following years: strengthening social dialogue in local and 
regional government in the new Member States and in candidate countries; supporting the reform 
process in local and regional government; promoting diversity and equality in local and regional 
government; and evaluating experience in various forms of service provision. 
This sectoral social dialogue committee has also agreed a series of joint statements on the economic 
crisis in the occasion of different European Council meetings (February 2009, February 2010, 
December 2010, October 2011). In the face of increasing austerity measures, the European social 
partners have consistently stressed the need to adequately fund local authorities in order to enable 
them to provide services to citizens. They maintain that a coordinated and well-organised public 
sector is a key element to be “better able to react to the crisis and deliver or contribute to solutions 
for citizens” (February 2010 Joint Statement). Indeed, CCRE-CEMR and EPSU underline that it is 
“unacceptable that many local and regional governments are confronted with decreasing revenue at 
a time when demands are increasing” and they highlight “the capacity to maintain and develop 
competent and motivated staff” (February 2010 Joint Statement). Moreover, the 2011 Joint 
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Statement states that “resources for local and regional government are continuously cut, which 
leaves local and regional government with new and greater obligations to maintain quality local 
public services”, with greater risks of exclusion for “the most vulnerable, the young, the elderly, the 
low-skilled or the unemployed”.  
They are also demanding a more prominent voice and the recognition of the role of the public sector 
in EU policies. In their response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on Restructuring and 
anticipation of change: what lessons from recent experiences? of 30 March 2012, EPSU and 
CCRE-CEMR express their concern that austerity measures and labour law reforms may weaken 
social dialogue when it is most needed to accompany restructuring in the public sector and 
emphasise the positive contribution that social dialogue has played in certain countries. They 
maintain that “the financial crisis has highlighted the important leading role of local and regional 
governments in providing support […] for new jobs, education, training, employment, social 
protection and adapted service provision to their region/area”. Moreover, they argue that “the best 
anticipative long term approach to restructuring and changes is through Social Dialogue based on 
trust”. 
For hospitals and healthcare, a social dialogue committee was established in 2006 and gathers 
EPSU and the European Hospital and Healthcare Employers Association (HOSPEEM). EPSU and 
HOSPEEM signed in 2008 a code of conduct and follow up on Ethical Cross-Border Recruitment 
and Retention in the Hospital Sector. The implementation phase was expected to last three years 
and at the end of the fourth year an assessment of the project will be undertaken. This sectoral 
social dialogue committee has not addressed the economic crisis directly, concentrating instead on 
specific issues such as the prevention of sharp injuries in 2009 or the recognition of professional 
qualifications in 2011, as a response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on Reviewing the 
Directive o the Recognition of Professional Qualifications 2005/36/EC. 
In education, a sectoral social dialogue committee was set up in 2010 with ETUCE ( the European 
Trade Union Committee for Education) on the employee side and EFEE (the European Federation 
of Education Employers) for the employers. The committee adopted its first joint texts in January 
2011. The first is a joint declaration which supports investing in education, training and research as 
an “investment in the future” to foster sustainable growth and social well-being. The second covers 
a set of "Joint Guidelines on Trans-regional cooperation in Lifelong Learning among education 
stakeholders", which are to be implemented in 2011-2012 and assessed in 2013. In addition, the 
social partners in this sector have engaged in joint work on a number of projects, including on 
work-related stress, recruitment and retention, and skills development. 
Most recently a new sectoral social dialogue committee was launched for Central Government 
Administrations in December 2010. It brings together TUNED (the Trade Unions’ National and 
European Administration Delegation), which is an EPSU-led trade union delegation consisting of 
affiliates of EPSU and CESI, and EUPAE (European Union Public Administration Employers). In 
June 2011, these social partners agreed on a 2011-2013 work programme which includes responses 
to European Commission initiatives such as the revision of the working time Directive, the free 
movement of workers in the public sector, gender equality and skills and training, improving the 
image and attractiveness of the civil service, and moves to “develop further a joint reflection on the 
effects of the crisis and the measures taken in the central government administrations, in particular 
in collecting and analysing data with regards to the impact on well being at work, the civil service 
attractiveness, and the challenges of recruitment in times of demographic changes” (Social 
Dialogue Committee for Central Government Administrations 2011: 3). 
In December 2011, TUNED and EUPAE released a statement on the Effects of the crisis in the 
central government administrations which recalled that austerity measures were affecting the 
sector’s workforce, its remuneration and potentially its working conditions. The statement 
underlined the importance of public administration in addressing the crisis and providing citizens 
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with adequate services as well as the crucial role of workers in achieving these goals. The response 
of this sectoral social dialogue committee to the European Commission’s Green Paper on 
Restructuring and anticipation of change: what lessons from recent experiences? underlines how 
the financial crisis has, on one side, “highlighted the important role central government 
administrations play in regulating the market, providing employment and social protection and 
jobs” and on the other hand has led to “programmes of pay, pensions and job cuts or freezes, 
reforms of working conditions as well as changes of labour law”. The social partners in this sector 
also state that “a major feature of restructuring in the public sector is that the social dialogue has 
been sidelined”, although there are cases where social dialogue has contributed to settling disputes 
and overcoming tensions – for example in Ireland, Lithuania and Slovenia – thereby showing “that 
it is possible for social dialogue to deliver results in tense national contexts”. In Slovenia, there are 
rising tensions in the area of social dialogue – for example, no new social agreement has yet been 
adopted since the expiry of the previous one in 2009, due to the differing expectations of the social 
partners. Further, there is continuing opposition from public sector unions to government plans for 
additional public sector pay cuts. 
As can be seen, the economic crisis has been addressed in some of the sectoral social dialogue 
committees in the public sector by means of joint statements. These documents have reviewed the 
impact of the economic downturn on the relevant sectors, notably central and local administrations, 
and stressed the importance of supporting public service provision through adequate funding and 
staffing, in terms of both employment and skill levels, and promoting social dialogue to accompany 
reform and restructuring. In this sense, although they have contributed to the debate, they have not 
directly affected policy implementation. 
 
3.6 Wage setting systems 
In connection with the above-mentioned specific regulation of the employment relationship in the 
public sector, which persists in many EU countries, three formally different wage setting systems 
can be found in the public sector: a) unilateral determination on the part of the government or public 
authorities, through laws or administrative acts; b) free collective bargaining, along the lines of 
wage setting in the private sector; c) mixed or hybrid arrangements, that are neither unilateral 
determination nor collective bargaining. The latter mechanism refers mainly to the UK experience 
of the pay review bodies, which must be considered as a special case as they cannot be equated with 
either of the above systems of pay determination, although they share some elements of both.  
A further issue arises when the outcomes of negotiations need a decision of the government to be 
implemented. One possibility is that this decision is just a procedural formality that can be taken for 
granted, in which case this system can be classed as de facto collective bargaining (the Italian 
experience between 1983 and 1993, for instance, or Cyprus). A different possibility is when the 
outcomes of negotiations are never binding for the government and can be substantially amended or 
totally disregarded, as in France, in which case the system is closer to unilateral regulation than to 
collective bargaining. 
In general terms, free collective bargaining prevails in the UK (except for the groups of employees 
under the pay review body system) all the Nordic countries, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, and, with qualifications, Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal. In Portugal the 
government has the power to decide unilaterally in the case of a stalemate in negotiations. In Greece 
also, civil servants under public law have been permitted since 1999 to negotiate their terms and 
conditions of employment (training, health and safety, mobility, trade union prerogatives), but pay 
issues are excluded, while public sector employees under private contracts enjoy full bargaining 
rights in line with rights enjoyed by private sector employees (Ioannou 1999; 2012). In 
Luxembourg wage agreements must be confirmed by law. 
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In most Eastern European countries the state plays a strong role in relation to trade unions and 
collective bargaining, with the exception of Slovenia, even when forms of joint consultation take 
place (ETUI Warneck & Clauwaert 2009). In some cases collective bargaining in a strict sense does 
not take place (Bulgaria, Poland), or its viability is very uncertain and indeterminate, as in the Baltic 
countries and Hungary (Masso and Espenberg 2012; Hámori and Kӧllὄ 2012). In others, 
negotiations take place, but they do not cover pay issues, and pay mechanisms are established by 
the state (Czech Republic, Romania). In others, negotiations are allowed, pay issues included, but 
agreements do not have validity until a formal decision is taken by the government or relevant 
authorities (Slovakia). On the whole, various restrictions on collective bargaining apply, and these 
have in many cases been further strengthened during economic crisis. A case in point is Romania, 
where a 2011 law seriously reduced the scope of social dialogue, to the advantage of legislative 
regulation, limited the extension of negotiated provisions, and tightened representativeness criteria, 
further weakening the role of trade unions, despite their relatively high density rate (Vasile 2012). 
In many cases, the above-mentioned institutional mechanisms co-exist in the same country, with a 
varying balance between them, applied to different segments of the public sector workforce; in 
other cases modified forms or contaminations between them can be observed. 
Germany, as already mentioned, is the clearest example of co-existence of the first two wage setting 
systems, with its dualistic regulatory model separating civil servants from the rest of public 
employees (and from private sector employees). Until the 1990s these legally different mechanisms 
could be considered to some extent functionally equivalent, leading to similar working conditions 
despite different forms of employment and interest representation, thanks to the pattern-setting role 
of negotiations regarding white and blue-collar workers. However, in recent times, pressed by the 
economic crisis and budget constraints, government and public employers have often used their 
legally guaranteed, unilateral regulatory powers to significantly change the working conditions of 
civil servants, uncoupling bargaining processes and outcomes in the two domains (Keller 2011: 
2344). These developments show that it would be misleading to interpret this system as de facto 
negotiations between the state and the unions, assimilating it to collective bargaining, as at times 
assumed (Glassner 2010): this would overlook that, in critical circumstances, such a regulatory 
model gives the public employers a much greater degree of freedom than collective bargaining.  
A similar co-existence characterises most continental European countries, connected with groups of 
employees, especially in the public administration sector, with separate, distinct rules that prevent 
or limit collective bargaining. What is distinctive of Germany, however, is the size of this group and 
the fact that such rules and restrictions are not limited to specific functions, as in the majority of 
other market economies, but to the group of Beamte as a whole (Keller 2011: 2333). Austria is a 
similar case, with restrictions to collective bargaining rights extended to an even larger group of 
public employees (Adam 2008). In Italy, on the contrary, groups with limited bargaining rights (but 
public law status) are a minority of public employees, as the large majority have terms and 
conditions of employment that are regulated via collective negotiations since 1993. 
The last two wage setting systems, as mentioned above, co-exist in the UK. Along with widely 
diffused collective bargaining practices, the proportion of employees covered by pay review bodies, 
whose chair and members are appointed by the government, has been increasing steadily, now 
including more than two million employees, which is around or above 35% of total public 
employment. There are currently six such bodies, covering armed forces, doctors and dentists, the 
National Health Service, prison officers, school teachers, and senior salaries (high level holders of 
judicial offices, senior civil servants, senior officers of the armed forces, and top senior officers of 
the NHS); police officers have partly distinct advisory and negotiating boards (www.ome.uk.com). 
This system differs both from unilateral regulation and collective bargaining in that wages and 
salaries are neither directly determined by the government or the employers, nor collectively 
negotiated by the interested parties (Bordogna and Winchester 2001). Rather, these bodies make 
annual recommendations to the government and relevant authorities (of England, Scotland and 
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Wales) about pay increases, based on independent research and evidence received from both the 
employers and representative organisations of the employees, and other interested parties. Although 
in most cases the government accepts the recommendations of the pay review bodies, in particular 
circumstances it can use its nominal power to reject or amend them, as it did in 2009. And it may 
happens that in such occasions trade unions, interpreting the system as a form of unilateral 
regulation, accuse the government of imposing a “diktat”, jeopardising the independence of the 
review bodies, as in 2011 and 2012. 
France is an example of contamination between the first two systems. Legislation dating from 1983 
introduced a right to limited forms of collective negotiations (colloques préliminaires, négociations 
préalables) concerning pay issues for all public functionaries. The government, however, retains the 
ultimate power to unilaterally determine pay increases, not only in the sense that the outcomes of 
these negotiations need to be formally approved by the government or the parliament, but primarily 
in the sense that the outcomes are not binding for the government, which is not obliged to even 
open the negotiations, let alone to reach an agreement – as it has been the case for possibly the 
majority of years since 1983. This ultimate decisional power of the government has not been 
removed even after the important reform relating to the renewal of social dialogue in the public 
sector, approved in July 2010. Nevertheless, the prerogatives of social dialogue have to some extent 
been strengthened and the scope of negotiations has been enlarged to several issues other than pay 
(Bordogna and Neri 2011; Tissandier 2010). Given these characteristics, France is certainly closer 
to the model of unilateral determination than to a model where the right to collective bargaining is 
fully established, although forms of joint regulation are not excluded. 
Against this background, a clearly observable trend in recent years, under pressure from the 
economic crisis, is a strong and widespread revival of unilateralism, even in countries where 
collective bargaining rights and practices are well established. Austerity packages affecting public 
sector salaries, employment levels and pension systems have been adopted by many governments 
without negotiations, and often not even consultation, with trade unions (for more details, see 
chapters 4 and 6 of this report. See also Vaughan-Whitehead 2012; and European Commission 
2011: Ch. 3). In addition to employment, salaries and pensions, the tradition of free collective 
bargaining, or of a broader social dialogue, where it has existed, has also been a victim of 
governments’ policies in response to the crisis. 
 
Box 3.1 Comparing the influence of public-private sector pay on the procurement of local 
government services 
Based on a draft by Damian Grimshaw and Jill Rubery (Manchester Business School) 
Understanding pay patterns among workers in the public and private sectors is important in the 
analysis of factors influencing procurement decisions. However, direct comparison of pay for 
similar occupational groups is only one part of the analysis. Other factors include: coverage of 
collective bargaining (which may be uniform across public and private sectors or divided); the 
level of the statutory minimum wage (especially for services that involve low-wage workers); 
and segmentation in the legal employment status of workers (varying for example with the 
public, private and joint ownership character of the organisation). We consider these inter-
related issues drawing on case studies of municipalities undertaken for an EC financed project 
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involving experts from five countries who have produced five national reports listed in the 
references.
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A meta-analysis of the results of a sample of decomposition studies comparing public and 
private sector pay reveals significant inter-country differences in public-private pay patterns. 
The results suggest a public sector pay premium at the median wage for men and women in 
France and the UK and for women only in Germany, but a public sector pay penalty in 
Hungary and Sweden. Of particular interest is evidence of pay gaps among the lower paid 
(table 3.10). Quantile regression studies suggest those countries with public sector pay 
premiums at the median experience even higher premiums among the lower paid, especially for 
women (although for female part-timers in the UK the public sector premium increases with 
the level of pay). In Sweden the size of wage penalty among public sector workers is fairly 
consistent along the pay distribution, while in Hungary both sectors tend to pay the minimum 
wage at the bottom (possibly with a higher incidence of minimum wage workers in the public 
sector) and there are large pay penalties for professional groups. 
Evidence from local government case studies in France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden and the 
UK tests the extent to which this portrayal of pay gaps is a realistic reflection of the 
experiences of procurement. The evidence is mixed (table 3.10). 
 
Table 3.10: Comparing decomposition results with case-study evidence on the public 
sector pay premium 
 Summary results of decomposition studies Local government case-study evidence 
 Public sector pay 
premium at the 
median wage? 
Larger premium for 
the lower paid? 
Private sector 
contractors offer 
lower pay? 
Worse private sector 
pay a cause of union 
resistance to 
outsourcing? 
France Yes  Yes (larger for women) No No (some examples of 
resistance to insourcing) 
Germany Yes for women only Yes (large for women, 
small for men) 
Yes (although the gap 
has reduced) 
Yes 
Hungary No (penalty since 2007, 
but premium during 
2002-6) 
No (higher low pay 
incidence in public 
sector) 
No No 
Sweden No  No (similar sized 
penalty at all wage 
levels) 
No No 
UK Yes Yes (larger for women) Yes Yes 
Source: Grimshaw et al. (2012) 
  
In France, the case studies in fact paint a picture of better conditions among private contractors 
than in local government and reluctance among employees to move back into local government 
despite some political initiatives within municipalities to insource services. Nevertheless, the 
picture is complicated by the presence of varying public-private organisational forms and 
differences in public and private employment law. An example of outsourced school catering 
records better pay prospects for the catering workers in a public-private organisation (with 
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 Project reference VS/2011/0141, ‘Public sector pay and social dialogue during the fiscal crisis: the effects of pay 
reforms and procurement strategies on wage and employment inequalities’, co-ordinated by Damian Grimshaw. 
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majority public ownership) than in the municipality, and thus limited trade union support for 
proposals to re-internalise services. By contrast, an example of in-house waste services finds 
low pay and a compressed seniority-related pay-scale, but with some trade-offs with working 
hours and work effort. The situation is further complicated by penalties associated with the re-
municipalisation of services and workers: insourced workers lose private sector fringe benefits 
(such as healthcare and other benefits negotiated by the works council of the private sector 
company); and they lose at least half their accumulated seniority entitlements, meaning they 
miss out on seniority-related pay rises until their experience in the municipality has caught up 
with their protected position in the payscale. These factors help explain the reluctance of 
workers (and unions) in target private sector companies in some of the case study examples to 
agree to proposed insourcing. 
 
In Germany, the case studies generally accord with the pattern of public-private sector pay 
differences, with lower pay offered by private sector providers of local government services. 
However, the pattern is changing rapidly following the introduction of a new low pay grade 
(grade 1) in the national collective agreement for federal and municipal workers designed 
explicitly to reduce cost incentives to outsource. When combined with the introduction of a 
patchwork of sector minimum wages, these institutional changes have weakened the strength of 
pay differences as a driver for procurement decisions. Four new binding sector minimum 
wages are especially relevant to local government – those set in the sectors of elderly care, 
commercial cleaning, waste services and temporary agencies. 
In West Germany, the public-private gap in minimum pay is now very limited for cleaning and 
care services, slightly wider for waste services (at 54 cents per hour) but of a significant size 
for temporary agency workers (around €1.50). In East Germany, there is much wider 
differential for cleaning and care services, a narrow gap in waste services (caused by a unified 
base rate for East and West Germany in the collective agreement) and a very wide public-
private gap for temporary agency workers. The negligible pay differential for provision of 
cleaning services in West Germany is one reason why some municipalities have taken cleaning 
activities back in-house, although under alternative mixes of public-private ownership; both 
case-study examples involved the hiring of cleaners on grade 1. The picture for waste services 
provision is more complex, since despite a lower sector minimum wage in West Germany, the 
collective agreements in the private sector set much higher wages, close to those prevailing in 
the public sector. This diminishes the cost incentives for procurement involving private sector 
firms covered by the collective agreement, but we do not know the share of waste service 
workers in the private sector who work in firms outside the sector collective agreement, nor 
what share are paid the statutory minimum wage for the sector. The case-study data suggest 
that companies outside the collective agreement provide less generous bonuses, pensions and 
employment protection. A further dampening pressure on conditions (as well as the low sector 
minimum wage) derives from the very low minimum for temporary agencies, which supply 
workers in this (and other) sectors. 
In Hungary, the pay gaps revealed by the case studies also fit with the results of econometric 
decomposition studies. The financial precariousness of many municipalities has dampened 
local government pay during the austerity crisis and acts as an incentive for employees (and 
unions) to accept transfers to the private or third sector. In one case study, elderly care workers 
accepted the outsourcing to a church organisation following a period of severe financial 
problems within the municipality and the revoking of a raft of supplementary wage benefits. 
However, while basic pay may be higher in private sector contractors delivering local 
government services, overall employment conditions are more vulnerable due to a switch in 
legal employment status from public to private sector. In practice, this means that coverage of 
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the legal system of wage tariffs set out in the public sector pay arrangement is replaced by the 
thin protection associated with the Labour Code, limited to application of the two statutory 
national minimum wages (a standard and skilled minimum wage). In one municipality, the 
perception among interviewees was that everyone was paid the minimum wage regardless of 
whether they worked for the municipality, a municipal-owned company or a private sector or 
third sector (eg. church) subcontractor. 
Sweden’s relatively inclusive system of industrial relations means that pay differences are not a 
strong driver of outsourcing and insourcing decisions in local government. With high collective 
bargaining coverage, strong union membership and a convergence of trends in wage-setting in 
both public and private sectors (‘negotiated decentralisation’), outsourcing and insourcing 
decisions are not motivated by differences in pay and industrial relations. Public and private 
sector collective agreements exist for all five areas of investigated services (public transport, 
school catering, cleaning, waste services and elderly care); moreover, the sector agreements for 
school catering and cleaning are in fact integrated across public and private sector 
organisations. Also,, the minimum annual wage rises in 2012 were very similar across the 
public and private sector agreements.  
In the UK the divided industrial relations model between strong collective bargaining coverage 
for public sector workers and weak coverage for private sector workers means that workers in 
private sector contractors delivering elderly care, cleaning and school catering services are paid 
at, or only slightly above, the statutory national minimum wage. At first sight the national 
collective agreement for local government would appear to set a wage that is increasingly 
competitive with private sector companies; a pay freeze and increases in the national minimum 
wage have combined to shrink the gap with the collectively agreed base rate from 9% to 2% 
during 2009-2012. 
However, case studies of six UK municipalities reveal evidence of local interventions to 
improve pay for the lowest paid. These respond to varying combinations of political, 
managerial and union interests to address problems of poverty (particularly by introducing a 
‘living wage’), improve staff retention and compensate for higher work effort in a reduced 
workforce following downsizing. These interventions conflict with the strongly ideological 
central government demand for a revision of public sector pay to become ‘more market facing’, 
which would reduce pay among low paid public sector workers. Our evidence suggests pay is 
pushing in two directions – towards reducing local government workers’ pay as a result of a 
failure of the national agreement to win pay rises and yet a widening gap with the private sector 
for the very lowest paid following local level collective agreements. The overall effect on the 
role of pay differences in influencing procurement of low-wage services in UK local 
government would thus appear to be neutral. 
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3.7 Centralisation, decentralisation, differentiation 
As in the private sector, over the last two decades public sector collective bargaining and wage 
setting systems in many countries have undergone two connected trends, albeit with important 
exceptions and qualifications: decentralisation of pay negotiations (European Commission 2011: Ch 
1), and (partial) substitution of automatic, collective, seniority-based pay and career systems with 
more selective and discretional systems, often based on performance or merit criteria, leading to 
differentiation of careers and terms and conditions of public employees. In several cases these 
trends represent a significant break with a tradition of centralisation and nationally uniform 
procedures and terms and conditions. Where decentralisation has occurred, moreover, an important 
difference from an industrial relations perspective is whether this process has taken place within or 
outside of a centrally coordinated framework (Traxler 1995). 
The reasons for these changes differ according to country. In some, they are linked to the federal 
form of the state (Belgium, Germany), in others they are linked to processes of administrative and 
institutional decentralisation and increased managerial autonomy, connected to the transfer of 
services and tasks to lower levels of government or external agencies, as in Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and the UK. 
From an employment relations and HRM perspective, the main purpose of this has been to achieve 
flexibility in pay and terms of employment, making these more responsive to variations in 
local/sectoral labour market conditions and organizational needs. An additional reason, strongly 
stressed in the NPM approach and inspired by moral hazard theory, has been to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour within public organisations by making agents more responsive and 
responsible to their principal and more exposed to the potential costs of their actions. Selective pay 
systems, such as performance-related pay, are expected to transfer the costs of hypothetical 
opportunistic behaviour at least partially onto the individual employee, through the denial of pay 
increases or promotion which were previously granted automatically. A similar effect is expected in 
the case of decentralisation of pay bargaining, by linking the level where collective negotiations 
take place and resources are distributed more closely to the level where resources are ideally 
produced. 
Theory and international comparison suggest however that the expected, beneficial effects of 
decentralisation of bargaining and differentiation/individualisation of pay cannot be taken for 
granted but depend on appropriate institutional conditions. If these are absent, as it is often the case 
in public services and public sector employment relations, unintended and even perverse effects 
may follow. For example, the gains in terms of agency costs may be offset by the rise in transaction 
costs; collusive behaviours between the decentralized bargaining parties may occur instead than 
more responsible strategies (Rexed et al. 2007; Bordogna 2008). 
These considerations apart, the consequences of the recent economic crisis and government 
austerity packages on such trends are not univocal. In general, the effects appear to be greater on 
decentralisation processes than on the differentiation/individualisation of pay and career systems. In 
various cases bargaining decentralisation has been halted or even reversed.  
The second trend, on the contrary, has apparently been strengthened in several countries, along with 
the adoption of more private-sector-style HRM practices, although to some extent hampered by the 
scarcity of resources. In both cases, a stronger recourse to unilateralism on the part of public 
employers has been instrumental in these changes. Significant differences are, however, observable 
across countries, depending on the gravity of governments’ financial difficulties but also on the 
appropriateness of the institutional arrangements under which decentralisation and differentiation 
were previously pursued. Comparisons of public and private sector pay practices should also take 
into account qualification levels, which tend to be higher in the public sector (IFO 2004). 
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The Nordic countries are examples of coordinated decentralisation, with a two-tier collective 
bargaining system in state and regional/municipal sectors, where the main public service unions 
form cartels to negotiate with a centralised bargaining agent on the employers’ side (Ibsen et al. 
2011). This two-tier structure allows a certain percentage of wage increases to be decentralised to 
local bargaining, with co-ordinating mechanisms that differ from country to country but rather 
effective in all, including the possibility of partial allocations on the basis of merit, qualifications, 
results and responsibilities – and therefore differentiation on an individual or group basis. In 
Denmark, these changes were linked to a major public sector reform in 2007 which merged 13 
counties and 271 municipalities into five regions and 98 municipalities, enlarging the coverage of 
both the municipal and state agreement areas. A strong role of co-ordination is played by the 
Ministry of Finance, that controls the budgets of state and regions/municipalities and conducts 
collective bargaining in the state sector. In addition, in Denmark wage developments in the public 
sector are linked to developments in the private sector.  
In Norway the process of coordinated decentralisation took place within a framework of structural 
devolution to agencies that started in the 1980s, accompanied by the creation of large state-owned 
companies in various services and by a system of management by objectives centrally monitored 
through strict budget allocations both in the state and municipal sectors. A regional reform to merge 
counties into larger regional units has also recently been implemented in Norway, although more 
modest compared to the Danish example. Since the 1990s the main agreements of the state, counties 
and municipalities sectors allow the distribution of wage supplements at the local level of 
bargaining, to align structural devolution of responsibility with managerial tools of personnel 
management, although this autonomy may be curbed by budgetary constraints and centralised 
controls. Differentiation/individualisation of pay has also increased in recent years, in both the state 
and municipal sectors, partly breaking with the high uniformity of the past, although in this case as 
well within limits imposed by budget constraints.  
Through three waves of reform inspired by the NPM approach - based on efficiency gains, 
privatisations and free consumers’ choice - Sweden has the most decentralised wage bargaining 
system. In some respects it is even more decentralised than in the private sector, with significant 
possibilities for individualised remuneration systems and lighter central controls than in Denmark 
and Norway. Despite this, sectoral agreements still play a co-ordinating role, albeit weakened, and 
mechanisms exist to align local level responsibilities with local autonomy (Ibsen et al. 2011). 
Cases of coordinated decentralisation, although in different forms than in the Nordic countries, are 
also seen in Ireland, partly in the Netherlands after 1993, and also in the Czech Republic and Spain. 
A 1993 reform in the Netherlands moved the determination of pay and working conditions of all 
public sector employees, which was previously central responsibility of the Minister of the Interior, 
to sector-level negotiations between employers and employee organisations (Steijn and Leisink 
2007), meaning a shift both from unilateral to joint regulation and from centralised determination to 
decentralised negotiations. 
Italy represents a case of decentralisation within a two-tier bargaining system, albeit less 
coordinated than in other countries, following amendments to the 1993 reform adopted in 1997-98. 
As a consequence, the number of national sectoral agreements for non-managerial staff has 
increased from eight to 12. More importantly, centralised controls on local-level negotiations have 
been significantly weakened and individual employers have been allowed to add financial resources 
in local-level pay negotiations above the amounts decided upon by national agreements. However, 
this process of bargaining decentralisation has occurred without adequate mechanisms to align 
actors’ autonomy and responsibilities at local level, and in particular the financial responsibilities of 
public employers. Such a disalignment between autonomy and responsibility has facilitated 
collusive rather than responsible behaviours of the decentralised bargaining parties, leading in the 
following years to local-level pay increases largely exceeding those of the private sector in the same 
period. This in turn prompted the re-establishment of centralised controls on the part of the 
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government over the entire bargaining machinery, and new amendments in 2009 (the so-called 
Brunetta reform) to reduce the scope and autonomy of local-level negotiations and partially re-
centralise the bargaining structure at national level, with the legal obligation to move from the 
previous 12 sectoral bargaining units at national level to no more than four. 
In Spain also, a trend towards decentralisation took place in the 1990s and 2000s, in connection 
with the process of greater administrative autonomy given to regions and local governments, in turn 
giving rise to relatively complicated and at times overlapping regulations. To partly contrast these 
trends, in 2006 a reform of legislation on employee representation and determination of 
employment conditions in the public administration (LORAP, Ley de Órganos de Representaciόn, 
Determinaciόn de las Condiciones de Trabajo y Partecipaciόn del Personal al Servicio de las 
Administraciones Públicas, approved in 1987 and amended in 1990 and 1994) was adopted to 
coordinate the regulation of some common issues for salaried employees and civil servants across 
the various administration levels (state, autonomous communities and local entities; EIRO 2011). 
A process of decentralisation of the determination of employment conditions and, where it was 
permitted, of collective bargaining, took place also in many Eastern European countries after the 
end of communist regimes, at times in a rather disorganised way. In some countries, collective 
bargaining, for the groups of employees for which this is permitted, takes place only at company or 
individual employer level. This is due either to the weakness of trade unions (Estonia, Latvia) or the 
lack of employers’ association at sectoral level (Czech Republic), or both reasons. In Romania, the 
wages of public employees were until recently determined by a large number of rules, with 
significant variations between different parts of the system, giving rise to more than 400 wage 
levels with a 1:29 ratio between the minimum and maximum wage. This complicated and dispersed 
system was reformed by a 2009 framework law, amended in 2010, to harmonise the wage system of 
public sector workers, within a comprehensive design to restructure public sector employment and 
pay. This new legislation, initially agreed upon by trade unions, was eventually unilaterally 
imposed by the government (Vasile 2012: 274-76). 
The clearest example of uncoordinated, decentralised single-level bargaining structure is probably 
that of the UK central government during the period of Conservative cabinets between 1979 and 
1996. Here, the highly centralised civil service system and civil-service-wide pay determination 
were replaced with around 90 semi-autonomous executive agencies, each with its own wage and 
grading system, and forms of performance-related pay. However, this break-up of previously 
unified conditions of employment in locally-based systems, aimed at increasing flexibility, had 
unintended consequences in terms of fragmented career pathways, staff transfer problems, and 
rigidities. Under subsequent governments, forms of devolution of pay determination have been 
maintained to support modernisation, albeit embedded within coherent national frameworks, in an 
attempt to reduce pay dispersion (Bach and Givan 2011). Considering, moreover, that bargaining 
decentralisation has always been weaker in other parts of the public sector, and the increased role of 
the pay review bodies, it is probably inappropriate to identify the present public sector wage setting 
system in the UK as a case of uncoordinated decentralisation. In any case, within this framework, 
the recent economic crisis has favoured, as in other countries, forms of recentralisation and 
unilateralism. 
France and Germany are traditionally credited with the most centralised wage setting systems 
among all the EU-27 Member States (Bordogna and Winchester 2001). This is still the case in 
France, whereas recent developments in Germany require qualifications. 
In France negotiations on wage increases, when they take place, are held between the representative 
trade unions and the Minister of Public Function, within limits set by the Minister of Finance. One 
bargaining unit covers all the employees of the three public functions (central government, 
including education; local government; and hospitals). When a decision is taken by the government 
to increase wages and salaries by a certain percentage, whether agreed with trade unions or not, this 
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decision affects in a uniform way all six million public functionaries. It is hard to find in Europe an 
equally centralised system, either in the public or the private sector. The above-mentioned recent 
law on the renewal of social dialogue in the public sector may have effects on the representative 
trade unions which are admitted to negotiations and on the number of matters that can be negotiated 
(Tissandier 2011), but not on the extreme centralisation of the system of pay determination. Forms 
of performance-related pay and individualisation of terms and conditions have been introduced in 
recent years, initially for functionaries of the higher grades, and then partially extended to the lower 
grades. On the whole, however, this does not seem so far to have significantly altered the 
traditionally uniform HRM practices that characterise French public bureaucracy. 
The German wage setting system used to be almost as centralised as the French system, despite the 
federal constitutional structure of the state. Centralisation was granted by a unitary bargaining 
coalition on the employers’ side, covering all three levels of government – federal level (Bund), 
federal states (Länder) and municipalities -, led by the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, in the German 
case also, only one collective agreement covering a major bargaining unit used to set pay and 
working conditions for all public employees. The substantive components of the agreements were 
usually transferred to civil servants by formal decisions of the Federal Parliament. Thus, despite 
different forms of employment and interest representation, changes to working conditions were 
basically the same for all public employees, civil servants included (Keller 2011: 2344). Recently, 
however, two factors have partially altered this highly centralised structure. First, in 2003 the 
Bargaining Association of German states (TdL) left the unitary bargaining coalition and started 
independent negotiations, concluding in 2006 an important separate agreement with state-specific 
arrangements. Second, a break up also occurred within the Bargaining Association at the state level, 
with the exit of the state of Berlin and the state of Hesse, which started a form of single employer 
bargaining. So, in a short period of time, changes in horizontal and vertical integration altered the 
highly centralised bargaining structures that characterised the German system, with its uniform and 
standardised employment conditions (Keller 2011). It remains to be seen whether these 
developments are isolated events or signal more structural transformations. The economic crisis 
seems to reinforce this trend towards a greater differentiation. This is also pursued through a wider 
use of the regulatory powers of public employers to first unilaterally enforce changes in pay and 
working conditions of civil servants, and then  to attempt to extend them via collective bargaining 
to other public employees. Greater decentralisation and differentiation via stronger unilateralism 
seem to be the effects of the crisis on German public sector employment relations. 
Connected to, but analytically distinct from, decentralisation trends are processes of differentiation 
and even individualisation of pay and terms and conditions. This has occurred in most countries 
under programmes of modernisation of public administrations, inspired to a greater or lesser extent 
by the NPM doctrine. However, there is great variation across countries with regard to the extent to 
which these measures, in form of performance-related pay (PRP) or similar mechanisms, have been 
implemented, especially among non-managerial staff (Bach and Bordogna 2011). They are more 
diffused among managers and senior civil servants, although the incidence of pay linked to 
performance should not be emphasised
39
. These trends towards the differentiation of terms and 
conditions have not been halted, in principle, by the recent economic crisis; rather, the scarcity of 
resources has often created obstacles to their practical implementation - recent developments linked 
to part of the 2009 reform in Italy is a case in point (Pedersini 2010b). 
 
                                                          
39
 According to a OECD study on performance-based arrangements for senior civil servants (including Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and Sweden among other OECD countries), this component is never higher than 8%, 
and in several cases significantly lower (OECD 2007: Table 5). 
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3.8 Industrial conflict and settlement of disputes 
As noted above and introduced in chapter 1 of this report, the right to strike is the most problematic 
issue for public sector employees throughout the EU (Clauwaert and Warneck 2008: 22-23). 
Restrictions often apply, although with notable variations across countries and different groups of 
public employees. In general, central government employees (defence, police, magistrates) and 
career civil servants are more frequently subject to limitations, if not simply forbidden to take 
industrial action. However, special regulations can also be found in various countries for other 
groups of employees, especially those providing essential public services such as health services, 
education, and transport. In the latter case, restrictions usually apply irrespective of the public or 
private nature of the provider and of the legal employment status of employees; moreover, they 
have different characteristics depending upon whether the right to strike is constitutionally 
protected (as in Italy, France, Spain and Greece) or not. 
Apart from the armed forces, police and the judiciary, severe restrictions or explicit prohibition on 
taking strike action in the case of career civil servants exist in several countries such as Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. The case of German 
Beamte is probably the clearest example in point, while in Estonia and Austria the right to strike is 
either banned or has a very uncertain status for all public employees. Contractual employees can 
usually take industrial action related to contract renewal, although they are often subject to peace 
obligation clauses during the period of validity of collective agreements (as in Germany, Denmark 
and other Nordic countries, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Ireland). Such clauses do not exist in 
countries such as Italy, France, Luxembourg, Slovakia, the UK, and, of course, in countries where 
formal collective agreements are excluded for all or groups of public employees. 
In several countries special rules exist, for instance regarding advance notice before taking 
industrial action, or the provision of minimum services to be guaranteed in case of a strike, as in 
Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Hungary. These rules may refer to ‘essential public 
services’ or to services of ‘special public interest’, irrespective of the public or private nature of the 
employer and the legal status of the employees. The Italian legislation, for instance, defines as 
essential public services, irrespective of the legal status of the provider, all those services which aim 
to satisfy the constitutionally protected rights of the person to life, safety, health, mobility, 
education, information, to name but a few (law 146/1990, amended in 2000). A similar regulation 
was approved in France in 2007. In Hungary, the right to strike was curtailed in 2011 by requiring 
prior agreement between the parties on ‘adequate services’ (Hámori and Kӧllὄ 2012: 183). 
Other special regulations or institutions relate to the procedures used to handle collective disputes in 
the public sector. In some countries special conciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures for 
the civil service exist, as in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Greece 
(Bordogna 2007). In Norway, where not only employees with ordinary contracts but also civil 
servants have the right to strike, mediation is always compulsory in the state sector and arbitration 
is compulsory for senior civil service (Stokke 2002). In Netherlands, a special Advisory and 
Arbitration Board (Aac) dates from 1994. In Denmark, two arbitration systems for all public 
servants exist, based on different laws: one is a disciplinary court for statutory civil servants (the 
Civil Servants’ Disciplinary Court), while the other is an industrial relations court for staff covered 
by collective agreements. For contractual staff there is, moreover, the Independent Public 
Conciliator, to which social partners can take a matter concerning a conflict of interest if they are 
unable to reach an agreement (Andersen at al. 1999; Stokke 2002). In Ireland, a scheme of 
conciliation and arbitration for the civil service was introduced in 1950, with a third party dispute 
resolution institution (the Civil Service Arbitration Board) and joint councils for conciliation 
purposes. Such formal mechanisms of conflict resolution for collective disputes do not exist in 
Germany, where mediation agreements are concluded by the autonomous social partners or by 
decisions of the courts (Keller 1999). 
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In other countries, such as Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, the institutions and mechanisms 
to handle collective disputes are the same in the public and private sector. 
Within this web of rules, or despite it, over the last decades there has been a shift of the relative 
weight of labour disputes from the industrial/manufacturing sectors towards the (public) services 
sector (EU Commission 2011; Carley 2010; Bordogna and Cella 2002; Shalev 1992). In recent 
years, as a response to the economic crisis, this trend has intensified in several countries, especially 
where austerity packages have particularly hit public employees, although with some exceptions, 
such as many Eastern European countries (see also Chapter 4 of this report). Often, however, 
workers’ protests have occurred in form of mass demonstrations, street violence and riots, rather 
than strikes in the strict sense (Bordogna 2010). 
 
3.9 Conclusions: Identifying clusters 
From the point of view of public sector industrial relations the European Union looks like a ‘mosaic 
of diversity’. Despite some trends towards convergence both between countries and between the 
public and private sector within each national case,  to a greater degree than in the private sector 
employment and industrial relations are here deeply rooted in country-specific legal, normative and 
institutional traditions that contribute to this diversity and make comparison difficult. 
However, in summarising the key features of public sector industrial relations, five main country 
clusters can be identified. Some have relatively strong common features, and are therefore clearly 
identifiable, while in others marked diversities exist within the group. 
A first, clearly identifiable group is that of the Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, Finland and  
Norway. The main characteristics of this group are: the largest, or among the largest (Finland), size 
of public sector employment in the EU27, with a high female presence,  and a strong welfare state; 
significant harmonisation processes between career civil servants and employees employed on 
ordinary contracts, although differences do persist in these countries; very high trade union density, 
though declining slightly in recent years, and wide collective negotiations practices, within a rather 
decentralised, two-tier bargaining system with strong and effective coordination mechanisms; few 
restrictions on the right to strike, but special machinery for collective dispute resolution. Elements 
of the NPM doctrine have been adopted, including forms of performance-related pay, but 
incorporated within public administration systems that maintain some (neo-) weberian 
characteristics (Pollitt et al. 2007; Ibsen et al. 2011). Partial differences relate to the incidence of 
part-time workers (comparatively low in Finland), of temporary workers (very high in Finland and 
Sweden), and of young workers (ratio with elder workers below 1 in Finland and Sweden). From an 
industrial relations point of view, Ireland shares some features with this group of countries rather 
than with the UK, to which it is often associated. The rate of unionisation is quite high, there is  
special machinery for handling collective disputes in the civil service, and national ‘tripartite 
concertation’ has an important regulatory role for central government employees, as in Finland. 
This is despite difficulties in recent years and the fact that the single level bargaining system is in 
itself more centralised than in the Nordic countries. Ireland has a public sector employment share 
that is relatively high but lower than the Nordic countries, the UK and the Netherlands.  The 
incidence of women, part-time workers and, especially, young employees is relatively high, while 
the presence of temporary employees is relatively low.  The Netherlands also has some features in 
common with this group, although its union density rate is notably lower and its two-tier collective 
bargaining system is characterised by a weaker degree of coordination; other features of the 
Netherlands, however, are probably closer to those of the following group. 
Germany, France, Austria, and partly Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, with a Rechtsstaat 
tradition of Napoleonic or Prussian origin, have in common a strong component of career civil 
servants, which make up a large proportion of central government employees, and in France almost 
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all of public employees. Career civil servants do not have the right to bargain collectively (in France 
and in Belgium this right has a weak status), and in Germany, Austria and, with some uncertainty, 
Belgium, career civil servants are also excluded form the right to strike. This right is instead 
constitutionally protected in France without distinction between private and public sector 
employees, as in Italy, which creates partly common regulatory problems.  
Germany, Belgium (at least in central government) and, to an even greater extent, Austria, have a 
medium-high trade union density. Density rates are relatively low in France, although notably 
higher than in the private sector. In Germany the union density rate of Beamte is probably higher 
than that of public sector employees under ordinary contracts, which have the same bargaining 
rights as private sector employees. In all countries wage determination is relatively centralised, 
particularly in France and Germany, although in Germany there have been some decentralising 
trends in recent years. The public sector employment share is high in Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, but comparatively low in Germany and Austria. The female employment share is 
rather high in all cases (just below 70%), although lower than in the Nordic countries. Part-time 
working is widespread in Germany, Austria, Belgium and of course the Netherlands, but less so in 
Luxembourg and France. The incidence of temporary workers is high in France and Germany, but 
notably lower in Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. The ratio between young and older workers is 
higher than 2 in Luxembourg and significantly higher than 1 in the other countries, with the partial 
exception of Germany, but in most cases has been decreasing since 2008. In the comparative public 
administration literature, these countries have recently been included within the “neo-weberian 
state” model (Pollitt et al. 2007). 
A third cluster, although with significant internal differences, is that of the Southern European 
countries – Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta and Cyprus. With regard to the employment 
structure, the public sector share is in this cluster comparatively medium-low, with the partial 
exception of Malta and, to a lesser extent, Greece. The female share in public employment is around 
60% in Italy, Spain and Cyprus, higher in Portugal, and notably lower in Greece and Malta. The 
incidence of part-time working, where data exist (Italy and Spain), at 12-14% is much lower than in 
all the countries of the previous clusters, while the incidence of temporary workers, well above 
20%, is in Spain and Portugal the highest of the EU-27 (along with Finland). It is medium-high in 
Cyprus, and lower in Italy and Greece. The ratio between young and older workers in Malta is the 
third highest in the EU-27, well above 1 in all the other countries, and the lowest by far in Italy, 
which has the oldest age structure in the EU. Trade union density is high in Greece (64%) and 
medium-high in Italy and Portugal (45-50%); data are not available for the remaining countries. As 
for employment relations, most of these countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) used to share 
several features (with France as well), such as the special employment status of a large part of 
public employees and no or limited scope for collective bargaining right, especially for civil 
servants. Since the early 1990s, however, Italy has moved towards the Nordic countries cluster, 
although with difficulties and specificities, adopting several NPM-inspired measures, at least the 
rhetoric of this
40
. Special employment status has been abolished for the large majority of public 
employees; jurisdiction has moved from administrative law and tribunals to private law and 
ordinary courts; collective bargaining, with a two-tier structure, has become the main method for 
determining terms and conditions of employment, including pay, and is widely practiced, with some 
form of central coordination, however ineffective between 1998 and 2007. Bargaining coverage, 
with regard to national collective agreements, is 100%, due to the sole and compulsory employers’ 
representation in ARAN. Forms of performance-related pay have been introduced since the late 
1990s especially for managerial positions, although subject to weak assessment procedures, while 
they have less importance for non-managerial employees; the effects of the 2009 reform have still 
                                                          
40
 Kickert (2007) interprets Italy as a case of  New Public Management failure. 
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to be proven. The right to strike is constitutionally protected, without distinctions between public 
and private employees, with limitations only for employees (both private and public) of the 
essential public services. In Greece, where union density is relatively high (64%, more than three 
times higher than in the private sector), the right to collective bargain was introduced by legislation 
in 1999 for civil servants, although their public law status has not been abolished and pay issues are 
still excluded from negotiations; collective negotiations have greater influence for contract 
employees and in local government. In Portugal also, the special status of a relevant part of public 
employees has not been abolished, and although collective negotiations play a significant role in 
determining terms and conditions of employment, including of career civil servants, if they reach a 
stalemate the government maintains the power to act unilaterally. The union density rate is around 
45%. The special employment status of a significant part of public employees, with the connected 
prerogatives, also survives in Spain, although, as in Portugal, almost one in four public employees 
has a temporary or fixed-term contract. Union density in the sector is around 30-31% (Muñoz de 
Bustillo and Antόn 2012).  In both countries NPM-inspired reforms have been introduced to a 
limited extent, at least until recently.       
A final group with specific features consists of the former communist Central and Eastern European 
countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria and Romania. All these countries, with the partial exception of Hungary, have a 
comparatively small public sector employment share, with a relatively high presence of women, 
particularly in the Baltic countries (around or above 75%), with few exceptions (mainly Romania). 
As far as available data show, there is a limited incidence of part-time and of temporary workers, 
with the partial exception, in the latter case, of Poland and Hungary. The share of young employees 
is very high in Romania, Slovenia and Poland, to a lesser extent in Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, but low in the Baltic countries and especially Bulgaria. No systematic, comparative data 
on unions are available, but trade unions are generally weak, with the exception of Romania and 
Slovenia. This is especially the case in central administration, where career civil servants with 
special employment status are still important, and the practice of collective bargaining is limited or 
totally absent, either because of formal restrictions or because of the weakness of trade unions.  
Where collective negotiations exist, they often take place only at the individual employer level, in 
some cases also because of the absence of the relevant employers associations, as in the Czech 
Republic. Bargaining coverage is consequently very low. Social dialogue institutions exist in some 
countries, such as Hungary and Romania, but their role has been significantly restricted in recent 
years. Restrictions exist also with regard to the right to strike, especially in central administration.  
Overall, this group stands out for the weakness of industrial relations institutions and practices, with 
Slovenia as probably the main exception. For more details on industrial relations in the new 
Member States, see chapter 2 of this report. 
The UK can perhaps be considered a case apart, although some features of its employment structure 
are similar to those of other clusters. The share of public sector employment is comparatively rather 
high, with a high presence of women and part-time employees. The percentage of temporary 
workers is instead the lowest in the EU-27, while the ratio between young and older workers, 
although not particularly high, is well above 1. Some peculiarities in employment relations stand 
out. For example, there is no special status for public employees in general and civil servants,  no 
special limitations on the right of association and the right to strike, with the exceptions of a few 
groups, although since the 1980s strike action is subject to general, rather strict procedural rules. 
Trade union density is medium-high in comparative terms and almost four times higher than in the 
private sector. Collective negotiations are widely practiced, within a single level bargaining system, 
but a significant proportion of public employees are covered by pay review bodies. Negotiations are 
rather decentralised in the civil service, although measures to reduce fragmentation and pay 
dispersion have been put into place since the late 1990s. Forms of performance-related pay are in 
operation, linked to various waves of NPM-inspired reforms adopted since the 1980s, but attention 
  154 
is also paid to equal pay and low-pay issues. The traditional model employer approach has been 
abandoned under the Thatcher governments, but employment relations in the public sector are still 
different to those in the private sector.   
 
Within this framework, the measures adopted by many EU governments in response to the global 
economic crisis that began in 2007 not only have affected the employment levels, salaries and 
pension benefits of public employees (see evidence in chapter 4 of this report), but in some 
instances have also strained the traditional regulatory system prevailing in the  country.  Sometimes 
these strains have halted or reversed consolidated patterns; in other cases they appear to have 
accelerated and deepened changes already underway. Four main, problematic features can be 
mentioned here (for an extensive analysis of the impact of the crisis on public sector industrial 
relations, see chapter 4 of this report).  
First, there has been a general revival of unilateralism, with few exceptions. In many cases 
measures affecting public employees and public service employment relations have been decided  
relatively urgently without negotiations with trade unions, and sometimes even outside consultative 
procedures. Where powers of unilateral determination formally existed, they have of course been 
utilized (France and Germany for Beamte are cases in point, but also various central and eastern 
European countries like the Baltic countries, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania – see Vaughan-
Whitehead 2012); where collective bargaining or forms of social dialogue were allowed and 
practiced, these have been suspended or were less effective (Italy is a clear example, Ireland is 
another one, at least in the first phase of the crisis, but also the UK, Spain, Portugal, and Greece 
could be mentioned). It should also be noted, however, that where the social dialogue is not well-
embedded in the public sector it is much more difficult to find consensus, particularly in a difficult 
economic context. For a more detailed examination of the tension between the role of government 
and the development of social dialogue, see Chapter 4. 
Second, we have seen a process of recentralisation of wage-setting systems in many countries, as a 
consequence of centrally defined horizontal measures applied in a generalised and undifferentiated 
way to all services and all employees (Italy, France, UK, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, some central 
and eastern European countries), although in some cases the break-up of centralised systems has 
opened the way to processes of decentralisation and differentiation of procedures and terms and 
conditions, as in Germany. 
A third point regards the traditional issue of the distinctiveness of public service employment 
relations compared with the private sector. The removal of this feature was a crucial target of the 
NPM approach, within a wider programme towards a leaner and less distinctive public sector. In 
this respect, recent measures adopted in response to the economic crisis seem to have had 
ambivalent effects. On the one hand, probably the main distinctive feature of public sector 
employment relations, namely the power of public employers to unilaterally determine terms and 
conditions of civil servants, has been reaffirmed and possibly further strengthened, also influencing 
dynamics and outcomes related to public employees under private contract (like in Germany). On 
the other hand, these peculiar prerogatives have in some cases been used to accelerate the 
introduction into the public sector of private-sector-style HRM practices and managerial techniques 
(like in Italy). 
The final feature concerns public sector trade unions. While they remain the stronghold of national 
trade union movements almost everywhere, their role has generally been weakened by the crisis, at 
least in terms of capacity to influence governments’ and public employers’ policies. 
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Appendix 3.1 Number employed in public sectors as % of total employed in all 
activities 
         
 Public sectors 
Public 
Administration 
Education Health 
 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 
EU-27 23.6 24.8 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.3 9.5 10.4 
EU-15 24.9 26.3 7.3 7.2 7.0 7.5 10.6 11.6 
Belgium 31.0 31.7 9.7 8.9 8.5 9.2 12.8 13.6 
Bulgaria 17.8 19.2 7.0 7.6 6.1 6.4 4.7 5.2 
Czech Republic 18.4 19.3 6.3 6.5 5.7 6.1 6.4 6.7 
Denmark 30.8 33.4 6.0 5.6 7.2 9.0 17.6 18.8 
Germany 24.6 25.4 7.2 7.0 6.1 6.2 11.3 12.2 
Estonia 19.6 21.8 5.8 6.6 9.1 9.4 4.7 5.8 
Ireland 22.3 26.6 5.0 5.7 6.8 7.9 10.5 13.0 
Greece 20.4 22.2 8.3 8.8 7.0 7.5 5.1 5.9 
Spain 18.2 22.2 6.3 7.8 5.7 6.5 6.2 7.9 
France 29.6 29.6 10.3 9.7 6.9 6.7 12.4 13.2 
Italy 20.1 20.4 6.2 6.3 6.9 6.7 7.0 7.4 
Cyprus 19.2 18.8 8.0 7.1 7.1 7.8 4.1 3.9 
Latvia 20.6 21.8 7.7 6.4 8.2 10.4 4.7 5.0 
Lithuania 21.7 23.5 5.5 6.1 10.0 10.7 6.2 6.7 
Luxembourg 30.2 29.9 11.8 11.8 8.4 8.1 10.0 10.0 
Hungary 21.6 22.9 7.1 7.8 8.0 8.3 6.5 6.8 
Malta 24.8 26.5 8.8 8.8 8.4 9.3 7.6 8.4 
Netherlands 29.3 29.6 6.6 6.5 6.9 6.7 15.8 16.4 
Austria 21.3 22.1 6.8 6.6 5.7 6.2 8.8 9.3 
Poland 19.1 19.9 6.2 6.6 7.5 7.6 5.4 5.7 
Portugal 19.0 21.6 6.6 6.4 6.6 7.6 5.8 7.6 
Romania 13.4 13.8 5.0 5.1 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.4 
Slovenia 18.8 20.6 5.7 6.3 7.5 8.4 5.6 5.9 
Slovakia 19.8 22.0 6.9 8.2 6.7 7.0 6.2 6.8 
Finland 26.2 27.9 4.6 4.7 6.5 7.2 15.1 16.0 
Sweden 31.8 32.3 5.7 6.0 10.6 10.8 15.5 15.5 
United Kingdom 28.5 30.1 7.1 6.3 9.1 10.4 12.3 13.4 
Norway 32.7 35.6 5.6 5.7 8.7 8.3 18.4 21.6 
 
Source: Eurostat         
Note: NACE rev.2 classification        
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Appendix 3.2 Employment change in all activities and public sector, 2008-2011 
   % change 
 
All activities 
Total public 
sector 
Public administration  Education Health 
EU-27 -1.9 2.4 -1.1 1.1 5.9 
EU-15 -1.8 2.5 -1.5 1.2 6.0 
Belgium 1.9 5.7 0.7 5.5 10.3 
Bulgaria -10.3 -5.7 -4.8 -8.8 -3.1 
Czech Republic -2.5 -3.1 -6.8 -3.1 0.8 
Denmark -4.9 2.5 0.0 13.8 -1.4 
Germany  2.0 3.8 -3.7 4.5 8.5 
Estonia -8.3 2.7 4.7 -4.8 14.6 
Ireland -13.8 2.2 -2.0 -0.5 5.9 
Greece -8.6 -2.9 -3.5 -4.3 0.3 
Spain -10.3 3.3 4.7 2.1 2.9 
France -0.9 0.6 -0.6 -2.5 3.1 
Italy -2.0 -1.6 -2.0 -6.6 3.5 
Cyprus -0.1 6.3 3.0 11.6 6.6 
Latvia -24.0 -11.1 -17.4 -7.2 -9.5 
Lithuania -9.8 -3.0 -2.4 -3.8 -2.2 
Luxembourg 5.8 13.0 6.7 11.5 18.1 
Hungary -1.4 2.4 -4.1 4.1 8.8 
Malta 4.2 2.2 -0.8 0.7 7.3 
Netherlands -0.4 7.1 3.1 1.6 10.9 
Austria 1.8 3.5 0.4 3.4 5.6 
Poland 1.9 6.3 8.1 3.8 7.7 
Portugal -5.6 3.7 -1.2 1.4 10.4 
Romania -3.3 1.2 0.1 -1.8 5.6 
Slovenia -5.5 5.5 1.0 8.3 6.7 
Slovakia -1.7 -0.1 -2.5 1.8 0.2 
Finland -1.6 1.3 -1.9 3.4 2.0 
Sweden 0.8 0.6 -2.0 1.8 0.7 
United Kingdom -0.8 3.9 -5.4 3.7 8.5 
Norway -0.5 4.7 3.4 4.8 5.2 
 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts and Labour Force Survey      
Note: All figures come from the National Accounts except as noted here. For Bulgaria and Romania, data 
for public sector activities come from LFS; for Portugal, the change 2010-2011 is estimated from LFS data; 
for the UK, data for Public administration and Education relate to the number of jobs rather than number of 
persons employed; data for Health come from the LFS. The EU totals are based on the sum of employment in 
Member States in the different sectors. 'Total public sector' is the sum of employment in the three sectors 
shown. 
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Chapter 4: The consequences of the crisis for public sector industrial 
relations  
 
Public sector employees in virtually all countries have been affected by the crisis as governments 
seek to reduce the size and scope of the public sector. Adjustments have included pay freezes, pay 
cuts and reductions in staffing levels, although countries generally seem to fall into two clusters 
– those that have been severely affected and have put into place austerity measures, and those 
that have been affected to a lesser extent. The future appears to point towards more 
centralisation and unilateralism in public sector industrial relations. 
 
Based on a draft by Stephen Bach, King’s College London, and Roberto Pedersini, University of 
Milan. 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
It has become a commonplace to argue that public sector industrial relations have undergone major 
changes over the past two decades, precipitated by a process of liberalisation and marketisation and 
pressure to enhance service quality in response to increased citizen expectations (Bordogna 2008; 
Schulten et al. 2008). These changes have been associated with new public management (NPM) 
reforms and attempts to deprivilege public sector industrial relations, but despite these measures 
labour relations regimes and outcomes continue to vary widely between countries (Bach and 
Bordogna 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In the past two decades some Member States have 
decreased public sector employment, such as in Germany and Sweden but others, including Greece 
and Spain, have continued to increase public employment and welfare provision. General 
government national accounts data, by contrast, shows that employee compensation is increasing in 
absolute terms in Germany and Sweden, but decreasing in Spain and Greece.  
To what extent has the crisis reinforced diversity in models of public sector industrial relations as 
identified in chapter 3 or has a new orthodoxy prevailed, based on ‘internal devaluation’ through 
cuts in public expenditure, wages and employment? Since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis, the institutional framework and character of public sector industrial relations has been put 
under strain. A stronger scrutiny on the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure has 
emerged; the role of key stakeholders such as public sector trade unions has been challenged and 
formally autonomous employers, with devolved authority, have been subject to tight financial and 
managerial control from the centre of government.  
 
The catalyst for these changes has been the deepening economic and financial crisis after 2008, 
which required governments to redirect their attention from a focus on initiatives to maintain 
aggregate demand to concentrate on deficit reduction as Member States’ budget deficits increased. 
The causes of the crisis are not rehearsed here (see Krugman 2008; Lounsbury and Hirsch 2010; 
Stiglitz 2010) but what is indisputable is that governments have targeted the public sector as a key 
sector for adjustment. As this chapter identifies, governments have drawn extensively on wage 
freezes and wage cuts, reductions in employment and changes to pension arrangements to deal with 
budget deficits. The immediate consequences of these measures are clearly identifiable and in the 
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majority of countries longstanding terms and conditions of public sector employment are being 
undermined and the size of the public sector workforce is being reduced. These changes have 
frequently been formulated and implemented with limited involvement of the social partners; a 
sharp reversal of the trend towards extensive negotiation and consultation that has become the 
prevailing pattern in the public sector over recent decades (Bordogna 2008; Demmke and Moilanen 
2010).  
 
The short term consequences of these programmes are visible not least in the protests and strikes 
that have been a widespread response. The longer term implications for service quality, social 
cohesion and attractiveness of the public sector as an employer are harder to discern. Many of the 
measures described in this chapter only started to take effect from around 2010 and in many 
countries will continue in some form until the latter part of this decade. If the consequences of 
austerity reach far into the future, it is also necessary to look backwards to take account of the 
historical legacy of public sector reform in understanding the strength of the pressures being 
confronted by different Member States and the type of austerity measures being implemented 
(Vaughan–Whitehead 2012). Consequently, examining the severity of external pressure to address 
current deficits and taking account of existing public sector reforms, we distinguish between two 
broad clusters of countries in terms of how they have responded to the crisis in reshaping public 
sector industrial relations.  
 
The first group of countries are implementing the largest programmes of adjustment and are seeking 
to frontload changes in pay and conditions to maximise expenditure reductions. These are countries 
that are under the most direct pressure to reduce public expenditure rapidly and because there is a 
limited tradition of structural reform there is an emphasis on immediate results via cutback 
management (Dunsire et al. 1989).This refers predominantly to quantitative reductions in the 
paybill by cuts in wages and employment, reinforced over the longer term by restructuring of the 
public sector. A common feature of these countries is that they confront strong external pressure 
towards fiscal consolidation. This can be direct pressure because they come under economic 
adjustment programmes backed by the EU and the IMF, or indirect, because of unfavourable market 
sentiment and the spectre of external intervention linked to concerns about their public debt 
sustainability. These countries are at the centre of the sovereign debt crisis and this pattern is most 
strongly exemplified by developments in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In a differing 
political and economic context, austerity programmes in the Baltic States, especially Latvia, but 
also Hungary and Romania, also exemplify this pattern of adjustment.  
 
A second cluster of countries have not been immune from austerity measures but the timing and 
form of these programmes has been more directly under the control of their own national 
governments and has frequently involved the adaptation or continuation of structural reforms that 
have sought to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Due to the severity of the 
economic and financial crisis, austerity measures still impact markedly on the public sector 
workforce, but there is often less discontinuity with previous organisational and managerial 
reforms. These countries have still used cutback management measures but they are often in more 
dilute forms – pay freezes rather than pay cuts; restrictions on hiring rather than immediate 
reductions in staffing and more focused on human resource management reforms such as the 
strengthening of systems of performance management. An important difference with the first group 
of countries is not the size of the public sector, but its capacity to modernise. This cluster includes 
Germany and Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Sweden and in addition France, the 
Netherlands and with some caveats the United Kingdom. Italy is a less clear cut case because it has 
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had a lengthy engagement with NPM reforms, but its high levels of debt makes it more exposed to 
financial markets and more susceptible to austerity measures than the other countries in this cluster.   
 
This chapter develops this analysis building on the definition, structure and dynamics of the public 
sector outlined in chapter 3, concentrating on developments since the onset of the crisis in 2008 but 
noting prior reforms as relevant. The definition of the public sector used in this chapter focuses on 
core public services as covered by the NACE classification system i.e. category O (Public 
administration and defence; compulsory social security); category P (Education) and category Q 
(see box 1.1 in chapter 1). This chapter outlines trends in public expenditure and recent public 
sector reforms, before considering austerity measures. These include pay freezes, pay cuts and 
reductions in employment. The process of change, in terms of the extent of social dialogue, and the 
responses of the social partners, especially in terms of the extent of mobilisation, are also analysed. 
 
 
Box 4.1 Information sources 
The data in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, is drawn from: Eurostat, Eurofound’s European 
Industrial Relations Observatory; EPSU Reports; ETUI collective bargaining newsletter; Financial 
Times; Labour Research; OECD country studies and the private subscription service Planet Labor. 
 
 
 
4.2 Public expenditure trends and public sector reform  
 
The economic crisis emerged in earnest during 2008 with governments extending financial support 
to ensure the solvency of the banking sector. The shock to the financial system, however, caused a 
sharp slowdown in economic activity and many governments responded by adopting large stimulus 
packages to boost aggregate demand, output and employment.  
 
As Table 4.1 indicates, general government expenditure, which includes central, state and local 
governments and social security funds, amounted to 49.1% of EU-27 GDP in 2011, around EUR 6 
200 billion (European Commission 2012d). There has been considerable variation over the last 
decade. Between 2002-2007 government spending relative to GDP was on a downward trajectory, 
but there were exceptions, with a rise of more than 2 percentage points of GDP in Greece, the UK, 
Romania and Ireland and a rise of over 1 percentage point in Portugal and Cyprus. By contrast, 
countries such as Germany, Sweden and the Czech Republic reduced government expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP by more than 4 percentage points in this period and as discussed below, the first 
group of countries have confronted the strongest pressure to reduce public expenditure.  
 
Following the onset of the crisis the picture altered markedly as countries sought to sustain 
economic growth and prevent a sharp rise in unemployment, alongside the need to inject resources 
into the ailing financial sector. In addition to short-term pressure to deal with deficits, over the 
medium term, demographic change, especially the ageing population, is placing pressure on 
governments to address debt problems as the workforce supports a higher proportion of retired 
workers (European Commission 2012a). From 2008 there was an increase in government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and this trend became much more pronounced during 2009. 
This trend was mainly accounted for by the decline in the denominator – GDP – after 2008. 
Subsequently, from 2010 government expenditure as a percentage of GDP started to decrease but 
with some notable variations around the mean. 
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Table 4.1 Total general government expenditure, 2002–2011 
 
  
% GDP 
2011 
Percentage point of GDP change 
2002-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
EU-27 49.1 -1.0 1.5 4.0 -0.5 -1.5 
EU-15 49.7 -0.9 1.6 4.1 -0.4 -1.5 
BE 53.3 -1.6 1.6 3.9 -1.2 0.8 
BG 35.6 -0.4 -0.8 3.0 -4.0 -1.8 
CZ 43.0 -4.6 0.1 3.6 -1.0 -0.7 
DK 57.9 -3.8 0.7 6.5 -0.1 0.0 
DE 45.3 -4.4 0.6 4.1 -0.5 -2.4 
EE 38.3 -1.8 5.7 5.8 -4.8 -2.4 
IE 48.1 3.3 6.3 5.6 17.4 -18.0 
EL 51.8 2.4 3.1 3.4 -2.5 0.3 
ES 45.2 0.3 2.3 4.8 0.0 -1.1 
FR 56.0 -0.3 0.7 3.5 -0.2 -0.6 
IT 49.9 0.5 1.0 3.3 -1.5 -0.5 
CY 46.1 1.3 0.8 4.1 0.0 -0.1 
LV 38.4 0.0 3.1 4.6 -0.3 -5.0 
LT 37.4 0.0 2.6 6.5 -2.9 -3.4 
LU 42.0 -5.2 2.8 5.5 -1.8 -0.8 
HU 49.6 -0.8 -1.5 2.2 -1.6 -0.2 
MT 42.3 0.1 1.2 0.3 -0.8 -0.2 
NL 49.8 -0.9 0.9 5.2 -0.2 -1.4 
AT 50.5 -2.1 0.7 3.3 0.0 -2.1 
PL 43.6 -2.1 1.0 1.4 0.8 -1.8 
PT 49.4 1.3 0.4 5.0 1.5 -1.9 
RO 37.9 3.2 1.1 1.8 -1.0 -2.2 
SI 50.7 -3.8 1.9 4.8 1.2 0.4 
SK 38.2 -10.9 0.7 6.6 -1.5 -1.8 
FI 55.1 -1.6 1.8 6.9 -0.3 -0.7 
SE 51.2 -4.6 0.7 3.2 -2.6 -1.1 
UK 48.5 2.3 4.0 3.6 -0.9 -1.9 
Source: Eurostat (2012), Government revenue, expenditure and main aggregates, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
The main items of general government expenditure comprise the compensation of government 
employees, intermediate expenditure (e.g. rents), capital formation, social benefits and debt 
payments. In 2011, 22% of total expenditure in the EU-27 consisted of employee compensation 
(European Commission 2012b).  Table 4.2 indicates an upward trend in total general government 
expenditure between 2002 and 2007. This increase continued after 2007 but at a lower rate. 
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Moreover, after an initial increase after the start of the 2008 crisis, the shift in sentiment towards 
fiscal tightening and the onset of austerity measures was abundantly clear by 2011.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Total general government expenditure at current prices (EUR) 
Annual % change 
 2002-2007 2007-2011 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
EU-27 4.1 2.4 3.9 2.1 3.6 -0.1 
EU-15 3.8 2.2 3.1 2.8 3.3 -0.2 
BE 3.9 5.0 6.5 6.1 2.2 5.4 
BG 12.4 3.3 12.8 6.4 -6.8 1.7 
CZ 7.3 5.6 17.3 0.1 3.4 2.3 
DK 2.8 4.6 4.8 7.2 5.0 1.6 
DE 0.7 2.7 3.2 5.0 4.0 -1.4 
EE 14.4 2.8 17.9 -2.8 -6.9 4.8 
IE 9.7 2.4 10.7 1.9 31.8 -26.0 
EL 8.5 0.5 11.3 5.7 -8.3 -5.5 
ES 7.8 3.8 9.2 7.5 0.1 -1.1 
FR 4.0 3.0 3.8 3.9 2.3 2.1 
IT 3.8 1.6 3.4 3.0 -0.8 0.8 
CY 8.2 6.0 10.0 7.8 3.1 3.2 
LV 16.4 0.7 18.4 -9.5 -3.3 -0.9 
LT 13.7 3.7 21.3 -3.5 -3.3 2.2 
LU 6.4 7.1 7.6 10.0 6.3 4.6 
HU 6.8 -0.4 3.1 -9.5 2.3 2.9 
MT 3.7 4.3 10.3 -1.3 4.6 3.8 
NL 3.8 3.8 6.2 7.3 2.2 -0.4 
AT 3.6 3.4 4.7 4.2 3.6 0.9 
PL 7.2 5.3 19.7 -11.7 16.2 0.0 
PT 4.4 2.9 2.6 8.8 5.6 -4.7 
RO 22.9 2.0 15.1 -11.5 2.7 3.6 
SI 5.3 5.7 12.5 5.7 2.5 2.5 
SK 9.9 8.9 19.9 16.0 1.0 0.2 
FI 3.9 5.2 7.2 5.8 3.1 4.6 
SE 3.0 3.6 0.1 -6.8 14.0 8.4 
UK 5.1 -1.5 -4.4 -6.4 6.7 -1.5 
Source: Eurostat (2012), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
 
Fiscal consolidation  
 
The data on government debt and deficits across the EU presented below has led to concerns about 
the sustainability of some countries’ sovereign debt burden.  
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Table 4.3. Economic growth, government debt and deficit/surplus, 2007-2011 
Country GDP Deficit/surplus (% of GDP) Debt (% of GDP) 
% Change 
2007-2011 
2011 % point change 
2007-2011 
2011 % point change 
2007-2011 
EU-27 -0.4 -4.4 -3.5 82.5 23.5 
BE 2.4 -3.9 -3.8 97.8 13.8 
BG 2.5 -2.0 -3.2 16.3 -0.9 
CZ 2.8 -3.2 -2.5 40.8 12.9 
DK -3.9 -2.0 -6.8 46.6 19.5 
DE 2.9 -0.8 -1.0 80.5 15.3 
EE -7.8 1.2 -1.2 6.1 2.4 
IE -6.8 -13.3 -13.4 106.4 81.3 
EL -14.7 -9.5 -2.7 170.6 63.2 
ES -2.8 -9.4 -11.3 69.3 33.0 
FR 0.1 -5.2 -2.4 86.0 21.8 
IT -4.5 -3.8 -2.2 120.7 17.4 
CY 3.5 -6.3 -9.8 71.1 12.3 
LV -16.9 -3.4 -3.0 42.2 33.2 
LT -5.8 -5.5 -4.5 38.5 21.7 
LU -0.4 -0.3 -4.0 18.3 11.6 
HU -3.1 4.3 9.4 81.4 14.4 
MT 5.5 -2.7 -0.4 70.9 9.0 
NL 0.7 -4.4 -4.6 65.5 20.2 
AT 2.3 -2.5 -1.5 72.4 12.2 
PL 15.8 -5.0 -3.1 56.4 11.4 
PT -2.6 -4.4 -1.2 108.1 39.7 
RO 1.3 -5.5 -2.6 33.4 20.6 
SI -3.0 -6.4 -6.4 46.9 23.8 
SK 8.3 -4.9 -3.1 43.3 13.7 
FI -2.6 -1.1 -6.4 49.0 13.8 
SE 4.3 0.2 -3.4 38.4 -1.8 
UK -2.3 -7.8 -5.0 85.0 40.8 
Source: Eurostat (2012), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the economic and public finance situation across the EU in 2011 
and trends since 2007, which is the last year of growth before the current crisis and a particularly 
challenging benchmark for performance thereafter. Economic trends present quite a varied picture 
as many countries succeeded in coping with the economic downturn and achieved some growth. 
Countries at the centre of the sovereign debt crisis and the Baltic economies have recorded the most 
significant falls in GDP.  
 
In terms of government deficit to GDP ratios, the position deteriorated in most countries from 2008 
to 2009. Even in 2008, there were only seven countries with a surplus, namely Bulgaria (1.7% of 
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GDP), Denmark (3.2%), Cyprus (0.9%), Luxembourg (3.3%), Netherlands (0.5%), Finland (4.3%) 
and Sweden (2.2%) and the situation deteriorated thereafter. As table 4.3 indicates, in 2011 Estonia, 
Hungary and Sweden were the only EU 27 countries with a surplus (1.2%, 4.3% and 0.2% of GDP 
respectively). The highest deficit (as % of GDP) and most negative trajectory occurred in Ireland 
(2008: -7.4%; 2009: -13.9%; 2010: -30.9%; 2011: -13.3%), a consequence of supporting its banking 
sector. Greece (-9.5%), Spain (-9.4%) and the UK (-7.8%) also continued to maintain sizeable 
deficits in 2011. Overall, the deficit in the EU as a whole stood at -4.4% of GDP in 2011 compared 
with -6.5% in 2010.  
 
In terms of general government debt in 2011 and changes since 2007, there is considerable variation 
between countries. Greece was the most indebted EU country at 171% of GDP in 2011, followed by 
Italy (121%), Portugal (108%), Ireland (106%), Belgium (98%), France (86%), the UK (85%), and 
Germany and Hungary (81%). The lowest level of government debt in 2011, measured as a 
percentage of GDP, was recorded in Estonia (6%) as well as in Bulgaria (16%) and Luxembourg 
(18%). The Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden documented debt levels 
around 40% of GDP, with Romania slightly lower. 
 
 
Public Sector Reform  
 
The capacity of governments to finance their deficit had a crucial influence on the timing and form 
of fiscal consolidation packages adopted, but government action and market sentiment has also been 
influenced by other considerations. In particular, the legacy of previous public sector reforms to 
enhance productivity has mitigated the shock of the crisis and encouraged a degree of continuity 
with programmes of modernisation (Vaughan-Whitehead 2012). For many years, an important 
strand of public sector industrial relations analysis has focused on the extent to which Member 
States have reformed their public sector and moved employment regulation closer to patterns 
prevailing in the private sector, broadly associated with the adoption of NPM reforms (Bordogna 
2008; Demmake and Moilanen 2010). Although it is widely recognised that there has been no 
convergence between countries in the adoption of NPM measures, the pursuit of structural reforms 
or modernisation has reformed public sector industrial relations in many countries including 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK, albeit to a varying extent (Bach and 
Bordogna 2011; Bordogna and Neri 2011; Ibsen 2011; Keller 2011). These prior reforms have 
assisted countries in maintaining public finances more under control and created more scope for 
governments in these Member States to respond to the crisis in ways that fit prior patterns of 
structural reform. This has especially been the case in Germany, Sweden and Denmark. The UK is 
an unusual case because it has been subject to extensive structural reform over the last decade, but 
this was accompanied by rapid expansion of public employment and expenditure (Bach and Kessler 
2012). Moreover, it has not joined the Euro, providing more scope for policy options other than 
internal devaluation. It has continued public sector restructuring, via initiatives such as outsourcing, 
but in contrast to many of this cluster it has resorted vigorously to cutback management, with large 
reductions in public employment.  
 
These responses contrast with Member States that have experienced limited public service 
modernisation, in which the crisis has created pressure for far-reaching structural reforms of the 
public sector in the aftermath of more immediate cutback management. The analysis of public 
management reforms in countries including Greece, Portugal and Spain point to pervasive 
difficulties in improving operational effectiveness because of rudimentary systems of  governance, 
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a strong tradition of patronage in public service appointments and missed opportunities to deal with 
unjustifiable reward practices (Alba and Navarro 2011; Lasierra 2007; Ongaro 2008; Tzannatos and 
Monogios 2012).  
 
To summarise, concerns with rising government deficits in the aftermath of the first round 
economic and financial crisis in 2007/2008 has had an impact on most EU Member States . Against 
that backdrop, concern with the sustainability of rising government debt amidst continued high 
deficits altered around 2010 and  fiscal consolidation measures aiming at putting government debt 
on a sustainable basis became the favoured policy response of the affected countries and supported 
by IMF, OECD and European Commission. Two clusters of countries have been identified. The 
first contains those that have faced the most severe pressure for budget consolidation, reflected in 
their recourse to external assistance, and a legacy of limited public sector reform as the cases of 
Greece and Portugal illustrate most clearly. They have been required to make rapid adjustments, 
focused on straightforward cutback management techniques – reducing headcount and wages whilst 
seeking to put in place longer-term structural reforms of the public sector. In the second cluster of 
countries, most clearly exemplified by the experience of Germany, Sweden and Denmark, long-
standing patterns of public sector reform have been maintained and the crisis had a less severe 
impact with less recourse to cutback management. This categorisation is used to discuss 
differencing experiences of fiscal consolidation in the next section. 
 
 
4.3 Fiscal Consolidation: Austerity Measures in the Member States 
 
The first grouping of countries have all undertaken sharp fiscal consolidation and this has been 
brought about by external pressure. The role of the providers of financial assistance – the EU 
(including the ECB) and the IMF - has been a very significant influence on programmes to reduce 
public expenditure in Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, and Romania. These countries 
have all been required to pursue ‘internal devaluation’ but the scale of the challenges they face and 
their capacity to reduce public expenditure rapidly has differed. Greece has been at the centre of the 
European debt crisis and has been required to implement an ambitious programme of fiscal 
consolidation and structural reforms. In May 2010, following severe market turbulence, the euro 
area member states and the IMF agreed in lending EUR 110 billion to Greece over the period 2010-
2012 under strict conditions which included measures to improve tax collection, accelerate 
privatisation and reduce public spending over the medium term. Nonetheless, market sentiment 
turned against Greece during 2011 and additional financial assistance was required during 2011 and 
2012.  
 
Portugal required financial assistance in 2011, when EUR 78 billion was made available and this 
was accompanied by commitments to reduce the government deficit in a permanent way. 
 
Spain in particular but at various points also Belgium and Italy have not been immune from the 
pressure exerted by the bond markets. The public sector in Spain was traditionally relatively small 
and decentralised with public expenditure below levels in other Mediterranean countries (Table 
4.1). The economy contracted severely and unemployment almost tripled to 22% by early 2012.  In 
May 2010, the Spanish government, under sustained pressure from the financial markets, the 
European Central Bank and the IMF radically altered course and committed to EUR 15 billion of 
spending cuts in 2010/11 followed by further measures to cut the deficit to 6% of GDP from 11.1% 
  
 
 
171 
in 2009 - a target that was missed (Deepiane and Hardiman 2012; Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón 
2012). 
 
Ireland also experienced strong growth in its public sector during the 2000s, increasing about 30% 
between 2001 and 2009 and with few signs of concerted public sector modernisation (O’Connell 
2012). This employment growth was accompanied by substantial pay increases, with a significant 
pay premium in comparison with the private sector which increased markedly between 2003 and 
2006 (Geary and Murphy 2011). The economic and financial crisis hit Ireland very hard because of 
the scale of the bursting of the housing bubble and the very large measures it took to subsequently 
support its banking system. That led to sharp increases in its government debt even if from 
relatively low levels., In late 2010, Ireland required EUR 85 billion in November 2010 to the 
EFSM, EFSF and IMF. It was the severe deterioration of the public finances reinforced by the 
legacy of substantial increases in public sector pay and employment that required Ireland to pursue 
a vigorous programme of fiscal consolidation, focused initially on public sector pay cuts.  
 
Hungary and Romania both received EUR 20 billion support packages from the IMF, the EU and 
the World Bank in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Whereas the government of Hungary pursued less 
severe expenditure cuts than most countries subject to external assistance, Romania made much 
deeper cuts in wages and employment, reflecting a legacy of muddled attempts at public sector 
reform and a desire to avoid further recourse to IMF loans (Glasner 2010; Vasile 2012).  
 
The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania confronted a different legacy with relatively small 
public sectors and in the case of Estonia a cautious fiscal policy during the boom years. These 
economies, however, were immediately hit by the economic crisis, with sharp falls in GDP, 
exacerbated in Latvia’s case by the nationalisation of the indebted Parex bank. In 2008 Latvia 
secured a EUR 7.5 billion loan from the IMF and EU but this was accompanied by very large 
reductions in government expenditure, public sector wage cuts and employment reductions. 
Lithuania was also swept up in the crisis and in 2009 implemented wage and job cuts. Estonia 
moved early in 2008, reflecting its commitment to balanced budgets, introducing public sector wage 
reductions (Masso and Espenberg 2012; Rastrigina and Zasova 2012). 
 
Turning to the second cluster of countries, with less harsh austerity measures and more continuity in 
patterns of reform, Germany has been characterised by cumulative, evolutionary change, 
underpinned by a rapid recovery from the 2008 crisis. Public expenditure increased only very 
modestly during the past decade and Germany is distinctive in terms of the decline of public sector 
employment up to 2009 and its subsequent growth after the crisis, reflecting investment in key 
services including schools and child care (Bosch et al. 2012). Over the past decade important 
changes have occurred in public sector collective bargaining and alterations in work organisation 
with the growth of outsourcing and temporary contracts. The most significant long term government 
measure was the 2009 Constitutional amendment incorporating a ‘debt brake’ that strictly limits 
debts and requires balanced budgets by 2016 which may result in downsizing, especially at 
municipal level (Bosch 2012; Keller 2011).  
 
The process of adjustment in the Nordic countries has also been marked by continuities with earlier 
periods of public sector reform. In Sweden there have been no specific measures to cut wages and 
employment (Anxo 2012). Denmark has implemented some budget reductions for the 
municipalities but it is difficult to disentangle these changes from existing programmes of 
restructuring. The case of France shares some of the same characteristics in terms of the 
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continuation of existing cautious new public management style initiatives and a rather delayed 
response to the crisis. In 2011, plans were published to reduce expenditure with consolidation 
measures focused on restrictions in replacing staff to reduce headcount and other operational 
efficiencies (Gautié 2012). The Netherlands has also experienced a lengthy period of public sector 
reform and the main preoccupation has been to meet the requirements of the European Stability and 
Growth Pact by 2013. In autumn 2010 austerity measures intended to save EUR 18 billion by 2015 
were announced which included plans for wage moderation and employment reductions in the 
public sector.  
 
The UK is an unusual case because it stands out for its sizeable consolidation programme stemming 
partly from the high levels of support it provided to the finance sector and the subsequent sharp 
deterioration in its public finances. By 2015, GBP £80.5 billion cuts in public expenditure are 
planned, intended to reduce the deficit from 8.4% in 2009 to 0.4% of GDP by the end of its 
parliamentary term in 2015. In Italy a series of deficit reduction measures have been introduced, 
focused especially on reducing municipal and regional government expenditure with EUR 26 
billion reductions planned for 2012-15.  
 
 
4.3.1 Key issues and trends 
 
Three observations follow from this overview of austerity measures. First, the underlying reasons 
for fiscal consolidation programmes and their size and scope differ significantly between countries, 
with implications for social partner engagement. In countries that have confronted the severest 
external pressure to reduce public sector employment and wages, governments have rarely been 
able to fully accommodate the interests of the social partners and the timing of social dialogue. In 
particular countries, the economic crisis proved to be a catalyst to address longstanding problems of 
public debt and to tackle a disproportionate reliance on public employment that had become 
unsustainable - Greece being the outlier in this regard. However, other countries at the centre of the 
sovereign debt crisis have also been portrayed as having a bloated public sector. By contrast the 
Nordic countries and Germany have been less exposed to the crisis and there is much less 
preoccupation with reducing public expenditure; the emphasis has been on longer term 
modernisation of public sector industrial relations.  
 
Nonetheless, as the situation in France and the Netherlands illustrates, a continuing process of 
modernisation does not preclude the need to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, fostering the implementation of consolidation measures, albeit in less harsh forms and with 
more scope for debate and social dialogue. By contrast, countries forced by the rapidity and scale of 
the sovereign debt crisis to tackle their fiscal problems with very tough programmes of adjustment. 
This has major implications for the extent to which the social partners can influence the scope and 
scale of austerity measures. 
 
Second, despite some differences in start dates, austerity programmes stretch into the medium-term 
with structural reforms starting to have major consequences for pay and working conditions in the 
public sector. Although some austerity measures stretch back as far as 2006, for example in 
Hungary, in the majority of countries programmes started around 2009-2010 or even later in 
Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK. In the case of pay freezes or pay cuts (see 
below), except in extremis, there has usually been a lag between the announcement of the policy 
and its implementation in the following year’s pay round. In this regard the crisis has affected the 
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public sector and its workforce in a lagged way in comparison to the abrupt reduction in demand 
and rapid response of private sector firms in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Another 
contrast with the experience of the private sector, however, is that the impact of austerity 
programmes for the public services stretch far into the future with supplementary measures often 
put in place. In other words austerity measures are not one off initiatives, but have a long term and 
cumulative effect.. 
 
Third, there is an irreducible political dimension to the implementation of austerity measures in the 
public sector. Governments have been aware of the unpopularity of austerity and have tried to 
curtail the scope for opposition or delayed austerity measures until after elections have been held 
(Kickert 2012). Despite this manoeuvring, the political fallout from austerity programmes has been 
considerable and their unpopularity has contributed to electoral defeat in many countries, including 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, France, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. Many 
governments have passed emergency budgets and put in place revised fiscal frameworks, 
strengthening finance ministries, to enhance budgetary discipline and ensure the effective 
implementation of austerity measures. In 2012, the Spanish government introduced measures to 
enhance control over the budgetsof the autonomous regions, which control a major component of 
public expenditure. The Italian government imposed a binding financial recovery plan on Sicily to 
avoid defaults by local authorities. In Greece, the  consolidation measures have the force of law but 
it is not only countries with the worst fiscal outlook that have used legislation. In France and Italy, 
the government proposed a revision to the Constitution that would embed the principle of balanced 
budgets, a measure taken by Germany as well. In the UK in 2010, the government established an 
Office of Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) to provide independent forecasts and monitor adherence 
to new fiscal rules. These measures are designed to reassure investors, increase transparency and 
redefine political choices as technocratic decisions.  
 
Consequently EU governments have focused on paybill reductions which can take many forms. 
These include: pay cuts, pay freezes; reductions or abolition of bonuses and allowances; changes in 
pension provision;  alterations in working time (both increases and decreases); changes in 
employment, including modifications in the use of temporary and atypical workers; and reductions 
in employment often brought about by restrictions on hiring and replacement of existing workers. 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the key measures within the European Union. 
 
 
4.3.2. Pay cuts 
 
Indicating the severity of the crisis, since 2008, at least 9 EU Member States have directly reduced 
the public sector wage bill. There have been significant variations in the level of cuts, related to the 
weakness of the fiscal context and the scope for manoeuvre of the government concerned. The 
response of the social partners, parliament and the media has also influenced government decisions 
on pay cuts. Take the case of Lithuania: its government initially announced plans in June 2009 for a 
13% cut for around 250,000 public sector workers such as teachers that do not enjoy civil service 
status and a 10% cut in pay for 60,000 civil servants. Dissent in parliament led to this reduction 
being scaled back to a 5% cut in basic pay with more substantial reductions in other allowances. 
Countries where nominal pay has been reduced, at least for some groups, include the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain and the UK. This group includes all countries subject to EU/IMF assistance and the 
remainder are predominantly countries subject to strong bond market pressures to cut their deficit. 
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After the substantial increase observed in the 2000-2009 period, Greece has experienced the largest 
reductions, with cumulative and increasingly deep pay cuts introduced since the start of 2010, 
targeting the complex system of allowances as well as basic pay. Starting with a pay freeze in 2010 
for those earning over EUR 2,000 a month, the policy shifted towards reductions in allowances for 
public sector workers with some variations between occupational categories. The so-called 13th and 
14th month salaries were reduced before being abolished for public sector workers. In February 
2012 as a prerequisite for additional financial assistance from the EU and the IMF, the Greek 
parliament approved a new and unified public wage grid with the aim to further reduce wages by 
20% on average and introducing some merit based performance bonuses. Later on, special wage 
regimes, which were not affected by the new wage grid and used to lead to higher-than-average 
wages, were reduced by 12% on average starting from August 2012.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Pay cuts, pay freezes and other measures affecting public sector employment in 
selected countries 2008 - 2012 
 Pay Cut Pay Freeze Other measures 
BG   Proposed replacement of seniority advancements with bonuses. 
Employment in central government fell by 12% between 2009-
2011. 
CZ 10% cut in wages in 2011 Until 2014  
DK  No real wage 
increase in 2010 
Removal of seniority bonuses in 2011 
DE  6.3% wage increase 
between 2012-2014 
for 2m public sector 
employees  
 
EE Cut in basic payoff around 6% 
- larger reductions in public 
administration between 2008 
and 2010. 
2009 and 2010 Abolition or reduction of performance related supplements and 
other additional payments  
IE At least 5%, 10% for new 
recruits 
  
EL A series of on-going pay 
reductions and a new pay 
structure  
Pay freeze for public 
sector workers 
earning more than 
€2,000 per month 
(2009) 
Reduction and subsequent elimination of 13th and 14th monthly 
salary-and new pay structure with a total effect of minimum least 
15-20% pay reduction. Complete change of collective bargaining 
system and shift to elements of incentive pay. In 2011, increased 
working hours from 37.5 to 40 hours per week. Planned reductions 
in employment  of 150,000 (20%) by 2015 
ES 5% pay cut in 2010 2011 and 2012 In 2012 increase in working hours from 35 to 37.5 hours per week 
and increased contact hours for teachers 
FR  Pay scales frozen for 
2 years 
Replacement of 1 in 2 staff that leave the public sector  
IT 5% on salaries over EUR 
90,000, 10% over EUR 
150,000 for 2011-2013  
 
Wages frozen at 2010 
level for 2011-2013 
with possible 
extension  to include 
2014 
Collective bargaining suspended 2010-2012 
Workforce attrition – only 1 in 5 workers replaced in 2011-2013 
period with possible extension until the end of 2014  
CY Proposed in 2011 3 years  
LV 15% in 2009; 2010 pay cut by 
20% for higher paid & by 
15% for lower paid 
 As part of package agreed with the IMF: introduction of single 
remuneration system for those in central & local government 
institutions, which cut pay in 2010 by on average 5% compared 
with 2009. 
LT Cut of 15%  Until 2012  
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 Pay Cut Pay Freeze Other measures 
HU Cut by 7% in 2008-2010 Pay freeze since 2009 Abolition of 13th month salary (8% of annual salary) replaced by 
lower flat-rate payment for most public sector workers(2009/10) 
7000 government job cuts announced in 2012  
NL  No wage agreement 
concluded in central 
government since 
2011- a wage freeze  
Planned job reductions in central government by 2015  
Ending of LIFO principle in 2012 making it easier to dismiss 
central government workers  
PL  For two years Teachers excluded from pay freeze (pay has increased) 
PT 5% pay cut in 2011 
For 2012 13th and 14th month 
payments suspended for 
medium and high salaries, 
despite a challenge in the 
Constitutional Court  
2 year pay freeze 
from 2011 until 2013 
Reductions in health benefits.  
RO 25% temporary cut in 2010 
partly restored under new pay 
system 
2012  The new pay system introduced in 2012 eliminates a range of 
bonuses and abolishes the 13th month pay 
SI 4% in 2011, additional cuts of 
8% on average in 2012 
2011 and 2012 (six 
months) 
 
SK Paybill cut by 10% in 2011   Teachers and some other groups are not affected by the pay cut 
SE  No - wage 
moderation  
Reductions in employment of staff on fixed-term contracts  
UK 
 
Cuts in premium payments 
and allowances, especially in 
local government  
2010-2012 some 
exemptions for lower 
paid  
Cap on pay rises of 1% planned for 2013/14 
Large reductions in employment underway – in excess of 10% 
between 2010-2015.   
Sources: see list of information sources 
 
 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Ireland, Portugal and Spain amongst others have 
also made substantial pay cuts, often as part of the lending conditions established by the 
international community. Latvia provided undertakings to the IMF to reduce central and local 
government funding for wages by 15% in 2009 with limits to additional payments. Protection for 
the low paid resulted in a smaller public sector paybill reduction of around 5% in the first half of 
2009. Continuing economic difficulties prompted further pay cuts in a supplementary budget of 
June 2009 and an average 18% pay cut by late 2009 with teachers worst affected. In Hungary 
during 2009 the 13
th
 month salary was removed, worth around 8% of annual pay. Romania also 
moved towards the removal of 13
th
 month payments and holiday bonuses, but in addition passed a 
temporary six-month 25% across the board reduction in pay for the second half of 2010 as a 
precursor to longer structural reforms of pay determination. In Ireland the first phase of pay 
reductions in 2009 took the form of a differentiated pension levy which on average reduced pay by 
7.5%, with cuts in basic pay on an income related scale of between 5-15% implemented in January 
2010. Subsequently no additional pay cuts have been introduced as a result of the Croke Park 
agreement (see box 4.2). In Portugal pay cuts of 5% were introduced later, at the start of 2011, but a 
deteriorating fiscal position led to further pay reductions brought about by the suspension of the 13
th
 
and 14
th
 month salaries for those workers earning above EUR 1,100 per month with lesser 
deductions for those below this threshold. The Spanish government also introduced an average 5% 
pay cut in June 2010 and this was followed by a pay freeze, at the new lower level for 2011. The 
government elected in autumn 2011 immediately extended the pay freeze for 2012 and took 
additional measures to reduce public expenditure. 
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4.3.3. Pay freezes 
 
A related method of adjustment has been the use of pay freezes. These measures have often 
operated alongside pay cuts and have frozen public sector pay or significant components of pay. In 
some countries this has been an important component of the government’s response such as in 
Cyprus, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland and the UK, indicating a less drastic response to the crisis. 
The first pay freezes were introduced in 2008-9 and because of the severity of the crisis in Greece 
and Ireland agreed pay increases were annulled. Pay freezes for two years have been common, but 
in the Czech Republic and Italy such measures are planned to continue for four years until the end 
of 2014. 
 
Pay freezes take different forms and do not invariably result in pay reductions because other aspects 
of remuneration apart from base pay may increase. France and the UK have implemented two year 
pay-scale freezes. In France, this has been set against improvements in some other elements of pay, 
such as performance-related pay. In the UK, pay scale freezes have not stopped progression in 
sectors such as the health service, enabling workers to continue to gain nominal wage increases by 
moving up the pay scale. The end of the UK pay freeze in 2013 will be marked by a slight easing of 
pay policy with the government anticipating that pay awards will average 1% in 2013-2014. Other 
methods in which wage freezes have been introduced is by the suspension of collective bargaining 
as in Italy or by the failure to negotiate a collective agreement as occurred in the Netherlands in 
central government after 2011.    
 
Another important variant on pay freezes relates to their coverage, with specific groups or sectors 
excluded. Although the structure and financing of public services varies between countries (see 
chapter 3 of this report), governments exercise the tightest control over central government and 
especially the civil service workforce. This stems from the tight alignment between the role of 
government as a policy maker and its role as an employer. Consequently the scope for the strongest 
control over public sector pay exists where the government is the direct employer, has political 
authority over policy decisions, and controls expenditure directly. The Netherlands illustrates this 
dynamic with a pay freeze from January 2011 implemented in central government, but in local 
government and hospitals wage agreements provided for 1.5% and 2% pay increases respectively. 
In some countries specific groups have been excluded, notably teachers in Poland and Slovakia. 
Overall, the relative advantage of a pay freeze for government is that it is easy to understand, 
straightforward to implement and for politicians sends a signal to the electorate that public sector 
workers are not exempt from the type of wage adjustments that have occurred in the private sector 
during the crisis. 
 
Although austerity is a phrase that has permeated discussion of the public sector across Europe, 
some countries have been less affected by the crisis and have not opted for pay freezes and wage 
reductions. These countries are exemplified by strong traditions of social dialogue and often a prior 
legacy of public sector modernisation. Austria, Germany and the Nordic countries illustrate these 
developments. In Austria, public employers were seeking a pay freeze for 2010, but trade unions 
secured a wage increase of around 1% and gained higher increases in 2011 (Glassner 2010) with 
pay claims of around 4% submitted for 2012. There have also been pay rises in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden with some variation between sub-sectors. Germany has also been shielded from pay 
cuts and ver.di, the trade union that bargains on behalf of the public sector workforce, obtained a 
6.3% increase over two years (2012-2014), influencing agreements in other parts of the economy. 
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Nevertheless, it should be remembered that this was preceed by a three-year pay freeze from 2005-
2007 and a low increase in 2011.  
 
A number of other themes can be discerned. First, there have been attempts to target pay reductions 
on the higher paid. In certain cases, the lowest paid have been fully or partially exempted from pay 
freezes or wage cuts. For example, in the UK the two-year pay freeze excluded workers earning less 
than £21,000 (around €26,000) a year except in the case of local government workers covered by a 
separate agreement. In Ireland, during 2008-2009 a series of measures reduced public sector pay, 
but when further reductions were announced in December 2009 to take effect on January 1
st
 2010 
these were on a sliding scale with a 5% cut on salaries of EUR 30,000 increasing to a 15% 
reduction for those earning above EUR 200,000 (Stewart 2011: 223). Similarly in Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain higher earners have been targeted for larger reductions in pay. 
 
Second, in contrast to the private sector, where pay is usually decided at company or sectoral level, 
these exceptional wage measures often require parliamentary approval. Consequently it is not the 
direct employer or an employer’s association making pay decisions but rather national politicians 
with a variety of incentives and answerable to a broader range of stakeholders. Governments 
therefore have sometimes amended plans to curtail public sector pay and have been reluctant to 
provoke the public sector workforce, especially in election years; planned measures do not always 
equate with outcomes. In Slovenia, plans to cut basic pay by 4% at the end of 2011 were rejected 
(although in 2012 the Public Finance Balance Act decreased wages in the public sector by 8% on 
average) whilst in Portugal an amendment to the 2012 budget law raised the monthly salary 
threshold for suspension of the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month salary payments from EUR 1,000 to EUR 1,100 
(EC 2011). In Denmark more contentious aspects of pay reforms such as the individualisation of 
pay negotiations were not pursued during 2011, an election year. Nevertheless, despite some 
concessions, the unpopularity of austerity programmes has not prevented the collapse of 
governments. 
 
Third, as Table 4.5 indicates, the crisis has led to a slowdown in the rate of increase in 
compensation and in some countries the effects of wage freezes and pay cuts are starting to become 
evident. These measures, however, represent short-medium term responses that have a finite time 
limit. As economic growth returns, restricting public sector pay may lead to staff shortages, 
emigration and difficulties in attracting talented individuals into public service. Many governments 
have sought to use the crisis to bring about structural reforms of pay determination and wider labour 
market reforms that will have significant long term consequences for public sector employment 
relations. In the UK, the government proposed changes in public sector pay determination to take 
more account of regional variations in pay rates. In Bulgaria, a new pay system in public 
administration has replaced traditional seniority-based pay with a system that takes more account of 
performance and in Luxembourg performance management and progression of civil servants have 
been reformed. 
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Table 4.5 Compensation of public administration employees, 2002-2011 
 % of GDP Annual average % change in EUR or national currencies 
  2011 2002-2011 2002-2007 2007-2011 
EU-27 10.8 2.8 4.0 1.4 
EU-15 11.0 2.6 3.7 1.3 
BE 12.6 4.0 4.0 4.1 
BG 9.0 9.0 11.2 6.2 
CZ 7.3 4.3 7.0 1.0 
DK 18.5 3.4 3.1 3.8 
DE 7.7 1.5 0.4 2.9 
EE 11.1 9.3 13.8 3.8 
IE 12.0 5.3 10.7 -1.0 
EL 12.4 4.6 8.0 0.5 
ES 11.6 6.0 8.1 3.5 
FR 13.2 2.7 3.0 2.3 
IT 10.7 2.3 3.6 0.8 
CY 16.1 7.6 9.0 5.8 
LV 9.5 9.4 21.1 -3.7 
LT 10.3 7.1 10.6 3.0 
LU 8.0 6.4 6.5 6.3 
HU 10.2 3.4 6.8 -0.7 
MT 13.4 3.9 2.7 5.4 
NL 9.8 2.9 2.8 3.0 
AT 9.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 
PL 9.8 6.1 5.4 7.1 
PT 11.4 -0.3 0.5 -1.3 
RO 7.6 14.6 25.6 2.1 
SI 12.8 6.2 6.3 6.1 
SK 7.1 4.3 3.9 4.8 
FI 14.2 3.9 4.0 3.7 
SE 13.9 2.7 3.9 1.1 
UK 11.1 4.8 6.8 2.3 
Source: Eurostat (2012), Government revenue, expenditure and main aggregates, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
Overall, virtually no country has been immune from pressures to curb wages but the degree of 
moderation has varied between countries. The experience of different countries confirms the 
differences between the two clusters of countries outlined earlier. In the first, the deepest cuts are 
evident with the most sizeable reduction occurring in Greece but with large pay cuts also taking 
place in Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Spain. In the second cluster of 
countries Germany is a case apart in terms of the absence of pay cuts with somewhat similar 
developments in the Nordic countries and in some of the agreements concluded in the Netherlands. 
In the UK, the pay scale freeze has not precluded some pay uplift for low paid workers and those 
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able to progress to higher salary points. In France, various bonuses have partly compensated for the 
freezing of pay scales. The upshot is that, whilst acknowledging some variations between countries 
within each cluster, very important differences remain in the experience of wage moderation 
between the two country groupings.  
 
 
4.3.4. Pensions 
 
Pensions comprise a very large and rising share of public expenditure (European Commission 
2012b). Pension provision has been under pressure not only because of fiscal pressures but also 
from demographic trends (Ghellab et al. 2011). Most countries have reviewed pension arrangements 
and have increased the statutory pension age for men and women in the public and private sectors. 
A key measure is to increase the threshold age for the payment of a statutory pension delaying 
payment for up to five years, typically raising the threshold from 60 to 65 with plans to raise the 
threshold further in a range from 66-68 over subsequent decades, often linked to increased life 
expectancy. In addition contribution rates have frequently been raised. 
Alterations in public sector pension arrangements, however, may require agreement from the social 
partners, who often have a key role in managing pension funds. Complex negotiations have resulted 
in changes (i.e. increases) in the retirement age of public sector workers with differences remaining 
between countries and between occupational groups within each country. Pension reforms that have 
been especially prevalent in the public sector include: an increase in the retirement age with a 
narrowing or closing of the gap between men and women and between the public and the private 
sectors; abolition or at minimum an uplift in the age of mandatory retirement for specific 
occupational groups such as police officers; increased contributions via special levies or permanent 
increases in employee contribution rates; new – usually less favourable – pension provision for new 
starters in public sector jobs; reductions in benefits, with short-term reductions often reinforced by 
structural reforms that alter accrual mechanisms. Pension reforms and the social partners’ response 
are discussed more fully in chapter 6 of this report. 
 
 
4.4 Employment, working time and flexible labour utilisation 
 
Reducing the public sector pay bill by a combination of pay freezes, pay cuts and adjustments to 
pensions have been the most prevalent methods for achieving savings. In addition, a variety of other 
measures have been used to reduce public expenditure. In general terms the scope for governments 
to reduce public sector employment is related to nationally specific employment statutes. As noted 
in chapter 3, many public sector workers have permanent employment status and high levels of job 
security, incorporated into specific public sector labour codes that are difficult to reform. The crisis, 
however, is being used as an opportunity to alter labour codes  often portrayed as protecting 
privileged public sector workers, for example in relation to dismissal. More broadly, despite the 
uncertain results of public sector reforms (Bach and Bordogna 2011), responses to the crisis seem to 
have reinforced efforts to introduce some of the principles, if not the core practices, of NPM with 
considerable interest in the use of outsourcing, performance management and attempts to increase 
flexible labour utilisation to control the paybill. An important difference, however, in the latest 
phase of reform is that instead of an emphasis on the decentralised management of change, both the 
measures and their consequences have been substantially predetermined at the centre, reflecting the 
overriding priority to achieve financial objectives. . 
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In many countries there has been no tradition of the collective dismissal of public sector workers, 
Spain and Italy being typical, and prior to the crisis employers often hired substantial numbers of 
temporary employees to provide additional flexibility in labour utilisation. This trend, however, has 
been reversed in countries such as Italy with the employment of temporary workers restricted by 
austerity measures. By contrast a climate of retrenchment has been significant in encouraging the 
increased used of temporary labour in some countries such as France, Germany and Sweden 
(Vaughan-Whitehead 2012). In the United Kingdom, in which there is no separate public sector 
employment statute, public employees can be made redundant relatively easily, reducing incentives 
to employ large numbers of temporary workers. Irrespective of specific employment protections, in 
the past governments have been wary about increasing unemployment and dampening aggregate 
demand by reducing public sector employment during a deep recession. Such aspirations continue, 
but deficit reduction and fulfilling the requirements of the European Stability and Growth Pact are 
dominant policy objectives and consequently there has been greater willingness to reduce public 
employment than in the past.  
 
 
4.4.1 Employment Cuts  
 
Reductions in employment have usually been brought about indirectly by hiring freezes rather than 
directly via voluntary or mandatory cuts in employment. A number of countries have introduced 
hiring freezes or replacing a small proportion of public sector workers in relation to leavers. In 
France only one in two civil servants are being replaced and in Italy the proportion is one in five. 
The same ratio was used in Greece during 2010, but was amended to one in 10 for 2011 and a 
similar one in 10 ratio is being used in many parts of the public sector in Spain. In Ireland the 
Public Service Agreement 2011-2014 (the “Croke Park agreement”) severely restricted recruitment 
and promotion and public sector employment fell from its peak in 2008 of 319,000 to 308,000 in 
2010 and is envisaged to diminish to 295,000 by 2014 (OECD 2011). Another mechanism used to 
reduce public sector employment is to transfer surplus workers into a labour reserve, usually 
accompanied by wage reductions, and if after a set period - one to two years - alternative 
employment is not available, the individual is dismissed. These arrangements were introduced in 
Greece but plans to place 15,000 employees in the labour reserve by the end of 2012 were not 
achieved with little use of the scheme. It has been re-launched as a mobility scheme intended to 
accelerate the restructuring and downsizing of the public sector and a new target of 27,000 transfers 
to the mobility scheme should have been achieved by the end of 2013. Affected employees are 
provided with one year of reduced pay and if they fail to find another public sector position they 
will be dismissed (IMF 2013). These measures are often a precursor to plans to reform dismissal 
procedures within the public sector, which are on-going at the time of writing in countries such as 
the Netherlands and Spain. For example, in the Netherlands, legislation proposed in 2012 outlines 
measures to harmonize dismissal regulations in the public sector in line with those in the private 
sector (Leisink, Weske and Knies 2012).     
 
Employment reductions have also been targeted at specific groups and employment categories 
rather than applied in a uniform fashion. Temporary workers have been vulnerable to non-renewal 
of their contracts in countries such as Italy. One common characteristic of employment reductions is 
that some occupational groups, especially managerial and administrative staff, have been targeted 
for employment reductions as part of broader strategies to rationalise and streamline public service 
delivery via the merging or restructuring of administrative units. For example, the outsourcing and 
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the sharing of information technology, finance, legal and human resource management services has 
become more prevalent. Reductions in managerial positions often accompany these changes as has 
been the case in Portugal, the UK and Ireland. To facilitate worker redeployment and effective 
staffing patterns there have been moves to harmonise terms and conditions of employment across 
the public services, such as in Ireland.  
 
Employment cuts, however, are not always cost neutral as longer-term savings have to be balanced 
against the short-term costs of early retirement schemes in which public sector workers may gain 
immediate access to their pension, even if they have not reached statutory pension age. This has 
caused concern in some countries, such as Ireland, especially if there is suspicion that managers are 
being re-hired on favourable contractual terms. Moreover the loss of experienced workers may 
diminish the skills available to organisations in a period in which managerial talent is at a premium 
in bringing about complex changes in public service provision. Indeed, some countries have 
become so concerned about the level of early retirement requests that they have altered their 
regulations. In Portugal there were around 11,000 early retirement requests in the civil service 
during 2011. In April 2012 a law was passed with immediate effect to suspend early retirement 
rules until 2014 to prevent further loss of civil service expertise and to improve fiscal control 
. 
Overall, as Table 4.6 indicates, there has been a shift since 2007 with employment in public 
administration starting to decrease as a proportion of total employment, although variations between 
countries and over time are influenced by the severity of adjustment in the private sector. In keeping 
with the overall argument of this chapter, countries subject to IMF agreements and external pressure 
have often been required to commit to larger reductions in employment, although it has not always 
been straightforward to achieve these reductions. Greece, for example, pledged to reduce public 
employment by at least 150,000 between 2011 and 2015, but the reduction in employment during 
2011 was slower than anticipated. 
 
 
4.4.2 Working Hours  
 
Finally, governments have used a variety of other changes in working arrangements to increase 
flexible labour deployment and bring about pay bill savings. In contrast to experience in the private 
sector, as reported in the 2010 Industrial Relations in Europe report, there has not been widespread 
recourse to short-time working. In the private sector, short-time working reflected attempts to 
preserve employment in a period of sharply reduced aggregate demand. In the public sector the 
underlying pressures are different, stemming from budgetary restrictions rather than a lack of 
demand for services. Indeed the reverse may be true because demand pressures on staff often 
increase in a period of recession (e.g. requests for social security benefits or employment 
assistance). Consequently, to meet growing demand but also boost productivity, governments have 
increased working hours. In Spain, in 2012, a 37.5 hour working week was imposed on all public 
sector employees, despite some regional and local governments agreeing shorter working hours for 
their workforce .These workers were able to maintain their shorter working week, but their pay was 
reduced in proportion to hours worked. In Ireland, many public sector workers are working longer 
hours, the so called ‘Croke Park hours’ with teachers and lecturers working an additional 26 to 36 
hours per year to improve educational standards. 
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Table 4.6. Number employed in public administration, 2002-2011  
 % of total Annual average % change 
 2011 2002-2007 2008-2011 
EU-27 6.7 0.5 -0.4 
EU-15 6.8 0.1 -0.5 
BE 9.5 1.3 0.2 
BG 6.5 2.6 -1.6 
CZ 5.6 0.3 -2.3 
DK 5.8 -0.2 0.0 
DE 6.4 -0.9 -1.3 
EE 7.2 2.1 1.5 
IE 5.7 3.3 -0.7 
EL 9.1 3.0 -1.2 
ES 7.9 1.5 1.5 
FR 9.2 0.2 -0.2 
IT 5.4 -1.1 -0.7 
CY 9.6 1.0 1.0 
LV 6.5 1.7 -6.2 
LT 6.1 0.7 -0.8 
LU 5.2 2.7 2.2 
HU 7.5 2.8 -1.4 
MT 7.4 0.0 -0.3 
NL 5.7 -1.0 1.0 
AT 6.5 0.3 0.1 
PL 6.6 3.5 2.6 
PT 6.5 -0.3 -0.4 
RO 5.1 -0.4 0.0 
SI 5.6 2.1 0.3 
SK 6.7 2.7 -0.8 
FI 6.9 0.1 -0.6 
SE 5.4 0.5 -0.7 
UK 5.3 1.0 -1.8 
Source: Eurostat Accounts and Labour Force Survey 
Note: All figures are based on National Accounts data except as noted here. For Bulgaria and Romania, 
data come from the LFS; for Portugal, the change 2010-2011 is estimated from LFS data; for the UK, data 
relate to the number of jobs rather than number of persons employed. The EU totals are based on the sum of 
employment in Member States. 
 
4.5 The implementation of austerity measures: Limited social dialogue and widespread 
mobilisation 
 
4.5.1 Social Dialogue 
  
Social dialogue, interactions between organisations representing employers and workers and public 
authorities, does not occur in a vacuum and has been profoundly influenced by the economic crisis 
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and moves towards fiscal consolidation. As reported in chapters 1 and 3, there are strong traditions 
of negotiation and consultation in the public sector, reflecting much higher levels of union density 
than in the private sector. Public sector union density and influence is less evident in central and 
eastern European Member States, with certain exceptions, such as Poland (Bernaciak et al.  2011). 
In general, social dialogue has come under pressure. It has been challenging to build trust and gain 
agreement between parties with differing interests and when austerity measures invariably involve 
making concessions that the social partners may not be willing or able to concede. 
 
At the same time the contentious nature of austerity measures makes negotiation and consultation 
even more important because austerity measures cannot be implemented effectively without some 
level of acceptance and ownership by the social partners. This is particularly true in the case of 
policies with longer-term implications such as pensions – see chapter 6 of this report. Social 
dialogue provides opportunities for the social partners to share information with each other, enables 
government to improve policy design and implementation, and often ensures the most vulnerable 
are shielded from the consequences of austerity measures. Nonetheless, in many countries a sense 
of ownership has been absent and the implementation of austerity measures has resulted in severe 
social strife. Despite these strains, in some countries traditions of negotiation and consultation have 
remained intact, facilitating more effective implementation and reduced conflict. 
 
Public services social dialogue occurs at a number of levels. At European level, the response of the 
sectoral level committees to the crisis is documented in box 4.2. 
 
 
Box 4.2 EU level public services sectoral social dialogue joint statements on the crisis 
There are four European sectoral social dialogue committees which cover the public sector. The 
committee for local and regional government comprises the European Federation of Public Service 
Unions (EPSU) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). In education, 
the social partners are the European Trade Unions Committee for Education (ETUCE) and the 
European Federation of Education Employers (EFEE). For hospitals, EPSU meets with the 
European Hospital and Healthcare Employers’ Association (HOSPEEM) and in central government 
the Trade Unions’ National and European Administration Delegation (TUNED) is linked with the 
European Union Public Administration Employers).     
The local and regional government social partners (CEMR and EPSU) sent a joint message to the 
European Council meeting in March 2009, emphasising the importance of maintaining employment 
in the sector and the resource implications of increased demand for services. Further joint 
statements were issued on the economic crisis, reinforcing these points, to a European Council 
meeting in February 2010 and December 2010. 
In October 2011, CEMR and EPSU reminded the European Council ahead of its 26 October 
meeting that: ‘the austerity policy followed by dramatic cuts in public services….will continue to 
undermine labour markets and the social model.’ The joint statement encouraged the European 
Council to take a long-term perspective to strengthen and enhance social dialogue including support 
for ‘sustainable employment measures in Local and Regional Government and investment in 
training, skills and decent work’. 
The central government administrations social partners (TUNED and EUPAN) issued a statement 
on 31 December 2011 and noted that ‘in a majority of European Countries the administrations are 
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subject to austerity measures affecting their global budgetary means, their workforce and/or its 
remunerations and that can influence working conditions’. The Committee stressed ‘the proven 
importance of the public sector in general and of the public administrations in particular, in the 
present difficult times, to strengthen, monitor and consolidate the sustainable recovery of our 
economies’. They reaffirmed that ‘what constitutes the administrations are the people who work in 
them and that if we don’t place them at the heart, in every moment of the transformations we are 
going through, we are certain not to attain the objectives’. 
The social partners concluded that: ‘in the framework of such transformations, the recognition and 
promotion of social dialogue is essential and absolutely necessary, as well as the need to uphold 
public sector values of universal access, accountability, transparency, integrity and equal treatment’. 
 
At national level, there have been wide variations in the role played by social dialogue in 
contributing to the process and implementation of austerity plans. In the 1990s, a period of 
economic adjustment during the establishment of economic and monetary union, there were 
numerous agreements between governments, employers and trade unions on incomes, employment 
and social security reforms (Baccaro and Lim 2007; Natali and Pochet 2009). It has been noted, 
however, that a period of economic crisis on its own is a poor predictor of concerted joint action. 
Specific political and institutional conditions, especially weak governments and their poor electoral 
prospects and the capacity of unions to deliver on their side of the bargain are important conditions 
influencing the establishment of social pacts in crisis conditions (Avdagic et al. 2011; Hamann and 
Kelly 2007). In the highly turbulent economic and political conditions that have prevailed since 
2008, there has been no return to the social pacts of the 1990s. 
 
Even in countries with established traditions of social dialogue, the severity of the austerity 
measures proposed has made it very difficult to develop co-ordinated responses to the crisis. 
Governments have often acted in haste because of pressure from financial markets and felt the 
necessity to develop waves of austerity measures, often in a reactive way, undermining the 
confidence of employers and trade unions in government action. This is not a conducive context in 
which to pursue agreement with the social partners, since it exposes one of the main limitations of 
negotiation and consultation: it requires time, often additional resources to effect change, and 
involves compromises. For governments the need to implement austerity measures quickly has 
made them more cautious about the value of social dialogue because of the difficulties in reaching 
agreement on complex and contentious issues in a timely manner. 
 
The process of consultation and negotiation has focused on the level of the sector and has been less 
dominated by traditional collective bargaining over wages, concentrating on discussions of complex 
issues such as pension reform, employment reductions and flexible labour utilisation. In a similar 
way to the preceding analysis, it has been more difficult to reach accords in countries most affected 
by the sovereign debt crisis, especially Greece, Lithuania Portugal, Spain and Romania.  Ireland, 
however, stands out in this regard (and not only in relation to our first cluster of countries) because 
it has been the only European country that has concluded a comprehensive long-term (four-year) 
agreement between the public service trade unions and the government, exchanging job cuts for 
wage stability, backed up by targets and the monitoring of outcomes. Although this agreement is a 
pale imitation of the series of social pacts agreed during the 1980s and 1990s, it remains a very rare 
example of a national sectoral level agreement that addresses austerity in a relatively inclusive 
manner  and with much less conflict than similarly indebted countries (see Box 4.3).This response 
has been attributed to the legacy of social partnership which encouraged the search for compromise, 
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the importance of inward investment and the emphasis on maintaining Ireland’s global 
competitiveness, and a public belief that the public sector had been treated generously in terms of 
pay and pensions in the recent past  (Dukelow 2011; Geary and Murphy 2011; Stewart 2011).  
 
 
Box 4.3 Ireland: Public services social dialogue in the crisis: The Croke Park agreement 
Ireland represents a distinctive case of adjustment to the financial crisis. The collapse of the 
property boom and the implosion of the Irish banking system led to unprecedented austerity 
measures. Initial deductions of pay for public sector workers of between 3-9.6% in spring 2009 
were followed by further pay cuts on a sliding scale of between 5% to 15%, linked to earnings from 
January 2010. These measures prompted strikes and demonstrations throughout 2009 and during 
2010. In December 2010 the crisis culminated in large-scale EU/IMF financial support of EUR 85 
billion accompanied by government agreement to undertake further fiscal consolidation. 
Prior to the crisis, Ireland had been central to industrial relations analysis and debates about the 
scope for social dialogue in particular institutional contexts. Commentators had been puzzled by the 
establishment from 1987-2006 of a series of three–year national economic and social partnership 
agreements between employers, trade unions and successive governments that contributed to a 
highly centralised and coordinated approach to wage determination in a context in which few of the 
institutional preconditions for social partnership appeared to be present (Roche 2007). For sceptics, 
the onset of the crisis seemed to confirm the fragility of the Irish social partnership model as social 
concertation unravelled during 2009, the implication being that social partnership was not 
embedded in the Irish system and that the scale of adjustments required, precluded scope for social 
partnership (Regan 2011; Doherty 2011). 
In 2009 negotiations on a national pact broke down after an agreed national wage settlement was 
abandoned because employers and the government regarded it as too costly in a rapidly 
deteriorating economic context. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTFU) accepted the need for 
public sector reform and adjustments to public finances but also proposed tax increases for higher 
earners alongside stimulus measures. The ICTFU agreed to a EUR 4 billion cut in current 
expenditure based on productivity increases and short-time working, but the government did not 
accept the ICTFU proposals and unilaterally imposed pay cuts via a supplementary budget in April 
2009. As public finances deteriorated, the government signalled it was seeking further reductions 
and this prompted a one day strike on 6 November 2009. 
Discussions between the public sector trade unions and the government with employer involvement 
led to a four-year (2010-2014) Public Service Agreement (the Croke Park Agreement). The 
agreement stated that there would be no further public sector pay cuts before 2014 in exchange for a 
phased reduction in public sector staff numbers and a substantial commitment to reform, including 
changes in work organisation and working conditions, especially for new starters. The trade unions 
also guaranteed industrial peace, if necessary using existing binding dispute resolution mechanisms 
to prevent strike action. These reforms were to be monitored by an implementation board that 
would publish annual reports on progress, supported by sectoral groups (such as in health and 
education) to support employers and unions in progressing changes in working practices and 
enhancing productivity. Despite considerable unease within the trade union movement, in June 
2010 the ICTFU Public Services Committee accepted the agreement with only one affiliate, the 
Irish Federation of University Teachers, initially not signing the agreement. 
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Considering the existing pay reductions and continuing staff reductions, some trade union members 
have been ambivalent about the agreement and concerned that their scope to influence employer 
decisions would be limited. There has been unease that a large number of early retirements and a 
recruitment moratorium is leading to staff shortages. The implementation body, however, reported 
in June 2012 that savings in the order of EUR 891 million had been achieved during 2011-12 in 
addition to the EUR 597 million delivered in 2010-11. Staff numbers had fallen substantially, 
service reconfiguration had commenced and industrial peace had been maintained. There has been 
some questioning of the appropriate balance to be struck between cutting public service staffing and 
reducing pay and there is some uncertainty about if cuts in allowances would breach the agreement. 
In November 2012, talks between the government and trade unions began on an extension of the 
agreement. The new talks centre on fresh reforms to extract a further €1 billion worth of savings 
from public sector costs by the end of 2015. The government says the cuts are vital, but 
acknowledges that the process will not be easy. 
 
 
In other countries also affected by severe fiscal consolidation, a much less positive picture emerges, 
frequently blending elements of government unilateralism, unsuccessful attempts at consultation, 
combined with some agreements on specific components of reform such as pension provision. The 
case of Greece indicates the absence of social dialogue and policy has been decided unilaterally by 
emergency decree with virtually no attempt to involve the social partners. The fragile and uneven 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining in the public sector has been suspended, resulting in 
sustained, politicised, mobilisation against austerity (Ioannau 2012). Severe restrictions on social 
dialogue and failure to reach agreement on a new public sector pay system has also characterised 
the experience of Bulgaria and Romania (Vasile 2012).  
 
In Spain, the government was committed to social dialogue and set out a joint response to the crisis 
in summer 2008.  It was the unveiling of austerity measures in May 2010, including public sector 
pay cuts, that precipitated industrial action. This put pressure on the government and in January 
2011 a social pact was agreed with separate elements, including a tripartite agreement on the reform 
of the pensions system and a bipartite agreement between the government and the trade unions to 
reform the public sector. The trade unions gained some concessions on the shift towards a pension 
age of 67 – also for private sector workers – (see also chapter 6 of this report) and social dialogue 
was restored for civil servants. Despite this agreement, the fragility of consultation and negotiation 
has become apparent in autumn 2011 with deeper budget cuts, triggering mass demonstrations and 
general strikes (see Table 4.9). 
 
Similarly in Belgium, Italy and Portugal amongst others there has been very little consultation on 
measures that impact on the public sector workforce and in Hungary during 2011 the country’s 
Council of Interest Representation was dissolved and replaced with a weaker consultative body 
(Hámori and Köllő 2012). In some countries there has been little formal consultation but informal 
dialogue over austerity has taken place, such as in Austria (Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011).  In 
other cases consultation has been tokenistic, seeking the social partners’ endorsement for measures 
largely decided by government and with little scope for modification. In some of these countries it 
has been the weakness of organised labour that has persuaded trade unions to accept austerity 
packages, such as in Latvia and Lithuania during 2009, rather than risk losing residual authority as a 
legitimate social actor (Bohle 2011).  
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In countries less affected by austerity with ongoing processes of public sector modernisation and 
established traditions of social dialogue, something resembling established collective bargaining has 
continued as is evident from the experience of Germany and Sweden. In Denmark as well, wage 
negotiations have continued and in Finland the social partners are actively engaged in discussions in 
relation to pension reform. Even in countries where there has been strong disagreement with the 
government over austerity measures there has been scope for social partner engagement. President 
Hollande of France, elected in 2012, has committed to make social dialogue a major plank of policy 
with a conference held in summer 2012 with social partners to discuss pensions and wider labour 
market reforms. In Latvia, during 2012, agreement was reached with education trade unions to raise 
teacher salaries despite several rounds of difficult negotiations with the threat of planned strikes 
removed. In the UK, contentious discussions took place but eventual agreement has been reached in 
relation to pension reform. The UK government: altered the normal pension which is moving up in 
steps from 65 to 67 to 68 by 2044/5; workers’ contributions are increasing; and pension schemes 
shifting from final salary to career average based schemes. These proposals led to strikes in 2011 
and provoked industrial action by doctors in 2012 for the first time since 1975. Trade unions 
extracted some concessions, safeguarding the low paid and negotiations resulted in overwhelming 
trade union support to accept government proposals, ending pension disputes in most parts of the 
public sector.  For more details of social partner involvement in pension reform, see chapter 6 of 
this report. 
 
Box 4.4 Public sector adjustments in Europe and their effects 
 
A first evaluation of public sector adjustments in Europe was carried out in 2011-12 by the 
ILO, co-financed by the European Commission, to contribute to a better understanding of the 
nature and extent of such adjustments in different European countries, and to identify some of 
their effects. A conference on this topic was organized in Brussels on 21-22 June, 2012, with 
the participation of government, employer and worker representatives from 30 European 
countries. The results of this study are summarised here and will be published as Public 
Sector Shock – The effects of policy retrenchment in Europe, D. Vaughan-Whitehead (Ed.), 
Edward Elgar-ILO, 2013. 
 
Research carried out by high-level national experts shows a great diversity in public sector 
adjustments in Europe. Beyond common trends in public sector reforms before the crisis, 
including outsourcing, a greater incidence of fixed-term contracts and rationalisation, current 
adjustments have varied significantly according to their nature and magnitude, their timing 
and the policy mix. Such differences might be explained by whether the individual country 
has already experienced significant public sector adjustments in the past, as in the Netherlands 
or Sweden. The scale of adjustment may also depend on whether or not it takes place in 
countries with large-scale public sector employment. One key factor in diversity of approach 
was vulnerability to the economic crisis: countries that had healthier public finances before 
the crisis, such as Sweden and Germany, have been under less pressure to cut public 
expenditure. They were in an even better position if they had already started public sector 
reforms and adjustments, as was the case in Sweden and, albeit differently, the Netherlands. 
By contrast, the public sector has come under most pressure in the countries with the largest 
budget deficits, namely Greece, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Hungary, Ireland and a few others. 
Public sector retrenchment can also reflect the conviction that the private sector operates more 
efficiently and at lower cost than the public sector, as in the United Kingdom. 
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This immediate and urgent pressure to make savings and reduce public expenditure tends to 
favour quantitative adjustments, mainly cuts in expenditure, but also jobs and wages in the 
public sector, which are summarised below. Wage cuts have been implemented in various 
ways, either through a basic wage freeze or cut in, for example, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, or through the abolition of bonuses previously enjoyed by public sector 
employees, such as the thirteenth month payment in Hungary and the thirteenth and 
fourteenth month payments in Greece. For details, see table 4.7 
 
 
Table 4.7: Employment and wage cuts in the public sector in selected European 
countries 
 
 Employment reductions Wage cuts and structural changes 
Croatia New recruitment frozen –6% in 2009; return to 2008 level; then freeze 
–15% for state officials 
Estonia –1% in 2008–09 Cuts concerned 71% of public sector employees 
–10% in public administration and –3% in education in 2009–2010 
France –7% in 2008–12 
Staff reductions in hospitals 
10% loss in real wages due to freeze of index points since 2010  
Increase in the social contribution pension equal to a 3.5% loss in net 
wages 
Wage individualisation 
Germany  Performance-related pay up to 8% of total wage bill 
Increase in low paid 
New lower pay scale to avoid outsourcing 
Christmas bonus reduced; reduction of yearly bonus 
Greece First target of –20% by 2015 
modified to –26%, mainly through 
cuts in fixed-term contracts 
Already –15% by 2011  
–15–20% in 2011 (–21% for military personnel) 
Abolition of thirteenth (paid in December) and fourteenth month 
(Easter and summer) payments 
New cuts announced for 2012 (–15%) 
11% public sector premium has fallen since 2010 and may have 
disappeared by end 2012 
Hungary Downward trend until 2008, then 
increase by 4.7% in 2008–2010; 
and slight decrease by –1.7% in 
2010–2011 
Abolition of thirteenth month payment in 2009 and of subsidies for 
housing, heating and travel 
Cuts between –37% for unskilled and –13% for high skilled in 2008–
2010 
Public sector premium fell from 15% in 2004 to –12% in 2009 
Ireland No layoffs so far but no 
replacement of retirees and no 
renewal of many temporary 
contracts 
–5.2% in 2009–2011 
Wage cuts introduced in December 2009 from –5% (for lowest 
wage) to –15% (for highest wages) 
–4.7% on average in 2010 
Latvia –4.3% in 2008–2009 –25% in public administration and –20% in education in 2009–2010 
Public sector premium fallen from +21% in 2006 to +9% in 2010 
Lithuania –1.1% in 2008–2009 –15% in public administration in 2009–2010 
Netherlands Continued to increase in 2008–
2010 (by 6%) especially part-time. 
Significant cuts planned up to 
2014 
Wage cuts progressive in the 1980s 
Real wage decline in 2010–2011 by –1 to 2% (by –2% in public 
administration to –2.5% in education);  
Portugal –9.5% in public administration in 
2005–2010 
Public sector unemployment 
growth of 20%  
–2.5% of real wage in public administration in 2010 
Further cut of 3.5% to 10% in 2011 
In 2012 suspension of thirteenth and fourteenth month payments (for 
holiday and Christmas bonuses) for medium and high wage earners; 
corresponds to –16% for most skilled  
In 2000–2009 real wage fall by –3.6% in public sector compared to 
+9.4% in private sector 
Romania –9.5% in 2008–2011 
Further cuts in 2012 
–25% in 2010 
Cut of thirteenth month payment and abolition of most bonuses 
–10% in 2011 despite some attempts to compensate for former cuts 
Freeze of wages in 2012 
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Public sector wage premium fallen from +44.5% in 2009 to –15.6% 
in 2010 (a loss of 60.1 percentage points) 
Spain –18,000 in 2010 in public 
administration  
No new recruitment in 2012 
–5% in 2010 
Frozen in 2011 and 2012 
Result: –10% real wages in 2010–2011 
Same in autonomous regions 
Fall in public sector wage premium from +17% in 2009 to +7% in 
2011 (gap reduced by 60%) 
Sweden Previous reduction of 17.7 % in 
1991–2007 
Cut by 1.4% in 2008–2010 (95% 
of them short-term contracts)  
Also decrease in part-time 
employment  
Higher cuts at local level 
Similar wage growth as in private sector (3.3% in 2005–2009)  
United 
Kingdom 
–10% planned over 5 years 
(2010–2014); largely exceeded in 
2010–2011 (–6.1%) so double cut 
may be forecast by 2014 
In 18 months (2010–2011) already 
–9% in public administration, –
4% in education and –3% in 
health 
Wage freeze in 2010–12 has led to –5% real wage in 2010–2011 
1% cap on basic wage rises in 2013–2014 
 
 
While in some cases these adjustments can efficiently complement structural reforms in the 
public sector (such as improved wage determination systems and increased efficiency), they 
were also found to limit the effects of these institutional reforms and even halt them, as was 
the case in Portugal and Romania. A disproportionate focus on quantitative adjustment 
therefore brings a number of risks and leads to adverse effects in the social and economic 
spheres. 
 
The wages and working conditions of public sector employees are clearly being modified by 
the magnitude of the changes involved. In a number of countries, public sector employees 
have lost the wage premium they traditionally had over the private sector, which was 
empirically justified in many countries by higher education levels for public sector 
employees. In Romania, for example, the premium fell from 40 percent in 2010 to -15 percent 
in 2011. Not surprisingly, these dynamics may now have the effect of lowering skills and 
human capital levels in public sector occupations. At the same time, wage cuts have 
contributed to increasing wage inequalities and increasing the number of low-paid public 
sector workers (see table 4.8 below).  
 
 
Table 4.8: Low-paid public sector workers in selected EU countries  
Germany Increase in low-paid workers in the public sector both at national and 
municipal levels due to a greater incidence of fixed-term and part-time 
contracts. 
Greece Impoverishment of public sector employees (fall in wages by 15-20 percent in 
2011 and new cuts of an additional -15% in 2012) due to the abolition of 13
th
 
and 14
th
 month salaries, and a cut in the minimum wage. 
Hungary In 2010, 55 per cent of public sector employees with education below 
secondary level were below the poverty threshold compared with 33 per cent 
in 2008. 
Lithuania Increase in low-paid employees in the public sector due to a 15 per cent cut in 
2009-2010 
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Portugal The number of low-paid workers in the public sector has increased due to 
wage cuts. 
Romania Low- paid workers have increased in the public sector due to a wage cut of 25 
per cent in 2011. 
United Kingdom Increase in low-paid workers in the public sector due to a shift of many public 
sector employees from full-time to involuntary part-time working. 
 
Gender inequality has also been fuelled by public sector adjustments, as a result of the 
traditional importance of the public sector for women’s employment, access to higher 
positions and more flexible time and work and family arrangements.  
 
Job losses in the public sector have also contributed to increasing the workload and working 
hours of those public sector employees who remain, while overtime rates have been reduced 
or frozen in a number of countries. The simultaneous reduction in expenditure has also 
reduced the human and material resources available for delivering public services, which have 
generally remained at the same levels or have actually increase – as is the case in health and 
education.  
 
The absence of social dialogue in the reform process and the abolition of a number of 
provisions that encouraged collective bargaining in the public sector have also contributed to 
a worsening of working conditions in the public sector. The public sector could therefore be 
seen as having lost its role as a model employer, offering job security, collective bargaining, 
codetermination and good pay and working conditions, instead converging with private sector 
practices. 
 
These changes and the way they have been implemented have triggered a wave of 
demonstrations and strikes by public sector employees – often joined by other social groups – 
throughout Europe. 
 
Future prospects for human capital and job quality in the public sector are also under threat. 
Not only have deteriorating wages and working conditions in the public sector and high 
unemployment led to significant emigration – especially among doctors, nurses and teachers – 
but the public sector has stopped attracting the quantities of young qualified graduates which 
hitherto have been its lifeblood. 
 
All of these changes – especially when resulting in a growing mismatch between increasing 
demand and falling supply – cannot be neutral for the future quality of public services. This is 
already to be observed in education and health care in some countries – on indicators such as 
a lower ratio of teachers to students in the classes and longer waiting lists for admission to 
hospitals – but also threatens the efficiency of the public administration. 
 
While the public sector reform process continues in Europe, it will be important to continue 
such monitoring, especially as it will be possible to evaluate the effects of the current reforms 
in more detail only as more data become available in the course of time. 
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4.5.2 Responses of social partners  
 
In this context there have been important differences between the social partners in terms of their 
perspectives on the necessity and type of austerity measures pursued. In general, trade unions have 
been fiercely opposed to austerity measures and have viewed them as unfair because they suggest 
that public sector workers did not cause the financial crisis but are being singled out in terms of a 
worsening of their terms and conditions of employment and are in the vanguard of a race to the 
bottom. Public sector trade unions also stress the negative effects on employment and aggregate 
demand of the shedding of labour in the public sector at a time of low growth and have expressed 
concerns about the effects of austerity on particular segments of the workforce, especially women 
(see Rubery 2012). In general, public sector employers have been more receptive to austerity 
measures, accepting the need for fiscal consolidation, and appear especially interested in reforms 
that bring public sector employment conditions closer to those prevailing in the private sector in 
terms of ease of dismissal, wage flexibility, and less generous pension provision. 
 
These differences, however, mask important areas of common concern between the social partners. 
In particular employers and trade unions, especially at municipal level, that are slightly more 
detached from central government policy makers, recognise that they face a common challenge in 
dealing with budgetary reductions imposed with often limited consultation by central government. 
There has therefore been some scope for employers and trade unions to work together to devise 
joint solutions to budgetary constraints to enhance productivity and service quality: for example in 
Italy, or by more effective utilisation of information technology, facilitated by agreements such as 
in Ireland. In addition, both trade unions and employers are concerned about longer-term 
recruitment and retention in a context of austerity and negative media coverage of the public sector. 
 
The response to austerity measures has also revealed some differences of perspective within 
national trade union movements. Union pluralism is not a new phenomenon but is often reinforced 
by challenging circumstances. Trade union differences in responding to austerity often stem from 
representing distinct occupations and differing political alignments. In Portugal the CGTP has been 
less willing to go along with austerity measures than the UGT (Campos Lima and Artiles 2011) and 
there have also been important differences of perspective in the UK amongst civil service and 
teacher trade unions. Social democratic trade unions have reluctantly accepted the need for some 
budgetary reductions and have been prepared to make some concessions in countries such as 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK to safeguard the basic tenets of public employment. In 
France, the government was scheduled to launch a consultation in the autumn of 2012 on the 
general revision of public policies (RGPP), adopted in 2007, in order to restore balance in public 
accounts, in particular by applying the rule of not replacing one in two civil servants. 
 
Nonetheless, rival trade unions have organised joint industrial action such as in Italy and the UK, 
but it has been tempting for governments to try to take advantage of the fragile unity of competing 
trade unions. 
 
4.5.3 Strikes and demonstrations 
 
Undoubtedly the clearest response to austerity, exacerbated by the failure of social dialogue in the 
majority of countries, has been an unprecedented wave of protests (Vaughan-Whitehead 2012). It 
has been especially notable not only because of the emphasis within industrial relations scholarship 
on the end of strikes (see Godard 2011), but also because of the wide distribution of protests. Public 
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sector worker mobilisation also has to accommodate: restrictions on strike action for particular 
occupations, such as the police; obligations to maintain essential services in many countries; and the 
unlawfulness of political strikes in some countries – restrictions introduced before the crisis (La 
Macchia 2011 and chapter 1). Despite these restrictions, demonstrations, protests and strikes have 
been very widespread in response to public spending cuts and specific measures that have had a 
negative impact on the public sector workforce. As Table 4.9 indicates, occupations such as police 
and tax collectors that do not usually get drawn into strike action have been involved in protests 
against government policy. The overall aim of protests and strikes has been to put pressure on 
governments to alter austerity measures, but the protest movements also reflect a wider anxiety that 
political elites have capitulated to economic liberalism and have accepted that social exclusion and 
inequality will inevitably increase (Psimitis 2010). In this regard the division often made between 
economic and political objectives has been blurred in the mobilisation against austerity.  
 
  
Table 4.9 Examples of protests & strikes against austerity measures in the public sector 2008 -
2012  
Country Protest & 
Strikes 
Specific Sector or Occupational Groups Year Comment  
Austria Few reports of 
mobilisation 
   
Belgium Limited 
mobilisation 
Belgium's three key unions (CSC, FGTB and 
CGSLB) called for a general strike.  
Jan  2012  Protest against the government's austerity measures, as 
unions argue that dialogue has come to a standstill. 
Bulgaria Major protests 
against 
austerity 
measures  
National protest against pension reform. 
Thousands of trade union members participated. 
Nov 2011 
Protest against increasing the retirement age without 
consultation of the social partners. Subsequently, 
proposals were withdrawn. 
Cyprus Two main 
strikes reported 
Education unions went ahead with a two-hour 
work stoppage in all schools – while most trade 
unions called off strike action after reaching a 
framework agreement with the Minister of 
Finance. 
Dec 2010 
Opposition against package of fiscal recovery 
measures, in particular: public sector job losses; plans 
to calculate public sector pensions on the basis of 
average pay instead of final salary; concerns about 
wage moderation. 
General strike  Jan’11  Against reform package, incl. proposal of a cut in civil 
service salaries by up to 40% 
Czech Rep. Series of 
marches, 
protests, 
demonstrations 
and strikes  
Mass demonstration organised by NOS PČR; 
supported by opposition politicians and many 
other trade unions..Approx. 45,000 attended. 
Sep 2010 Demonstrators rejected: planned pay cuts for public 
and state employees; plans to reduce funds allocated to 
civil servants by 10% in 2011; amendment of the 
Labour Code which would potentially affect pay and 
rewards 
Anti-reform demonstrations, organised by 
ČMKOS. 
Previously, TU’s suspended tripartite 
negotiations. 
May 2011  Against proposed government reforms to the pension 
system, healthcare, taxation and the  labour code  
Hospital sector: Medical unions launched new 
protest campaign  
Nov ‘11 Demanding  pay rises and secure funding for wages  
Public sector employees (mainly public 
administration, schools, health and cultural 
institutions)- organised by ČMKOS 
Dec 2011 Against planned budget and wage cuts (= 10% of the 
public wage bill) and against changes in the 
remuneration scheme for public servants.  
Unions and civic organizations held major 
demonstrations – largest since 1989  with 
approximately 120,000 attendees  
Apr 2012 Protests due to ambitious fiscal tightening programme 
Denmark Limited 
mobilisation  
Unions planning protest meetings. 
 
Apr 2011  Against heavy cutbacks in defence spending; up to 
12,000 full-time (of 70,000) jobs to go (50% forced 
redundancies) 
Estonia Protests and 
strikes against 
austerity  
Demonstrations, followed by a three-day strike 
organised by the Education Personnel Union in 
education 
2011-2012 Main strikes in education as unions demand 20% 
increase in teachers’ wages in 2012 and 15% in both 
2013 & 2014 
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Country Protest & 
Strikes 
Specific Sector or Occupational Groups Year Comment  
Finland Few reports of 
mobilisation 
   
France Significant 
mobilisation -  
striker days 
increased 
markedly 
Series of public sector strikes  
 
2010 Against increase of retirement age from 60 to 62; 
dissatisfaction concerning pay, job cuts, restructuring 
and deteriorating working conditions  
Day of action of public sector unions within the 
CGT confederation; circa 270,000 participants in 
150 demonstrations 
Oct 2011 Call for an increase in salaries and for policies to tackle 
precarious employment. 
 
Several national strikes 2009-12 Relatively high participation rates among DGFiP 
employees 
Germany A limited 
number of 
public sector 
warning  strikes  
Municipalities: Approx. 150,000 social workers 
and nursery school teachers participated in a 
warning strike 
2009 Demanding wage increases and improvement in 
working conditions 
Two waves of warning strikes involving federal 
and federal state employees in the public sector, 
including teachers 
2011 Dispute over pay 
Warning strike: Federal State and municipalities, 
approximately  300,000 participants   
2012 Demands of wage increases for period of 2 years 
Greece 
 
 
Extensive and 
sustained 
protests, 
demonstrations 
and strike 
action- 838 
strikes  between 
Jan 2011 - Apr 
2012, including  
46 general 
strikes, of which 
30 in the public 
sector 
Numerous public sector strikes and protests 
involving teachers, transport workers, health 
workers, magistrates and tax collectors  
 2010 Against austerity measures including wage cuts, labour 
market reforms and tax changes; involving trade 
unions and mobilisation by citizen groups   
Unions organise strike in June and July 2011 Against new package the government agreed with the 
IMF, EC, and ECB in June 
48-hours’ general strikes and a 24-hours’ strike, 
organised by GSEE jointly with ADEDY  
Oct 2011 
 
Protests against the austerity package imposed by 
‘Troika’, e.g.  the abolition of the National Collective 
Labour Agreement and other “anti-labour”& “anti-
union” legislative measuresalready enforced 
Public service workers protests;  main 
demonstration organised by GSEE and ADEDY  
Dec 2011 Against austerity cuts. Custom official, Tax offices, 
courts, schools  were shut down, and hospitals operated 
on an emergency basis only.  
Hungary Significant 
mobilisation  
series of demonstrations by police-and firemen, 
professional soldiers 
2011 Protesting against reform of their early retirement 
schemes. 
Demonstration outside parliament by unions Sep 2011 Against abolition of country’s council (OET)  and its 
replacement with a new one; unions see their role 
diminished and a threat to tripartite arrangements  
Demonstrations by unions in the LIGA 
confederation  
Nov ‘11 Roadblock demonstrations across the country in protest 
of the draft labour code. 
A Fidesz-organized march  Jan  ‘12 Against Hungary’s alleged ‘colonization’ by the EU 
and the IMF 
Ireland  
 
 
Significant 
increase in   
protests in late 
2009, 
subsequently 
subsided after  
2010 
One-day strike and street protests by public 
sector unions  
Nov ‘09 Against wage freeze and pension levy and anticipation 
of harsh measures  
Rally/march supported by ICTU, SIPTU, UNITE 
, Mandate 
Nov ‘11 Against austerity plans, including spending cuts and 
attacks on social welfare 
Italy Series of strike 
actions 
General strike and  various other days of protests 
at sectoral level; a one-day strike and other 
strikes, organised by CGIL and UIL-PA 
Jun/ 
Jul ‘10 
Reason: May ’10: financial intervention 
package/decree, however other unions (e.g. CISL) 
consider decree as inevitable  
Protest organised by largest TU confederation 
CGIL 
June 2010 Against pay freeze for 4 years until end of 2013 
announced in budget statement (although not supported 
by other major TU confederations) 
General strike called by CGIL 
Jun ‘10 In protest against retirement changes applying to 
female civil servants 
 8-hour public sector worker strike  (approx. 
20,000 attended); simultaneous protest by 
members of Italian Pensioners Union 
Oct 2011 Due to threat to public services and collective 
bargaining and in protest against planned changes to 
pension system - increase of  pension age 
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Country Protest & 
Strikes 
Specific Sector or Occupational Groups Year Comment  
unitary strike action; civil service strike,  called  
by  CGIL, Cisl & Uil 
Dec ‘11 Against austerity program and due to lack of dialogue  
Latvia Protests against 
austerity  
Education and Healthcare sector 2009/ 2011 Protest action following budget and wage reductions, 
particularly in the education and healthcare sector, but 
in 2012 education dispute resolved  
Lithuania Protests against 
austerity 
measures 
Public and private trade unions (circa 5,000- 
7,000 participants) 
Early 09 General protest action due to government’s lack of 
consultation and dialogue.  
Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation (LPSK) Mid 2009  Hunger strike due to decision to cut basic monthly pay 
without consultation  
 
Four sectoral TU’s and the Pensioner’s Party Oct ‘09 Five simultaneous protests  against wage cuts for 
public sector employees 
Luxem-
bourg 
Few reports of 
mobilisation/str
ikes  
   
Malta Limited  
mobilisation  
 
  
Nether-lands Targeted 
protests 
predominantly 
in education  
Local government sector demonstrations Nov ‘11 In protest over the breakdown of collective bargaining  
Secondary teachers’ strike, called by the FNV-
affiliated teachers’ union, the AOb (approx. 
21,000 teachers participated) 
Jan 2012 Against changes in working hours, holiday 
entitlements, increased workloads 
teachers’ protest/ national manifestation  Mar‘12 Against planned budget cuts in education  
Protest of 15,000 people  March ‘12 
 
Against cuts in the provision of sheltered workplaces  
Poland Limited 
mobilisation 
Trade union protest (several hundred people)  Mar’12 Against pension reform (raising of pension age); 
demands for a national referendum  
 
Portugal Extensive 
strikes/ protests  
Two main union confederations (CGTP&UGT) 
call for 2nd general strike3 and major 
demonstrations by public sector unions  
Nov 2011 In opposition against austerity plans, including massive 
cuts in bonuses for public sector workers earning over 
€1,000 a month (which equals a two months’ pay)  
24-hour national strike called jointly by CGTP & 
UGT, including  shut down of public services in 
many parts of the country 
Nov’11 Against austerity measures imposed by government as 
a condition of the EU/IMF bailout 
Call for general strike by union confederation 
GCTP3 
Mar‘12 Against austerity measures imposed by the ‘troika’& 
the draft Labor Code reform 
STAL public service union plans  for a national 
demonstration  
Feb 2012 Against austerity measures being imposed by the 
troika, including  public sector pay cut and increased 
workloads 
Romania Extensive 
protests  
2 hour protest by 40,000 public employees; 
human chain by 20,000+ union members of all 
main  5 national trade unions 
May/ 
Jun ‘10 
In opposition to government reforms. 
 
Protests (by tax officials and  finance workers; 
workers in pension, health insurance and 
employment offices, teachers etc)  
Oct 20104 In opposition to a reduction of salaries of all public 
employees by 25% and a 40%-70% wage cuts for tax 
officials and finance workers (because of cuts in 
bonuses) 
Marches organised by main national TU 
confederations  
2011 In opposition against new labour laws 
Protest of five national union federations by 
removing themselves temporarily from all social 
dialogue; four national employers’ organisations 
joined protest.  
2011/ 
2012 
Protest against the new Social Dialogue Act, passed 
unilaterally by the government in 2011, which 
effectively put an end to collective bargaining. 
Ultimately protests led to the Prime Minister’s and 
cbinet resignation in February 2012  
Slovakia Some protests, 
especially in 
healthcare  
Healthcare sector – day of protest – 1 hour 
doctors’ strike  
Mar’11 Against the poor financial situation in the sector and 
demands for wage increases  
2,400+ physicians handed in their notices & 
continuing protests  
 
Sep- Dec 
‘11 
In protest at planned transformation of hospitals into 
joint-stock companies; action was called off after an 
amendment to the law on health-care providers  
Slovenia Protests in the 
public sector  
Public sector union (KSJS) calls for strike action. 
General public sector strike 
Oct ‘11 In protest against a 4% pay cut which would affect  
160,000 workers and lack of dialogue. 
In April 2012: general public sector strike against 
austerity measures. 
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Country Protest & 
Strikes 
Specific Sector or Occupational Groups Year Comment  
Spain Extensive and 
widespread 
mobilisation 
and strikes  
General strike Sep ‘10 against employment law changes  
Protests of Spain’s main unions1  CCOO & 
UGT1 and setting of general strike 
 Sep 2011 Against changes to Spanish constitution; changes to 
employment law (regarding compensation and 
dismissal)  and pensions &speed with which changes 
introduced  
mass demonstration of teachers, parents & 
students  
oct‘11 Against cuts in education budget 
FSP-UGT public services federation organised  
protest action  
Oct-11 
 
Against deterioration of pay and conditions in the 
Public Employment Service; Inadequate staffing, 
increased workloads, problems in relation to pay levels  
and other working conditions  
UGT & CCOO announced mass protests with 
local protests held in 57 cities and legal action 
against the law 
Feb 2012 Against government’s ’s labour law reform which  
increased flexibly in hiring-and- firing practices 
Public sector unions planning series of 
demonstrations 
Jan-Feb’12 Against further pay freezes across public sector and 
regional government budget cuts  
Workers' Commissions & UGT call for 24-hour 
general strike ; 2nd general strike since crisis 
began 
Mar 2012 Against labour reform;  against austerity program with 
public spending cuts of over €35 billion  
Sweden Few reports of 
protests 
   
UK Large-scale 
strikes in the 
public sector, 
focused on 
pension reform,  
jobs and wage 
cuts  
1 day strike stage by 4 trade unions unions 
(NUT; ATL; UCU; PCS) over public service 
pension reform 
June 2011 Against proposed changes to pension schemes and 
changes such as the use of CPI instead of RPI as basis 
for increasing pensions, and raising employee 
contributions 
‘Day of Action’ - large public sector coordinated 
strikes and marches/ rallies  – organised by the 
TUC and its affiliated unions 
Nov 2011 Around 2 million public sector workers (including 
NHS workers, civil servants and teachers) participated 
in response to a lack of progress on negotiations over 
pension reform 
 
 
Virtually no country has been immune from industrial action, although widespread demonstrations 
have been especially prevalent in countries hit hardest by austerity measures, especially Greece, 
Portugal and Spain and to a lesser extent UK and France. These protests are almost always directed 
at governments, or indeed international agencies, such as the IMF, rather than the immediate 
employer and are designed to demonstrate the strength of feeling against austerity measures and to 
try to wring concessions from governments. Beyond the generalised political dimension to these 
protests there are subtle differences of emphasis. There are relatively few cases in which strikes 
represent a traditional part of the bargaining process to try to gain improved pay offers from 
employers. Instead most protests are highly defensive attempts to limit the scale of concessions 
extracted from the workforce and to prevent privatisation and other forms of restructuring. 
 
Second, in some countries new actors are mobilising against austerity measures because these 
programmes impact on public services and welfare provision with major consequences for service 
users. This has created opportunities for coalitions, often using forms of social media, that combine 
service users and trade unions to counter austerity measures. These coalitions are partly intended to 
prevent trade union demonstrations being portrayed as simply focused on the interests of 
‘producers’ that are seeking to maintain the interests of their members. In some countries these 
developments have gone further and have been fuelled by a deep-seated hostility and loss of trust in 
the political process and a wariness towards the trade union movement. The best known case is that 
of the Indignados (indignant) movement in Spain, comprised of young people, that occupied public 
spaces in many Spanish cities and directed their anger at the political elites, including the trade 
unions, and have sought a wide ranging programme of change. 
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Third, protests and strikes have been combined with a variety of other responses to challenge 
austerity measures. The most common approach has been to launch legal challenges to aspects of 
austerity programmes because the constitutional validity of government policy has been questioned. 
In the UK, the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), for example, challenged an 
agreement between the government and selected unions that reduced the maximum redundancy 
compensation available to civil servants. Similar tactics have been used by trade unions in Latvia 
and Romania to overturn aspects of government austerity and pension reforms (Ghellab et al. 2011). 
In Greece there has also been widespread recourse to legal challenges.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusions  
 
This chapter has assessed the impact of the economic and political crisis for public sector industrial 
relations. These consequences extend beyond the impact on the workforce itself because the public 
sector provides services that are integral to maintaining competitiveness and social cohesion within 
Member States. The onset of the crisis led to a sharp increase in public deficits, leading Member 
States to adopt fiscal consolidation measures that almost without exception have had an impact on 
the public sector workforce. Although the extent of change has varied significantly between 
countries, a common trend is for an increase in the number of countries seeking to reduce the size 
and scope of the public sector. Moreover, additional austerity measures have been added to those 
already in train and timescales for austerity programmes have been extended. 
 
The process of adjustment has been very different from the remedies pursued by the private sector 
as described in the Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 Report.  The economic downturn affected 
private sector firms and workers through reduced demand and short-time working and related 
initiatives were used to maintain skills in anticipation of an upturn in demand. In contrast, the public 
sector experienced increased pressure as demands on social security and health services increased, 
reinforcing demands on staff and jeopardising service quality as the workforce is reduced. This has 
occurred because fiscal consolidation has focused on spending reductions with budgets adjusted to 
economic circumstances rather calibrated to shifting demand. This inherently political process of 
setting public sector budgets and wages has been influenced by citizen and workforce responses. 
Attempts to influence government austerity policy have been evident in the waves of protests and 
demonstrations in many Member States, but the scope for political manoeuvre by governments has 
been constrained by external pressure from the international financial markets and tight fiscal rules. 
 
This chapter has outlined how this process of adjustment has focused on reducing the public sector 
pay bill via pay cuts, pay freezes and reductions in employment, with staffing reduced by various 
means, including the use of staff replacement ratios. Other measures include widespread 
interventions to manage pension expenditure, often focused on the postponement of the retirement 
age and increased contributions and the alignment of conditions with those existing in the private 
sector. In addition working time has been extended and work re-organised via outsourcing and other 
measures. Over the medium term, sustained expenditure reductions will require further changes in 
work organisation and patterns of service delivery that extend beyond the ‘downsizing’ of the 
public sector workforce; there are some signs of continuing modernisation and restructuring of 
public services in some Member States.  
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It has been suggested that although all Member States have suffered impacts from the crisis, the 
process and severity of adjustment has differed between countries and there is no straightforward 
North European versus Mediterranean country divide as is often assumed. A first cluster of 
countries, exemplified by Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, have the largest programmes of 
adjustment because they face the most direct pressure to reduce public expenditure rapidly and have 
required external assistance. There is a limited tradition of structural reform of the public sector and 
there is an emphasis on immediate fiscal results brought about by reducing the pay bill by 
reductions in wages and employment. In a differing political and economic context austerity 
programmes in the Baltic states, especially Latvia, but also Hungary and Romania also exemplify 
this pattern of adjustment. In these cases, with the exception of Ireland, governments have scarcely 
tried or have failed to bring about agreed changes in public sector industrial relations by a process 
of social dialogue. Instead, unilateral changes in pay and working conditions, usually on more than 
one occasion, have been imposed on the public sector workforce. This has provoked widespread 
protests and disenchantment with government. The most sustained mobilisation has occurred in 
countries that have faced the harshest adjustment programmes and no serious attempt to engage in 
dialogue with the workforce has occurred, notably in Greece.  
 
A second cluster of countries have also implemented some austerity measures with variations in 
terms of severity between countries.  What differentiates this cluster is that the timing and form of 
these programmes has been more directly under the control of their own national governments and 
has frequently involved the adaptation or continuation of structural reforms that have sought to 
boost the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Due to the severity of the economic and 
financial crisis, austerity measures still impact markedly on the public sector workforce, but there is 
often less discontinuity with previous organisational and managerial reforms. These countries have 
made some use of cutback management measures but they are often in more dilute forms. An 
important difference with the first group of countries is not the size of the public sector, but the 
legacy of modernisation. This cluster is exemplified by Germany and the Nordic countries but also 
France, the Netherlands and with some caveats the United Kingdom. These countries did not 
confront the immediate fiscal crisis and market turbulence experienced by countries such as Greece, 
but many of them have implemented some austerity measures to bear down on public debt and to 
continue longer-term reforms of public sector industrial relations. Social dialogue has often been 
strained but there have been more concerted efforts to consult and negotiate with the public sector 
workforce to bring about agreed changes in pay and working conditions. In this regard, protests and 
strikes have occurred, but they have been less severe than in the first cluster of countries.  
 
Finally, what does the response to austerity indicate about longer term trends in public sector 
industrial relations? In other words, are these recent interventions having a more profound i.e. a 
structural influence on employment and industrial relations in the public sector? To respond to this 
question, it is necessary to both look back at the changes that were implemented before the crisis 
and examine whether the medium-to-long-term trends have been diverted or even reversed by the 
current reform wave. Since the mid-1990s (and in some countries well before that time), several EU 
countries have moved along a path marked by two main policies: on the one hand, the introduction 
of market-like incentives in public sector industrial relations and attempts to emulate private sector 
practice; and on the other, a shift to more decentralised and pluralistic forms of governance, again 
mimicking the functioning of the market and its responsiveness to local conditions. It is notable that 
these policy recipes, associated with NPM reforms, were being recalibrated before the crisis. This 
arose because outcomes did not seem to fulfil expectations as the capacity to control public 
expenditure and/or improve the productivity and quality of the public sector was uncertain. The 
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effectiveness of decentralisation was a particular weakness of earlier attempts at private sector type 
reforms, such as forms of incentive pay and other pay flexibility mechanisms, because either there 
was very limited genuine devolution or because enforcement mechanisms at decentralised levels 
were eroded, encouraging opportunistic behaviour and diluting budgetary control and productivity 
improvements. Consequently signs of recentralisation were evident, especially in the field of pay 
and compensation, by the mid-2000s (Bach and Bordogna 2011; Bach and Kessler 2012). 
 
The austerity measures considered in this chapter seem to consolidate moves towards centralisation 
and unilateralism in public sector industrial relations. This represents a return to patterns of public 
sector industrial relations that preceded the recognition of collective bargaining in the public sector 
that occurred in the decades prior to the crisis, but at the same time confirms the tendency to 
promote the introduction of private sector HRM practices. Indeed, there are two basic features 
linked to the public finance priority of reducing expenditure that prioritises pre-determined 
expenditure envelopes and fiscal monitoring that limits the sphere of industrial relations activity and 
therefore greatly reduces the autonomy of decentralised actors. First, the room for manoeuvre of 
public managers is being substantially reduced. This is because public managers have fewer 
resources to invest in human resource management and development but are under pressure to meet 
fiscal targets. This is encouraging strategies that reduce labour costs with fewer staff employed 
working under worse terms and conditions of employment, raising questions about the extent to 
which the public sector remains a model employer. Related to this, strategies that merge 
organisations, outsource services and/or share services between employers all curb managerial 
authority at local level. Moreover, strategies that have empowered managers in the past, such as the 
use of individual performance-related pay, are very difficult to operate in a context of wage freezes 
and wage cuts.  
 
Second, the joint and autonomous regulation of the employment relationship through collective 
bargaining is highly constrained both through the reduction of available resources – which are the 
usual and basic ingredient of negotiations – and due to direct wage freezes and the suspension of 
normal bargaining mechanisms. In a sense, a new centralised unilateralism is emerging, which 
resembles the traditional unilateral regulation of the public sector industrial relations by central 
political authorities, with a new emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency, rather than impartiality 
and equity. The public sector has not abandoned attempts to be a model employer but this principle 
has a far lower priority than in the past. The role of public sector trade unions has been seriously 
weakened and there have been limited attempts to encourage employee voice. The risk is that when 
economic growth returns the public sector in many countries might no longer be viewed as an 
employer of choice and this could seriously jeopardise efforts to recruit and retain a talented 
workforce that will help deliver high quality public services that maintain competitiveness and 
social cohesion.  
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Chapter 5: Greening the social dialogue 
 
 
The role of the social partners in the transition to green and greener jobs has been gradually 
increasing in recent years. However, more needs to be done to build a lasting and sustainable 
social dialogue that can help to meet the challenges posed by the move to a competitive, low-
carbon and resource efficient economy. 
 
Based on a draft by Christine Aumayr-Pintar and Christian Welz, Eurofound 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: European-level policy on greening and social partner positions 
 
This chapter aims to bring together different strands of recent research in the field of industrial 
relations and sustainability. It includes examples of social partner initiatives for managing the 
transition, results from a new study on the quality of green jobs
41
, some incidence of 
environmentally-related restructuring within the utilities sector
42
 and reports the results of a 
mapping exercise
43
 on the level of representation in the newly emerging renewable energy industry 
across Europe. Based on these pieces of research, conclusions on the importance and proposals for 
the promotion of “greening” the social dialogue are drawn. 
 
Within the framework of its Europe 2020 strategy, the European Union has re-confirmed its 
commitment to move towards a competitive, low-carbon and resource-efficient economy.
44
 In line 
with this, a number of policies for coordinated Member State action have been advanced, the major 
ones being the following: 
- European climate and energy policy set the following key targets (the 20-20-20 targets): that 
Member States jointly achieve a 20% energy reduction; source 20% of their energy from 
renewables; and cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020, compared to 1990. 
Binding legislation supporting implementation of these targets was contained in the EU 
climate and energy package 2008, which includes aspects such as the Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), an “effort sharing decision” for sectors not covered by the EU ETS, 
binding national targets for the use of renewables and a legal framework for the promotion 
of carbon capture storage
45
.  
                                                          
41
Eurofound 2012a 
42
From the European Restructuring Monitor, ERM 
43
Eurofound 2012b 
44
 See Commission Staff  Working document: “Exploiting the employment potential of green growth” SWD(2012) 92 
final. 
45European Commission, ‘The EU climate and energy package’, (consulted May 2012) 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm 
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- in its “2050 Low carbon Roadmap”46 the European Commission sketches a pathway towards  
further greenhouse gas reduction of 80% - 95% by 2050, focusing on a range of sectors.  
- the labour market implications of this transition phase will be supported by the  New Skills 
and Jobs Agenda
47
 
 
These policies are set out as the backbone of a policy-driven technological and social change. In, 
from an environmental point of view, an optimistic scenario, a new wave of “green restructuring” 
accompanied by green re- and up-skilling can be expected. While the extent of such change has 
been subject to some analysis (e.g. Cambridge econometrics et al. 2011
48
, see European 
Commission 2009
49
 for an overview), the quality of such a change and its implications for working 
conditions and employment have not been extensively analysed (see, however, EU-OSHA 2011a
50
 
and 2011b
51
 for health and safety implications). Recent research by the European Foundation has 
tried to fill this gap.  
 
The social partners at European level are engaged in this topic within different forums – particularly 
the sectoral social dialogue committees – (see chapter 7) and have issued a variety of position 
papers and opinions.  
 
On the worker side, the concept of “Just Transition” was adopted by the Trade Union congress in 
Vancouver, ITUC (2010)
52
. It embraces a package of policy proposals aimed at fostering a socially 
just, environmentally sustainable transition. Policies include investment in green and labour 
intensive technologies and sectors, research and early assessment of social and employment 
impacts, social dialogue and the democratic consultation of all stakeholders, training and skills 
development and local analysis and economic diversification plans
53
. 
On the employer side, employer representatives stress the importance of maintaining 
competitiveness by ensuring an international level playing field for industry – (BusinessEurope 
2008
54
) or by keeping the regulatory burden of environmental legislation low and empowering 
SMEs, through training, advice and access to funding, to play their part in fighting climate change 
                                                          
46
 European Commission 2011, COM 2011 (112) final 
47 
European Commission 2010, COM 2010 (682) final 
48Cambridge Econometrics, GHK and Warwick Institute for Employment Research, 2011. ‘Studies on Sustainability 
Issues – Green Jobs; Trade and Labour’ Final Report for the European Commission, DG Employment. 
49European Commission, 2009 ‘Employment in Europe 2009’, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 
50
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), 2011a ‘Foresight of New and Emerging Risks to 
Occupational Safety and Health Associated with New Technologies in Green Jobs by 2020. Phase I - Key drivers of 
change’, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
51
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), 2011b. ‘Foresight of New and Emerging Risks to 
Occupational Safety and Health Associated with New Technologies in Green Jobs by 2020. Phase II - Key 
technologies’, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
52 ITUC (2010) ‘Resolution on combating climate change through sustainable development and just transition’ 
2CO/E/6.10 (final). 
53
 Rosemberg ‘Building a Just Transition: The linkages between climate change and employment’, in ILO, International 
Journal of Labour Research, 2010, Vol. 2, Issue 2. 
54Business Europe 2008 ‘Combating Climate Change: Four key principals for a successful international agreement’ 
http://www.businesseurope.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=568&DocID=21780 
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(Ueapme 2010
55
). Fostering the adoption of cost-efficient ‘climate’ technologies, such as the 
construction of energy efficient housing, is a goal shared by all parties. 
 
In terms of employment, it is now generally assumed that overall, there will be little net gain in the 
number of jobs. While new jobs are expected to be created in certain sectors (such as renewable 
energy, environmental technologies and environmental consulting) other jobs might be transformed 
or lost, such as many of those in energy-intensive industries using conventional sources of energy). 
The vast majority of jobs, however, will have to become “greener”, i.e. generating less 
environmental impact, and this will require new skills and attitudes. It is generally undisputed that 
the social partners have an important role to play in accompanying and easing such a transition. 
However, this role has not been sufficiently analysed in the past and the present chapter should be 
seen as a first contribution to filling this gap. 
 
The recent economic and financial crisis has not reduced the number of green jobs but has affected 
the overall pace of greening across industry. While some companies are finding it hard to balance 
climate change with other needs in times of crisis, others capitalise on the new opportunities and 
contribute to jobs preservation and creation in Europe. Thus, it seems that the design, 
implementation and monitoring of actions aimed at mitigating the lasting effects of the crisis on 
greening is a key future challenge
56
. 
 
 
5.2 Role of the national social partners and their level of engagement 
 
Back in 1994, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound)
57
 undertook a study on social partners' cooperation in environmental protection in 10 
countries of the EU-15. It concluded that social partners (with a few exceptions) did not feel 
responsible for environmental concerns.  Where activities took place, they were unilateral and 
employee representatives focused on environmental concerns within their health and safety agenda. 
The social partners sometimes joined together to block state-imposed conditions regulating the 
environment, in order to avoid additional financial burdens. Recent research, however, has indicated 
a changing attitude of both sides of industry: The most recent Industrial Relations in Europe report 
(2010
58
) looked into the social partners; role in the transition towards a green economy. Drawing on 
a number of examples from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO), Eurofound 
(2009)
59
, the report found that social partners in almost all Member States are actively promoting 
issues on the green agenda, thus exerting their influence on policy. This embraces lobbying 
activities (notably in relation to the climate and energy package 2008) but also consultation within 
tri- or multipartite forums and sometimes the conclusion of tripartite agreements. Autonomous 
regulation on the other hand, such as collective agreements or guidelines, remain rare in the case of 
                                                          
55
 UEAPME Position Paper 2010 ‘UEAPMEs views on SMEs and Sustainable Development in the current economic 
and environmental context’ http://www.ueapme.com/IMG/pdf/1009_pp_sustainable_development_final.pdf 
56
Eurofound 2012a 
57
 Eurofound 1994’Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe’, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. EF/94/12/EN 
58European Commission 2010, ‘Industrial relations in Europe 2010’. 
59Eurofound 2009 ‘Greening the European economy: responses and initiatives by Member States and the social 
partners’, Broughton, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, EF/09/72/EN. 
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greening, except at company level. However, the social partners have initiated and contributed to a 
wide range of activities in support of the transition to a competitive, low-carbon and resource 
efficient economy, including training and counselling, campaigns, research, environmental labels 
and others. For a general overview of all social recent social partner initiatives and activities, see 
chapter 7. 
 
Chart 5.1 has been drawn based on the information provided in the individual national contributions 
of the above-mentioned report and modified according to discussions with stakeholders in various 
forums. The chart shows the stage of social partner and government involvement and indicates 
where tripartite bodies dealing with green issues are in place.  
 
 
Chart 5.1: Level of engagement and mobilisation by national governments and social partners 
 
 
 
 
 
This map shows that social partners and governments across Europe are at different stages of social 
learning in relation to the green agenda.  Nevertheless, examples of actions can be found 
everywhere. A few countries in mainly northern and western Europe report a wealth of interesting 
projects with strong social partner involvement (for example Germany, Sweden and the UK), 
whereas  in Southern Europe as well as in the New Member States (NMS) only a small number of 
initiatives can be found. As for the trade union concept of Just Transition, Rosemberg (2010, p.145) 
notes: “although all (..). policy options [within the framework] have been tested and proved 
successful in various contexts, not a single country has yet organized a massive transformation as 
the one the Just Transition framework calls for.” 
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5.3 Cooperative approaches in managing  greening at sectoral and company level 
 
The examples of cooperative approaches contained in table 5.1 all feature as „good practice“ cases 
from the sectoral or company level. They have been selected based on the fact that social dialogue 
has been used to respond to employment challenges triggered by environmental concerns. A major 
prerequisite for such initiatives to come into being, is however, the mere existence of social partner 
organisations and a functioning social dialogue at the respective level. This is, as the next section 
shows, by no means guaranteed, especially in the newly emerging sectors.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Examples of cooperative approaches in managing greening 
 
Sector Example 
Construction The joint collective training body OPCA
60
 for construction in France 
Sectoral OPCAs are bipartite bodies and responsible for the provision of 
continuing vocational training. OPCAs collect taxes from companies (1.6% 
of the payroll for companies with more than 20 employees) and use this 
money to fund training programmes for workers. Companies choose 
training from a list established by their regional OPCA antenna. The law 
encourages management and unions to sign agreements on training, and 
works councils must be informed of and express their view on the 
company’s training plan. But in general, management is not tied by the 
wishes and demands of the unions and workers’ representatives. During the 
last few years, priority has been given to training related to green 
construction. An example for an innovative construction training method is 
the “R&D concerto project in Lyon”, which will be passed on to the entire 
OPCA network. Concerto is a European Commission programme, divided 
into 18 projects, which aims to promote energy savings, the development of 
renewable energies and energy storage in 45 communities across the EU. It 
produces a documented analysis of each trial to generate energy and manage 
demand, and is particularly targeted at high-quality environmental buildings 
with a local energy management system. In Lyon training courses were 
prepared in consultation with the local energy agency (ALE) and the Rhône 
department’s construction industry employers’ federation. An original 
learning approach was used to motivate building workers: the transfer of 
skills was fostered by mixing employees from different trades and 
encouraging them to learn from the personal experiences of others and by 
identifying problem situations in order to trigger learning.
61
 
 Euroeneff project – Romania 
Romania is one of the NMS where the social partners have been actively 
working together on sustainable development issues over the past few years. 
The Euroeneff project, launched in October 2008, is a transnational 
                                                          
60
 OPCAs (Organismes Paritaires Collecteurs Agréés) are bipartite joint social partner bodies at sectoral level in France. 
They are engaged in sector related training matters.   
61
 Case taken from Eurofound 2011 ‘ Industrial relations and sustainability: The role of the social partners in the 
transition towards a green economy’, Schuetze et al, Eurofound. 
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initiative dedicated to training the construction industry workforce in 
energy-efficiency techniques. It aims to develop a multimedia guide to 
energy efficiency in building renovation for the trainers and teaching staff of 
the vocational schools and to improve the professional skills of the 
workforce, so making the sector more competitive. The Romanian partner in 
this project is the Vocational Institute of Builders (CMC), a non-
governmental and non-profit organisation established in 2004 by the 
Romanian Association of Construction Employers (ARACO) and the 
National Trade Union Federation in Construction and Erection Works, 
AnghelSaligny. CMC is directly dependent on the Builders’ Social Fund 
(CSC), a private social security operator organised in a parity structure led 
by the building employers’ association and trade unions. The Euroeneff 
project adapts a learning and teaching tool called FAINLAB, developed in 
Germany. FAINLAB covers some 15 professions in the construction 
industry, and with its multitude of aids, animations and video material, is a 
compilation of current knowledge. It also includes access to a large number 
of online information databases. Unlike the German version of FAINLAB, 
which focuses on apprentices, the English guide designed for Euroeneff has 
a broader target group and will focus on those already practising their trade 
(especially in SMEs), with an essential focus on energy efficiency issues in 
new-build and building renovation
62
.  
Energy The Lindoe Offshore Renewable Centre and its reskilling programmes 
– Denmark 
In the Copenhagen region, a programme has been funded and implemented 
on retraining for staff from several shipyards to work in the offshore wind 
industry. Major funding has been ploughed into the creation of the Lindoe 
Offshore Renewable Centre (LORC) and its reskilling programmes, in 
cooperation with the social partners. The LORC is founded in the 
framework of the “Growth fora” and dedicated to renewable energies, 
especially offshore renewables. LORC is a research and development centre 
in which the technologies associated with offshore and wind energy are 
tested and produced. It organises courses, seminars and conferences. 
Current employees of the shipyard can improve their skills and change the 
content of their current jobs. The social partners participate in the Council of 
Vocational Education at national level, which devises the various training 
programmes and approves the various types of certification, including for 
the so called “green” or “low-carbon” industries where the social partners 
monitor the various climate-energy standards and legislative instruments. It 
also adapts the certification arrangements for vocational training. 
63
 
 EUREM – European energy managers: a new standardised 
qualification 
An example of an employer-driven international initiative (with various 
collaboration partners such as vocational training providers and research 
                                                          
62
 Case taken from Eurofound 2011 
63Example taken from Syndex 2011‘Initiatives involving social partners in Europe on climate change policies and 
employment. Study by the European social partners, with financial support from the European Commission.’ 
  
 
 
209 
institutes) is the EUREM network which continued after EU funding had 
ceased. Within this network, a standardised qualification is provided for 
employees of energy providers or those working in energy-intensive 
industries. They promote company-wide energy savings and hence 
contribute to climate protection. The energy concepts of more than 2000 
trained Energy Managers resulted in energy savings of 1,500,000 MWh, 
cost savings of 60 million Euros per year, a CO2 reduction of 400,000 tons 
per year and investments of 200 million Euros. Exchange between these 
newly trained energy managers is sought to be fostered within an 
international network. In the case of Austria, for instance, more than 200 
energy managers have been trained to date through the Austrian Federal 
Economic Chamber (WKÖ). The proposals for energy savings resulted in 
accumulated savings of the equivalent of 200,000 households. 80% of these 
projects were actually implemented
64
.  
 Company example of an electricity provider – Slovakia 
One Slovakian electricity producer is increasingly employing green business 
practices. Among other things it aims for the gradual replacement of fossil 
fuels by biomass in two power plants and has created two new photovoltaic 
power plants. It is estimated that the operation of each photovoltaic power 
plant will reduce the volume of greenhouse gas CO2 by 1200-1300 tons 
annually, in comparison with the production of the same volume of 
electricity in fossil-fuel power plant. The implementation of these measures 
has not had any significant impact on the number and structure of jobs. 
According to a trade union representative, management consults trade 
unions on the implementation of green business practices that allows 
smoother implementation of related new technologies and working methods.  
Management also cooperates with trade unions regarding training and skill 
development activities through formal and informal dialogue. Training and 
skill development objectives are agreed in a company collective 
agreement.
65
. 
Chemical 
industry 
Company example of an international plastic producer in the 
Netherlands 
In 2007 this company introduced an ecological framework consisting of a 
life cycle-based assessment methodology, on which alternative solutions can 
be compared. Any product or service that creates more value with less 
environmental impact than competing alternatives commercially available, 
while fulfilling the same function, can be regarded as ecological under this 
framework. Trade unions are involved in the company’s sustainability 
strategy through works council discussions about future skills and 
sustainability-oriented behaviour. There are joint efforts to integrate the 
sustainability dimension into employee appraisal forms, reward schemes 
and collective labour agreements, in order to encourage generation of more 
sustainable ideas. However, trade unions feel that they could be more 
actively engaged in the sustainability strategy, which would facilitate their 
                                                          
64
Example taken from http://www.ihk-eforen.de/display/eurem/About+EUREM 
65
Case taken from Eurofound 2012a. 
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own transition towards sustainability and benefit the social dialogue in the 
long-term. The company’s remuneration structure has incorporated bonuses 
tied to performance on sustainability targets for higher-ranking employees. 
However, overall income levels have not changed significantly
66
. 
Non-metallic 
materials 
Social dialogue centre in the glass industry, Poland 
In 2004, the employers’ organisation PolskieSzkło (Polish glass industry), 
the Federation of Trade Unions in Chemicals, Ceramics and Glass, and the 
Secretariat of the Glass Industry NSZZ Solidarność signed a framework 
agreement on autonomous dialogue in the glass sector. The agreement 
provides for two annual meetings between representatives of employers and 
employees at which the major problems affecting the glass sector are 
discussed. This agreement has enabled common positions to be developed 
on environmental legislation and CO2 quotas allocated to the sector. The 
social partners have created a Glass Industry Social Dialogue Centre with 
aid from the European Social Fund. The remit of the centre is fourfold: to 
constantly improve social dialogue in the glass industry; to carry out 
economic and technical analyses on the basis of the work by the social 
partners and relevant experts; to develop e-dialogue technologies; and to 
prepare training courses for employers and employees on topics relating to 
the glass industry (essentially, environmental issues and social dialogue)
67
. 
Transport AENA Airports Inc. (AENA), Spain 
AENA is a Spanish state-owned company that operates Barcelona's El Prat 
airport. Along with public agencies and trade unions, AENA has promoted 
the development of a mobility plan to boost sustainable mobility for 
the 21,000 commuters who travel daily to workplaces within the airport's 
facilities. The case study showed that the development of the mobility plan, 
as opposed to mobility patterns dominated by private motor vehicles, clearly 
improved and increased public transport services, reduced harmful 
environmental effects, generated social and economic benefits and created 
new jobs in transport companies. AENA has managed to induce a cultural 
shift among airport employees. It encouraged a move from a culture based 
on the use of private vehicles to a sustainable mobility culture based on 
public transport. Sustainable mobility could not become a reality without 
the active participation of the different agents in the mobility commission, 
including workers'representatives, employers, public agencies, transport 
operators, the Association for the Promotion of Public Transport (an NGO) 
and the external mobility consultant (ALG)
68
. 
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Case taken from Eurofound 2012a. 
67
Example taken from Syndex 2011. 
68
Case taken from Eurofound 2012a. The same case, with many similar others about sustainable transport to the 
workplace, is referred to in the study "European Commuters for Sustainable Mobility Strategies" (ECOSMOS) carried 
out with the support of the Commission by a number of trade unions (CCOO, CGIL, ABVV and Auto Club Europa - 
DGB). 
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5.4 Representation within an emerging sector: electricity production from renewable energy 
sources (RES) 
 
The increased production of electricity from renewable energy sources (hydro, wind, tidal, solar 
energy, biomass) is at the top of the joint energy policy agenda
69
, and the EU Member States have 
included financial and other support measures for this type of business in their national energy 
strategies. However, in a number of countries these supports have recently been reduced or cut, 
either because of austerity measures, or as a result of falling production prices. While in some 
countries the growth of electricity production from renewables has already been largely achieved by 
the established electricity providers (e.g. in Austria or Denmark), a growing new business segment 
of smaller and decentralised electricity producers has emerged in many other countries. 
Representation on both sides of industry, however, poses a number of challenges, as a recent 
mapping exercise through the EIRO network showed
70
. 
 
Coverage by established actors 
In countries where renewable energy sources are already traditionally used by established providers 
(this is often the case for hydro energy), the industry is well covered by established actors. This is 
the case for instance in Austria (both on the trade union and the employer side), the United 
Kingdom (on both sides), Denmark (high degree of representation reported by the trade unions), 
Ireland (trade union representation in semi-state organisations in the renewables sub-sector is as 
high as in the fossil fuels sub-sector), Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg (both sides), Greece (on the 
trade union side), Lithuania (in the case of hydro), Slovak Republic, Slovenia (both sides) and  
Bulgaria (trade union density within hydro energy stands at about 30%). However, in most of these 
countries, smaller electricity providers within the newly emerging renewables sector are less likely 
to be covered and social dialogue within these sub-sectors is often practically inexistent. 
 
Low levels of representation 
In most other countries, there is little representation within the renewables sector from both sides of 
industry. Often this has been linked to the fact that newly-emerging areas (such as biomass, wind, 
and photo-voltaic) are primarily made up of small companies with few employees. In France, for 
example, the emergence of ‘new’ sources of energy seems to have a limited impact on industrial 
relations. In Spain, for the time being, company associations have not taken on the role of 
employers’ organisations, and the presence of the unions is weak in this sub-sector.  In Ireland, in 
the newer private sector companies in the renewables part of the sector, it is estimated that trade 
union representation is much lower than in the established providers. In Malta, the renewables 
industry is still in its infancy and it mostly relies on government subsidies to household when 
purchasing energy generating technology such as solar water heaters and photovoltaic panels.  
 
In Cyprus, within the very small number of private enterprises active in the area of renewables, 
terms and conditions of employment are not set through collective bargaining but in individual 
contracts, so this sector remains essentially uncovered in terms of collective bargaining. In Poland 
trade union representatives also voice objections to the social dialogue concerning renewables. In 
the Netherlands, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary, little is known about 
                                                          
69
Renewable energy directive: Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources 
70
Eurofound, 2012b 
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the newly emerging renewables sector, but it is presumed that representation is low on both sides of 
industries because of the small number of employees in the average firm. 
 
Active trade union strategies 
In a limited number of Member States, trade unions are actively pursuing representation in the 
renewables sector. For example, in Germany the metalworking trade union IG Metall has called for 
greater action and is trying to organise workers in the solar and wind energy sector. The union cites 
examples of successfully concluded single-employer agreements or of setting up works councils in 
companies in these industries. However, IG Metall has not yet been able to conclude a sectoral 
collective agreement for the solar or wind energy industries. The German services trade union ver.di 
additionally criticises ‘poor’ collective agreements and co-determination structures in companies in 
the renewable energy sector. Whilst ver.di wants to set up a campaign which aimed at extending the 
usual collectively agreed standards and co-determination rights of the energy industry to the 
renewable energy sector, IG Metall is calling for the conclusion of separate collective agreements in 
the renewable energy sector, for example a sectoral collective agreement in the solar industry. 
 
In Latvia, the main trade union LAB Enerģija consistently works with new emerging parts of the 
sector. Recently two new trade union organisations have joined LAB Enerģija. The results are 
limited regarding the newly emerging parts of the sector, because the majority of new enterprises 
are very small, with between two and five employees. In Portugal, SINDEL and FIEQUIMETAL 
are trying to recruit members and create organisational structures. In some cases the unions have 
begun negotiations on specific issues, as for instance between MFS – Acciona Energy and the 
FIEQUIMETAL member union SIESI.  However, it seems that unions have not been able yet to 
create an organisation in these new companies that would be capable of acting. In Sweden, the trade 
union SEKO reports that workers in wind turbine-producing factories that are represented by the 
Union of Metalworkers (IF Metall) have been contacted through their workplace in an effort to 
persuade them to change trade union membership. There have been some disagreements over the 
sectoral attachment of workers in wind turbine manufacturing. However, according to the trade 
union SEF, most of the workers employed in constructing wind power facilities in Sweden come 
from abroad, notably Denmark and Germany. In the United Kingdom, all unions appear to seek to 
recruit in emerging areas. For instance, the trade union Unite states: ‘Whether it be wind, wave 
hydro or photovoltaic, our aim is to ensure that the “new wave” generators are as organised as the 
existing and achieve terms and conditions that are at the cutting edge of our negotiations.’ However, 
there are no reports of specific campaigns to recruit in these areas. 
 
Emergence of new interest and business organisations  
Among all 28 countries monitored in the above-mentioned Eurofound study, only one new social 
partner organisation was registered on the employer side. In Romania, in March 2009, 40 RES 
companies, most of them SMEs, united in an Employers Association for New Sources of Energy 
(Asociaţia Patronală Surse Noi de Energie, SUNE). In two countries (Germany and Denmark) it has 
been reported that established employers’ organisations have opened new branches to represent 
parts of the newly emerging sectors. In Germany the association for the glass industry decided to set 
up a unit for the solar industry in 2008, a step reflected in a change of name to the Association for 
the German Glass and Solar Industry (Bundesarbeitgeberverband Glas und Solar, BAGV 
Glas+Solar). In Denmark, DI has formed a new branch federation within the organisation, DI 
Energy of which another federation, DI Bio Energy, is a part. However, these federations do not 
take part in collective bargaining. 
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In other countries, the emergence of interest organisations or different business associations without 
social partner status (i.e. not involved in collective bargaining) has been noted. This is the case for 
instance in Austria (Photovoltaic Austria (PVA) or Austrian Wind Energy Association (IG 
Windkraft), both are voluntary interest organisations for companies operating in solar and wind 
energy. In Germany in 2006, the Federal Employer Association of the Solar Sector (Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft, BSW) was created by a merger of the two organisations previously representing the 
solar industry in Germany. Three new employer organisations have been created in the renewable 
energy sector in Estonia: the Estonian Biogas Association (EestiBiogaasi Assotsiatsioon), the 
Estonian Renewable Energy Association (Eesti Taastuvenergia Koda) and the Estonian Solar 
Energy Association (Eesti Päikeseenergia Assotsiatsioon). In Greece there were no employers’ 
organisations in times of state monopoly.  Business associations have been  founded only in the past 
few years, after some producers, mostly in renewable energy sector came to the market. In the 
United Kingdom, the Renewable Energy Association (REA), or RenewableUK, represents members 
from the renewable industry. In Lithuania new employer organisations - LVEA, LITBIOMA, 
FTVA – have been recently established to assemble enterprises functioning in the RES sector. 
Although all three associations are members of the peak employers’ organisation – Confederation 
of Lithuanian Industrialists (LPK) – they do not take the role of sectoral social partners. 
 
 
5.5 Job quality impacts of greening and social partner involvement 
 
There are a number of job quality questions associated with green transition. These include the kind 
of impacts the green transition will have on the quality of jobs, and whether this will result in any 
changes in working conditions. Within its study, Eurofound 2012a
71
 looked into different 
dimensions of job quality (skills development, career and employment security, health and well-
being, and reconciliation of working and non-working life), and - based on a small online survey, an 
expert workshop, interviews with social partners, government representatives and experts, a 
literature research and a number of company case studies – tried to find out the effect that the 
process of greening might have on each of these dimensions. It is, however, very difficult to 
distinguish the impact of climate change from broader contextual factors affecting job quality, such 
as, for instance, technological change. Further, the impact of climate change on job quality could 
differ significantly across sectors, occupations, regions and time and the available literature does 
not provide sufficient evidence on whether a direct or indirect causality exists between climate 
change and job quality. Other available studies also point to a mixed effect of the greening of the 
economy on job quality (Cambridge Econometrics et al. 2011) 
 
There will be a redefinition of many jobs across almost all sectors, as pointed out in the 
Commission Communication "Towards a job-rich recovery" COM(2012)173. The latter 
distinguishes two situations concerning the job creation potential of the green economy: on the one 
hand "high-carbon sectors will face the challenge of the transition to low carbon and 
resource-efficient economy with many jobs in these sectors to be transformed" while on the other 
hand "new jobs in green and low-carbon sectors will be created". This is why the document SWD 
(2012)92 that accompanies the Communication provides a very wide definition of "green jobs", 
understanding them as "covering all jobs that depend on the environment or are created, substituted 
                                                          
71
Eurofound, 2012a 
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or redefined in the transition process towards a greener economy". The Eurofound study takes a 
similar wide approach when examining the effects of green change which it studies in 10 sectors
72
. 
 
This section aims to give a flavour of the results of Eurofound’s 2012 study, focusing on three 
sectors: construction, the energy sector and the chemical industry. Section 5.5.1 summarises the 
results of the online survey and, section 5.5.2 draws on evidence from the literature as regards 
expected effects on job quality. 
 
 
5.5.1 Online survey findings 
 
In October and November 2011, Eurofound carried out a small online survey
73
 (N=145) mainly 
among social partners, companies and government representatives on the job quality impacts of 
greening. The results have to be interpreted with caution and should be considered as a “range of 
expert opinions” rather than as hard evidence. The survey showed that: 
 
 Training and qualification will become more important: approx. 80% of respondents, who 
agreed that greening affects job quality, indicated that employees working with green 
business practices face higher qualification requirements and more demand for training.  
 Neither the working and non-working time ratio nor the social infrastructure is expected to 
be significantly affected by greening. 
 The impact of climate change will be less significant on the career and employment security 
dimension than on the skills dimension. The majority of respondents who agreed that 
greening affects job quality expect either no changes or positive change in career and 
employment security, and particularly income. However, representatives from the sectoral 
level were in general more optimistic about the impact greening will have on workers’ 
rights, their employment status and their income than those not responding for any sector.  
 Employees working with green business practices are largely expected to have better health 
and be less exposed to risks. However, this finding contrasts with recent research
74
, which 
indicates that greening, more intensively than in conventional jobs, creates new 
combinations of risks that still need to be assessed and managed.  
 
 
                                                          
72
Automotive, chemicals, construction, distribution and trade, energy, furniture, 
non-metallic materials, shipbuilding, textiles and transport. 
73
Eurofound 2012a 
74
 EU-OSHA 2011a and 2011b 
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Chart 5.2: Main differences in different aspects of job quality (i.e. better, same or worse) 
between employees working with green business practices and other employees, N=50 per 
category  
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Source: Eurofound 2012a, 2012b 
 
 
5.5.2 Expected effects on job quality within selected sectors 
 
While the above results are cross-sector, the study also examined greening processes more closely 
within 10 sectors. This section summarises some findings for three industries in which the impact of 
greening is expected to be relatively high. For an overview, see table 5.2. 
 
Construction industry 
 
The construction industry is among the most affected sectors in terms of absolute employment by 
the EU’s climate policies. In particular, greening may have an impact on career and employment 
security. First, a large proportion of workers in the sector in some countries are self-employed, and 
are thus less financially able to take up the training activities necessary to better adapt to the 
greening of the construction sector.  
 
In terms of composition of the workforce, the more skilled occupations remain male-dominated in 
all countries, with women comprising only 8% of all employees
75
. Women are better represented in 
administration and service employment, but their opportunities in green construction remain 
somewhat unused
76
. It should also be noted that some of the jobs that will be created to meet the 
2020 targets, such as those involved in the construction of renewable electricity plants, may not be 
                                                          
75
 Eurofound 2009b, ‘Restructuring in the construction sector’, Ward, T. and Coughtrie, D. Eurofound, Dublin.  
76Sustainlabour  2009 ‘Green jobs and women workers: Employment, equity, equality’, International Labour Foundation 
for Sustainable Development, Stevens et al., Madrid. 
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suitable for older workers, and they have also not attracted a large proportion of the growing female 
workforce)
77
.  
 
Greening may also affect the health of construction workers. For example, green construction 
creates a combination of known risks in new situations (e.g. installation of renewable energy 
equipment at height, the installation of new technology such as feed-in to smart grids). Potential 
risks also arise from dangerous substances used in new construction materials (e.g. when polishing, 
or grinding nano-containing bricks and paints) and in maintenance, demolishing or retrofitting 
activities. Further, workers participating in retrofitting are at risk of exposure to asbestos. Off-site 
construction could reduce risks on site, but transfer risks to other groups of workers
78
. In contrast to 
this, most of the sector respondents to Eurofound’s online survey79 indicated that workers involved 
in green construction have fewer health problems and lower risk exposure. Finally, the effects of 
greening in the construction sector tend to concentrate on geographical areas due to the availability 
of public support, a favourable investment climate or objective reasons (e.g. coastal areas for 
construction of wind farms). This can be expected to have an impact on the working and non-
working life dimension of employees as well as working time arrangements for example if the place 
of work is far from an employee’s home. 
 
Research in the green construction sector (renovation and insulation) in the walqing project
80
 was 
carried out in Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary and Norway. In some of the “green” companies, 
greening amounts to an increased standardisation of work – firstly because it is implemented 
through new standards for results and processes. Secondly, it may imply the use of more and more 
complex prefabricated parts that leave less to workers’ discretion but reduce the work done on the 
site. During a seminar to discuss emerging research findings on the relationship between greening 
the economy and the quality of jobs
81
, it became evident that environment-friendly innovation does 
not necessarily imply worker-friendly improvements. 
 
Energy sector 
 
The energy sector is among the sectors that will be most affected by the green transition, and this is 
likely to affect both low-paid unskilled and highly paid skilled occupations. Greening is therefore 
likely to have at least some effects across all dimensions of job quality in this sector.  
 
Green jobs stemming from increased demand are more likely to employ men than women, and less 
likely to be part-time or temporary, according to some sources
82
. An extensive European study 
                                                          
77Cambridge Econometrics, GHK and Warwick Institute for Employment Research 2011, ‘Studies on sustainability 
issues – Green jobs; trade and labour, Final report for the European Commission, DG Employment’, Cambridge 
Econometrics, Cambridge. 
78
EU-OSHA 2011b 
79
Eurofound 2012a 
80
 WALQING: Work and Life Quality in New and Growing Jobs (FP7-SSH, 2010-2012 - http://www.walqing.eu/). For 
each country involved in the project, stakeholder interviews with relevant social partners and other sector experts and 
actors were carried out. A sectoral brochure on the “Green Construction Sector” with summaries of key findings and 
selected good practice examples is available online:  
http://www.walqing.eu/fileadmin/walqing_SectorBrochures_2_Construction.pdf 
81
 See walqing seminar  "Greening the economy: What impact on the quality of work?", Brussels 29 September 2011 – 
Presentations available at: http://www.walqing.eu/index.php?id=62 -  
82
Cambridge Econometrics, GHK and Warwick Institute for Employment Research 2011 
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(WiRES
83
) looked into the aspect of female representation within the renewable energy sector based 
on the hypothesis that green restructuring processes could become a driver for the creation of new 
and better employment opportunities, particularly for women. However, the study discovered a 
number of challenges for women in accessing green jobs, in general, and in renewable energies, in 
particular. Most specifically, the new green jobs will be created in traditionally male-dominated 
industries and occupations and the masculine image of the sector could deter women from looking 
for a job there. Also the current female skills profile – with little focus on STEM (science, 
technologies, engineering and mathematics) subjects – and the male orientation of vocational 
training in many countries - acts as a further barrier to enabling women access to these new jobs.  
At the same time, the renewable energy sector requires workers with a certain level of expertise in 
the electricity and energy sector who are willing to travel, both factors that tend to discourage 
working women. On the other hand, some of the emerging job profiles, such as energy manager, 
could be appealing and affordable also for women.  
 
WiRES research further highlighted the fact that there is a lack of specific social dialogue 
experiences in RES at national and EU level. Health and well-being are closely related to skills, and 
this differs between green and non-green jobs, mainly in energy production, such as renewables 
renewables. Many emerging energy sectors have specific risks related to ‘engineering unknowns’: 
mechanical failure, insufficiently tested technology, unavailability of guidance and training for 
workers, and infrastructure deficits
84
. Wind, solar, marine and bioenergy, battery technologies are 
listed among the top technologies with implications for occupational health and safety due to 
physical hazards, including in offshore installation and maintenance
85
. Inexperienced workers are 
likely to face hazards in bioenergy production
86
. Manual handling of waste and exposure to 
hazardous substances remains an issue, and public pressure is likely to mean that less waste is 
exported to developing countries
87
 
88
.  
 
Chemical industry 
 
The chemicals industry is one of the major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions and the 
process of greening will therefore have a significant impact on this industry, mainly through 
regulations such as the IPPC (Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control), the 
Environmental Liability Directive (ELD)
89
, the European Emissions Trading System (ETS), the 
regulation on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP) and the 
REACH regulation. These regulations are also expected to have an impact on the skills required: 
                                                          
83ADAPT, UPEE, University of Szeged 2009 ‘WiRES – Women in the Renewable Energy sector’ Final Report 
presented to the European Commission. 
84
EU-OSHA 2011b 
85
EU-OSHA 2011b 
86
EU-OSHA 2011b 
87
EU-OSHA 2011a 
88
Arbeiterkammer Wien, Institut für Wirtschaft und Umwelt 2000, Umwelt und Beschäftigung: Strategien für eine 
nachhaltige Entwicklung und deren Auswirkungen auf die Beschäftigung [Environment and employment: Strategies 
for sustainable development and their impact on employment], Fritz, O., Getzner, M., Mahringer, H. and Ritt, T., 
Vienna. 
89
 TNO, ZSI and SEOR 2009, ‘Investing in the future of jobs and skills. Scenarios, implications, and options in 
anticipation of future skills and knowledge needs’. Sector report: Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastic 
products, European Commission, Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, 
Brussels. 
  
 
 
218 
most occupations in the sector will be required to have legislative and regulatory knowledge of 
environmental legislation and strong e-skills, but also skills in green marketing, environmental 
impact assessment skills, skills in life cycle analysis, knowledge of the ecology of products and 
skills in environmental communication.  
 
In terms of social dialogue, new industries emerging in the green chemistry sector (e.g. genetics and 
biotechnologies) are less organised and many companies in these areas have no collective 
agreements. Thus, the quality of jobs in these industries may be less protected than in conventional 
areas of this sector
90
.  
 
For an overview of the impact of greening on job quality in construction, energy and chemicals, see 
table 5.2 below. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of expected job-quality impacts in three selected sectors 
 
 Construction 
industry 
Energy Chemical industry 
Skills development High impact. 
Move towards more 
skilled jobs (high 
demand for, for 
example, technicians 
and (associate) 
professionals.  
High demand for 
recognition of green 
skills, training 
innovations (for 
example on-site 
training of workers), 
interdisciplinary 
(especially in 
retrofitting) and 
generic green skills  
Progress in green 
skills development is 
especially needed in 
SMEs and the 
relatively large 
informal construction 
sector. 
 
High impact. 
High demand for 
hard transferable 
skills such as STEM. 
Highest need for new 
skills in renewables. 
Lower impact in 
waste and gas 
subsectors.. 
Moderate to high 
impact due to long 
time frame for 
greening of the 
sector. 
Lower impact on the 
pharmaceuticals 
sector which is more 
driven by climate 
change adaptation. 
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Career and 
employment security 
High impact. 
Potentially high 
negative effects on 
self-employed 
workers who are 
harder to motivate 
and less financially 
able (outsourcing is 
increasing 
subcontracting and 
self-employment due 
to higher complexity 
of tasks). 
Women and youth 
underrepresented. 
Low sector 
attractiveness among 
youth – need to 
improve image of the 
sector and overall 
HR development in 
companies to attract 
new staff. 
Likely positive 
effects on equal 
opportunities from 
automation. 
Moderate impact. 
In general green jobs 
in the sector are more 
likely to employ men 
than women. 
Jobs in traditional 
subsectors are less 
likely to be part-time 
or temporary; 
however jobs in 
renewables industries 
and energy services 
tend to be less well-
paid and enjoy less 
secure employment 
conditions. 
Moderate to high 
impact on less-
organised subsectors 
within the green 
chemistry industry. 
Health and well-
being 
High impact due to 
the potential for work 
accidents that is on 
average,3–4 times 
higher than in other 
sectors, and higher 
risk of exposure to 
dangerous substances 
causing occupational 
diseases compared to 
other workers (ILO, 
2011a). 
Likely positive 
effects on health 
from automation 
practices. 
Moderate impact. 
Many emerging 
energy sectors have 
specific risks related 
to ‘engineering 
unknowns’ 
Traditional industries 
less affected. 
High impact (of 
emerging new 
technologies and 
substitution of 
chemicals for 
environmental 
reasons) due to sector 
specifics. 
Reconciliation of 
working and non-
working life 
High impact. 
Possibly highest 
negative impact for 
on-site self-employed 
workers engaged in 
Moderate impact. 
As typically 
regionally 
concentrated, 
traditional power 
Moderate to high 
impact on less 
organised subsectors 
within the green 
chemistry industry. 
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project-based, fixed-
term and seasonal 
work. However, 
standardisation of 
building elements, 
tight management of 
processes and use of 
eco-friendly 
materials may reduce 
occupational 
accidents and health 
problems (most 
likely – in large 
companies), at the 
expense of workers’ 
autonomy and 
craftsmanship. 
generation is phased 
out, workers will face 
a more pressing need 
for retraining and 
regional mobility (for 
example, longer 
commuting time). 
Inflexible working 
hours and multiple 
shifts widespread in 
renewables. 
Source: Eurofound 2012a 
 
 
 
5.6 Green Restructuring 
The transition process to “green” and “greener” jobs does not go always smoothly, as reported by 
the European Restructuring Monitor
91
 suggest. See also 2012 research from Eurofound (Eurofound 
2012c). While RES-oriented companies have been growing over the past few years, there are now 
reports of cases of closure or downsizing of solar and wind energy producers. However job growth 
in the green economy has been positive throughout the recession and is forecasted to remain quite 
strong. Only the energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors could create 5 million jobs by 
2020.
92
 
These include announcements from the German company Phoenix Solar that it will shed around 
200 jobs, and the loss of 150 jobs at the UK-based Carillion Energy Services, a supplier of heating 
and renewable energy, which has been attributed to a government decision to halve the amount of 
money people receive for selling solar energy to the national grid in the UK. In Norway the 
Renewable Energy Corporations decided to close down its solar cell plant in Porsgrunn, with loss of 
370 jobs, due to operating losses.  
Nevertheless, there is also clear evidence of growth in research-intensive activities within the 
renewable energy subsector. For example, the renewable energy firm Swalec Smart Energy in the 
UK has announced that it is to create a new £7m renewable energy training centre with the creation 
of 250 jobs, co-financed by the Welsh government. Baltic Solar Energy, a company engaged in 
                                                          
91Eurofound’s European Restructuring events database: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/index.php?template=searchfactsheets (Dates in brackets refer to the 
announcement date registered on the factsheets).  
92
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solar energy production, has launched a project which will lead to the creation of more than 100 
new jobs in Vilnius during the next five years
93
. Further, five high-tech companies (Intersurgical, 
Sicor Biotech, Baltic Solar Solutions, ViaSolis, and Baltic Solar Energy) will lead a joint 
development project whereby a research and development centre for the solar power and digital 
optical storage technologies is being set up. Also in the UK, the energy giant Scottish and Southern 
(SSE) announced the creation of 100 jobs in Glasgow following the collaboration of the company 
with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries on the development of low carbon technology, including offshore 
wind farms and carbon capture. SSE said it expected employment to rise significantly over the next 
five years to up to 1000 posts. Further, in Romania, three new wind parks are created by Eolenvest, 
which announced its intention to hire 880 employees in 2012. 
The bigger cases of restructuring, in terms of employees involved, have been seen among the 
“traditional” energy providers, with the first cases now being linked to the German political 
decision of denuclearisation following the Fukushima catastrophe. This includes 6000 job cuts in 
Germany at the German energy provider Eon and around 1000 job cuts by the end of 2016 at the 
German Energy Provider RWE Power. Further, the French public multinational industrial 
conglomerate Areva (120,500 employees), operating in the nuclear energy sector, will cut 1500 
positions in Germany, close a plant in Belgium (160 employees) and reduce its workforce in France 
by natural departures of 200 to 250 employees per year by 2016. On the other hand, the French 
electricity producer and distributer EDF has announced its intention to recruit 5000 employees in 
2012 as a way of compensating for large-scale departures due to retirement the coming years. 2200 
jobs will be created in nuclear and engineering activities.  
Together with the observation
94
 that decisions to further invest in and promote
95
 or to phase out 
nuclear energy
96
 have been taken by Member States within their national energy strategies, it can be 
expected that some intra-European job-mobility within the nuclear energy sector will be seen in the 
years to come. This will most likely concern a high-skilled workforce such as nuclear engineers. 
For further details, see table 5.3 below. 
In the renewables industry, increased competition from China has been named a major driver, of 
restructuring, together with ‘homemade’ pressure in the form of overcapacities worldwide in the 
solar cells market, which has decreased prices significantly. At the same time some Member States 
have changed their support schemes, for example lowering the feed-in-tariffs or cutting other 
subsidies, often linked to the tight budget situation and austerity measures.  
The Danish wind turbine blade manufacturer, LM Wind Power, has presented a labour force 
adjustment plan affecting the entire workforce (more than 200) of its plant located in Ponferrada 
(León, Spain). The dismissals are due to the economic downturn in Spain, the unfavourable climate 
in the wind turbine market and a decrease in demand for LM's products.  
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Case study in Eurofound 2012a 
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95
E.g.: France, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and other countries have announced to actively promote the 
usage of nuclear energy.  
96
E.g.: Germany and Italy, among others will  
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Table 5.3: Recent restructuring cases in renewable energy-producing industries and in the 
nuclear energy sector 
Date 
announced 
Country Company Sector Announced number of 
jobs created/destroyed 
08-05-2012 EU Phoenix Solar Electricity from RES 
producer/Solar 
Manufacturing 
-179 
24-04-2012 NO Renewable Energy 
Corporation 
Electricity from RES 
producer 
-200 
28-02-2012 RO Eolenvest Electricity from 
wind energy 
producer 
+880 
15-02-2012 UK Carillion Energy 
Services 
Heating from RES -150 
04-01-2012 FR EDF Nuclear energy +2200 
16-12-2011 DE RWE Power Nuclear energy -1000 
14-12-2011 UK Swalec Smart 
Energy 
Electricity from RES 
producer 
+250 
26-10-2011 FR Areva Nuclear energy -1560 to -1910 
16-07-2010 UK Scottish and 
Southern 
Electricity from RES 
producer 
+100 
02-07-2010 LT Baltic Solar Energy Electricity from RES 
producer 
+160 
Source: European Restructuring Monitor, events database, Eurofound 
 
 
However, the solar manufacturing industry is growing in other countries. In Hungary, the creation 
of a substantial number of jobs has been announced by two companies: Orient Solar (+300) and 
Solar Energy Systems (+108). Further, in Slovenia, Bisol, in the photovoltaic sector, has announced 
a business expansion and the creation of 230 new jobs by the end of 2011. In Italy, in the region of 
Catania, Sicily, 3Sun, a joint venture created by Enel Green Power, Sharp and STMicroelectronics, 
is to create 400 new jobs by the end of 2012. It aims to manufacture innovative photovoltaic cells 
and panels. In June 2011 the company and the trade unions reached an agreement under which 3Sun 
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will hire unemployed workers, with a particular focus on workers who have already worked in 
STMs on temporary contracts. In July 2011 3Sun had around 50 employees. 
Such examples of direct transition are, however, rare. As with all sectoral and cross-sectoral 
restructuring processes, jobs are seldom created in the same location or region or the same subsector 
or occupation in which jobs have been destroyed. Furthermore they also do not necessarily affect 
the same people: while many redundancy announcements are linked to early retirements, posts in 
new positions might be filled by workers from elsewhere. In addition to the local-level social 
partners, the inclusion of sectoral social partners in such cases of restructuring is crucial. 
For an overview of recent restructuring events in the green manufacturing industries, see table 5.4 
below. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Recent restructuring cases in “green” manufacturing industries 
Date 
announced 
Country Company Sector Announced number of 
jobs created/destroyed 
03-07-2012 CZ Schott Solar Solar manufacturing -500 
18-06-2012 BG Solarpro Holding 
AD 
Solar manufacturing -156 
01-06-2012 DE Solarworld Solar manufacturing -250 
25-05-2012 DE Odersun Solar manufacturing -260 
17-04-2012 DE First Solar Solar manufacturing -2000 
11-01-2012 ES Silicio Solar Solar manufacturing -295 
30-11-2011 HU Orient Solar Solar manufacturing +300 
15-11-2011 FI Moventas Wind Wind turbine 
manufacturing 
-120 
18-10-2011 ES LM Wind Power Wind turbine 
manufacturing 
-209 
17-10-2011 NL Solland Solar Solar manufacturing -190 
06-07-2011 IT 3Sun Solar manufacturing +400 
29-03-2011 HU Solar Energy 
Systems 
Solar manufacturing +108 
  
 
 
224 
Date 
announced 
Country Company Sector Announced number of 
jobs created/destroyed 
13-12-2010 PL LM Wind Power 
Services 
Wind turbine 
manufacturing 
+200 
10-12-2010 SI Bisol Solar manufacturing +230 
12-01-2010 DK Siemens 
Windpower, 
Aalborg 
Windmill production +130 
05-08-2010 DK Siemens 
Windpower, 
Ballerup 
Windmill production +200 
Source: European Restructuring Monitor, events database, Eurofound 
 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
Overall, the views of social partners on the industrial relations implications of the greening of the 
economy have changed from initially critical towards a more positive and supportive, yet 
differentiated, stance. At international, European and to varying degrees the national level, the 
social partners are actively involved in shaping policy responses to climate change and 
environmental protection. However, greening as such is not a topic of major importance to the 
social partners. The social partners at sectoral and company level in particular tend to be less active 
in this area, with the notable exception of the good practices cited in this chapter. In addition, the 
current recessionary times have perhaps also served to shift the social partners’ focus away from 
this agenda. In this regard it would seem crucial that the higher level social partner organisations on 
both sides of industry work to ensure a trickle-down of their climate-change policies so that the 
social partners at lower levels (in sectors, regions and companies) can implement them on the 
ground.  
There is also something of a gap between the level of participation and mobilisation of the social 
partners in the “old” and “new” Member States (the EU-15 and EU-10) and the degree of their 
exposure to these issues. The latter exhibit much higher shares of workers in the high-carbon 
industries in which major adjustments need to take place97, while the social partners and 
governments are often not as active. The European level social dialogue is a forum where learning 
processes between the social patterns of different countries can be promoted. For more details on 
social dialogue in the Central and Eastern European countries of the EU, see Chapter 2. 
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Overall, industrial relations in green sectors (in particular in the newly-emerging subsectors such as 
electricity production from renewable energy) are still rather weakly developed. Efforts to establish 
representation in these industries can be found in some countries on both the trade union and the 
employer side. However, on neither side is this process advanced enough so enable proper social 
dialogue to take place. Time will tell whether the scattered landscape of business associations will 
develop into fully-fledged employer organisations with the right to bargain collectively for their 
members, and whether and how trade unions will be able to represent newly emerging green 
sectors. It has been noted several times by EIRO correspondents that these rather fragmented 
industries are outside the interest of social partners in many countries. However, this so-called 
failure of representation could be counterbalanced by governments, for instance by encouraging the 
foundation of new social partner organisations, by promoting and kick-starting the sectoral social 
dialogue in newly emerging green industries, by guaranteeing a broader coverage through legal 
extension mechanisms of collective agreements and thereby fostering the inclusion of small 
businesses in the dialogue. Sector-level social dialogue would then gain more importance. The 
establishment of a functioning social dialogue within green sectors is even more urgent, as the 
sector itself has come under some pressure. Large firm closures and restructuring events announced 
in the solar and wind industry are linked to some Member States’ decisions to de-nuclearise, the 
change in the energy mix triggered by the renewable energy directive, recent changes in subsidies 
or trends in international manufacturing, so that further restructuring within established energy 
providers or equipment manufacturers is on-going.  
It is up to sectoral and company level social partners themselves to engage in ensuring a successful 
transition of employees to new and – ideally – greener and decent jobs and to ensure that newly-
emerging jobs can be filled by appropriately qualified people. Where direct transitions are not 
feasible – new jobs do not necessarily emerge in the same region or within the same companies – 
the importance of maintaining the employability of workers, promoting regional job creation, 
mobility of workers and ensuring a good match of jobs and workers is even more pressing. Here, 
the sectoral and regional-level stakeholders (including companies) will play a major role in 
developing tailored solutions.  
Providing vocational training and re-training facilities at sectoral level is a promising approach, as 
the examples cited here show. The availability of such measures at sectoral level ensures that SMEs 
also have access to these facilities, which is crucial, bearing in mind that newly-emerging parts of 
sectors are often fragmented. A further challenge is to mainstream low-carbon skills into all kinds 
of training, curricula and apprenticeships.  
Transitions to greener activities will only be successful if the quality of jobs in terms of working 
conditions and pay is ensured. The quality of green and greener jobs is difficult to assess and 
depends, amongst other things, on the sector. The skills and training dimension is expected to be the 
most affected by the process of greening, while other aspects of job quality such as health and well-
being, the reconciliation of work and family life or career and employment security might be less 
subject to change. However, this should not prevent the social partners from focusing on continuous 
improvement in working conditions and job quality during the transition in general and in relevant 
cases in particular, as these results vary to a great extent across sectors and occupations. 
At company level, transition could be achieved by various organisational ‘eco-innovations’98 in 
                                                          
98
Eurofound 2012a. 
  
 
 
226 
participation, such as involving employees’ representatives or trade union representatives in green 
management structures with responsibility for environmentally-related training or energy audits or 
by including energy-efficiency targets and benefits for employees associated with their achievement 
into collective agreements. 
Despite the above initiatives of social dialogue in the field of climate change, governments at all 
levels (European, national and local) remain the key player in promoting this policy-based 
transition. At the European level, the European Social Fund is an important tool to support the 
transition of labour force towards greener skills and jobs, especially in the context of the 20% 
climate mainstreaming objective in the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework. Eurofound 
and other research has highlighted some successful results of cooperation between the social 
partners, but more research on the role of the social partners role at different levels as well as 
monitoring of their involvement in this transition is needed. 
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Chapter 6: Social partner involvement in unemployment benefit and 
pensions systems in the EU 
 
The social partners are involved in the shaping and running of unemployment benefit and 
pensions systems to varying degrees across the EU. However, social partners in all countries are 
facing challenges and opportunities linked to the crisis. On the one hand, governments are 
tending to take rapid and unilateral action in order to accelerate reforms to welfare and pensions 
systems as part of austerity and cost-cutting measures. On the other hand, the growth of 
occupational and private pension schemes as a way of plugging the gap left by dwindling state 
provision offers the social partners a real opportunity to help shape these schemes. 
Based on a draft by Andrea Broughton, Institute for Employment Studies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines social partner involvement in the unemployment benefit and pensions 
systems of the EU Member States. One of the effects of the crisis on public sector industrial relation 
relations, as examined in previous chapters, has been the introduction of changes to national welfare 
and pensions systems, as governments try to cut public spending and implement austerity measures. 
This is turn is having an impact on the role of the social partners, as they seek involvement in and 
influence over these major reforms. This chapter therefore attempts to explore the role of the social 
partners in this regard, looking in particular at instances when they typically support and oppose 
reform, and how they have fared in their attempts to influence government policy. 
For policymakers, there are many advantages to involving the social partners in the formulation of 
social policy. However, there are also a number of potential challenges. This chapter explores both 
the positive aspects of social partner involvement in benefit and pension reforms and the potential 
challenges and barriers. Specifically in terms of pensions, one key question concerns how far it is 
possible for the social partners to assume a self-regulatory role by means of negotiating 
occupational pensions, which are beginning to fill the gap left by dwindling state provision. These 
are difficult questions to answer, but this chapter explores some of the main issues, with the aim of 
contributing to the debate.  
This chapter focuses on the following areas: 
■ The extent to which the social partners are involved in the formulation of social policy, using 
governance and involvement models to categorise country-specific traditions. 
■ The interaction between industrial relations and social policy in terms of the strength and 
influence of collective bargaining and what this means in terms of the influence of the social 
partners on unemployment and benefit policy. 
■ The range of unemployment benefit systems in existence, the main challenges, and the extent of 
social partner involvement in these systems. 
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■ The main trends and challenges relating to pensions policy, and the extent of social partner 
involvement in moves to reform pensions. 
■ The particular effects of the crisis on unemployment benefit and pension systems and the actions 
of the social partners in terms of trying to work with the government in modifying 
unemployment benefit and pension systems in the context of the crisis. 
■ Conclusions and future developments. 
6.2 Social partner involvement in social policy: involvement and governance models 
This section of the chapter attempts to categorise the diverse governance systems in place in EU 
Member States into four main clusters. It also examines the main reasons for and the potential 
problems of social partnership involvement in unemployment benefit and pensions systems, the 
differences in terms of employer and union interests in unemployment benefit and pension policy, 
and summarises views on the value of social partner involvement in social policy overall. 
The EU Member States exhibit a great diversity of histories and traditions in relation to the 
management of welfare and benefits. Despite this diversity, however, it is possible to categorise 
these different systems to a certain extent. For example, Ebbinghaus (2010a) defines four general 
social governance models for sharing responsibilities between the state and the social partners, 
noting that “depending on country-specific historic traditions of sharing public space, the social 
partners have very different degrees of influence on policy outcomes”. These four governance 
models are: 
■ Institutionalised consultation, in which the state may consult the social partners, but does not 
necessarily act on their opinions. 
■ Voluntary social concertation, in which an agreement or social pact is entered into between the 
government and the social partners. This will usually involve some concessions on the part of the 
government. 
■ Delegated self-administration, under which some decision-making authority and power of 
implementation is delegated to an independent self-administered agency, which may be more or 
less autonomous of the state. In this case, the influence of the social partners would tend to be 
lower if this self-administration is decentralised, made up of representatives elected from open 
lists, tripartite, and with no minority veto; it would be higher if this self-administration is 
centralised, if social partners can nominate representatives, composition is bipartite and each side 
has a right of veto. 
■ Autonomous self-regulation, under which the social partners operate under a voluntary 
agreement, without state interference. This may apply, for example, to the negotiation of 
occupational welfare provision outside of the public welfare system. The state can only 
indirectly affect outcomes in this case by, for example, refusing erga omnes extension of 
collective agreements.  
It is helpful to bear this classification framework in mind when examining the level and nature of 
involvement of the social partners in the unemployment benefit and pension systems of their 
countries. It is worth noting that examples from all four governance models can often be found in 
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the same country in different areas of social policy, depending on the particular point in time and 
the reform processes that are undertaken. 
Accordingly, examples of institutionalised consultation exist in Germany to some extent – here, 
social partnership has been institutionalised through autonomous collective bargaining and 
codetermination in the area of industrial relations (Ebbinghaus 2010a). Nevertheless, the tripartite 
Alliance for Jobs initiatives since the 1990s have not lead to successful institutionalised 
consultation on social policy in Germany. In the Netherlands, institutionalised consultation takes 
place through the tripartite Social and Economic Council (SER). For an overview of the history and 
functions of the SER, see box 6.3. Consultation in the Netherlands also takes place through the 
Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid), which was set up in 1945 and comprises 
representatives of the social partners only. Twice a year, in spring and in autumn, the Labour 
Foundation consults with the government on policy. Other examples of countries with 
institutionalised consultation arrangements include Italy and Spain, although here, the role of the 
advisory councils that exist tends to be more symbolic than influential (Ebbinghaus 2010a). 
6.2.1 Advantages of social partner involvement 
There are differing views on the value of social partner involvement in unemployment benefit and 
pension reforms. The social partners themselves would of course argue that their involvement is a 
force for the good, and Watt (2009) also found that where unions had an influence in drawing up 
Member States’ fiscal reform packages, the incorporation of social and equity concerns was more 
likely. In countries where there is a history of social partnership and good relationships between 
government and the social partners, social partner involvement can certainly be beneficial in terms 
of achieving buy-in to reforms, both among the social partners and the wider population, thus 
avoiding conflict and protest. 
In this context, Ebbinghaus (2010a) discusses the social partners’ power of veto and the extent to 
which it depends on the options of voice versus exit in the case of disagreement (ie whether the 
social partners decide to influence policy by participating and engaging, or whether they try to exert 
influence by withdrawing and protesting). In the cases of consultation and self-administration as 
noted above, voice, not exit, is the main option. In the cases of concertation and self-regulation, 
however, as these options are based on voluntary agreement, exit is a viable option, although there 
is a high risk of defection where there are rival union and employer organisations. 
The social partners themselves have many incentives for being involved in social policy reform, not 
least as this is a way of avoiding the imposition of more severe welfare entrenchment (Ebbinghaus 
2011). Further, cooperation in reform plans means that the social partners are at the centre of debate 
rather than being marginalised or even subject to social governance reforms on the part of 
governments seeking to curtail their opposing voice. Trade unions have an interest in fulfilling their 
mandate to represent and protect their members to the best of their ability. Employer organisations 
also have members’ interests to represent and while they may have different views on some aspects 
of social and economic policy, they also have an interest in being seen as partners in debate about 
reform, as this increases their visibility and validity to their membership. 
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6.2.2 Disadvantages of social partner involvement 
There is a converse argument that social partner involvement in reform and change can result in 
more limited change than would be the case if policymakers acted unilaterally (Marier 2008). For 
example, where there is formal social partner involvement in pension reform, this can lead to a 
more limited reform, resulting in a situation much nearer to the status quo, as a social partner-
agreed structure is likely to have more built-in points of veto. 
The nature of the relationship between the government and the social partners is also likely to have 
an effect on implementation of social reforms. Marier looks at whether social partner involvement 
in welfare reform is more successful in the case of a cooperative relationship with the government 
(as in Belgium), than a conflictual relationship (as in France). He finds that France has actually been 
more successful in implementing reforms than Belgium, even though French unions tend to be 
“outsiders” (opposing rather than participating in reform). One reason for this may be that Belgian 
pension reforms in 1996 tended to be less effective than similar French reforms, as they included 
many social compensations, such as exemptions or payments to compensate for losses incurred as a 
result of the reform, and were lesser in scope to start with. 
Industrial relations and social policy are intertwined to a considerable degree, in the context of the 
social partners’ continuing influence on welfare reform in many countries, and there would seem to 
be scope in the future for more social partner influence in the reforms that will be needed in the 
future. For example, in the context of the restructuring of the welfare state, there is increased scope 
for the conclusion of social pacts involving the social partners, and for the creation of more private 
occupational welfare arrangements such as private pension provision (Ebbinghaus 2010b)  – see the 
section below on pensions for more details.  
Further evidence of the interconnection between industrial relations and social policy is the fact that 
social contributions can be seen as reducing net wages for workers and increasing non-wage labour 
costs for employers (Ebbinghaus 2010b). Any changes, ie increases, in these social contributions 
will therefore reduce wages and raise overall labour costs, thus making it logical to class wage 
negotiations and social policy reforms as interdependent activities.  
This section has sketched some of the key issues relating to the debate about social partner 
involvement in social policy development more widely and unemployment benefit and pension 
systems in particular. Although there is a wide difference between national systems, some 
categorisation is possible. Common to all national systems are issues surrounding the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages of social partner involvement in policy formulation, although the 
precise nature of this depends on issues such as the relationship between the social partners and 
policymakers, and the exact role that they play. The involvement of the social partners in social 
policy development sits at the interaction between industrial relations and social policy, as many 
outcomes of social policy, such as social charges, have a direct effect on net pay. This therefore 
binds the social partners more tightly into discussions on social policy and benefit reform. In the 
past, there has been an exchange between wage moderation and social rights (ie lower wage 
increases in exchange for improvements in social rights), but today’s international economic 
competition and limits on state welfare spending no longer permit such an exchange (Ebbinghaus 
2010b). A balanced view of the role of employers and unions therefore needs to be developed in 
order to understand the ongoing challenges facing employers and unions, shifts in responsibility 
between state and non-state actors, and the repercussions of this for income inequality and social 
security. 
  
 
 
233 
6.3 Unemployment benefit systems 
This section of the chapter examines the main characteristics of unemployment benefit systems in 
the EU Member States, highlighting the differences and the similarities, and also examining their 
degree of embeddedness. It also analyses the degree of social partner involvement in the 
establishment and organisation of unemployment benefit systems, which can range from no 
involvement to a high degree of involvement. The latter is the case particularly in countries that 
operate the Ghent system, under which the main responsibility for unemployment benefit is held by 
trade unions, in their role as administrators of government-subsidised unemployment insurance 
funds. Main trends are also examined, including the impact of institutional changes, and issues such 
as lack of consensus between the parties. This section also considers the changing face of 
unemployment benefit systems and what this means for social partnership. 
6.3.1 Main characteristics  
The unemployment benefit systems of the EU Member States differ significantly in terms of their 
basic characteristics and the degree of involvement of the social partners. This is due to factors such 
as the history and culture of industrial relations, the nature of social dialogue, and tripartism and 
culture concerning the nature of the state, including whether or not it acts autonomously with regard 
to the unemployment benefit system, or whether decisions are based on tripartite consensus.  
The degree of embeddedness of unemployment benefit systems – ie how long they have been in 
operation – also plays a defining role. Schaapman and van het Kaar (2007) note that in the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the origins of present social security systems 
date back to the end of the 19th or beginning of the 20th century. The welfare state in most of the 
oldest EU Member States was established after World War II, while countries such as Greece, 
Cyprus and Malta began to develop a social security system in the second half of the 1950s. The 
basis for a welfare state in Spain was created in the mid- to late-1970s, while the creation of 
comprehensive social security systems in some of the new Member States only took place following 
the 1989 transition. 
Further, in some countries, a system operates under which individuals may qualify for partial 
unemployment benefits if they are looking for full-time work and have accepted a part-time job. 
Some studies have looked into the role of partial unemployment benefits in terms of providing a 
stepping stone into full employment. For example, Kyyrä (2008) explores this issue in Finland, 
finding evidence to support this. Partial unemployment benefit was used extensively by 
governments in some countries, such as Germany, Italy and Austria, during the crisis in order to 
support short-time working. For more details, see Mandl et al (2010). 
Notwithstanding these differences, however, there are core similarities between the unemployment 
benefit systems of Member States: some common characteristics are as follows (Schaapman and 
van het Kaar 2007): 
■ the dual character of the systems (ie comprising insurance and assistance); 
■ means of funding and calculating unemployment benefits; 
■ basic qualifying conditions (eligibility criteria); 
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■  the development of active labour market policies to complement the unemployment benefit 
system; 
■ certain administrative characteristics, such as the fact that unemployment insurance systems may 
be administered by government departments or take the form of self-governing institutions that 
are usually managed by representatives of insured workers, employers and the government; 
■ certain general aspects of the coordination of social partner involvement (despite major 
differences in the actual participation of social partners in unemployment benefit systems within 
the different countries).  
Table 6.1 below sets out the main characteristics of unemployment benefit systems in EU Member 
States. 
 
Table 6.1: Unemployment benefit systems in Europe 
  Countries Funding Main qualifying conditions Benefits 
Unemployment 
insurance 
All Contributions from employer 
and, in most cases (18 
countries), also employee, 
often (in 14 countries) topped 
up by government payments. 
Involuntary unemployment - 
employment record - 
actively looking for work 
Earnings-related 
Unemployment 
assistance 
AT, DE, FI, 
FR, EL, ES, 
IE, NL*, SE, 
SI, UK 
Contributions from employer 
and employee and/or 
government payments. 
Unemployment insurance 
expired or not eligible for it - 
(often) a short employment 
record - actively looking for 
work 
Social minimum, 
partly means-tested 
Social assistance All except EL 
and IT 
Taxes Unemployment insurance 
expired or not eligible for it - 
(for most categories of 
claimants) actively looking 
for work 
Social minimum; 
comprehensively 
means-tested 
Source: Social Partners and Social Security Systems, Schaapman M and van het Kaar R 2007.  
* In the Netherlands, the UA arrangement is expiring as the so-called follow-up benefit was  abolished for persons 
becoming unemployed after 11 August 2003. 
 
6.3.2 Social partner involvement in unemployment benefit systems 
The social partners play a distinctive role in the formulation and operation of unemployment benefit 
systems in many EU countries, although the precise nature of the role differs widely according to 
country (for more details see Eurofound 2012). In addition, even though formal involvement and 
cooperation may be in place, the degree of actual influence of social partner involvement can also 
differ: in some countries, the social partners commonly complain that although they are asked for 
their opinions and input, governments do not act on their advice. 
There are significant differences between social partner involvement in the preparation and 
establishment, ie the creation, of unemployment benefit systems by country. For example, at one 
end of the scale, countries such as Austria and Finland have systems that are based on well-
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established tripartite cooperation. In other countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and France, 
the preparation and establishment of unemployment benefit systems is dominated by bipartite 
consultation.  
At the other end of the scale, the new EU Member States have only recently developed tripartite 
concertation and social dialogue as a whole does not have a long history. Further, in countries such 
as the UK, Germany and Greece, there is an absence of tripartite consultation on unemployment 
benefits (Schaapman M and van het Kaar R 2007). 
Similarly, the role of the social partners in the administration of unemployment benefit systems 
ranges from high levels of formal involvement and participation to countries where the social 
partners have no role at all. Schaapman M and van het Kaar R (2007) have summarised the 
involvement of the social partners in the administration of unemployment benefit schemes and 
unemployment benefit services, highlighting national differences. For example, although the French 
social partners play a formal role in decision-making, their actual influence is reported to be 
minimal. In Greece, although efforts have been made to include the social partners more fully in the 
administration of benefits, their influence is reported to remain minimal in practical terms. This is 
also reported to be the case in Spain, where, although there are high levels of involvement, actual 
influence is not reported to be high. Conversely, in countries such as Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Slovakia and the UK, the social partners have no formal role in the administration of the 
unemployment benefits system.  
Countries where there are high levels of formal involvement and influence include Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Slovenia and Sweden, where the social partners play an 
important role in the administration of unemployment benefit systems. This list includes the 
countries in which the Ghent system operates (see below). 
The most recent comparative research examining social partner involvement in unemployment 
benefit systems (Eurofound 2012) groups the involvement of the social partners in these systems 
into five categories: 
■ institutional involvement in stable tripartite institutions connected to the policy-making process. 
This is the case in a large number of continental and Nordic countries, such as AT, DE, LU, NL, 
DK, PT, BG, CY, CZ, EE, EL, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SI; 
■  institutional involvement in stable bipartite bodies associated to the process, such as BE and FR; 
■  involvement in ad hoc committees established by public authorities when needed, as in FI; 
■ Non-formal involvement in information and consultation practices within policy-making 
process, such as in IT, NO, SE, UK; and 
■ participation without (at least explicit) involvement on the part of the state, as in IE, MT, ES. 
Under this classification, Eurofound notes that in almost all countries, the social partners are, to 
some extent or another, involved by public authorities in the design or readjustment of 
unemployment benefit systems. However, it is important to stress that the form that involvement 
takes does not necessarily predict the actual role of the social partners in the decision-making 
process.  
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6.3.3 Union involvement in unemployment insurance – the Ghent system 
Under the so-called Ghent system, the main responsibility for unemployment benefit is held by 
trade unions, which administer government-subsidised unemployment insurance funds. This system 
is in place in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden and to some extent Belgium, which is deemed 
(Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006) to have a hybrid system, under which the government also has a 
role in the distribution of benefits.  
In countries operating the Ghent system, workers often need to belong to a union to receive these 
benefits, which means that union membership tends to be higher in these countries. Theoretically, it 
is possible to become a member of a union-administered fund without joining the relevant trade 
union, although in practice this has traditionally rarely been the case. 
Trade unions involved in Ghent systems arguably have an interest in maintaining these systems, as 
this gives them an active role and involvement in unemployment benefit policy, raises their profile 
and visibility in a wider sense and may therefore result in higher membership rates. Involvement in 
the operation of unemployment benefit funds also means that trade unions can be insulated to some 
extent from the widespread membership decline due to economic and social trends that has been felt 
by trade unions in countries that do not operate this system.  
There have been a number of studies of trade union involvement in the administration of 
unemployment benefit systems under the Ghent system in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and 
to some extent Belgium, and what this means for trade union membership. For example, Blaschke 
(2000) looks at trade union density trends in Europe, concluding that there is no general trend. 
Rather, two groups of countries can be distinguished that show a common union density trend: 
those operating the Ghent system (which tend to have comparatively high trade union density rates) 
and those that do not. This study concludes that “The Ghent system is the most important institution 
on the national level which determines the development of union density”. For more discussion of 
trends in trade union density and membership, see chapters 1 and 3 of this report. 
However, the Ghent system is not infallible in terms of ensuring high membership levels for trade 
unions. Ebbinghaus (2002) notes that although trade union membership in countries operating the 
Ghent system grew until the early 1990s, it then stagnated and even declined, although the pace of 
decline has varied in the different Member States. He concludes that “union-led unemployment 
insurance seems no longer to protect union movements from decline, while improved labour market 
conditions and increased partnership initiatives have not (yet) facilitated the hoped turn around in 
unionisation”. 
In Finland, for example, the Ghent system began to come under pressure from 1992 due to the 
establishment of an independent fund, YTK. Research found that the link between union 
membership and the entitlement to earnings-related unemployment benefits was being increasingly 
eroded by the success of YTK, the membership of which reached 10% of the Finnish labour force 
by 2005 (Kuusisto 2005). Union density rates fell simultaneously, from 85% in 1993 to 79% by 
2000, although density increased back up to 83% by 2004 due to reactions to the crash of the IT 
sector. Böckerman and Uusitalo (2006) also examine the functioning of the Ghent system in 
Finland, noting that union density declined by more than 10 percentage points in fewer than 10 
years (from 84% in 1993 to 73% in 2002), and conclude that this decline is mostly due to the 
erosion of the Ghent system caused by the creation of the YTK fund. 
Further, in Sweden, the Ghent system was also eroded during the second half of the past decade, 
due to reforms to unemployment benefit insurance introduced by the government. In this case, it 
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would appear that the funds were a battleground on which the government sought to influence wage 
policy. Kjellberg (2009) notes that increases in the fees of union unemployment funds, aimed at 
pressuring unions to moderate their wage claims, resulted in significant losses in the membership of 
trade unions and of the funds: “In 2007, union unemployment funds lost almost twice as many 
members as the unions did. In a period of one year, union density declined by 4 percentage points, 
which is unique in modern Swedish history and remarkable also from an international perspective 
… by changing the Swedish Ghent system the government caused a fall in union density with no 
parallel in modern Swedish history.” 
6.4 Main trends in social partner involvement in unemployment benefit 
The context within which unemployment benefit systems operate has changed radically since many 
of these systems were first created. Clasen and Clegg (2011) note that many of these benefit 
systems were designed in economies that were predominantly industrial and characterised by 
employment relationships that were largely standardised and followed a stable career path. Over the 
past 20 years or so, this scenario has changed significantly, as the result of a move towards 
predominantly service-based economies and demand for more flexibility in terms of wages and 
employment terms and conditions. These types of changes in circumstance and context have had an 
influence on the level and influence of the social partners, although it would seem that the degree of 
change depends to a large extent on the national context. 
Schaapman and van het Kaar (2007) note that social partner influence is likely to be stable and 
undisputed in countries with a strong and continuing tradition of social partnership (such as Finland 
and Sweden), where there is a strong tradition of state leadership in social security (such as in 
Hungary), or where there is little social partner influence in the area of social security, and no 
debate on changing the situation (eg in the UK). In countries such as Slovenia and Malta, although 
influence is stable, the social partners are demanding more influence in the area of social benefits.  
Institutional changes are deemed to have had a negative impact on the influence of the social 
partners on unemployment benefit systems in some countries, such as Denmark and Germany. 
Further, lack of consensus among the social partners themselves in some countries, such as France, 
was also identified to have a negative impact on social partner influence in the area of social 
benefits.  
Some trends can also have positive influences on social partner involvement and influence. These 
include institutional changes to the advantage of the social partners, and proactive social partner 
approaches. This has been the case in Ireland where, although the welfare system is not generous, 
social partner influence has increased since 1987 due to the growth of social partnership (although 
this has now come under severe pressure as a result of the financial crisis). On occasion, trade union 
action has resulted in policy influence – this has been the case in recent years in countries such as 
Austria, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Most recently, the pressures affecting the operation of unemployment benefit systems are likely to 
have been exacerbated by the crisis, as governments implement austerity measures and cost-cutting 
plans (see also chapter 4 of this report). Social partners are being involved to a greater or lesser 
extent in this process – for more details, see the section below on the effects of the crisis. 
Another issue relevant to the formulation of unemployment benefit policy and the social partners’ 
involvement in this is that of the reservation wage – the lowest level of income that would be 
  
 
 
238 
acceptable to a worker for a particular type of job. There have been a number of studies devoted to 
assessing whether this reservation wage changes if a person remains unemployed, as this would 
have an impact on the setting of the level of unemployment benefit, something on which the social 
partners would have a view. Research has found some elasticity, although on the whole this is not 
deemed to be significant. For example, Addison et al (2010) examined whether an individual’s 
reservation wage declined over the course of a period of joblessness. They found that this was the 
case, but that this elasticity is quite small. They also found that there was well-determined direct 
association between completed duration of a period of unemployment and reservation wages, which 
is to be construed as higher reservation wages lead to higher jobless duration. Krueger and Mueller 
(2011) have also examined the reservation wage and the role it plays in job search. They found that 
the self-reported reservation wage predicts whether a job offer is accepted or rejected and that the 
reservation wage is basically stable over the course of unemployment for most workers, with the 
notable exception of workers who are over age 50 and those who had substantial savings at the start 
of the study. They also found that many workers who are looking for full-time work will accept a 
part-time job that offers a wage below their reservation wage. Further, they found that the amount 
of time devoted to job search and the reservation wage help to predict early exits from receiving 
unemployment benefits. This issue is of direct relevance to the social partners as it has a direct 
impact on the lives and income of benefit recipients and will therefore influence any positions that 
they take with regard to benefit changes or reform. 
This section has examined social partner involvement in and influence over unemployment benefit 
systems, which is characterised by high levels of diversity. Nevertheless, there are some common 
trends and challenges, such as meeting the challenge of adapting to the labour market and economic 
developments of the past 20 years or so, and the reaction of the social partners to this. Most 
recently, the economic crisis has posed a huge challenge to unemployment benefit systems, and this 
issue is examined later in this chapter. 
6.5 Pension systems: key issues and challenges 
This section examines the key issues and challenges facing national pension systems in the EU 
Member States. Most specifically, it looks at pension reform as the main challenge for the future 
that is common to all EU Member States, in the context of changing demographics. It highlights the 
main national pension reform plans in the context of EU guidance, and considers the reasons why 
social partner involvement in pension policy can make a significant contribution. In particular, it 
examines trends such as the development of second and third-tier pension provision and the 
opportunity that this presents for greater social partner involvement in policy development. 
Pension reform is one of the key issues facing European policymakers and is likely to become ever 
more pressing over the coming decades, due to changing EU demographics. Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension systems, which rely on those in work to fund the pensions of those who are retired, are 
facing increasing strain as the number of those in retirement grows in relation to those in work. This 
is a major issue in EU countries which rely on such systems: it is recognised that there is a need to 
move away from these PAYG systems, towards alternative forms of provision, such as occupational 
and privately-funded schemes. However, this path is fraught with difficulties and often encounters 
high levels of protest from trade unions.  
Overall in the EU, the proportion of those who are over 65 and dependent on those in the labour 
force has increased from almost 21% of the population in 1990 to almost 26% in 2010, according to 
Eurostat, and is predicted by Eurostat to reach just over 34% by 2025 and over 53% by 2060. 
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Further, according to the most recent Eurostat data on this subject, which relates to 2009, no EU 
Member State had reached the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 (ie each woman needs to have an 
average of 2.1 children over her lifetime in order to keep the population constant). France and 
Ireland came closest (2.0 each in 2009), but Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta and Portugal 
had fertility rates of less than 1.5, which are among the lowest in the world. The EU average 
fertility rate in 2009 was 1.59, according to Eurostat data 
Special mention should be made of the Member States in central and eastern Europe, which faced 
the challenge of pension reform as part of their move away from a planned to a market economy at 
the beginning of the 1990s. One of the key issues in these countries during the 1990s was the use of 
early retirement to absorb the high number of people made redundant due to enterprise 
restructuring. This in turn created a large number of retired people in relation to the working 
population. Hirose (2011) notes that many of these countries decided during the 1990s and 2000s to 
create second pillar pension provision as part of structural reform. As social dialogue was relatively 
weak in these countries (see also chapter 2 of this report), influence on national pension policy was 
limited. The most recent reforms have concentrated on increasing the retirement age, reducing the 
deficit in the state pension system, freezing indexation mechanisms, modifying qualifying 
conditions and eliminating privileged rights for special groups of workers such as military 
personnel and the police force. 
At European level, the European Commission issued in February 2012 a White Paper entitled An 
Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions
99
, in which it addresses the key issues facing 
pensions in the EU and puts forward a number of proposals to support EU Member States in reform 
of their pension systems. Reinforcing the role that the social partners can play in pension reform, 
the White Paper states that: “Member States, European institutions and all stakeholders, in 
particular social partners, need to respond together and within their respective roles, to the 
challenges that population ageing represents” (p.15). For details of the White Paper, see box 6.1 
below. 
 
Box 6.1: Main points of the European Commission’s 2012 White Paper: An Agenda for 
Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions.  
The main challenges for EU Member State pension systems, as identified in the White Paper are: 
■ Financial sustainability. Despite reforms, EU pension systems still face financial difficulties 
relating to demographic changes (the number of those in work shrinking in relation to the 
number of retired people) and so further reforms are needed. 
■ Maintaining the adequacy of pension benefits. Although most schemes in the EU allow older 
people to enjoy decent living standards and economic independence, the Commission highlights 
a number of gaps, such as women over the age of 75. Further, recent pension reforms will result 
in lower income replacement rates.  
■ Raising the labour market participation of women and older workers. The Commission states 
that the trend in recent decades towards earlier retirement has been reversed, although more 
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needs to be done. Labour force participation is currently still too low in the age groups just 
below the retirement age and progress too limited. Further, the success of reforms aimed at 
increasing pension eligibility ages depends on better opportunities for older women and men to 
stay in the labour market.  
Key actions to support Member States in pension reform include the following: 
Balancing time spent in work and retirement 
■ Monitoring of and support for Member State actions, awareness-raising, support for policy 
coordination and joint work on enabling and encouraging older workers, women in particular, to 
stay longer in the labour market, primarily through the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
■ Within the framework of the European social dialogue, consulting the EU social partners to 
develop ways of adapting work place and labour market practices, including career management 
notably regarding strenuous jobs, so as to facilitate longer working lives. 
■ Consultation of the social partners on how unwarranted mandatory retirement ages could be 
revised in collective agreements and national legislation. 
Developing second pillar (occupational) and third pillar (private) arrangements  
■ A review of the IORP directive on activities and supervision of institutions for occupational 
retirement provision. The aim of this is to promote more cross-border activity in this field and to 
help improve overall pension provision in the EU.  
■ Initiatives to increase protection of workers’ occupational pension rights in the event of 
employer insolvency.  
■ The development of a pension portability Directive setting minimum standards for the 
acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights and pursue on-going work on a 
pan-European pension fund for researchers. 
■ The development of a code of good practice for occupational pension schemes, addressing issues 
such as better coverage of employees, payouts, risk-sharing and mitigation, cost effectiveness 
and shock absorption. 
■ In the case of third pillar products, by 2013, the Commission will present an initiative aimed at 
raising the quality of these products and improving consumer information and protection 
standards via voluntary codes and possibly an EU certification scheme. 
 
6.5.1 Social partner involvement in pension systems 
As with unemployment benefit systems, there is significant diversity in the way in which the social 
partners are involvement in pension policy in EU Member States. Social concertation plays an 
important role in pension reforms where public policy is traditionally shared or when governments 
do not have the capacity to push through unilateral reforms due to union opposition. This is 
particularly the case in Bismarckian pension systems, where attempts at significant reform can 
provoke opposition from workers and their representatives. For more information on Bismarckian 
and Beveridge pension systems, see box 6.2.  
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An example of social concertation is the pension pact negotiated in 1995 in Italy by the government 
and trade unions, with the government making concessions in order to reach agreement with the 
unions. A similar type of agreement was reached on pensions more recently between the 
government and the social partners in Spain (see below). 
 
Box 6.2: Bismarckian and Beveridge pension systems 
Pension systems can broadly be classified into two types: Bismarckian and Beveridge. Under the 
Bismarck model, pensions are social insurance-based and contributions to social insurance funds 
are divided between employer and employee. These systems provide earning-related pension 
benefits aimed at maintaining economic status during old age. Countries with Bismarckian systems 
traditionally include Austria, Germany, France and Italy. In countries with the Bismarck system, 
state first pillar provision is strong and supplementary occupational and private provision is 
comparatively weak.  
Sweden, Finland and Norway moved towards the Bismarckian system in the late 1950s and 1960s 
by introducing a second public pillar of pension provision in order to supplement the first pillar of 
state provision. This second pillar of public provision is based on a pay-as-you-go principle and 
provides for income-related benefits. Since the introduction of this second pillar, the first pillar of 
public provision has declined. 
Under the Beveridge model, the pension system is aimed mainly at poverty prevention, and 
typically provides universal flat-rate means-tested benefits. Countries operating the Beveridge 
model are typically the Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK. In the UK and also the Netherlands, 
state provision is basic and occupational and private pension schemes are well-developed. 
 
Examples of self-administration and self-regulation can be found in Bismarckian social insurance 
systems. Here, for example, the social partners are elected into the administration bodies of pension 
funds at different levels. In France and the Netherlands, the social partners play a more direct role in 
social insurance, with French union and employer representatives sitting on the boards of national, 
regional and local social insurance funds. In the Netherlands, the social partners are involved in the 
administration of both the first pillar state pension and second pillar occupational pensions. In the 
Nordic countries, social partner involvement in drafting legislation, including in the area of welfare, 
is well-embedded in the national system of governance. 
In terms of the first pillar of pension provision (state provision), the formal involvement of the 
social partners varies from strong involvement, as in France, to more or less no involvement, as in 
the UK. The precise role that the social partners play reflects historical variations in the 
development of welfare states, for example the Bismarckian social insurance or the Beveridge-type 
welfare state models (Natali 2009). In countries with a strong consultative tradition, such as the 
Netherlands, tripartite bodies such as the SER and bipartite bodies such as the Labour Foundation 
exist to advise the government. For an overview of the SER and its recent input into pensions 
policy, see box 6.3 below. 
Van het Kaar (2004) notes that often, the social partners have an advisory or consultative status, 
sometimes without formal basis. Further, although in several countries the social partners have no 
formal influence on first pillar provision, their role in practice can be significant. For example, in 
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Finland, state pension provision is based on law, but its principles are mainly agreed in negotiations 
between the social partners. 
 
Box 6.3: The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands 
The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (De Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER) is an 
advisory and consultative body made up of employer and union representatives and independent 
experts. Its aim is to help create social consensus on national and international socio-economic 
issues. It was established in 1950 by the Industrial Organisation Act (Wet op de bedrijfsorganisatie) 
and is the main advisory body to the Dutch government and the parliament on national and 
international social and economic policy. The SER is financed by employers and acts wholly 
independently from government. It represents the interests of trade unions and employers, advising 
the government (upon request or at its own initiative) on all major social and economic issues, 
including social security and benefits. It is funded by a mandatory tax levied by the Chambers of 
Commerce. 
The SER’s three key objectives are: 
■ Balanced economic growth and sustainable development 
■ The highest possible employment rate 
■ A fair distribution of income 
In terms of the weight that the SER’s advice carries, the SER itself notes that the effectiveness of its 
advice is not easy to quantify: it cannot be measured purely by the extent to which it is incorporated 
into legislation and regulations, as not all advice is given for the purpose of developing a legislative 
proposal. In most cases, the advice given concerns the SER’s response or views on a policy 
document. Often, parts of a SER advisory report are eventually included in legislation and 
regulations, although as it takes a long time for policy to be implemented, it may be some time 
before the effects of the advice become apparent. 
The influence of the SER has arguably waned over the past two decades. Ebbinghaus (2006) notes 
that in the early 1990s, the SER failed to find solutions to the disability pension problem, and its 
slow decision-making process has also been widely criticised. In 1994, when a new left-liberal 
government came to power in the Netherlands, it abolished the obligation to consult the SER, later 
often bypassing the SER on legislative projects in social and economic policy matters.   
In June 2010, the SER concluded an agreement on pensions in which it sets out the adjustments it 
believes are necessary for the stability of state pensions and of occupational pensions, for which the 
social partners represented in the SER bear particular responsibility. It made a number of 
recommendations for changes to the Dutch system, in order to introduce more flexibility and in 
response to an ageing population. Proposals included changes to the pension system that do not 
increase contributions in occupational provision, but secure the system against increases in life 
expectancy and negative developments on financial markets, changes to make the state system more 
solid as a basis for pension provision, more leeway for individual choice, and the introduction of 
new measures to ensure long-term employability and improve labour market mobility for older 
employees. In terms of implementation, the accord states that the signatory parties trust that the 
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government will facilitate the accord; if not, further consultations will be held. An agreement on 
pension reform was reached in June 2011 between the government and the social partners. 
 
In addition, trade unions play an important role in representing pensioners in some countries. In 
Italy, for example, pensioners’ trade unions represent a significant proportion of Italian trade 
unions, accounting for around half of their membership and taking on a significant role in social 
policy and collective bargaining on welfare issues more widely (Pedersini 2000). Given the ageing 
of Europe’s population, this is likely to continue over the coming decades. 
6.5.2 Second and third pillar pension provision 
One key aspect of pension provision, and the main area of development in terms of pension policy, 
has been the growth in recent years in second pillar (occupational) and third pillar (private and 
supplementary) pension schemes, mostly as a supplement to dwindling state provision. In many 
countries, the growth of these additional pillars has increased social partner involvement in the 
formulation and implementation of pension provision. Involvement of the social partners in these 
additional pillars is important in terms of long-term sustainable and secure policy formulation, as 
these additional schemes are intended to plug the gap left by the reduction of state pension 
provision.  
In some national systems, such as those in Sweden and France, the social partners have a long 
tradition of involvement in second pillar pension provision, and so their involvement is well 
established. In Sweden, occupational pension schemes date back to the 1970s and the social 
partners were involved in the late 1990s in negotiating changes to the funding of occupational 
pension schemes, alongside reforms in the state pension scheme (Ebbinghaus 2002). In France also, 
the social partners jointly run the two national supplementary pension schemes - Agirc for 
managerial/professional staff and Arrco for other employees.  
The social partners also play a role in savings schemes that contribute to pension funds in France 
and Italy (Natali 2009). In France, these are company-level schemes such as employee savings 
plans and profit-sharing schemes, while in Italy, the social partners play an important role in 
managing the shifting of resources from severance pay schemes (the end of service allowance - 
trattamento di fine rapporto, Tfr) into pension funds. However, problems can arise, due to a lack of 
expertise and knowledge if, for example, board members are appointed on the basis of their trade 
union status rather than on the basis of their pension knowledge and expertise. This issue is also 
relevant to recent debate in the Netherlands, where the Minister of Social Affairs stated that 
management of pension funds should be carried out by relevant experts rather than the social 
partners (Grünell 2011).  
Social partner involvement in the negotiation and running of second-pillar occupational pension 
schemes demonstrates the intersection of industrial relations and social security policy, as 
occupational pensions take the form of deferred wages for employees in a given sector. However, 
the presence of well-developed social partners is a prerequisite for this to be successful: in order to 
be able to engage meaningfully in discussions on the development of occupational pensions, unions 
and employers need to have a certain level of strength and support. Further, the strength of 
collective bargaining machinery and institutions is also vital to the coverage, financing and benefits 
of these schemes. Negotiated and funded occupational pension schemes are arguably the next best 
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thing to PAYG state schemes, from the point of view of trade unions, as they provide a degree of 
security to employees, particularly if unions are actively involved in co-managing these schemes. In 
countries such as Italy (see box 6.4) and Germany (see box 6.5), the social partners have 
successfully become involved in the negotiation of occupational pensions systems. 
 
Box 6.4: Occupational pension funds in Italy  
In Italy, supplementary occupational pension schemes for companies or specific categories of 
employees only were typical until the mid-1990s reform of the public pension system, which aimed 
to create a homogeneous system which could potentially provide all workers, both employees and 
self-employed, with supplementary pension coverage. 
Today, under a legal framework, pension funds are financed by both employer and employee 
contributions, as agreed in industry-wide collective bargaining. Sectoral pension funds at national 
level have since been created by the social partners in sectors such as metalworking, chemicals, 
utilities and the food sector. 
Most recently, trade unions and employers representing the temporary work sector launched a 
sectoral pension fund for this sector in July 2011. The fund, Fontemp, was created under the 
framework of a renewal of the collective agreement for this sector in 2008 and has been set up by 
the employers’ organsation Assolavoro and the trade unions Felsa-Cisl, Nidil-Cgil and Uiltemp. 
The fund is financed on the basis of contributions from employees, employers and the end of 
service allowance (trattamento di fine rapporto). It is a defined contribution scheme, with employee 
contributions tax deductible up to a ceiling (currently €5,164). Employees may remain members of 
the fund even if they leave the temporary work sector upon gaining an open-ended employment 
contract. After two years of contributions, they may also transfer their capital to another 
supplementary pension fund.  
Sources: Planet Labour (2011d), EIRO. 
 
In Germany, the social partners have not traditionally been involved in the formulation of pension 
policy. However, employers and unions were involved a decade ago in the innovative creation of 
voluntary sectoral private defined contribution sectoral pension funds in metalworking and 
chemicals. These funds were based on collective agreements and were concluded after a pension 
reform law required employees to invest up to 4% of gross income in company or private schemes 
in order to supplement state provision (Behrens 2001; Bispinck 2002). It should be noted that these 
agreements were concluded during a time of industrial relations conflict, centring on working 
reduction (trade unions failed to achieve the introduction of the 35-hour week in metalworking in 
eastern Germany) and therefore were viewed as a renewal of social partnership. For more details, 
see box 6.5.  
 
Box 6.5: Sectoral pension provision in the German metalworking and chemicals industries 
In the autumn of 2001, employers and unions in the German metalworking and chemicals industries 
negotiated agreements providing for the creation of voluntary private defined contribution pension 
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funds. The schemes were based on pension legislation enacted shortly before these agreements, 
which stipulated that workers should invest up to 4% of their income in private pension schemes.  
Trade unions and employers were at the time keen to take the opportunity to create company-level 
and industry-level schemes (Behrens (2001). Among the first to set up a scheme was the 
management and works council at the German carmaker Volkswagen AG. This was followed by the 
creation of a joint industry-level fund in the construction industry and shortly afterwards schemes 
based on agreements for the metalworking and chemicals sectors, thus ensuring that labour-
management sponsored private pension schemes were available for a large part of the German 
workforce. However, the two schemes in the metalworking and chemicals sectors go beyond this in 
that they provide workers with options to convert part of their income into pension assets. The 
schemes also exempt investment from tax and social security contributions. 
Chemicals sector 
The chemicals sector fund offers a high level of flexibility in investment decisions and minimises 
administrative costs. Initially, the social partners had hoped to sign up about 300,000 workers out of 
the 590,000 who were covered by this collective agreement. Under the scheme, employees can 
convert up to 4% of their income directly into pension assets. These contributions are tax-exempt. 
Income includes pay, annual bonuses, holiday bonuses and capital formation payments. Employer 
contributions account for just over 28% of total investment. The chemicals agreement builds on an 
existing system of company-level supplementary pension schemes and was amended in 2008. 
According to the German chemicals trade union (IG Chemie) the main pension fund for the sector, 
ChemiePensionsfonds fund, covers more than 700 companies and almost 73,000 workers, who save 
on average €800 per year towards their pension. The social partners sit on the fund’s board of 
directors and investment committee. 
Metalworking sector 
In the metalworking sector, employees may also save up to 4% of income into the new sectoral 
scheme (MetallRente), which is run jointly by employers and unions. In this case, income covers 
pay, annual bonuses, holiday bonuses and “other income”. As there was no pre-existing company-
level supplementary pension provision in the metalworking sector, this agreement means that many 
small and medium-sized companies were required for the first time to offer supplementary pensions 
to their employees.  
Today, the metalworking sectoral fund covers over 21,000 companies and 450,000 workers and is 
the largest scheme in Germany. It has been extended to the steel, wood, plastics and textile sectors 
and is also open to companies outside the sector.  
 
By contrast, the social partners in the UK and Ireland have been less involved in the negotiation of 
occupational pensions than their counterparts in some other EU Member States, as in these 
countries, occupational pensions remain largely a voluntary initiative on the part of the employer, 
with little involvement from the social partners. 
There is a debate in some countries concerning the interests of those no longer in active 
employment, who are receiving occupational pensions. Where trade unions are involved in the 
governance of schemes, there is sometimes special provision for pensioners. In Sweden, for 
example, retired workers have the same rights of expression as active members of pension funds, as 
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long as they remain trade union members. In Belgium there are no specific legislative provisions 
requiring the consultation of pensioners, but both main trade union confederations contain 
structures representing retired workers (van het Kaar 2004).  
6.5.3 Social partner involvement in pension reform 
Within the context sketched out above, pension reform in EU Member States is largely based on: 
increasing the statutory retirement age in phases over a defined period; restructuring and limiting 
access to early retirement schemes; and boosting incentives for individuals to remain in the labour 
market for longer at the end of their career. These are long-term policy decisions and as such need 
to enjoy cross-party political support if they are to endure. Social partner involvement in decisions 
on these types of important reforms can therefore be seen as a way of creating and deepening 
political and societal consensus. Involving the social partners in these decisions can avoid reform 
blockage by means of vetos, and can also ensure that reform is largely equitable and widely 
accepted. Ebbinghaus (2011) notes that governments may actually actively seek social consensus 
with trade unions and employers as an explicit means of overcoming reform blockage in political 
decision-making: “Today governments need more than their own political majorities to provide 
sufficient momentum to overcome vested interests in reforming established pensions systems in an 
ageing society. The more responsibility for retirement income is divided between the state and 
society, the more possibilities there are for trade unions to influence political decision-making”. 
However, as set out at the beginning of this chapter, there can be difficulties and challenges as a 
result of seeking consensus. For example, political compromise between all stakeholders (ie the 
government, the political opposition and the social partners) can result in concessions that may 
delay reform or result in weaker reform that is actually needed, meaning that additional reform will 
need to take place in the future. 
One of the most common actions of Member State governments is the raising of the state retirement 
age in order to meet the challenges of an ageing population. This type of change has generally been 
unopposed by employer representatives, but strongly challenged by trade unions. In some cases, 
unions have been successful in winning concessions from the government. In Spain, for example, 
the government issued in January 2010 proposals for a reform of the country’s state pensions 
system, aimed at ensuring its sustainability in the medium and long term, notably in the face of 
demographic change (EER 2010a). The proposals centred on increasing the statutory retirement age 
from the current 65 years to 67. It was envisaged that the rise would be gradual and start from 2013, 
with the process being completed by 2026. The Spanish government indicated its willingness to 
engage with the social partners on this issue, and while the main national employers’ organisation, 
CEOE, welcomed the initiative, the CCOO and UGT trade union confederations were opposed and 
staged protests. However, the social partners and the government began social dialogue at the 
beginning of 2011 which resulted in a tripartite agreement on guaranteed pensions. The agreement 
delays the full implementation of the increase in retirement age by one year, until 2027, contains 
extra protection for women and young workers and provides for a range of active labour market 
measures, some of which will increase the social protection of unemployed people. Commentators 
note that the government was under pressure to negotiate on pension reform from financial markets, 
and by the unions, which had threatened a general strike (Sanz de Miguel 2011). 
Likewise in France, where the normal retirement age was increased from 60 to 62 by controversial 
legislation adopted in November 2010 (EER 2010b), the legislation followed a period of formal 
consultations with the social partners: trade unions were opposed to the plans and organised a series 
  
 
 
247 
of industrial actions in the summer of 2010. In response, the government made some adjustments to 
changes for workers with long careers or performing arduous work, although the increase in the 
overall pension age went ahead: the retirement age is increased by four months per year from 1 July 
2011, reaching 62 in 2018. In addition to the basic state pension, most people receive a 
supplementary pension under one of two national schemes - Agirc for managerial/professional staff 
and Arrco for other employees. These schemes are run jointly by trade unions and employers’ 
organisations and although they are not directly affected by the increase in the statutory retirement 
age, the social partners are now expected to negotiate over aligning the supplementary schemes 
with the basic state scheme. Commentators note that this conflict altered the relationship between 
the French President and the trade union CFDT (Tissandier 2011). 
In other countries, trade unions have opposed government plans, but appear to have had little 
influence on the final outcome. In Ireland, for example, the government announced in March 2010 
plans to increase the retirement age from 65 to 68 by 2028, and to require employers to enrol 
employees in a new supplementary pension scheme (EER 2010c). Further, in order to boost 
supplementary pension coverage, a state-administered ‘auto-enrolment’ scheme was to be 
introduced from 2014. Although the plan was supported by employer representatives, trade unions 
opposed it, and particularly the plans to widen supplementary pension coverage. Similarly, in April 
2012 the Polish government passed legislation raising the retirement age to 67 by 2020 for men and 
by 2040 for women, despite fierce opposition from trade unions (Planet Labor 2012a). Further, in 
Denmark, pension reform was agreed by the government in May 2011, in the teeth of bitter 
opposition from trade unions. Under the reform, the statutory pension age will be raised to 67 by 
2022 and the age at which voluntary early retirement can be taken will increase from 60 to 62 by 
2017. Employers had been campaigning for the abolition of early retirement for some time (Planet 
Labor 2011a). 
In the new Member States, pension provision has been completely overhauled over the past 20 
years. New institutions, new processes and new systems have been created in an attempt to put into 
place pension provision for the workforce in the context of the shift from a planned to a market 
economy. Guardiancich has carried out a number of studies on developments in the pensions 
systems of new Member State countries over the past 20 years. For example, looking at Hungary 
and Croatia, he finds that the multi-pillar pension arrangements that both countries have put into 
place, broadly based on World Bank recommendations, did not involve a great deal of discussion 
with the social partners  (Guardiancich 2009). 
This section has focused on social partner involvement in pensions and pension reform, a policy 
area that, in the light of changing demographics, is deemed to be an extremely high priority for 
governments. There are clear advantages for governments to encourage the social partners to be 
involved in pension reform, linked to ensuring sustainable solutions to this key policy issue. 
However, there are also issues surrounding the possibility that the social partners may not be able to 
deliver the radical reforms that are needed in some cases. Certainly, the past few years have seen 
major opposition to pension reform plans on the part of trade unions in many EU Member States. In 
some cases, governments have taken on board social partner counter-proposals, but in some cases 
social partner influence has been negligible. Second and third tier pension provision is a clear 
growth area, filling the gap left by declining state provision, and this represents an opportunity for 
the social partners to become much more active in the formulation and management of provision, 
particularly in the case of occupational pensions. Key challenges remain, however, not least the 
ongoing impact of the crisis, which is discussed in the next section. 
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6.6 Effects of the current crisis 
This section explores the effects of the economic crisis on unemployment and pension systems, 
examining the reactions of governments and the social partners, and any impacts in terms of the 
involvement of the social partners in reforms to unemployment benefit and pensions systems.  
The severe and ongoing economic crisis in the EU that began in 2008 has had a major impact on the 
financing of pensions and social benefit systems, adding fuel to existing debate about sustainability 
in the context of changing demographics and economic shifts in the EU. The level of influence and 
involvement of the social partners in these debates has varied across the EU.  
Watt and Nikolova (2009) carried out an analysis of Member States’ fiscal stimulus packages, 
looking amongst other things at social partner involvement in these packages, which typically 
contain public spending measures designed to boost employment and in turn kickstart the overall 
economy. They found that there was an even split between countries where unions have been 
supportive, critical or neutral. They note that “where unions have had a voice in designing the 
packages, governments have benefited from their political support for the package as a whole, even 
though they may be critical of specific measures or would have wanted a greater level of ambition”. 
Social partner consultation and involvement has been more common in those countries with a 
relatively strong social partner tradition, ie in northern Europe, Austria, Belgium and Spain. 
However, no union has accepted national packages as being adequate in terms of the scale of the 
economic crisis. Particular concerns on the part of trade unions focus on the longer-term 
implications of spending cuts, and the attention given to the situation of low-income groups. They 
conclude that the involvement of the social partners, and particularly trade unions, in these 
packages, was “not satisfactory”, although unions sometimes had some influence following 
protests.  
6.6.1 Differing outcomes for social partner influence on unemployment benefit policy in the 
crisis 
The crisis is having severe effects on social partner involvement in unemployment benefit systems: 
one effect is that a greater number of workers have lost their job, thus increasing overall reliance on 
unemployment benefits; at the same time, public finances are under pressure from the austerity 
demanded by the crisis in many countries (see chapter 4 for more details). In addition, as Eurofound 
(2012) notes, the decreasing flow of social contributions resulting from the growth in 
unemployment and reduced wages is threatening the financial sustainability of unemployment 
benefit schemes. Further, declining trends in trade union membership overall may contribute to a 
further weakening of the unemployment benefits system in those countries where trade unions play 
a role in these systems. The potential serious nature of this cannot be underestimated: Eurofound 
(2012) notes that future of the various welfare regimes as we know them and more generally the 
survival of the European Social Model are considered to be at stake. 
Many governments are attempting to make changes to their unemployment benefit systems in the 
context of the pressures brought about by the crisis, essentially reducing the level and/or length of 
replacement income and increasing activation pressure. For example, in Sweden, the government is 
thinking of introducing a compulsory unemployment insurance scheme in response to the 
significant increase in the number of unaffiliated employees. However, this is being rejected by 
trade unions and employers on the grounds that contribution levels will be too high (Lefresne 2010). 
For trade unions, this also has wider potential repercussions: “The risk facing the trade unions 
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managing these insurance funds is that they will suffer an erosion of their legitimacy, as the 
principle of voluntary membership has long been based on an individual undertaking to sign up to 
collective rules and regulations. The entire collective bargaining system might suffer as a result” 
(Lefresne 2010).  
The influence of the social partners on changes to unemployment benefit regimes in the context of 
the crisis differs widely across the EU, depending on the starting point, the economic context, the 
institutional surroundings and the social partners themselves. The social partners in some countries 
have not experienced any changes to their level of involvement – both in countries where the 
tradition is strong and in those where it is weak – while some social partners have felt marginalised. 
In a few countries, the social partners have gained a higher profile in the area of policy-making 
around benefits. Eurofound (2012) charts the main trends in terms of social partner involvement in 
unemployment benefit reform in the context of the crisis, revealing some wide differences around 
Europe. Table 6.2 offers a summary and classification of these in selected EU Member States. 
Table 6.2:  Trends in the involvement of the social partners in unemployment benefits during 
the crisis in selected EU Member States 
Country Tradition of 
social partner 
involvement 
Developments in the crisis Classification 
Austria Strong Continuing involvement of the social partners in the 
unemployment benefit regime, albeit with differing views 
between unions and employers on the best action to take. The 
social partners have continuing decision-making competences in 
terms of unemployment benefit and labour market policy. 
Continuing 
strong position 
Belgium Strong  Involvement of the social partners is continuing, although it may 
be that they find themselves party to an agreement that they do 
not support from an ideological point of view. 
Continuing 
strong position 
Cyprus Weak Involvement of the social partners in unemployment benefit has 
not changed during the crisis, due to low unemployment and lack 
of motivation on the part of the social partners.,  
Continuing 
weak position 
    
Czech 
Republic 
Developing Trade unions have been active in criticising legislative changes 
to unemployment benefit, and have received wide support for 
this. They have also been fighting abuses in terms of recourse to 
benefits. 
Increased 
during the crisis 
Denmark Strong  Although the social partners remain involved in the 
administration of the unemployment insurance system, reforms 
undertaken in the 2000s excluded them to some extent. Reforms 
dating from 2010 were pushed through that can be said to 
weaken the Danish flexicurity model.  
Weakened 
during the crisis 
Estonia Developing Social partner involvement in the unemployment benefit system 
was undermined in 2011 when the government took two major 
funding decisions without consulting the social partner 
representatives in the tripartite supervisory body of the country’s 
unemployment insurance fund. Social partner influence on 
delivery of benefits was unaffected.  
Weakened 
during the crisis 
Finland Strong The social partners continue to be actively involved in proposals 
for the reform of unemployment insurance and benefits. 
Continuing 
strong position 
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Involvement has included participation in round tables and 
discussions on labour market measures to respond to the crisis. 
France Strong Long tradition of social partner involvement in unemployment 
benefit, which has continued during the crisis and beyond the 
creation of  the employment agency Pole Emploi. 
Continuing 
strong position 
Germany Strong The social partners maintain involvement in unemployment 
benefit and labour market policy through the tripartite nature of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Employment Agency and 
the administrative committees of local employment agencies 
Continuing 
strong position 
Hungary Developing Previous strong involvement in the development of 
unemployment benefit systems was discontinued in 2011 with 
the abolition of national tripartite bodies in this area.  
Weakened 
during the crisis 
Italy Strong The involvement of the social partners is continuing and may 
even be strengthened in some cases 
Continuing 
strong position 
Latvia Weak Involvement of the social partners in unemployment benefit has 
not changed during the crisis.  
Continuing 
weak position 
Lithuania Weak Involvement of the social partners in unemployment benefit has 
not changed during the crisis, due to continuing dominance of the 
government. 
Continuing 
weak position 
Luxembourg Strong Opinions of the social partners regularly taken on board Continuing 
strong position 
Netherlands Strong The influence of the social partners in unemployment benefit 
policy has been weakened over the past decade. The government 
is now formulating reforms in the crisis in which the social 
partners are not being involved to the extent that they were 
previously. 
Weakened 
during the crisis 
Poland Weak Involvement of the social partners in unemployment benefit has 
not changed during the crisis.  
Continuing 
weak position 
Portugal Strong Decreasing influence due to the economic situation of the 
country in the context of the crisis. 
Weakened 
during the crisis 
Romania Developing Since 2009 the social partners have been financing projects 
aimed at the vocational training, counselling, and the 
professional readjustment of unemployed people.  
Increased 
during the crisis 
Slovenia Weak The social partners have traditionally not been active in the 
development or administration of unemployment benefits. 
However, during the crisis, they have been more active in 
reaction to unpopular government measures. The most successful 
example of recent social partner cooperation is the development 
of the Labour Market Regulation Act of January 2011, aimed at 
improving the status and conditions of unemployed people.  
Increased 
during the crisis 
Sweden Strong The social partners were not closely involved in unemployment 
insurance reforms in 2007. The reforms are believed to have 
damaged union strength. In the crisis, the reform appears to have 
made it more difficult for outsiders to gain access to the labour 
market. The social partners and government are unsure of the 
way forward. 
Weakened 
during the crisis 
Source: Eurofound (2012) 
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6.6.2 Social partner influence on pension policy during the crisis 
Pension reform is arguably one of the largest social policy challenges for the EU, and this has not 
escaped impact from the crisis. Many governments are attempting large-scale reforms, often in the 
teeth of opposition from trade unions. In many cases, reforms already in train have been accelerated 
by the crisis. In some countries, trade unions have merely registered their opposition, whereas in 
others they have been more successful in engaging with their government and influencing the 
outcome of reforms, even though they remain in many cases unhappy with the overall outcome. 
In the Netherlands, for example, trade unions have succeeded in altering government policy to some 
extent: a pension reform bill was published at the end of 2011, with some concessions to trade 
unions and the political left. Similarly, in Italy, the government is conducting meetings with the 
social partners on economic reform in the context of the crisis, including pension reforms. The aim 
is to increase the retirement age for men and women up to 66 for men and 62 for women by 2018. 
The move has been heavily criticised by all the main Italian trade union confederations (Planet 
Labor 2011b). 
By contrast, in the UK, trade unions have arguably had a limited impact on government pensions 
policy. The UK government has introduced highly controversial reforms to public sector 
occupational pension schemes, against fierce opposition from trade unions. In November 2011, a 
coordinated 24-hour strike involving members of 30 trade unions took place across the UK to 
protest against proposed changes to public sector occupational pension schemes. Based on the 
recommendations of an independent Commission, the changes include replacing existing final 
salary schemes with those linking employees’ pension entitlements to their career average earnings, 
raising the age at which pensions are payable, and raising employee pension contributions. Trade 
unions had been involved in talks on pension reform for some months for the strike action took 
place (Hall 2012). Further, government plans to move some civil servants out of the central 
government pension scheme into a privately-owned fund controlled by a profit-making mutual 
organisation have been opposed by the Public and Commercial Services (PCS) union as 
“privatisation by the back door”, and the union held a strike to oppose this in July 2011 (Gall, 
2012). 
Similarly, towards the end of 2011, the Irish government published legislation aimed at reforming 
pension provision for new entrants to the public service (Farrelly and Higgins 2012). The changes 
were announced by the government following consultation with the public service unions, but no 
formal agreement was reached. Some changes were made to the proposals following the 
consultation process, but teachers’ unions have strongly criticised the reforms. Table 6.3 gives an 
overview of trends in social partner involvement in pension reforms during the crisis.  
Table 6.3: Trends in the involvement of the social partners in pension reform during the crisis 
in selected EU Member States 
Country Developments in the crisis Classification 
Belgium Trade unions organised protests in 2011 against the government’s lack of 
social partner consultation on planned pension reforms. Following this, 
consultation took place that will influence the reform 
Involvement (after protest) 
and influence on outcomes 
Bulgaria Trade unions staged protests against government pension reform plans in 
2011, focusing on raising the retirement age. Subsequent government 
talks with the social partners did not, however, result in agreement 
No embedded consultation 
and no influence on 
outcomes 
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Denmark Pension reforms despite trade union opposition No influence on outcomes 
France Adjustments to planned pension age increases made by the government 
following protests by trade unions in 2010 
Involvement and influence 
on outcomes 
Greece Protests have been taking place against the government’s austerity 
measures, including pension reform. Social partner demands unlikely to 
be acted upon. 
No influence on outcomes 
Hungary Pension reform with little involvement of the social partners No involvement or 
influence on outcomes 
Ireland Some consultation on pension reform in the public service, although 
trade unions are opposing the reforms. Opposition to planned increase in 
retirement age and introduction of a new supplementary pension scheme 
Involvement 
Italy Government consultation of the social partners on pension reform and 
most specifically increasing the retirement age 
Involvement 
Luxembourg Government sought consultation with the social partners on planned 
pension reform in 2010 
Involvement 
Netherlands Pension reform bill published at the end of 2011 contained concessions 
to the trade unions and the political left 
Involvement and influence 
on outcomes  
Poland Pension reforms despite trade union opposition No influence on outcomes 
   
Spain Pension reform is based on a tripartite agreement on pensions, agreed in 
2011 
Involvement and influence 
on outcomes 
United 
Kingdom 
Trade unions have been involved in talks on public sector pension 
reform, but are largely taking the route of opposition to planned changes 
Involvement 
Source: EIRO 2010-2012; Planet Labor. 
 
Another consequence of the economic crisis has been the effect on second- and third pillar 
pensions, which are tied to the stock market to a greater extent than state provision. According to 
OECD data, private pension funds in OECD countries lost 23 per cent of their asset value on 
average in 2008 (Hirose 2011). While this will not have an immediate effect on those who are not 
nearing retirement age, those who are about to retire will be finding that their defined contribution-
based pensions fall short of what they had expected before the crisis hit. 
Further, Ebbinghaus and Wiß (2011) examine private supplementary pension funds in a range of 
EU countries in the light of the effects of the financial crisis. They also show how these funds have 
lost considerable wealth over the past few years, as a result of insufficient regulation. Documenting 
the trend away from defined benefit and towards defined contribution schemes, they note that this 
has led to an individualisation of financial risks, which has been exacerbated by the crisis, 
especially where the state or collective regulation has not intervened. They conclude that the move 
away from state to additional pension provision will increase the role of the social partners in old 
age provision and that the social partners are increasingly called upon to become involved in 
decisions on financial markets, as the majority of supplementary pension schemes are funded 
schemes, and that this may be desirable for all parties. “A stronger inclusion of unions and workers’ 
representatives in supplementary pensions may balance the interests and risks between employers 
(low administration costs), financial institutions (profit) and beneficiaries (high benefits). The 
retreat of the state from public pension commitments has not only increased the need to fill the 
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retirement income gap by private funded pensions but has led to demands for better regulation of 
these pensions”.  
The shift away from state to private, third-pillar pension provision, which has been well-
documented over the period from 1981 to 2007, has been effectively put on hold by the crisis. 
However, it would appear that there is some evidence of a “rebirth” of pension privatisation, as 
governments encourage individuals to save for their retirement, while continuing to provide 
minimum state pensions (Orenstein 2011). Orenstein sees the future as a broad landscape of 
minimum pensions financed by taxation or other sovereign means, plus “nudge-type” automatic 
enrolment in pension schemes, notional defined contribution and quasi-mandatory occupational 
schemes: “Global pensions policy has shifted from an emphasis on harnessing free market wizardry 
to controlling costs through raising the pension age, better covering the poor, and nudging people to 
save, rather than mandating them to do so. This reﬂects the outcome of a debate that has taken place 
for years within the pension policy community, but took on new form and immediacy with the 
effects of the global ﬁnancial crisis”. 
 
Box 6.6: Contract/occupational welfare benefits 
One relatively recent development has been the rise of so-called contract, or occupational, welfare 
benefits, which are welfare benefits negotiated by the social partners as an extra contractual benefit. 
These can include benefits related to pensions, health care or health insurance, sickness insurance, 
and extra unemployment or accident insurance, to which employees would be entitled in addition to 
mandatory public social insurance or social protection. In some countries, these types of benefits are 
being provided by some employers in order to complement or even replace public welfare. Further, 
employers, constrained in terms of not being able to offer pay increases in the context of the current 
crisis, are offering these types of benefits in their place.  
This phenomenon has been increasing in Italy for some time. Recent examples in Italy include: the 
eyewear company Luxottica, which has created the most comprehensive system of occupational 
welfare in Italy; SEA, which operates Milan’s airport system, and the employers’ association 
Unindustria Treviso, which has created a system of regional welfare. The development of 
occupational welfare in Italy has been encouraged by the state through the provision of fiscal 
incentives, which grant tax exemptions on worker benefits (Maino and Mallone 2012). 
 
This section has attempted to show the effects of the ongoing crisis on unemployment benefit 
systems and pension systems, and the impact that this has had and is still having on social partner 
involvement in these systems. Governments have been under pressure to carry out cost-saving 
reforms in the context of austerity, within the context, in the case of pension provision, of an 
ongoing need to respond to demographic developments. The social partners have, in many cases, 
been opposed to government plans, and have on occasion managed to influence policy, but the 
sheer speed of events and the need to push through reforms immediately has meant that the 
influence of the social partners in many cases has been limited. This is in line with the conclusions 
of chapters 3 and 4, which document a move towards centralisation and unilateralism. Nevertheless, 
there appears to be scope for increased social partner influence on the development of second and 
third pillar pension provision, which is increasing and will need effective regulation in the future.  
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6.7 Conclusions and future developments 
The social partners will continue to play a part in the formulation and administration of 
unemployment benefit and pension policy, although the extent of their influence is likely to vary 
depending on factors such as national history and culture, embeddedness of tripartism and the 
nature of industrial relations culture. While national systems remain fluid to a certain extent, 
responding to a range of internal and external pressures, one common feature across all Member 
States is that governments are currently trying to stabilise their welfare and benefits systems in 
response to demographic and economic issues, many of which are now being exacerbated by the 
crisis.  
The future looks somewhat uncertain at the time of writing, given the ongoing economic crisis in 
the eurozone countries and continuing concerns over the levels of sovereign debt and the need to 
pursue austerity. There are, however, a number of identifiable trends that are linked to the current 
economic environment.  
Continuing austerity and public spending cuts have led to changes in tax, benefit and pensions 
systems in many EU Member States (for more discussion of the effects of austerity, see chapter 4). 
Generally in the EU, changes to unemployment benefit systems include a reduction in the level or 
duration of benefits paid or tightening up of eligibility criteria. Pension reforms that were already in 
train in response to demographic trends are now more urgent in the context of the crisis. These 
reforms generally centre on a reduction of state provision. Linked to this, it is likely that second- 
and third-pillar pension provision will continue to grow, in order to compensate for cutbacks in 
first-pillar state provision. Systems that rely primarily on contribution-based financing are more 
conducive than tax-based systems to the achievement of stable public finances in difficult economic 
times, as they focus on keeping employment stable, this being their main source of revenue 
(Wagner 2009). Overall, therefore, this means a trend towards the increasing privatisation of public 
welfare benefits, translating into an ongoing growth in the level of second- and third-pillar benefits.  
All of these developments represent significant challenges for the social partners. Governments are 
clearly under pressure to find solutions to, on the one hand the very acute challenges posed by the 
crisis, and on the other hand the longer-term challenges posed by demographic and economic shifts. 
Seeking consensus with stakeholders such as the social partners is one way of achieving this. 
Nevertheless, the social partners will need to develop strategies to ensure that they remain at the 
negotiating table when governments are formulating rapid responses to the crisis. The development 
of second- and third-pillar pension provision represents a real opportunity for the social partners to 
become major stakeholders in reform. However, they need to carve out a longer-term strategy in 
response to this, in order to ensure their position as players in the development of this kind of 
provision, rather than relying simply on state regulation. 
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Chapter 7: European social dialogue developments 2010 – 2012 
 
European social dialogue supports and enriches the social dimension of the European Union by 
constituting a significant and attractive forum for negotiations, consultations and discussions. It 
facilitates communication and enables social partner consultations, joint actions and 
negotiations. The past two years have proved the importance of the European social dialogue, 
with the increasing number of social dialogue committees, numerous projects conducted and 
more than seventy common texts adopted by the social partners, including four agreements 
setting minimum standards. 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The two years since 2010 have been turbulent times for Europe. In the midst of a severe economic 
and financial crisis that is exerting a heavy social cost and increasing unemployment, European 
social partners have addressed difficult, sometimes conflicting policy issues in the search for 
common agreed solutions, thereby demonstrating the value of  dialogue between management and 
labour at EU level. In times of crisis the EU's task of promoting the role of social partners at 
European level, as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), takes 
on special significance and importance. 
The Treaty mandates the European Commission with facilitating the dialogue between the social 
partners, i.e. the representatives of management and labour. This is achieved in the framework of 
the cross-industry social dialogue committee and some 40 social dialogue committees for different 
sectors of the economy. In these committees, employers' organisations and trade unions 
autonomously decide on their work programme and the issues they wish to address. The committees 
are the place for consultations, discussions and joint actions of the social partners. If the social 
partners wish, the committees also provide a forum for negotiations leading to binding agreements, 
which could become EU legislation (see box 7.1 for details). 
 
Box 7.1 The principles of European social dialogue 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) recognises the importance of the 
social dialogue between management and labour and states explicitly in Article 152 that "the Union 
recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity 
of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their 
autonomy." The Treaty acknowledges as well the role of the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth 
and Employment which meets at least once a year and brings together representatives of the 
Council Presidency, two subsequent Presidencies, the European Commission and the social 
partners, who are divided into two delegations of equal size comprising 10 workers' representatives 
and 10 employers' representatives. Furthermore, Article 154 TFEU obliges the Commission to 
promote and support the consultation of management and labour at the European level. The 
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Commission must consult the social partners twice on each legislative proposal in the fields of 
social policy: first on the possible direction of EU action, and in a second stage on the content of the 
Commission's proposal. In respond to either a first- or second-stage consultation, the social partners 
have the right to inform the Commission that they wish to start formal negotiations on the given 
subject. If they decide to do that, the social partners have nine months to reach agreement, during 
which the Commission suspends its work on the proposal. The nine month period can be extended 
if needed and agreed with the Commission.  
The social partners can negotiate binding agreements at EU level either in response to a 
Commission consultation or on their own initiative. According to Article 155 TFEU, agreements 
reached by the social partners can be implemented in two ways. First, agreements can be adopted 
"in accordance with procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member 
States", which means that the social partners are responsible for implementing agreements at 
national level and in a way stipulated by national legislation or practice (autonomous agreements). 
This procedure can be used for autonomous agreements between the social partners on any subject. 
Second, on matters falling under Article 153 TFEU, the social partners can jointly request the 
Commission to submit their agreement to the Council which can adopt it by decision, making it 
legally binding in the EU. The European Parliament will be informed if this legislative procedure is 
used. If the social partners' agreement is adopted as a legislative act, the Member States are obliged 
to implement its provisions as in the case of other Directives and the Commission monitors the 
transposition process to the national legal systems. Article 153 of the Treaty also allows the 
Member States to entrust national social partners with the implementation of a Directive's 
provisions.  
In addition to European social dialogue at cross-industry and sectoral level, dialogue between the 
representatives of management and labour also takes place at the level of transnational companies, 
including through European works councils. Section 8.2.5 in chapter 8 provides basic information 
on these forms of social dialogue, while further details on transnational company agreements, 
including the 2012 Commission staff working document entitled "Transnational company 
agreements: realising the potential of social dialogue" are available online 
(http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&langId=en&intPageId=214). 
 
The continued attractiveness of European social dialogue for management and labour can be seen in 
the continuing interest in creating new sectoral social dialogue committees. One sector, the food 
and drink industry, launched its committee – the 41st European sectoral social dialogue committee – 
in early 2012. The social partners in the sports and active leisure sector are advancing towards the 
creation of a social dialogue committee, while organisations in the graphical and ports sectors are 
also working on setting up social dialogue committees. As a result the total number of social 
dialogue committees is expected to reach 44 in the near future (box 7.2). 
 
Box 7.2 New sectoral social dialogue committees 
In 2012, a new sectoral social dialogue committee was established for the food and drink industry, 
bringing the total to 41 sectoral social dialogue committees. The food and drinks industry had been 
the last industrial sector that was not covered by a European social dialogue committee. The first 
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meeting of the new committee took place on 23 January 2012. During this meeting, a work 
programme was agreed by the social partners, EFFAT and FoodDrinkEurope. The main priorities of 
the programme are employment and development of competition and policies affecting the food and 
drink sector. The committee is currently also examining the impact of the common agriculture 
policy on the sector. 
The consolidation of social dialogue in the sports and active leisure sector has again advanced. 
Social dialogue here dates from 2008, when the European Association of Sport Employers (EASE) 
and Uni Europa Sport mutually recognised one another as social partners for the sport and active 
leisure sector, including not-for-profit sport, professional sport and active leisure. On 17 June 2011, 
the two organisations signed a joint statement on the Informal European Sectoral Social Dialogue 
Committee for sports and active leisure, in which EASE and Uni Europa Sport reaffirmed the 
importance of having one European sectoral social dialogue committee for the whole sector, as is 
the case for professional football. The two organisations also validated the operational structure of 
the future committee. On 11 and 12 December 2012, the Commission has launched the start of a 
test phase for this sector. 
In the graphical sector, in 2011 Intergraf and UNI Europa Graphical submitted a project which 
aimed to continue the informal social dialogue between these two social partner organisations and 
prepare a formal request for the creation of a sectoral social dialogue committee for this industry. 
The graphical sector covers some 120,000 undertakings and around 710,000 workers in Europe 
(2009) and includes all types of printing activities, such as newspapers, books and packaging 
printing, as well as associated support activities, such as pre-press and pre-media services and book-
binding. The committee is expected to be formally established in 2013. 
In 2011 the EU social partners acting in the ports sector, ETF and International Dockworkers 
Council (IDC) on the workers side, and FEPORT and ESPO representing the employers, sent a joint 
letter to the Commission requesting the creation of a new social dialogue committee in this sector. 
Based on the assessment of the representativeness of these stakeholders, the ports social dialogue 
committee could be created in 2013. 
This chapter chronicles the developments in European social dialogue during the past two years, 
which have witnessed the signing of several social partner agreements, showing that social partners 
are increasingly making use of the space for European collective bargaining provided for in the 
Treaty. The past two years also continued to be dominated by the fallout from the financial and 
economic crisis. A wide variety of topics were dealt with in the framework of European social 
dialogue, ranging from restructuring to corporate social responsibility, health and safety at work and 
training issues. In addition to the own initiatives of social partners, the Commission consultations 
and social partners' involvement in impact assessments provide a basis for the work of the social 
dialogue committees. In the formal mechanism foreseen by the TFEU, the social partners were 
consulted three times over the past two years, namely on the need to adapt EU Directives in the 
field of health and safety at work to a Regulation on the classification, labelling and packaging of 
chemicals, on the review of the European Company Directive, and on a quality framework for 
trainees. Yet the role of social partners in the law-making process as consulted stakeholders goes far 
beyond these formal social partner consultations. In fact the expertise of the EU cross-industry and 
sectoral social partners is continuously sought by the Commission in many policy areas, reflecting 
  
 
 
 
262 
social partners' increasing role as consulted stakeholders in the preparation of legislative or strategic 
proposals (see also box 7.3). 
The chapter will start with a chronological presentation of the four sectoral social partner 
agreements reached in 2012. This is followed by an overview of the activities connected to the 
crisis, including the related topics of restructuring, training and skills. Section 7.3 summarises the 
work of the sectoral social dialogue committees in other fields, such as health and safety, corporate 
social responsibility and gender equality, while the final part of the chapter reports on an evaluation 
of past actions developed in the cross-industry social dialogue committee. 
 
Box 7.3 Social partner involvement in impact assessments 
In line with Articles 8-10 TFEU, the European Commission conducts comprehensive assessments 
of the potential impacts of all its policies and initiatives. Stakeholders are consulted in a systematic 
manner during the preparation of these impact assessments. The guidelines used in preparing the 
assessments highlight the obligation to consult European sectoral social dialogue committees in 
cases where the Commission initiative could be expected to entail social implications for the 
concerned sector(s). 
While based on available information, consultation of sectoral social dialogue committees is 
complementary to other forms of consultation, notably public consultations. It also differs from 
wider consultation of other actors of civil society in that social partners engaged in European 
sectoral social dialogue are recognised by the Commission as representative actors of the sector 
concerned. A possible joint position of the social partners in a sector can therefore give a strong and 
representative indication about realistic policies and their impacts and implementation. 
A consultation of a sectoral social dialogue committee on an impact assessment covers the 
underlying problem definition and baseline scenario, subsidiarity questions, the relevant policy 
options and, in the further process, the estimated social and employment impacts of the various 
options and possible accompanying or mitigating policy measures. Social partners are particularly 
well placed to provide detailed evidence and expertise for their sector, including data and other 
technical input, thereby contributing to the quality of both the impact assessment and the 
Commission's decision-making. 
 
7.2 Main developments in European social dialogue 
7.2.1 European social partner agreements 
The two-year period since 2010 has seen the signing of four sectoral social partner agreements: 
inland waterway transport, professional football, hairdressing and sea fisheries. For the agreements 
in waterway transport and hairdressing the social partners have requested implementation by 
Council decisions in accordance with Article 155(2) TFEU and the same request may be made by 
the social partners in the sea fisheries sector once their agreement is finalised. The Commission 
services are currently assessing the two finalised agreements with a view to deciding whether to 
present a proposal to the Council. In line with a well-established procedure, the Commission is 
examining the representativeness of the signatory parties and their mandate, the legality of all 
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clauses in the agreements in relation to existing EU law, and the provisions regarding SMEs. In the 
case of the agreements in the inland waterways transport and hairdressing sectors, negotiated on the 
own initiative of the social partners, the Commission is also assessing the appropriateness and value 
added of EU action in these respective fields, based on an estimation of costs and benefits. The 
agreement in the professional football sector will be implemented autonomously by the social 
partners according to the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States. Details of all four agreements are set out below. 
 
Inland waterway transport 
The agreement in the inland waterway transport sector concerns certain aspects of the organisation 
of working time. It was negotiated at the own initiative of the sectoral European social partners, 
who signed the agreement on 15 February 2012. The European Barge Union (EBU) and the 
European Skippers' Organisation (ESO) representing the employers' side, and the European 
Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) representing the workers' side, considered that the general 
Working Time Directive is not adapted to the needs of their sector (for example in the areas of 
reference periods and work organisation) and negotiated, between 2008 and 2011, an agreement 
which takes account of their sector's distinctive working conditions while ensuring a high level of 
protection for these workers' health and safety. It covers both crew members and shipboard 
personnel (for example hotel and catering workers on board ships). 
The agreement lays down important minimum rules: 
 total working time may not exceed 48 hours per week, though this may be averaged over up 
to 12 months 
 total night working time may not exceed 42 hours per week  
 a right to at least four weeks' paid annual leave, and to paid annual health checks 
 a right to at least 10 hours' rest every day (at least six hours must be uninterrupted) and at 
least 84 hours' rest in total every week. 
At the same time, the agreement provides some flexibility to suit the specificity of this sector. For 
example, the normal working day is eight hours, but daily working time may be longer, and some 
weekly rest days may be temporarily postponed, provided that the minimum standards set out above 
are always respected. 
 
Professional football 
On 19 April 2012, the EU social partners in the professional football sector signed an agreement on 
minimum requirements for standard players contracts. The agreement was the result of negotiations 
between the European sectoral social partners that started with the establishment of the Sectoral 
Social Dialogue Committee in 2008. The text was signed by the International Federation of 
Professional Footballers (FIFPro), the European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL), the 
European Club Association (ECA) – and UEFA, the governing body of European football. It is 
expected to be implemented in the EU, but also beyond the EU in all 53 UEFA countries.  
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The agreement is a significant achievement for the EU social dialogue in the professional football 
sector. Its main goal is to offer minimum social standards concerning players' contracts. To ensure 
that player contracts throughout Europe meet certain minimum standards, contracts must be in 
writing and registered and must be signed by the parent or guardian in the case of a minor player. 
Contracts must define the respective obligations of clubs and players. On the clubs' side, this 
includes provisions on regular payment of salaries, social security or paid leave and mandatory 
insurance coverage. The club must respect minimum wages for the players, if this has been agreed 
by social partners at national level. On the players' side, contracts must also refer to their duty to 
participate in training, to maintain a healthy lifestyle and to comply with disciplinary procedures. 
Standard contracts will also contain provisions on dispute resolution and applicable law. Further, 
the agreement provides that clubs and players will contractually commit themselves to act against 
racism and other discriminatory acts and to fight against doping in football. The agreement also 
contains provisions related to the protection of young sportspersons, in particular paragraph 6.5 
which obliges clubs to respect Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of 
young people at work and to ensure that every youth player involved in its youth development 
programme has the right to follow mandatory school education in accordance with national law and 
that no one is prevented from continuing their non-football education.  
The EU social partners in the professional football sector have committed themselves to 
autonomously implementing the agreement by using the most appropriate legal instruments as 
determined by the relevant parties at national level in the EU and in the remaining countries of the 
UEFA territory. The agreement has been accompanied by a joint letter stipulating that in a certain 
number of countries the standard of contractual protection is already above the standards provided 
for in the autonomous agreement and, consequently, no further action is required. The agreement 
should be implemented no later than three years after its date of signature in all countries 
concerned.  
The agreement, its implementation and monitoring is not only an expression of the autonomy of the 
social partners, but also of the autonomy of sport as recognised in the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Hairdressing 
The agreement of the social partners in the personal services (hairdressing) sector, Coiffure EU and 
UNI Europa Hair & Beauty, is a comprehensive framework agreement on the protection of the 
occupational health and safety of workers in the sector. It was signed on 26 April 2012 and aims to 
reduce the risk of occupational diseases and accidents in hairdressing, in order to protect the health 
and safety of workers. This is part of the overall objective of the EU sectoral social partners to 
increase the professionalism and profitability of the hairdressing sector. The negotiations on this 
agreement were launched on the own initiative of the European social partners and built upon their 
previous work on health and safety. 
There is scientific evidence that hairdressers are exposed to high risk of occupational disease, in 
particular skin diseases and musculoskeletal disorders. Hairdressers are affected by these diseases to 
a much greater extent than the general population. Therefore, since the establishment of the sectoral 
social dialogue committee in this sector in 1999, the social partners have worked on these issues, 
concluding a joint declaration ("covenant") on health and safety in 2005. New scientific research 
conducted since then documented continuing high rates of risk and uneven progress between and 
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within Member States. The European social partners also felt that the protection provided to 
consumers through the European cosmetics legislation was not sufficient to address the work-
related health risks of professional hairdressers. The social partners came to the conclusion, 
therefore, that only an EU-level agreement could bring about a sustainable improvement in the 
situation of occupational health and safety in hairdressing throughout the EU. 
The negotiations leading up to the agreement and its implementation are being accompanied by 
further joint action of the European sectoral social partners on the issue of health and safety. In the 
framework of the so-called "SafeHair" projects, co-financed by the European Union, they have 
partnered with the University of Osnabrück with the purpose of providing scientific advice for the 
content of the agreement and of developing didactical materials for its practical application. 
Furthermore the sectoral social partners will disseminate the agreement throughout the European 
Union through a series of regional workshops in 2013. 
The agreement builds on existing best practices in the Member States, where experience has been 
gained with the cost-effectiveness of the measures. It aims to set meaningful minimum standards to 
improve the situation EU-wide and addresses five main problem areas related to occupational health 
and safety in the hairdressing sector: 
1. Use of materials, products and tools with the aim of protecting the skin and respiratory tract: 
the agreement foresees that gloves should be worn for wet work, that a balance between wet 
and dry work should be organised, and that certain materials, products and tools should be 
substituted for safer alternatives whenever possible. 
2. Musculoskeletal disorders: the agreement specifies that a rotation of tasks should be 
organised whenever possible to avoid repetitive movements, that the most recent ergonomic 
practices should be taken into account when new equipment and tools are purchased, and 
that newly acquired treatment chairs should be height-adjustable. 
3. Working environment and organisation of work: the agreement stipulates that salons should 
have sufficient space, adequate ventilation, especially for workstations where chemical 
substances are transferred or mixed, and that adequate facilities and products for the hand 
hygiene of workers are available. 
4. Maternity protection: given the demographics of the hairdressing workforce, the agreement 
reiterates the importance of the protection of pregnant workers, in line with EU and national 
legislation, and stipulates that the employer and worker concerned should assess whether 
specific tasks can be carried out (in case of doubt a doctor should be consulted). 
5. Mental health and wellbeing: the agreement underscores the importance of social dialogue, 
the necessity to carefully plan working time and work organisation in the salon, and 
confirms the implementation of the European cross-industry social partners' framework 
agreement on work-related stress of 8 October 2004. 
The agreement in the hairdressing sector became the subject of much attention when several media 
outlets, especially in the UK, criticised and in some cases misrepresented its contents. For instance, 
several newspaper articles claimed that the agreement would lead to a ban on the wearing of high-
heeled shoes in hairdressing salons or to a limit to the number of haircuts that can be performed in a 
day, neither of which is true. The media attention was matched by growing political attention, with 
nine Member States and an Acceding Country expressing concerns about the agreement and asking 
  
 
 
 
266 
the Commission not to present it to the Council, on the grounds of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
At the same time, the Party of European Socialists, several Members of the European Parliament 
and many European trade union confederations, including the ETUC, criticised the initiative of 
these Member States and asked the Commission to continue the procedure as foreseen in the Treaty.  
The current debate around the hairdressers' agreement points to the need to improve and clarify the 
criteria to be used by the Commission in the assessment of social partners' agreements that are 
submitted to the Commission for implementation by means of a legislative instrument. Such criteria 
were defined most recently in a communication of 2002
100
. Since then new practices and methods 
of preparation of legislative proposals have been introduced in line with the principles of the Smart 
Regulation agenda. These involve inter alia the preparation of extensive ex ante impact assessments 
defining the problem, setting the objective clearly and comparing costs and benefits across a range 
of different policy options. The Commission has indicated that it would look at the ways in which, 
without undermining the autonomy of the social partners, the impact of future agreements should be 
evaluated, thereby enabling the Commission and the Council to make an informed decision. For its 
part, and in respect of the agreements that were submitted in 2012, the Commission will analyse 
their impact, including their benefits and costs, on the basis of all facts and figures available. The 
results of the assessments of the agreements in the hairdressing and inland waterway transport 
sectors should be available during the course of 2013. 
 
Sea fisheries 
With the objective of ensuring that fishers have decent conditions of work on board fishing vessels, 
in 2007 the International Labour Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
adopted the Work in Fishing Convention (C188). Its provisions address minimum requirements for 
work on board, conditions of service, accommodation and food, occupational safety and health 
protection, medical care, and social security. The ILO Convention has been adopted by all 27 
Member States of the European Union.  
In order to ratify the Convention, both national and EU regulations need to be adopted. With regard 
to EU law, the Commission initiated a legislative process through the consultation of the social 
partners in 2007. Following a period of negotiations, the EU social partners acting in the sea 
fisheries social dialogue committee, ETF (representing workers) and Europêche and Cogeca (the 
employers’ representatives) signed an agreement on 21 May 2012 implementing the ILO Work in 
Fishing Convention. By concluding this agreement, the European social partners contribute to the 
systematisation of the social acquis communautaire in the fishing sector, with the aim of 
encouraging Member States to ratify the Convention and complete a European and global level 
playing field on the matter. The EU social partners have expressed the intention to ask for the 
Commission to present to the Council their agreement in order to implement it via a Council 
decision in accordance with article 155(2) TFEU. To this end, they sent to the Commission an 
official letter, by which they expressed their intention to revise their so-called autonomous 
agreement signed on 21 May 2012, so that it fully complies with the existing EU law and acquis 
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communautaire as far as working conditions, labour law, sea fisheries and maritime transport 
regulation are concerned.   
 
7.2.2 The crisis and European social dialogue 
7.2.2.1 Cross-industry social dialogue 
Employment 
Over the past two years increasing divergences have become apparent between the cross-industry 
social partners at EU level, in particular on the causes of the crisis, the austerity programmes and 
the economic policy mix. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has frequently 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the austerity policies which have been pursued at EU and national 
levels during the past two years and which, in its view, have paralysed growth, caused employment 
to deteriorate, increased inequalities and weakened confidence in the EU. At the Tripartite Social 
Summit on 1 March 2012 ETUC called for a new vision for Europe and announced that it would 
draw up proposals for a new social contract for Europe. On the employers' side, 
BUSINESSEUROPE welcomes the emphasis placed on growth and competitiveness by EU leaders. 
It emphasises the risk of the EU engaging in continuing cycles of low and slow growth and the need 
for determined action to restructure the EU economy through smart structural reforms, “even if 
some may be painful”. There is, however, consensus between the two sides on the potential added 
value of EU level social dialogue, acknowledged not only on the occasion of high-level meetings 
(such as the Tripartite Social Summit), but also in joint projects carried out throughout 2011, as 
well as in individual positions. 
Nevertheless, over the past months, the social partners have reached something of a consensus in 
relation to their responses to the crisis at EU level: both sides consider that the first political priority 
at EU level should be restoring growth and jobs. Both workers and employers' organisations believe 
that creating the conditions for strong investment and concrete actions at EU and national level to 
boost growth and support job creation should be the overarching objectives of the European Union's 
future political agenda. The social partners support a policy mix and believe that they should play a 
role in this policy mix. They state that they are ready to contribute to the design of reforms if these 
reforms lead to restoring growth, jobs, competitiveness and social cohesion. 
 
Box 7.4 The negotiations on working time 
The cross-industry social partners at EU level began negotiations in December 2011 on a review of 
the Working Time Directive, which ended without an agreement in December 2012. The 
Commission will now need to decide whether it should still present a legislative proposal (based on 
its consultations and impact assessment work) during the current mandate.  
During the negotiations delegations agreed on keeping the process out of the media spotlight and 
that they would refrain from any interim statements while their talks continue. The general 
atmosphere was reported as constructive. Regarding scope, the employers' side wished to focus on 
on-call time and paid annual leave/sick leave, while the trade unions' side considered that all issues, 
including the opt-out from maximum working time, must be on the table.  
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In late July 2012 the cross-industry social partners sent a joint letter to Commissioner Andor, asking 
for the extension of time beyond the basic nine- month period mentioned in the Treaty, and 
indicating that their talks were making progress. On 14 August the Commission agreed to extend 
the period for the social partners' negotiations until 31 December 2012, when the social partners 
informed the Commission that they were not able to reach an agreement. 
In the past two years a number of important developments in the cross-industry social dialogue can 
be highlighted, including the adoption by the European social partners of their 4
th
 joint work 
programme covering the period between 2012-2014 and the launch of negotiations on working time 
(see box 7.4), which ended, however, without an agreement. Nevertheless, these are strong signs of 
the social partners' commitment to social dialogue at all levels. The 4
th
 joint work programme, 
which was adopted following three negotiation meetings, reflects the commitment of both sides to 
make their contribution to the shaping of a sustainable exit from the crisis. It foresees the launch of 
a reflection in the social dialogue committee on the role of social partners in the economic and 
social governance at EU level (see also box 7.5).  Moreover, it also foresees a joint analysis on the 
functioning of labour markets and on mobility and economic migration (two pillars of the EU's 
employment package). The programme includes the following: joint work on youth employment, 
including transitions from education to work; an analysis of the functioning of the European labour 
markets (targeting both short-term, crisis-related challenges as well as structural issues); follow-up 
work on gender equality; follow-up work on education and lifelong learning; mobility and 
economic migration; the consequences of the European economic governance on social dialogue at 
EU and national level; and a joint assessment of social dialogue instruments and capacity-building 
projects. 
Following the Commission's Communication on a Youth Opportunities Initiative in December 
2011, in January 2012 the members of the European Council called for immediate action targeted at 
youth unemployment, to be developed by Member States in a strong partnership with the social 
partners. Social partners welcomed this initiative and indicated their willingness to take part in its 
implementation. They considered the initiative to be a good basis, but underlined the need for more 
concrete measures in order to be effective. There was a general consensus that creating growth is a 
crucial step in tackling the crisis and that young people need to be fully involved in that exercise 
through active participation in the labour market. ETUC specifically highlighted that youth 
unemployment is a moral, social and economic issue. It believes that more funds are needed to 
coach young people, while mobility and stimulating young business starters are not necessarily the 
best means to tackle the issue. With its Youth Committee, ETUC has set up a focus group and will 
forward its recommendations for concrete measures to the Commission. 
On the employers’ side, BUSINESSEUROPE has advocated supporting youth entrepreneurship and 
particularly dual learning and apprenticeships. It believes that there is also a need for better 
matching the skills of young people with the skills needed by companies. BUSINESSEUROPE has 
established a taskforce on youth employment to look at concrete proposals on how the EU can 
better support apprenticeships and dual learning systems through the use of EU Funds. The 
document "Creating opportunities for Youth" puts forward recommendations to the EU institutions, 
the member states and the companies at EU and national level. 
According to the document, the EU should take a range of actions, including the allocation of a 
share of the European Social Fund and of the Erasmus for All programme to provide seed funding 
for Member States that wish to establish or reform their dual learning systems and support 
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European and national campaigns for changing the perception of vocational education and organise 
a regular forum for discussions on monitoring of the European apprenticeship strategy. The 
Member States are also encouraged to support and facilitate dual learning and apprenticeship 
systems, for instance through integrating work-based learning into the educational system. 
Employers' organisations are encouraged to take part in the governance of dual learning 
apprenticeship systems and contribute to the design of curricula and their adaptation over time. 
Furthermore, they should try to motivate companies to become involved in the dual system. Finally, 
companies should provide high-quality training and promote the take-up of apprenticeships by the 
younger generation. 
In the framework of their agreement on inclusive labour markets from 2010 the social partners have 
organised a large number of awareness-raising actions at national level. In some Member States, the 
social partners have focused on youth, for instance in Austria they have promoted joint projects 
targeted at accelerating youth integration into the labour market and in Denmark they have provided 
a significant contribution to improve the vocational and educational system.  
 
Box 7.5 The role of social partners in the new EU economic governance structures 
In his speech on the State of the Union in September 2011, President Barroso emphasised his intent 
to further develop EU social dialogue: 
To guarantee these fundamental values (of the Social Charter) in Europe, I believe we need to boost 
the quality of social dialogue at European level. The renewal of Europe can only succeed with the 
input and the ownership of all the social partners – of trade unions, of workers, of businesses, civil 
society in general 
More active involvement of the social partners in the EU governance has been the subject of debate 
at various occasions over the last two years: it was discussed at previous Tripartite Social Summits 
in 2011 and 2012 and was highlighted in a letter sent to the Commission by the French Ministers of 
Labour and of European affairs on 29 April 2011.    
There is wide consensus on the need to better involve social partners in the governance of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, in particular to ensure a contribution on the substance of debates. The 
Tripartite Social Summit is a major element of this governance. However, a more comprehensive 
discussion and involvement of social partners in the preparation of EU policy priorities is needed.  
A core document of the Europe 2020 governance is the Annual Growth Survey (AGS). In this 
context, the idea of consulting social partners on employment and social issues ahead of the AGS - 
through an exchange of views with the Commission on its analysis/proposals - is explored by the 
Commission together with the social partners. This would also be in line with the proposals made 
by French and German Ministers to improve the governance and provide the opportunity for an 
exchange with the social partners as part of the preparation of the AGS, at a decisive moment of the 
implementation of the strategy between the end of the European Semester and the beginning of the 
new cycle. The Commission shares the view of the Ministers that EU and national social partners 
should be further involved in the EU governance and in the implementation of national reform plans 
in the context of the European Semester 
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Through the AGS the Commission has emphasised the need for modernising wage-setting systems, 
so that wage developments better reflect developments in labour productivity and competitiveness. 
This is a necessary condition to reduce unemployment and favour correction of large 
macroeconomic imbalances that have materialised in a number of European countries. The role of 
social partners and collective bargaining has to be respected in the process. The Commission is 
engaged to promote and support social dialogue throughout the EU, while fully respecting the 
autonomy of the social partners and the diversity of national systems of industrial relations.  
The Employment Package, presented in April 2012, proposes to reinforce the involvement of the 
EU social partners in the European Semester, together with the reinforcement of multilateral 
surveillance in the area of employment policies and a strengthening of the link between 
employment policies and relevant financial instruments. Among other elements the Commission 
has put forward plans for EU-level exchanges of views and monitoring on wage developments. A 
first exchange with the social partners on wages developments at EU level took place at the end of 
January 2013.  
 
Flexicurity 
In May 2011 the European social partners completed a joint study on The implementation of 
flexicurity and the role of the social partners, the main purpose of which was to “jointly monitor the 
implementation of the common principles of flexicurity, notably in order to evaluate the role and 
involvement of the social partners in the process and to draw joint lessons.” A further aim was to 
promote greater trust and mutual understanding among the social partners to facilitate the 
implementation of the flexicurity principles at national level. The project specifically examined the 
impact of the crisis on the concept of flexicurity. 
Importantly, the study showed that if flexicurity is implemented in a balanced way, an 
overwhelming majority of employers and a certain majority of trade unions believe that it has the 
potential to provide win-win situations. At the same time, however, the project indicated that certain 
challenges remain, and not only those caused by the 2008 global financial and economic crisis. In 
particular, in countries where the past decade has been characterised by strong pressure towards a 
liberalisation of labour law regulations and more flexible forms of employment, it has proved very 
difficult for the social partners to develop a joint understanding and common view on flexicurity. 
The study uncovered rather worrying evidence from countries normally cited as models of 
flexicurity, namely the Netherlands and Denmark, where trade unions are concerned about negative 
effects of recent reforms and changes in the balance of flexibility and security in the labour market. 
The Dutch trade unions reject the concept of flexicurity and while the Danish trade unions are still 
convinced of the potential strength of this labour market model, they are concerned about the 
erosion of some of its major components. 
The major concern of trade unions in most countries is related to the imbalance of flexibility and 
security in today’s labour market, the polarisation between workers “inside” and at the “margins”, 
the increase in precarious forms of work and other trends of labour market segmentation. In this 
context, both trade union representatives and employers have stressed the need to define “modern 
social protection rights” that reflect the challenges and risks in today’s labour markets. Making the 
notion of flexicurity live for Europe’s small and micro businesses is also a major challenge that can 
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only be addressed by businesses, employers’ organisations, trade unions and the state working 
together to provide a positive and supportive environment for skills development and the 
management of individual and collective job transitions. 
 
7.2.2.2 Sectoral social dialogue 
The crisis and restructuring (see also box 4.2 in chapter 4) 
The social dialogue committee for local and regional government has adopted several joint 
opinions and statements on the crisis and restructuring. In December 2010, the social partners in 
this sector (the Council of European Municipalities and Regions Employers' Platform (CEMR-EP), 
representing municipal employers, and the European Federation of Public Service Union (EPSU), 
representing workers) issued a joint analysis on the impact of the economic crisis, followed by a 
common statement on the crisis in October 2011. In March 2012, as a reaction to the consultation 
on the European Commission's Green Paper on restructuring, CEMR-EP and EPSU adopted a 
common response. In their documents, the social partners remind decision makers to take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, and the fight against social exclusion in defining and implementing EU 
policy as set out in Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
CEMR-EP and EPSU expressed their concern about the current economic and social developments 
and jointly stated that: 
(1) The austerity policy followed by dramatic cuts in public services and investments has only 
contributed to the negative development in growth and employment and will continue to undermine 
labour markets and the social model of Europe. The current overriding concern in economic policy 
has been to foster economic stability and balance budget deficits at the expense of the public sector 
without reflecting on alternatives of public income. 
(2) As a result resources for local and regional government are being continuously cut, which leaves 
local and regional government with new and greater obligations to maintain quality local public 
services. Creating new financial burdens is risking a race to the bottom for the provision of these 
services to European citizens, and excluding the most vulnerable, the young, the elderly, the low-
skilled or the unemployed. 
(3) The European Council must take a long-term perspective, maintaining sustainable development 
in all its dimensions, when coordinating their responses to the crisis and to reflect this in their 
national reform plans, in order to ensure that local and regional governments are able to continue 
long-term planning and develop viable approaches. Strengthening, facilitating and enhancing the 
social dialogue, including finding innovative ways of cooperating, is vital in achieving this goal. 
CEMR-EP and EPSU also recall their joint statements from February and December 2010 
presenting a joint analysis on the impact of the economic crisis on local and regional government, 
which contained a range of key messages to the European Council on issues such as public 
spending, supporting sustainable employment, the positive role of public sector policies, access to 
finance, and balanced economic governance. 
The social partners in the local and regional government sector have also launched a common 
project entitled Future of the workplace: providing quality jobs, modern and sustainable 
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workplaces in local and regional government, which began in January 2012. The final objective 
was to develop a common European framework for action for municipalities and regions as 
employers, which was adopted in December 2012. This framework of action is composed of a 
series of six recommendations, which aim at contributing to a social and sustainable Europe at the 
local and regional level that supports the public sector as an employer. These recommendations 
concern the following issues: improving performance and securing necessary resources, recruitment 
and retention, skills and lifelong learning, gender equality, migration and providing sustainable 
workplaces.   
Similarly, in December 2011 the central government administrations social dialogue committee 
adopted a joint statement on the effects of the crisis. This followed a letter in June 2011 on the 
Europe 2020 strategy on jobs and growth and the Single Market Act to the President of the 
European Council and the President of the European Commission. In their contribution to the 
consultation on the Commission green paper on restructuring, the social partners in this sector, the 
Trade Unions' National and European administration Delegation (TUNED) and the European Public 
Administration Employers (EUPAE), welcomed the references to the important role that central 
administrations play both as an employer and service provider for Europe’s social cohesion, 
competitiveness and thus in tackling the effects of the crisis. They feel that this is particularly 
welcome as, in their view, this role has often been in the past underestimated or neglected in 
European policies. Further, they welcome the fact that the Green Paper recognises that public sector 
employees are affected by cutbacks across the EU, and thus that the impact of restructuring must be 
dealt with in the public sector as well as the private sector. The issue of the crisis and restructuring 
also runs through the committee’s work programme of 2011-2013. EUPAE and TUNED have also 
launched their first project since the creation of the sectoral social dialogue committee. The aim of 
this project, entitled Improving the Image of Central Government Administrations in Europe, is to 
enhance the attractiveness and image of the sector which faces austerity measures, restructuring and 
demographic changes. The final project conference took place in Prague on 4 October 2012.  
In December 2012, EUPAE and TUNED also signed a European Framework Agreement for 
Quality Service. Through this framework of actions, the European social partners in this sector 
commit themselves and their national affiliate members to implement public service values, 
including a high level of quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment, the promotion of universal 
access and of user rights, as set out in the protocol attached to the EU Treaties on services of 
general interest as well as the right to good administration enshrined in the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. To meet these requirements, 20 commitments were made by the European 
public employers and trade union representatives. They pledge, in particular, to enhance the 
efficiency of public services, and to ensure quality, cordiality, fairness and integrity, the quality of 
working life, trade union rights, and communication and transparency vis-à-vis users, and in the 
relationship between employers and employees. 
In December 2010, the social dialogue committee for hospitals and healthcare adopted a 
framework of actions on recruitment and retention. In this, the sectoral social partners – the 
European Hospital and Healthcare Employers' Association (HOSPEEM) and EPSU – reaffirmed 
that access to healthcare services for all is a fundamental human right and forms an essential part of 
the European social model. They also call upon all relevant actors to be committed to the effective 
functioning of healthcare services. This implies a multifaceted approach that has to take into 
account the various challenges different countries are experiencing in terms of healthcare shortages. 
These challenges are multiple and complex and include the ageing population, which increases the 
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demand for healthcare services and social services, coupled with an ageing workforce and 
difficulties in recruiting and retaining healthcare workers. Given the demanding nature of the work 
in this sector, ensuring an optimal working environment is particularly important in order to ensure 
that patients receive high-quality care. The financial and economic crisis affects the healthcare 
sector in different ways in different countries. In the view of the social dialogue committee, cuts in 
healthcare resources as applied in some Member States are short-sighted measures with detrimental 
consequences for public health, the availability of health care staff and infrastructures. To maintain 
and further improve the services, the committee urges Members States to maintain their autonomy 
and capacity to plan services and organise resources at local, regional and national level, with a 
view to securing and building the overall sustainability of healthcare systems. HOSPEEEM and 
EPSU commented as well on the Action Plan for the EU Health Workforce and issued a joint 
statement on the subject in September 2012. The Action Plan is a component of the so-called 
“Employment Package” which focuses on growth and employment in Europe. The social partners 
agree with the analysis of quantitative trends presented in the Action Plan and suggested several 
ways of improving the situation in the sector, for example, earmarking EU funds (ESF) in order to 
retain health workers in countries suffering from outward migration of these workers. 
In September 2010, the European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE) organised a 
conference on the impact of the economic crisis on the education sector, with contributions from 
the European Federation of Education Employers (EFEE) and the European Commission. The 
results of two surveys carried out in 2009-2010 and presented at the conference were very diverse, 
although the overall trend is worrying, in particular regarding public spending on education and on 
teachers' working conditions. The social dialogue committee established in June 2010 adopted its 
first joint opinion on education, training and research, entitled Investing in the future, in January 
2011. Programmes of fiscal consolidation should, in the opinion of the EU-level social partners in 
this sector, give priority to areas of spending that are an investment in the future, thereby supporting 
access to learning at all levels. Member States and employers should make the appropriate 
investments and organisational arrangements to ensure that all Europeans are provided with 
attractive opportunities for lifelong learning. While accepting that education should continue to be a 
national competence and that it should therefore not be regulated at European level, the social 
partners support the EU initiatives of mutual learning and coordination of policies, as well as EU-
funded education and training programmes. The social partners see it as their responsibility to work 
together to influence European initiatives so as to ensure that they are useful and practical. 
In April 2012 the social partners in the postal services social dialogue committee signed a new 
joint declaration on the evolution of their sector. It sets key principles to better guide the profound 
restructuring that is affecting all postal companies in Europe: anticipation of change, recognition 
that change management benefits from cooperation between social partners, development of the 
employability of workers and encouragement of investment in the postal sector. The declaration 
updates an earlier document dating from 2007 and builds upon the conclusions drawn from several 
projects co-financed by the EU, within which the European social partners in the postal sector set 
up a social observatory. 
In the postal sector social partners are also in continuous co-operation and information exchange 
with the Commission with regard to postal reform and sector developments. They play an important 
role in the Postal Users Forum organised by the Commission once per year in Brussels, where 
postal services users, postal operators and trade unions discuss the effects of postal liberalisation in 
direct dialogue with the Commissioner and/or high level representatives from the Commission. 
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Moreover, the social partners are contributing to the study on main developments in the postal 
sector 2010-2013 and to the 5
th
 report on the application of the Postal Directive, which will be 
published early 2014. 
The social dimension of the Energy 2050 Roadmap is a key issue for social partners in all energy-
related sectoral social dialogue committees. The Roadmap states that the transformation of the 
European energy sector will affect employment and jobs, require a modified approach to education 
and training and a more vigorous social dialogue. In order to efficiently manage the upcoming 
change, the involvement of social partners at all levels will be necessary in line with just transition 
and decent work principles. 
The sectoral social dialogue committee for the extractive industries regularly discusses the 
restructuring of the European energy sector and the challenges posed by the climate change. The 
European social partners in this sector have criticised Council Decision 2010/787/EU establishing a 
time limit for the financial support of uncompetitive coal mines, in so far as according to them, the 
strict rules for granting of closure aid impede the development towards a subsidy-free industry. The 
committee has also worked on the issue of shale gas, including the economic and environmental 
aspects of its exploitation and resource efficiency. In addition, it has engaged with the EU's 
initiative, a Resource-efficient Europe, which is part of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the EU's Energy 
2050 Roadmap and the EU's Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy by 2050. The social 
partners also issued a joint position on the European Parliament's report An effective raw materials 
strategy for Europe with the aim of presenting their opinion on the issue of taxation of raw 
materials. They also expressed their position regarding reuse, resource efficiency and recycling 
where technically, environmentally and economically feasible and encouraged innovation and 
sharing of proven best practice to increase resource efficiency. They believe that in the current 
difficult financial and economic climate, a further tax burden would be a wrong signal to recovery. 
Several existing studies on raw material taxation, at both European and national levels, demonstrate 
a mixed picture on the effectiveness of energy taxation. Therefore the social partners believe that a 
tax on mineral resources is not an adequate fiscal tool for increasing resource efficiency. 
The Budapest III declaration adopted in January 2012 expresses similar views of the social partners 
on the extraction and use of coal. Essentially the social partners support the position that the fight 
against climate change and maintenance of the European industrial base, and the competitiveness of 
European industry are not mutually exclusive goals. The social partners advocate the increased use 
of technology in tackling any environmental pollution that might result from coal mining, increased 
research and development spending in the mining sector, which has for many decades provided 
cheap energy and secure jobs for workers in many European countries. They also mention the use 
of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture readiness (CCR) technologies, which will 
help to make the extraction and use of coal cleaner in the future than it is today. According to the 
declaration, the above-mentioned Council decision 2010/787/EU limiting the financial support of 
uncompetitive coal mines should be changed, extending support beyond 2018 due to the changing 
geopolitical situation and the need to guarantee current energy prices, security of energy supply and 
provide secure jobs. The debate connected to this decision feeds into the larger debate about 
restructuring, environmental sustainability versus industrial competitiveness and the need to 
maintain growth and jobs in Europe. 
The social dialogue in the gas sector, similarly to the extractive industries, has been highly 
influenced by the process of restructuring of the European energy market. Structural changes in the 
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sector led to the problem of representativeness on the employers' side. The liberalisation of the 
energy market and the separation of transmission and distribution operation systems has increased 
the number of companies active in the sector. However, these are not represented in the sectoral 
social dialogue committee on gas as Eurogas remains the only employers' organisation participating 
in the dialogue. It is therefore not surprising that the committee has spent a lot of time looking into 
the future of the sector and examining its changing structure, including the fragmentation of the 
sector, the development of specific sectors of gas consumption, the security of supply concerns, 
relations between conventional and unconventional (shale) gas as well as how electricity and gas 
convergence has positive as well as negative effects. Other areas of interest are corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), the changing regulatory framework, including fragmentation of company 
structures and the value chain. The social partners in this sector have also issued a joint declaration 
on the Energy Roadmap 2050, pointing out that more attention should be paid to the social 
dimension of Europe’s energy policy, and particularly to its role in creating employment both 
directly in the energy sector and indirectly in the broader economy. They also stressed that the 
Roadmap should address in greater detail the issue of emerging skills and competency problems for 
the European labour market and the different energy sectors, including the gas industry. It is clear 
that a lack of skilled and competent staff will be a constraint on further development of the energy 
sector and energy services. 
The sectoral social dialogue committee in electricity has been dealing with ongoing restructuring in 
the European energy market. Following the publication of the Commission's Green Paper on 
restructuring, the social partners in this sector discussed a possible update of the 2008 toolkit on 
socially responsible restructuring and stressed that the Commission should respect the position the 
Treaty gives to the employers and trade unions and follow the established procedures. Moreover, 
employers emphasised the importance of addressing restructuring at the local level and pointed to 
the broader societal context. The Energy 2050 Roadmap and the envisaged restructuring in this 
triggered analyses on the social dimension of the transformation process, including issues of just 
transition, employment, skills and qualifications. In 2011, the social partners finalised a project 
entitled Towards a low carbon electricity industry: employment effects and opportunities for the 
social partners, which emphasised that the profound changes that are expected will be positive as 
well as negative and will cause significant shifts in employment between sectors: “In terms of 
number of jobs, studies consider an increase in the workforce of the electricity sector, but with 
differences between types of fuels. Coal- and oil-fuelled power plants will see their workforce 
reduce, while gas and renewables will increase." The development in the distribution field is more 
difficult to estimate. The social partners' joint position on smart meters 12/2010 notes that new 
technology can contribute to raising customers' awareness of their energy consumption, developing 
new products and services in the retail market and promoting a broader technological development 
of the network infrastructure (so‐called smart grids). 
The social partners in the electricity sector also asked the Commission for the inclusion of Just 
Employment Transition Principles in the Energy 2050 Roadmap. In a joint study, they indicated 
that “just transition can be seen as the transition (or shift) towards a more sustainable and 
environmentally-friendly economy, based on social dialogue between governments, employers and 
trade unions, in a way that promotes high economic growth and investment in low-carbon 
technologies, while ensuring a smooth social transition through adaptation and mitigation actions as 
well as through the development of skilling and reskilling programs (or just new skills) and the 
creation of quality jobs.” This approach is also in line with the agreement reached at the Climate 
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Change Summit in Cancun in December 2010, where the EU and other governments recognised the 
importance of ensuring a just transition, decent work and quality jobs. The social partners also 
commented on a public consultation on the external dimension of EU energy policy. In a joint 
position, they stated that the European Commission should recognise the dialogue between the 
social partners as a valuable contribution in Europe and in neighbouring countries to shaping the 
external dimension of EU energy policy and energy dialogue. Further, trade unions from several 
European Member Sates conducted a project on the relationship between the quality of social 
dialogue and nuclear safety. Social dialogue in the nuclear energy sector is always closely linked to 
the state and characterised by the prominent role of employee representations. This project stressed 
the role of maintaining a vibrant social dialogue in times of restructuring, the end of former 
monopolies and increased reliance on subcontracting. 
 
Since 2008, the social dialogue committee for the live performance sector has been discussing the 
impact of the crisis on this sector. The economic slowdown has placed the sustainability of this 
sector under pressure due to the consequences of austerity for public finances. In May 2009, the 
social partners adopted a joint statement, expressing their concerns and calling for sustained public 
funding support for the performing arts. In January 2011, the social partners sent a joint letter to the 
Dutch authorities, conveying their concerns about what they considered to be alarming plans for the 
future funding of the performing arts in the Netherlands, urging the Dutch government to reconsider 
its intentions. In December 2012, the social partners of the live performance committee were among 
the signatories of an open letter of the International Cultural Industry Associations to the Spanish 
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, as well as the European Parliament and the Commission, protesting 
against the Spanish government's intentions to abolish the reduced VAT rate applicable to 
admissions to cultural activities such as cinema, live music events and theatre. The organisations 
concerned claim that this will lead to a reduction of investments in the entire Spanish cultural sector 
and will destroy thousands of jobs. 
 
Employment, industrial policy and competitiveness 
Against a background of continuing economic uncertainty in many parts of the EU, the related 
topics of industrial policy, the competitiveness of economic sectors, the employability of the 
workforce and the challenge of demographic change have continued to receive special attention in 
social dialogue. 
An agreement on competence profiles for process operators and first line supervisors in the 
chemical industry was signed by the social partners in this sector – ECEG and EMCEF – on 15 
April 2011. This framework of action was the outcome of a project managed jointly by the two 
social partners, and includes the definition of minimum core competences for the two job profiles 
and a commitment by their national member organisations to report annually on all implementation 
actions. On 20 March 2012, ECEG and EMCEF also adopted a joint opinion on the proposal for a 
Directive on energy efficiency, with the aim of ensuring the global competitiveness of the European 
chemical industry. 
In the civil aviation social dialogue committee, three of the recognised social partners, representing 
airports, independent ground handlers and workers (ACI-Europe, the International Aviation 
Handlers' Association (IAHA) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation, ETF), adopted a 
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joint opinion on the consultation regarding the potential impact of new Commission proposals on 
ground-handling services. Although the airlines could not subscribe to the end result, the 
achievement of this Statement on the revision of the ground handling directive of 7 April 2011 was 
considered to be an important step forward in the social dialogue in this sector. The signatory 
parties called for improvements to the current tender system and for a social clause on transfer of 
staff in case of partial or total loss of activity. The Commission proposal, published on 1 December 
2011, is now being discussed by Council and Parliament. 
In November 2011, the European social partners from the air traffic management (ATM) working 
group jointly organised a conference on The role of the European Social Dialogue in the 
implementation of the Single European Sky, during which they signed a declaration in which they 
outlined their future work. In their joint conference statement, the ATM social partners set out a 
number of aims to address the social challenges that the industry is facing: to maintain and enhance 
safety across Europe; to ensure a sustainable European aviation industry through the 
implementation of the Single European Sky, and to make it a success story; to improve industrial 
relations through the continued improvement of social dialogue based around agreed principles; and 
to contribute to deliver an efficient ATM industry. 
The European social partners in the rail sector (the Community of European Railways and 
Infrastructure Companies (CER), the European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) and ETF) have 
been working on the challenges of demographic change in the context of the project Employability 
in the face of demographic change - prospects for the European rail sector. The result is a guide 
with more than 30 examples of good practices, addressing the issue of demographic change and 
employability in European railway companies. These actions focus on the areas of recruitment and 
retention, education and training, further education and qualifications, health promotion, and 
appropriate working conditions for the various life phases. In addition, the guide includes the 
outcomes and evaluation of a survey that was carried out during the course of the project. A total of 
35 European railway companies and trade unions participated in this survey. Given the advanced 
average age of the workforce in many of the companies surveyed (34% of the workers are older 
than 50) and the difficulties for certain occupational groups, almost 80% of these companies expect 
that demographic change will impact on recruitment in their companies. At the same time, however, 
age-specific actions have not yet spread very widely among railway companies. 
Similar to many other economic sectors of activity, the European insurance sector is exposed to a 
process of far-reaching change, which to a large extent is driven by demographic developments. 
The creation of socio-economic conditions that will allow both employees and employers to keep 
pace with this changing environment represents a huge challenge for Member States, the EU 
institutions and the social partners. The social partners in the insurance sector decided on a very 
wide approach to the demographic challenge, including not only age-related human resources 
policies but also work-life balance in wider sense, qualifications, lifelong learning, health and 
safety. A project entitled Addressing the Demographic Challenge in the European Insurance 
Sector: A Collection and Dissemination of Good Practices is the first project dealing with the 
demographic challenge in the insurance sector from a pan-European perspective.  It aims to raise 
the attractiveness of the sector by sharing and disseminating good practices and therefore includes 
the publication of a booklet of good practices, a conference in June 2012 and a seminar in 
September 2012. It is a major step forward in the follow-up to the Insurance sectoral social dialogue 
committee joint statement of January 2010. The good practices collected for inclusion in the booklet 
will be selected on the basis of their originality and innovative character. The project is also directly 
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linked to the Europe 2020 strategy and the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity 
between Generations 2012. The Commission has welcomed the priority given by the European 
social partners in this sector to key issues such as demographic change, work/life balance, lifelong 
learning and health and safety, noting that their contribution is crucial for the European Union to 
meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy.  
The subject of active ageing was also discussed by the social partners working on common 
guidelines in the hospitals and healthcare sector. Further, the social partners in the chemical 
sector adopted general remarks in January 2011 on the Commission's Green Paper towards 
adequate, sustainable and safe European pension systems. The European Chemical Employers 
Group (ECEG) and the European Mine, Chemical and Energy workers' Federation (EMCEF) state 
that they subscribe to the most of the targets presented in the Commission's document, however, 
they perceive some specific goals to be inadequate, particularly the provisions on occupational 
pension schemes. Furthermore, the social partners expressed their disagreement with the procedure 
followed by the Commission and argued that they were insufficiently consulted on the issue. The 
social partners did, however, note that the existing institutions concerning pension policy at the 
European level are sufficient. 
 
The sectoral social partners in the temporary agency work sector, the European Confederation of 
Private Employment Agencies (Eurociett) and UNI Europa, prepared and launched a joint project 
on Temporary agency work and transitions in the labour market. The project aims to assess the 
possible role of the sectoral social partners in facilitating transitions in the labour market (from 
education to work, from unemployment to work, and from different types of labour contracts). It 
looks at the profile of temporary agency workers (skills level, age, gender, main sectors in which 
they work) and at the career of temporary agency workers (for example, the situation before and 
after temping, average length of assignment, types of labour contracts offered to them, quality of 
transitions and applicable working conditions). The project also aims to find out to what extent 
some agency workers might be in a precarious situation, focusing in particular on women, migrant, 
low-skilled and older workers. In a further development, during the past two years the social 
partners in this sector have supported their national members during the implementation phase of 
Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work. In close cooperation with their global 
counterparts, Eurociett and UNI Europa also promoted the ratification of ILO Convention 181 on 
Private Employment Agencies as a relevant international framework for regulation on temporary 
agency work and as a way to promote decent work. The final conference of the project took place in 
December 2012. 
In April 2012, the social partners in the commerce sector issued a joint contribution on social issues 
for the European Retail Action Plan which is being prepared by the European Commission. The 
main policy objective of a this Action Plan is to ensure a consistent and systemic approach to the 
treatment of issues identified as hampering the provision of more efficient and fair retail services in 
Europe. In their contribution, the social partners call upon the Commission and the Member States 
to: promote social dialogue, collective bargaining and the development of free and democratic trade 
unions and employers organisations across the EU; promote and fund initiatives for improving 
health and safety at the workplace and fostering a more inclusive labour market; take all possible 
action to fight the use of undeclared work, while reducing administrative burdens, especially for 
SMEs, as an incentive to develop regular activities; support projects aimed at identifying skills 
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needs and mismatches; and provide the necessary funding for investments in education and training, 
including for the development of systems for the recognition of skills acquired on the job. 
In September 2011, taking forward the work of its working group on demographic challenges, the 
social partners in the education sector launched a joint project on recruitment and retention of 
teachers. Many Member States are facing shortages of teachers, notably for certain subject matters 
and at disadvantaged and remote schools. In addition, concerns are being raised regarding the 
evolution of the quality of the teaching workforce. The project's objective was to examine the 
current situation and existing national policies regarding recruitment and retention in the education 
sector in order to develop a joint approach among the social partners to respond to the main 
challenges. The resulting recommendations, endorsed at the committee's plenary meeting in 
November 2012, called upon the social partners to: continue to monitor this serious issue and to 
build on and consolidate these results in their future work, with a possibility of looking for further 
projects on exchange of national practices; consider strategies to address job insecurity and its 
negative consequences; remind national policy makers and decision makers of their full 
responsibility in this respect, notably by developing new strategies aimed at increasing the 
attractiveness of the teaching profession and enhancing the image and the public perception of the 
teaching profession; launch and engage in a cross-sectoral dialogue with other stakeholders, as 
recruitment and recruitment issues do not only affect the education sector. 
In the metal industry, the Council of European Employers of the Metal, Engineering and 
Technology-Based Industries (CEEMET) and the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF) issued 
a declaration on 2 December 2010 calling for high-quality vocational education and training (VET) 
as prerequisite for a competitive and sustainable European industrial base. These social partners 
also formed an ad-hoc working group on competitiveness and employment in a globalised 
economy, which issued a declaration stressing their determination to work together towards the 
realisation of the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy in their sector on the same day. On 14 March 
2011, they unveiled a tool to attract people to educational pathways that lead to the metal, 
engineering and technology-based industry. On Further, on 15 April 2011, they went on to publish a 
joint opinion on the Commission Communication on an Industrial Policy for the globalisation era, 
focusing on the challenges associated with the skills base, restructuring, and improving framework 
conditions for industry. Skills and training remained at the top of their agenda, as they formulated 
another joint opinion on 27 October 2011, calling for an increased permeability between VET and 
higher education. On 30 November 2011, they presented a tool-box for recovering and 
strengthening competitiveness and safeguarding sustainable employment in the European metal 
industry. Finally, in 2012, EMF and CEEMET, working with a number of employers' organisations 
in the automotive sub-sector completed the first phase towards an establishment of a sectoral skills 
council. 
In the steel sector, EMF and the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (EUROFER) 
issued out a joint opinion on industrial policy in June 2009, which addresses the challenges of an 
energy-intensive industry in sustainable development. These challenges were also the topic of the 
European Steel Day organised by EUROFER with the participation of the EMF and the European 
Commission in Brussels on 28 June 2012. 
In the shipbuilding industry, EMF and the Community of European Shipyards' Associations 
(CESA) adopted a joint opinion on 8 December 2010 on a review of the framework on state aid to 
shipbuilding. The social partners took an active part in the consultations leading to a review of the 
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EU's flagship policy towards the sector under the title LeaderSHIP 2020. To raise the profile of the 
industry and its attractiveness among employees and job-seekers, CESA held an event on the 
occasion of the European Maritime Day in Gothenburg on 22 May 2012. 
In the construction sector, on the basis of their work programme, the social partners are working on 
the following themes: attractiveness of the sector to young workers; competiveness; and a climate 
friendly construction industry. The social partners adopted a range of documents concerning 
employment in the sector, such as a joint opinion on self-employed and bogus self-employed people 
in February 201; a joint position paper on the Directive on conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfers in February 2011 and 
January 2012; and a joint proposal for improving the application and the enforcement of the posting 
or workers Directive (96/71/EC) in July 2011 and December 2012.  
The sectoral social dialogue committee for sea fisheries expressed its opinion concerning the 
problems currently facing the fishing industry in Europe. The social partners were of the view that 
they were not properly consulted in the preparation of impact studies on changes in the Common 
Fisheries Policy, despite the risk that they see of the suggested modifications leading to a reduction 
in the number of jobs, vessels and fishing quotas. Furthermore, they argue that significant reduction 
in quotas for some species of fish was decided without assessing their impact. Finally, the social 
partners noted that regulation aimed at curbing illegal fishing is very complicated and causes 
problems for fishers. They requested that the Commission and Member States simplify these rules 
to make them more comprehensive. 
 
Skills and Training 
Many sectoral social dialogue committees continued their work on training and skills development. 
On 6 December 2011, the European sectoral social partners in the textile, clothing and leather 
(TCL) sectors agreed to establish a European Council for Education and Employment in Textile 
Clothing Leather. The objective of this "EU TCL Skills Council" is to foster the enhancement of the 
networking of the various European Textile Clothing and Leather Observatories and education and 
labour market stakeholders and to promote synergies for a better, more sustainable and more 
competitive European TCL industry. By bringing together corporate executives, owner-operators of 
smaller firms, employees, union leaders, educators and government representatives in a network 
that will inform the policy recommendations of the TCL European social partners, the skills council 
will be addressing a wide range of issues related to technological change, qualification standards, 
labour development planning, and human resource development. The EU TCL Skills Council is the 
first skills council to be set up by European sectoral social partners. 
In the road transport sector, the International Road Transport Union (IRU) and ETF, together with 
partners, have undertaken a joint social partner project on training in the commercial road transport 
sector, covering mobile and non-mobile employees of road transport companies (the "STARTS" 
project – Skills, Training and the Road Transport sector). The social partners recognise the 
indispensability of high-quality training for developing an efficient, properly skilled, safe and 
sustainable workforce in commercial road transport. In recent years the sector's workforce has had 
to expand rapidly and improve its range of skills to respond to numerous changes to the working 
environment and increasingly complex legal, operational, and product-related requirements. They 
believe that it is in the mutual interest of both employers and workers to identify what is needed to 
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optimise the positive impact of training in the road transport sector and to ensure that it can be 
delivered in the most effective and efficient way. The objective of the project is to determine the 
main challenges and best solutions for improving the provision of training to drivers and other 
workers performing certain non-mobile, logistics-related tasks. On 24 October 2012, the social 
partners adopted the conclusions and recommendations of the STARTS project. 
In the context of an EU-funded research project (PLATINA) in support of the inland waterway 
transport action programme NAIADES, the social partners in inland waterway transport are 
involved in the work package on jobs and skills for which they provided input on the harmonisation 
of job profiles based on professional competencies for operational and management level. This 
work will feed into future standards of training and certification in inland navigation. 
In maritime transport in the framework of the EU-funded project Enhancing Recruitment and 
Training in the European Shipping Industry, ETF organised three workshops and a final conference 
during the course of 2009 and 2010. The objective of this project was to identify ways to attract 
young people to a seafaring career and to develop a more stimulating career path and mobility 
within the maritime cluster. The ETF report served as a basis for adopting a related ETF policy on 
training and recruitment in the maritime industry. 
The social partners in the postal services sector launched a joint project to investigate the impact of 
the introduction of new technologies on skills needs in their sector. The project builds on the joint 
declaration on training and skills development from 2006 and examines how skills and jobs are 
matched in European postal companies against the backdrop of profound restructuring affecting the 
postal sector.  
The social partners in the hospitals and healthcare sector in March 2011 submitted a joint 
response to public consultation on the Directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications 
(2005/36/EC). Three issues were identified as key objectives which need to be guaranteed when 
updating the Directive: health and safety of patients; quality of service provision in health and 
social care; and the high level of qualification and professional standards for the healthcare 
workforce. The European social partners emphasised their interest in being involved and their 
availability to participate throughout the further consultation and legislative process. 
After having completed the mapping exercise on existing and emerging observatories on 
employment and training and a feasibility study, the social partners in the commerce sector entered 
at the end of 2011 the second phase of the creation of a European sector council on employment and 
skills. At the final conference, held on 5 December 2012, the social partners agreed on the 
establishment of a skills council. The aim of this is to foster a better understanding of the impact on 
skills needs of challenges faced by the commerce sector, such as the introduction of ICT, 
globalisation and emerging markets. It will also aim better match demand and supply of training, as 
well as the offer and demand on the labour market. 
In January 2011, the social partners in the education sector adopted Joint Guidelines on Trans-
regional Cooperation in Lifelong Learning among Education Stakeholders. These guidelines were 
drawn up in the context of a joint project by EFEE, ETUCE and the Organising Bureau of European 
School Students Unions (OBESSU). They aim to identify the critical factors for successful 
implementation by all interested and involved parties of the national lifelong learning (LLL) 
strategies. They provide guidance on: how to improve school education contribution to the 
achievement of key competences for LLL; how the needs of learners and education practitioners are 
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to be included in the national LLL strategies; and how to successfully involve all stakeholder 
groups in the implementation of the national LLL strategies. These guidelines are being 
disseminated and promoted among the relevant European, national, regional and local stakeholders 
and their impact will be evaluated after two years. 
In November 2011, the EFEE, in partnership with the ETUCE, concluded a project on Leadership 
and governance in schools as instruments for improving students' results and preparing them for 
lifelong learning. In addition to its contribution to general education objectives, this project 
contributed to the identification and development of the skills needed by school leaders in the 21
st
 
century, and hence to the adaptation of the workforce to a changing environment. The conclusions 
of the project will feed into discussions in the context of the European Policy Network on School 
Leadership, in which EFEE and ETUCE are partners. 
The live performance sector will take part in one of the "reference groups" for the development of 
the European Skills, Competences, Qualifications and Occupations (ESCO) taxonomy, which will 
describe the most relevant skills, competences and qualifications needed for several thousand 
occupations. To ensure that ESCO meets the needs of its users, interested parties, such as 
employment services, social partners, companies, education and training institutions and developers 
of job search web tools, have been invited to take part in its development. In order to ensure the 
visibility and accurate description of the live performance sector's occupations, the social partners 
in this sector have taken up this invitation. 
The mapping of skills has also been conducted by the social partners in the gas and electricity 
sectors. Two parallel joint projects were implemented to analyse national activities and institutions 
dealing with skills and qualifications, and labour market research that is focused on the gas and 
electricity sectors. The aim of the projects was to assist the social partners in identifying existing 
work that can benefit the European social dialogue and provide insight into the potential of 
European sector skill councils. The social partners from the extractive industries sector also 
monitored the Commission proposal on the establishment of sector skill councils, as well as the 
New Skills for New Jobs initiative. 
Responding to a call for proposals of the Commission in the context of its New Skills for New Jobs 
initiative, the social partners in the audiovisual and live performance sectors launched a project 
that aims to map sectoral actors across the EU that are involved in skills analysis and forecasting as 
well as education and training. The resulting report, which was finalised in November 2012, will be 
the basis for a decision by the respective social dialogue committees on whether to create a sector 
council on employment and skills – be it separate councils or one council covering the two sectors. 
Such a sector skills council should improve the anticipation of future skills needed in the sector(s) 
concerned, contribute to better matching between skills and labour market needs, and bridge the gap 
between the worlds of education and work. 
In the construction sector the Bricklayer project (2008-2010) has investigated the possibilities, 
means and problems associated with implementation of the European Qualifications Framework 
(EQF), the European Credit System for Vocational Education and Training (ECVET) and the 
development of a sectoral qualifications framework in relation to bricklaying.
101
 The sector is also 
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working on a feasibility study to set up EU Sector skills Council for Construction (2011-2012) 
under the Progress programme. 
In agriculture, the social partners continue to develop and implement a passport for skills called 
Agripass.
102
 The Employer's Group of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European 
Union (Geopa-Copa) is running a project on vocational training of agricultural workers aimed at 
developing skills necessary to facilitate the mobility of workers. The European Federation of Trade 
Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT) is developing a project on quality 
employment in a sustainable agriculture. Social partners are currently running a joint project on the 
impact of the future common agriculture policy on employment in the sector of agriculture.  
The social partners in the personal services/hairdressing sector are continuing with the 
implementation of their 2009 autonomous agreement establishing European hairdressing 
certificates. The social partners have clarified the administrative aspects and are ready to award the 
first European hairdressing certificates in the near future to hairdressers fulfilling the qualification 
requirements. 
The social partners in the hotel and restaurant (HORECA) sector (EFFAT and the Confederation 
of National Associations of Hotels, Restaurants, Cafés and Similar Establishments in the European 
Union and European Economic Areas, HOTREC), are running a project on  the implementation of 
the European Qualification and Skills Passport, which will be integrated into EURES. Further, the 
HORECA sector is in the preparatory phase of the possible setting up of an employment and skills 
council. It is also involved in the ESCO initiative, with the establishment of a reference group.  
 
Box 7.6 Financial support: the social dialogue and industrial relations budget lines 
The European Commission’s promotion of European social dialogue includes financial support, 
mainly in the form of grants to social partners and other industrial relations stakeholders. On the 
basis of Article 154 TFEU, the most important financial programmes are the three headings in the 
EU budget earmarked for: industrial relations and social dialogue; information and training 
measures for workers' organisations; and the information, consultation and participation of 
representatives of undertakings. Further details on these funding opportunities can be found on the 
following website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=86&langId=en. 
Industrial relations and social dialogue 
This budget heading supports the European social partners and other organisations active in the 
field of industrial relations in contributing to addressing the overarching EU employment and social 
policy challenges as laid down in the Europe 2020 strategy and in connection with EU initiatives to 
address the consequences of the economic crisis. 
Each year, through a call for proposals with two application deadlines, the Commission supports 
around 80 projects led by the social partners and other organisations active in the field of industrial 
relations. These projects cover activities linked to the work programmes of the European cross-
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industry and sectoral social dialogue committees, as well as measures to strengthen the social 
partners’ capacity, especially in the new Member States and candidate countries, and which 
contribute to the development of European social dialogue (excluding national capacity-building 
activities, which can be funded under the European Social Fund). 
The total funding available under this budget heading in 2012 is EUR 16.5 million. Of this, around 
EUR 13.5 million will fund projects through the call for proposals. Other activities supported in 
2012 include studies in the field of industrial relations and social dialogue, meetings of the 
European social partners, including the cross-industry and sectoral social dialogue committees, and 
a joint project with the International Labour Organisation, which will cover social partner capacity-
building and training, and industrial relations analysis. 
Information and training measures for workers’ organisations 
This budget heading provides support for information and training measures for workers’ 
organisations carried out by European, national and regional workers’ organisations. Each year, 
through a call for proposals with one application deadline, the Commission supports around 25 
projects in this field. This budget heading also provides support to the European Trade Union 
Institute (ETUI) and the European Centre for Workers’ Questions (EZA), which are the major 
European institutions providing training and research for European workers’ organisations. ETUI 
works with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and EZA works with the Christian 
workers’ organisations, which are also members of the ETUC. The total funding available under 
this budget heading in 2012 is EUR 17 million. Of this, around EUR 3.42 million will be awarded 
through the call for proposals. 
Information, consultation and participation of representatives of undertakings 
This budget heading provides support for operations to ensure the conditions for fostering the 
development of employee involvement in undertakings, by promoting the relevant EU legislation. 
This includes the Directives on European works councils and on employee involvement in the 
European Company and European Cooperative Society, the Directive establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, and the Directive 
on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies and fostering transnational company 
agreements. Each year, through a call for proposals with two application deadlines, the Commission 
supports around 50 projects in this field. The total funding available under this budget heading in 
2012 is EUR 7.5 million, all of which is to be awarded through the call for proposals. 
 
 
7.3 Other themes in European sectoral social dialogue 
Health and safety 
Health and safety issues belong to subjects regularly discussed by the social partners in the 
European social dialogue committees. The last two years have seen several new initiatives in this 
policy area, including projects, common statements, joint declarations and exchanges of 
information in sectors ranging from agriculture, through construction to public services. 
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In February 2012, the social partners in the extractive industries sector expressed by means of a 
joint letter their concern about the rejection of future funding for the NePSI (Negotiation Platform 
on Silica) initiative. NePSI strives to improve the health protection and training of workers 
encountering silica dust in order to minimize and preferably eliminate exposure by implementing 
good practices. In their 2012 letter, the social partners, some of whom were NePSi signatories, 
emphasised the crucial importance of the autonomous Agreement on Respirable Crystalline Silica, 
signed in 2006, and its role in encouraging and demonstrating the continuously improving 
implementation of good practice, both at national and industry level. The NePSI initiative has 
received continuous financial support from the Commission since 2006, but this could not be 
granted on a continuous basis. The employers agreed to cover the costs of the implementation of the 
NePSI agreement during 2012. 
In September 2012 the social partners issued a Joint statement on the further improvement of the 
working conditions and occupational health of employees in the extractive industries in the context 
of European social dialogue, which updates a previous document from 2004 and expands its 
coverage to new social partners that have joined the social dialogue committee over the past eight 
years. The statement covers all people involved in raw and secondary (including recycled) material 
exploration, extraction and processing activities in extractive industry companies, whether 
performed on the surface, underground or using drilling equipment, and discusses key areas such as 
health and safety, training and vocational education. 
The social partners in the electricity sector agreed on a joint position the security and safety in the 
nuclear industry in December 2011. They emphasised the necessity for the nuclear industry to meet 
the highest levels of safety possible and expressed the need for a European approach in this area. 
They state that the stress tests are a step in the right direction and open the process for discussions 
on European health, safety and security standards for the nuclear sector. They believe that, 
following the potential recommendations of the stress tests, appropriate measures need to be taken 
to ensure that power stations meet the safety levels required. The joint position also states that 
subcontracted workers should also benefit from a high level of health and safety and training. 
Furthermore, it expresses the importance of consultation and the need for the regulatory bodies to 
take account of the views of the trade unions. Once decisions are taken to decommission a nuclear 
power station highest standards should remain ensured and qualified workers should be given the 
opportunity to remain in the nuclear industry. 
In the education sector the ETUCE, building on its longstanding work in this area and in 
partnership with the EFEE, ran in 2011 a project on work-related stress in the case of teachers. The 
action, the outcomes of which will feed into the discussion on this topic by the social dialogue 
committee of the education sector, aimed to collect comparative data on how work-related stress 
affects teachers in the EU/EFTA countries. 
Since 2009, the social dialogue committee in the live performance sector has been exchanging 
information on national initiatives in the field of health and safety, notably on risk assessment tools 
and practices. In their 2012-2013 work programme, the social partners agreed to work towards a 
joint statement highlighting their exchange of views, the work of the European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work (OSHA), the existing toolkits and the overall value of such initiatives. They 
also engaged in the development of a risk assessment tool as support for touring productions, based 
on the Online Interactive Risk Assessment tool of the OSHA, by the end of 2013. 
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In the construction sector, the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW) and 
the European Construction Industry Federation (FIEC), working in the framework of the new 
Community strategy on health and safety at work (2007-2012), edited a guide on health and safety 
which has been published in 12 languages. Furthermore, the social partners are currently running 
activities regarding the safe removal of asbestos. 
The employers' organisation in the agricultural sector, Gopa-Cogeca, is running a project on the 
implementation of policies on musculoskeletal disorders and the impact of the sector’s European 
2005 agreement on reducing risk of musculoskeletal disorders. Moreover the social partners in this 
sector (EFFAT and Gopa-Cogeca), agreed on a resolution on Protecting workers' health against 
plant protection products in September 2010.  
EFFAT and FERCO (European Federation of Contract Catering Organisations) in the contract 
catering sector have created an on-line food and hygiene tool. This instrument aims to promote 
stringent food hygiene standards and provides free of charge in-house training, mostly for SMEs, in 
the hospitality sector. 
The social partners in the leather industry adopted in May 2012 a joint statement on the ban of Cr 
VI in leather and leather products. They welcomed the initiative of Denmark to propose within the 
framework of REACH the extension at EU level of the restrictions for Hexavalent chromium 
(chromium VI). They also requested from the EU authorities to effectively protect European 
customers from imported leather products which could contain Cr VI. 
In the furniture sector, the social partners adopted in 2011 a joint position on the New Community 
Strategy on Occupational Safety and Health. The European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers (EFBWW), European Furniture Industries Confederation (EFIC) and European 
Furniture Manufacturers Federation (UEA) in their common statement suggest a conversion of the 
EU recommendation concerning occupational diseases (2003/670/EU) into a Directive containing 
minimum requirement. The social partners state that they do not want a total harmonisation in the 
field, but indicate the need for the adoption of minimum requirements. They also note that the 
health hazards in the sector become more complex as a result of the increasing use of numerous 
different hazardous substances or growing stress levels. In 2010 the social partners also conducted a 
common project on the reduction of accidents in the sector. In December 2012, the social partners 
finalised the project Nano in furniture – State-of-the-art 2011. This project intends principally to 
present an inventory of available nano-products, measurement results, risk assessment proposals, 
prevention techniques and nano-reference values. 
The social partners in the woodworking industry (the European Confederation of Woodworking 
Industries (CEI-Bois), EFBWW and European Panel Federation, EPF), adopted in 2010 a joint 
declaration on workers’ exposure to formaldehyde. They also launched a project which aims to 
provide additional translations and further dissemination of the Less Dust brochure, especially in 
new Member States and candidate countries, which aims to prevent the negative impact of wood 
dust on workers’ health. 
On 12 October 2011, the European sectoral social dialogue committee for the paper industry 
adopted its Work Programme 2012, based on four main issues: health and safety (healthy workplace 
campaign); skills and qualifications, demographic change; resources and raw materials policies; and 
social sustainability reporting. Further, the social partners in this sector recently finished their work 
on a report on good health and safety practices in the European paper industry.   
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In the hospital and health sector, the social partners have also taken action to improve health and 
safety conditions: in 2012 they initiated a common project on the promotion and support for the 
implementation of Directive 2010/32/EU on the prevention of sharps injuries. 
In 2011 the social partners in the postal services sector launched a survey on slips, trips and falls in 
their sector. This work builds upon their 2009 joint declaration on accident prevention and aims at 
gaining an overview of the occurrence and consequences of slips, trips and falls in the postal sector, 
along with prevention measures. As a follow-up, the social partners organised a technical seminar 
in early 2012 to discuss health and safety at work and share good practices. 
In early 2011, the telecommunications social partners adopted a joint declaration on good practice 
guidelines designed to improve the mental wellbeing of workers within the telecommunications 
sector. The guidelines are the result of a joint project entitled Good Work – Good Health, which the 
social partners had carried out in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Corporate social responsibility 
The social partners in several social dialogue committees have been focusing on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and its role in a given sector. In the hotel and restaurant sector, for example, 
the social partners have regularly monitored an initiative to improve corporate social responsibility 
during plenary meetings. Further, the social partners in the gas sector have invested a considerable 
amount of work in a survey on CSR policies. A presentation was made on the results of a survey in 
September 2011. The survey showed that policies, agreements and reporting on equality and 
diversity, health and safety, management of change, skills and CSR itself showed differences in 
attention and intensity. Work on CSR did not continue since there was no agreement between the 
social partners on how to progress – this mirrors the on-going changes and difficulties in social 
dialogue in the gas sector. 
In December 2011, the European social partners in the tanning and leather industry kicked off the 
third phase of their Social and Environmental Reporting in the Leather Industry initiative, which 
began in 2008. In 2010, national social and environmental reports from Bulgaria, France, Germany, 
Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom were presented in joint seminars and at a main event organised within the framework of 
the project. 
The social partners in the postal sector have been working on the environmental activities of 
companies and unions in the sector, including aspects of employee engagement and training. Taking 
the growing importance of environmental responsibility in the postal sector into account, the social 
partners discussed different points of view and collected good practices. 
The sectoral social dialogue committee in the local and regional government sector adopted a 
joint statement on socially responsible public procurement in June 2011. The social partners 
expressed a positive attitude towards the European Commission's guide on socially responsible 
public procurement (SRPP) and underlined that the guide should be read in conjunction with the 
Lisbon Treaty, which recognises local and regional autonomous governments. Furthermore, the 
social partners declared that they will actively promote the guide. 
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In the sugar sector, the implementation reports of the corporate social responsibility Code of 
Conduct were presented to the plenary sessions of the sectoral social dialogue committee. In 
addition, after publication of the new ISO 26 000 certification, which provides guidelines for social 
responsibility, the social partners reflected on possible adjustment of the Code of Conduct. They 
also discussed the major economic challenges facing the European sugar industry as well as the 
future European policy for sugar after 2013 in the context of the EU’s common agriculture policy. 
In September 2012, the social partners in the hospital and health care sector, EPSU and 
HOPSEEM, adopted a joint report on the use and implementation of a code on conduct that they 
had agreed four years earlier. The code of conduct addresses the problem of unethical recruitment 
practices related to the mobility and migration of health workers. The social partners organised a 
survey to gather information from national social partners on the use of the code of conduct and to 
obtain feedback concerning potential changes and improvements of the existing document. The 
report identifies key issues and challenges for two groups of countries: immigration and emigration 
of health workers. 
In the graphical sector, the social partners – Intergraf and UNI Europa Graphical – conducted a 
common project on socially responsible restructuring, which was concluded in September 2012. 
The social partners cooperated informally as the sectoral social dialogue committee for this sector 
has not yet been established. 
In their joint opinion on The contribution of culture in combating poverty and social exclusion, 
adopted in December 2010, the social partners in the live performance sector welcomed the 
initiative of the then Belgian Presidency of the Council to discuss the contribution of culture to 
combating poverty and social exclusion in the context of the European Year for Combating Poverty 
and Social Exclusion in 2010. They underlined the need for specific programmes to be available to 
finance projects and activities that seek to increase the integration of excluded groups. The social 
partners also called upon the Member States to endorse the principle of access to culture and to 
support the sector to develop appropriate policies. 
 
Harassment and violence 
In September 2010, the European social partners in the hospitals, regional and local government, 
education, commerce and private security services sectors (EPSU, Hospeem, CEMR, ETUCE, 
EFEE, UNI-europa, Eurocommerce and COESS) signed guidelines to tackle third-party violence 
and harassment at work. The guidelines, which build upon existing best practice in these sectors, set 
out the practical steps that can be taken by employers, workers and their representatives/trade 
unions to reduce, prevent and mitigate problems. Following the signature of the guidelines, the five 
sectors undertook a joint project to support the implementation of the guidelines within the Member 
States. In addition, the European education sector social partners are carrying out an 
implementation project which involves case studies and the development of a sector-specific guide 
to support the implementation of the multisectoral guidelines. The five sectoral European social 
dialogue committees were scheduled to prepare a joint progress report in 2012 and a final joint 
evaluation will be undertaken in 2013. 
The rail sector has finalised a joint project on Insecurity and the Feeling of Insecurity in Rail 
Passenger Transport, which was carried out as follow-up of joint recommendations made the social 
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partners in this sector. At the final conference of the project, which took  place in December 2012, 
the social partners issued joint recommendations (a) to support their members in taking measures 
that help to increase security and the feeling of security of staff and passengers vi-à-vis third-party 
violence, (b) to contribute to improving working conditions in rail passenger transport, and (c) to 
initiate strategies aimed at preventing and handling third-party violence at work via practical 
measures in its communication, prevention, intervention and aftercare. 
The sectoral social partners in public transport addressed also the problems of physical insecurity 
and the feeling of insecurity in their sector (caused by, for example, threats from passengers). In 
2003 they decided on a joint approach to this issue and jointly agreed on recommendations to tackle 
these problems. In 2011 the social partners examined the progress made in the sector since 2003 
and published their observations in a report which stated that the implementation process of the 
recommendations can be judged as positive. Nevertheless, the document indicates that there still 
room for improvement. 
 
Working conditions 
The sectoral social dialogue committee in road transport was consulted in 2010 on the 
Commission's plans to improve the digital tachograph system. The sectoral social partners IRU and 
ETF agreed on a Joint Statement on the review of the tachograph regulation, which the 
Commission took into consideration when preparing its proposal to amend Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport. In their joint opinion, the social 
partners stress the importance of the digital tachograph for ensuring the respect of drivers’ working 
conditions, the improvement of road safety and fair competition between transport operators. The 
IRU and ETF welcomed the review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 as a means to 
improve its performance and strengthen its ability to meet the above-mentioned objectives. For both 
sides of industry, it is essential that the device be made effectively resistant to fraudulent 
manipulation so that it provides reliable and trustworthy data on driver activities, which is crucial 
for its functions. While maintaining and improving its functions, the IRU and ETF want the device 
to be more efficient to operate and better integrated within the working environment. 
As a follow-up to their common criteria for rest facilities drawn up in 2006 and taking into account 
the Council Resolution of 8-9 November 2010 on preventing and combating road freight crime and 
providing secure truck parking areas, IRU and ETF adopted a Joint statement on parking along 
Europe's road transport network on 5 July 2011. In this, they call for proper parking provision and 
facilitation of access in order to meet political, social and read safety imperatives. Considering that 
the lack of adequate parking and rest facilities impact on the quality of rest of professional drivers, 
leading to an increased risk of fatigue and ultimately impacting in a negative way on road safety, 
IRU and ETF call for the European Commission to adopt a coordinating role in improving the 
provision of accessible, secure, and free parking areas and rest facilities for professional drivers. 
The social partners also call on governments to ensure that parking areas do not become magnets 
for crime and to build or upgrade significantly more secure parking areas to enable industry to 
remain compliant with EU regulations and improve road safety and working conditions for drivers 
and operators. 
The social partners in the private security industry, the Confederation of European Security 
Services (CoESS) and UNI Europa, signed a joint opinion on the revision of the public procurement 
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Directive on 30 May 2012. In this, they called on European institutions to broaden the definition of 
the sustainability of tender offers to include social obligations of tenderers, such as respect of labour 
agreements, skills, and health and safety. On this basis, they were joined by the social partners in 
the cleaning, the catering and the textile industries in a pluri-sectoral joint opinion, which involved 
the European Federation of Cleaning Industries (EFCI), the European Apparel and Textile 
Confederation (ERATEX), the European Federation of Contract Catering Organisations (EFCO), 
and EFFAT. In the hotel and restaurant sector, EFFAT, together with the employer's organisation, 
HORTEC, issued  a Joint Statement on Undeclared Work in the European Hotel and Restaurant 
Sector in December 2010 and together are monitoring the situation. Furthermore, the social partners 
in the construction sector are collaborating with the aim of combating all forms of unfair practices 
and ensuring decent working conditions for workers. 
In June 2012, the social partners from Air Traffic Management Working Group, the Air Traffic 
Controllers European Unions Coordination (ATCEUC), the Civil Air Navigation Services 
Organisation (CANSO) and ETF, adopted guidelines for consultation arrangements for Functional 
Airspace Blocks. The Guidance is being set up in the framework of the Single European Sky 
initiative. This tool will help employers and workers to set up appropriate consultation 
arrangements and improve working conditions. 
 
Box 7.7: Case study research in sectors with above-average job growth and below-average job 
quality 
 
The WALQING research project “Work and Life Quality in New and Growing Jobs” investigated 
which jobs are growing and what is the quality of these jobs. In a 2
nd
 phase it carried out 53 
company case studies in sectors with above-average job growth and below-average job quality. 
 
The findings are summarized in the walqing social partnership series; assembling reports around 
“Stakeholder policies and problem assessment” and providing a detailed overview of social 
partnership relations in some of the 11 countries involved in the project in the 5 selected sectors of  
 Office & Domestic Cleaning,  
 Green Construction,  
 Waste Management, 
 Restaurants & Catering,  
 Elderly Care. 
Two sectors were chosen by each national team for closer investigation.  
 
For each of the sectors investigated by WALQING, a brochure summarises key findings and 
selected good practice examples. All reports are available for download at the walqing web 
resource: http://www.walqing.eu/index.php?id=154  
 
Office & Domestic Cleaning: 
Ursula Holtgrewe/Karin Sardadvar (eds) (2012): The Cleaning Sector: Office Cleaning. 
Green Construction: 
Ursula Holtgrewe/Karin Sardadvar (eds) (2012): The Construction Sector: ‘Green’ Construction. 
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Waste Management 
Ursula Holtgrewe/Karin Sardadvar (eds) (2012): The Sewage & Refuse Disposal Sector: Waste 
Collection. 
Catering 
Ursula Holtgrewe/Karin Sardadvar (eds) (2012): The Hotels & Restaurants Sector: Catering. 
Elderly Care 
Ursula Holtgrewe/Karin Sardadvar (eds) (2012): The Health & Social Work Sector: Elderly Care 
 
The accompanying national social partnership case study reports, ordered by sector, can be found at 
http://www.walqing.eu/index.php?id=64. 
 
Equality 
In the road transport sector, the social partners in the urban public transport sector have 
undertaken a joint social partner project on women’s employment in the urban public transport 
sector (WISE). The project aims to collect and evaluate data and trends from various European 
countries and transport companies in order to obtain a clear picture of the situation of women in 
transport professions. In addition, by way of a qualitative survey, it aims to gain an impression of 
the real life of women employed in public transport companies (for instance focusing on issues such 
as unsuitable workplace ergonomics or the reluctance of some male drivers to accept female 
drivers). Further, case studies in several companies will provide a direct insight into current 
strategies of public transport companies concerning female employees. The expected outcomes of 
the project will be recommendations regarding women in employment, to be signed by the social 
partners, and an action guideline Women in transport professions for decision-makers in companies, 
trade unions and employers' associations, containing the results of the project and information on 
good practice examples. 
The social partners in the rail transport sector also carried out a project on women in rail (WIR), 
which is a follow-up of a previous European project and baseline study on the situation of and 
policies for, women in the railway sector carried out by CER and ETF in 2004-2005 and subsequent 
policy orientations of 2007 (Joint recommendations for a better representation and integration of 
women in the railway sector). The project produced a Good Practices and Implementation Guide, a 
comparative study, which covers 25 railway companies from 17 European countries for a total of 
750,000 employees, and a summary report of three thematic seminars, which were organised within 
the framework of the project. The comparative study evaluates the implementation of the 
recommendations and the development of the situation of women in employment in the sector since 
2003, from a qualitative and quantitative point of view, showing a slight improvement, although 
little progress in the operational professions in the sector. The Good Practices and Implementation 
Guide explains the main problems and current developments for female employees in the rail sector 
in the areas of recruitment, reconciliation of work and private life, career and equal pay and overall 
equality policy. It puts forward actions to improve female employment and contains 10 case studies 
from six countries.  
The working group on higher education and research, which was created in the context of the social 
dialogue committee for the education sector, engaged in a reflexion on "what makes up an 
attractive career in higher education and research”. Based on the observation that women are less 
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well represented at the higher levels in post-graduate education and research, in particular in 
management positions, gender equality issues are a particular focus, in addition to the mobility of 
researchers and the question of how to create a supportive environment for early stage researchers. 
In October 2011, the social partners in the audiovisual sector adopted a Framework of Actions on 
Gender Equality. This set of actions covers gender portrayal, gender roles at work, equal pay, 
equality in decision making, and the reconciliation of work and personal life. This framework of 
actions builds amongst others on the 2005 cross-industry social partners' Framework of Actions on 
Gender Equality, while acknowledging the sector's specific responsibility with regard to the 
protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and democracy across the European Union. The 
social partners also carefully considered how to promote and respect the fundamental rights of 
equality and non-discrimination on the one hand and freedom of expression on the other. The 
European social partners in this sector are committed to promoting these actions and 
recommendations among their member organisations and have therefore launched a joint project 
with that purpose, beginning at the end of 2012 and running for one year. A seminar will be 
organised in November 2013, allowing for exchanges of information and sharing of best practises 
on the implementation of the Framework of Actions in different countries. 
The European social dialogue committee for Central Government Administrations adopted a 
common statement Towards equal pay between women and men in December 2011. The committee 
stated that there is a need to revise European equal pay legislation and called upon the European 
Commission to conduct analysis in the field of gender pay gap, including the examination of causes 
contributing to this problem. The social partners suggested the implementation of quantitative 
targets to reduce gender pay gaps. Furthermore, they noted that Eurostat should monitor gender pay 
data. 
As can be seen, gender equality remained an important topic for the social partners. There is, 
however, a need to further strengthen commitments and actions to advance gender equality through 
social dialogue and tripartism. It is also necessary to broaden the coverage of sectors, and to 
encourage the European social partners to keep gender equality high in the agenda as a horizontal 
priority and implement specific actions not only in the gender pay gap area but also in the other 
priorities previously included in the Framework of Actions. In particular, steps to reduce gender 
segregation, to improve work-life balance in sectors mostly male-dominated and also to tackle 
gender pay gap in sectors mostly female-dominated are needed. 
Furthermore, cooperation with social partners is also an integral part of the European Disability 
Strategy 2010-2020. This includes involving social partners at EU level, with full involvement of 
SME representatives, to develop models of good practice on reasonable accommodation and good 
quality jobs and to provide employers and policy makers with information on positive measures. 
 
Mobility and migration 
Three of the recognised social partners within the European social dialogue committee on civil 
aviation, representing airlines and workers, adopted a joint opinion on the general rules regarding 
social security coordination regulations No (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009 that apply to all persons 
working in two or more EU countries. In their Joint Position on the Social Security Regime 
Applicable to Air Crews of 8 June 2011, the Association of European Airlines (AEA), the European 
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Cockpit Association (ECA), and ETF express their wish that the principles of the above regulations, 
based on place of work, be applied to mobile air transport workers. The social partners believe that 
the "home base" of mobile air transport workers is the best determinant of the applicable social 
security law. Many airlines provide their services from so-called home bases, the place where the 
personnel normally starts or ends a duty period or a series of duty periods This is also the location 
with which the worker has the greatest connection during their employment. The new social 
security rules for aircrew,
103
 which came into force on 28 June 2012 clarify that they are due to pay 
social security contributions and are eligible to receive benefits in the country where they start and 
end their shifts, in other words their home base, instead of that the country where their airline is 
based. 
There remain obstacles to the mobility of cultural workers and productions within and outside the 
EU. In April 2011, the social partners in the live performance sector adopted a joint statement 
calling upon culture ministers to support the establishment of Mobility information services for 
artists and for culture professionals in the Member States. They believe that such a network of 
information points across Europe would answer the need for basic information, as well as tailored 
advice and guidance for culture professionals working or seeking to work in another Member State. 
They called for their national members to be involved in the creation and management of such 
structures. 
 
Capacity-building 
The social partners in several sectors took actions to strengthen social dialogue through capacity-
building measures. Most of the initiatives were targeted at the new Member States, where social 
partners are usually weaker (see Chapter 2). For instance, in the construction sector, EFBWW ran a 
project on Capacity Building for Setting up Paritarian Funds in Central and Eastern European 
Countries. Other initiatives were aimed at reinforcing the existing European and the national 
networks of the social dialogue, for example a project managed by EFFAT in the agriculture 
sector. 
In close cooperation with the sectoral European social partners, the International Training Centre of 
the ILO organised in 2011 two parallel capacity-building projects in the commerce sector, 
targeting respectively employers' organisations and trade unions in the new Member States and 
some Candidate Countries. The projects aimed to reinforce the institutional capacity of national 
organisations, in order to improve engagement in policy development and sectoral social dialogue, 
both at national and EU level. As the projects ran in parallel, an integrated approach was ensured 
and social partnership was fostered. A bipartite workshop brought all participants together at the 
end of the period of separate training actions. 
In December 2010, the social partners in the temporary agency work sector, Eurociett and UNI 
Europa, organised a round table on temporary agency work social dialogue in Istanbul in 
coordination with the Turkish social partners. As was the case with previous round tables in a 
number of countries (such as Bulgaria in 2009, Hungary in 2007 and Poland in 2006), the aim was 
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to establish and/or improve national social dialogue in the sector and to promote European social 
dialogue. 
Capacity-building projects were also conducted in the banking sector. Drawing on the UNI Europa 
Finance strategy on transnational collective bargaining, adopted in 2008, a new initiative was 
implemented. Its main goals were to strengthen the network, cooperation and joint action among 
trade unions on collective bargaining across the EU27 and to develop a sustainable mechanism for 
gathering information and data on local/national collective bargaining. The project aims to facilitate 
cooperation and coordination among affiliates, enhance the prospects of successful social dialogue 
and overall to add value to trade union involvement in securing the long-term competitiveness of 
the European finance sector. Another project called Tandem aimed to deepen the relationships and 
mutual influences between the activities of EWCs and the sectoral social dialogue. The project 
included workshops, conferences and the dissemination of findings though reports and an 
interactive website. The social partners made progress in discussing CSR, the wider issue of skills 
and more specifically skills councils and a potential joint project on life-long learning based on a 
2005 joint declaration on CSR.   
Measures to improve integration of the social partners from new EU Member States into the 
sectoral social dialogue was undertaken in the insurance sector, as almost eight years after 
enlargement they remain underrepresented in the sectoral social dialogue committee. The new 
Member States are also covered by a project addressing the demographic challenges for the sector, 
including a workshop in Prague aimed at social partners from the new Member States, which was 
organised in September 2012. 
The social partners in the live performance sector have undertaken several joint projects since 
2004 with a view to integrating the new Member States in the EU sectoral social dialogue and 
strengthening social dialogue in the different EU Member States. In its 2011 and 2012-2013 work 
programmes, the social dialogue committee confirmed its continued commitment to these 
objectives. Starting in 2011, both the employers’ and workers’ delegations undertook separate 
projects to strengthen the capacities of their members in new Member States. Both projects had a 
grass-root, hands-on approach, building on an analysis of the specific needs of employers’ and 
workers’ organisations in the different countries. The social partners agreed to exchange views on 
how best to build on the findings of their separate projects, including possible renewed joint action 
to further strengthen social dialogue across the EU and to better involve national partners, in 
particular those in the new Member States. 
For several years, the social partners of the audiovisual sector have been engaged in joint actions to 
promote social dialogue in the sector, notably in the new Member States, and to improve the 
participation of representatives of these countries in the social dialogue committee. A first project 
culminated in a regional seminar in Prague in June 2008, providing for an exchange on the structure 
and functioning of social dialogue in the sector. A second project, targeting countries that were not 
covered by the first project, resulted in a joint declaration which was adopted at a conference in 
Sofia in October 2010. In this Sofia Declaration, the European social partners in this sector confirm 
their strong commitment to social dialogue, stating that all Member States should recognise the 
necessity and benefits of employers’ associations and trade unions, and the mutual recognition 
between employers and workers; in order to strengthen European social dialogue, it is necessary to 
have strong employers’ associations and strong unions who are able and capable to negotiate on 
collective agreements. They state further that social dialogue should be considered, developed and 
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strengthened where possible in the audiovisual sector in those countries where it is absent. The 
declaration includes suggestions for action towards these objectives, addressed at the European 
Union, national governments and employers and workers organisations in the new Member States. 
Building on the experience of the previous projects, the European social partners in the sector have 
launched a new round of national capacity-building workshops in the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in the period from November 2011 to June 2012. A regional seminar 
on national and EU social dialogue for national social partners from these countries and 
representatives of European social partners from the sector was organised in October 2012. The 
resulting Tallinn Declaration stresses the sector's unequivocal support for the European Parliament's 
resolution of May 2012, which states that "press and media freedom are hallmarks of a democratic 
society". Confirming the principles and commitments set out in the Sofia Declaration, the European 
social partners in this sector expressed the views that: social dialogue and collective bargaining are 
important factors for economically and socially sustainable growth, equipping the social partners to 
adapt to change and face challenges, more particularly in times of crisis; freedom and association 
and social dialogue need to be inclusive and cover all forms of employment; collective bargaining 
should cover all workers, including the most vulnerable; and skills development should be 
considered a fundamental right of workers as well as an essential tool for industry to grow and 
adapt to change. The social partners also called upon the EU and the Member States to abstain from 
political interference and respect editorial freedom; ensure the necessary funding; and develop an 
appropriate regulatory framework enabling the sector – both public and private – to develop its full 
potential. 
While there is no sectoral social dialogue in the non-profit social services sector, a project to 
promote employers' social services organisations was carried out in 2012. The aim of the project 
was to provide a detailed understanding of how social dialogue is organised and structured in the 
social services sector in Europe. The mapping exercise and exchange of good practice promoted by 
this first project could ultimately lead to explore the possibility for the creation of a European 
sectoral social dialogue committee. As highlighted in the Social Business Initiative
104
, social 
enterprises are an important part of promoting a highly competitive social market economy. Several 
studies demonstrated that industrial relations tend to be more peaceful in social enterprises, since 
their method of governance favours participation and openness. 
 
Industrial policy  
The social partners in the industrial sectors, in particular trade unions, have expressed interest in 
participating in the impact assessment process presented by the Directorate-General for Internal 
Market and Services. They also discussed the following issues without producing a joint statement: 
system of governance and remuneration and anti-discrimination in access to and the provision of 
goods and services. 
Following dissolution congresses of the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF), the European 
Mine, Chemical and Energy workers' Federation (EMCEF), and the European Trade Union 
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Federation of Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUF-TCL) on 15 May 2012, the three federations 
joined forces in the foundation congress of the new IndustriAll European Trade Union on 16 May. 
The new organisation now constitutes one of the largest European trade union federations and 
represents the employee side in 11 sectoral social dialogue committees. 
 
The international dimension 
Third-country contractors and workers were the subject of a joint statement by EFBWW and FIEC, 
the social partners in the construction sector. In this, they expressed their concern that unhealthy 
and unfair competition with third-country contractors based on the lowest price endangers social 
rights and environmental considerations. The statement notes that some foreign companies are 
state-owned and state-aided, which endangers the level playing field in the EU and puts European 
companies under pressure. They therefore recommend changing European legislation or its 
application, for example the Posting of Workers Directive and Regulations on EU public 
procurement.  
The social partners in agriculture issued a common declaration on the association agreement of the 
European Union – Euromed – in September 2010. They also issued a joint declaration on the 
Commission’s Communication (2009) 591 A better functioning food supply chain in Europe in 
September 2010 and a common opinion on roll-over protection structures for narrow-track wheeled 
tractors in December 2010. 
The Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Ukraine was the subject of a joint statement by the 
social partners in the leather sector. In May 2012 they expressed their concern that the Ukrainian 
market will not be substantially open for European producers. They state that this deal should not be 
perceived as a precedent and similar arrangements should not be made with other countries. 
Furthermore, the Commission is asked to monitor the trade flows in the sector and to report to the 
social partners on the development of trade and its effects on industry on both sides. 
 
In the maritime transport sector, ETF and the European Community Shipowners’ Association 
(ECSA) called for an ambitious, holistic and coordinated EU response to piracy. The social partners 
recognised the complex character of the problem and indicated multifaceted concerns: diplomatic, 
military, trade and most importantly humanitarian. The EU is believed to be able to address the 
problem and make a significant improvement in the area due to its coordinated and broad approach. 
They adopted a common position that stresses the need for urgent action to protect seafarers. 
 
7.4 Cross-industry social dialogue: evaluation of past actions and outlook 
The cross-industry social partners have conducted a study entitled European social dialogue 
achievement and challenges ahead, which was completed in May 2011. This showed that the social 
partners throughout Europe are concerned about recent developments at the European as well as 
national policy level that undermine the strong role of social dialogue in policy- making and 
decision-taking. When looking at the EU-level as well as the national level in terms of 
implementing the outcomes of social dialogue, it appears that implementation is most effective in 
  
 
 
 
297 
those cases where the national social partners are able to develop joint positions and initiatives and 
where these fit into the agenda of governments. 
While generally the positive impact and the creation of added-value for national developments are 
relatively unquestioned, the same cannot be said about the performance and concrete outputs of 15 
years of social dialogue at the EU level. Here, both similarities as well as dissonances are striking 
and the survey has revealed differences, nuances and different opinions and assessments that do not 
always correspond to the usual differences between trade unions on the one hand and employers on 
the other. While most social partners have expressed positive opinions on the implementation of 
autonomous framework agreements, the assessments made of the role and usefulness of softer 
instruments, such as frameworks of actions, joint statements and texts, vary significantly and seem 
to depend at least as much on different national backgrounds and traditions of social dialogue as on 
affiliation either to employers’ organisations or trade unions. Here, both employers and unions have 
raised concerns about concrete achievements and progress made in some countries and also 
suggested a number of ways on how to improve the performance of EU-level social dialogue. 
While some social partners appreciate the application of softer instruments such as joint studies, 
analyses or joint statements, others regard this as a weakening of social dialogue and demand 
outcomes that are as concrete as possible and have a real impact on social conditions. Finally, there 
is tension between principles and diversity versus standards and convergence. While trade unions in 
particular are interested in concrete outcomes of social dialogue that contribute to reducing 
inequalities and strengthening standards of working and living in Europe, employers’ 
representatives have stressed the need to respect diversity and are much more in favour of 
developing common principles (for example in the area of flexicurity) rather than defining certain 
minimum social standards of social Europe. 
In addition to studies on the situation and the development of social dialogue, in October 2011 the 
cross-industry European social partners (ETUC, BUSINESSEUROPE, CEEP, UEAPME) adopted a 
joint implementation report on the Framework Agreement on Harassment and Violence at Work, 
which was concluded in April 2007. In May 2012, the cross-industry European social partners 
transmitted their report to the European Commission. The document states that the framework 
agreement has brought real added value in terms of raising awareness and better equipping 
employers and workers to deal with situations of harassment and violence at work. The social 
partners believe that the key to this is the flexible nature of the agreement, which can be tailored to 
the different national, sectoral and company realities. Indeed, the report finds that, rather than 
duplicating existing measures, the social partners have concentrated on building on these, using 
different forms of implementation measures and taking inspiration from the framework agreement. 
Furthermore, not just the outcomes but also the social dialogue processes and discussions by which 
the social partners arrived at those outcomes are important. Nevertheless, the European social 
partners and their members acknowledge that there are gaps in the reporting of the implementation 
of the agreement, as a number of countries have not yet submitted joint implementation reports. 
This is a wider issue, and ensuring a better implementation of autonomous social dialogue 
instruments will be considered by the European social partners in the context of the next EU social 
dialogue work programme. The European Commission was aiming to launch its own study to 
monitor the implementation of the agreement in late 2012. 
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Chart 7.1 Number and type of texts adopted by the European social dialogue committees, 
2002-2012 
 
Note: There may be slight inconsistencies with data presented in earlier editions of Industrial Relations in 
Europe due to corrections and reclassifications of social dialogue texts. 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
European social dialogue has clearly maintained its vitality and value over the past two years, 
despite external circumstances that are very challenging for industrial relations almost everywhere 
in Europe. The instrument of European social dialogue has been at the disposal of EU-level social 
partners for more than two decades, a historical milestone that was commemorated in autumn 2011 
with a conference in Warsaw (see box 7.8). This followed the publication in 2010 of a Commission 
staff working document on the functioning of sectoral social dialogue, in which the Commission 
encouraged the European and national sectoral social partners to make full use of their capacity to 
negotiate, to reinforce their administrative capacity and representativeness and create synergies 
between sectors. The continuing interest in establishing new sectoral social dialogue committees for 
additional sectors of the economy is testimony to the fact that employers and trade unions alike 
value European social dialogue, which has become an integral part of European social governance. 
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Box 7.8 Conference on the European Social Partners' Agreement 
The conference Negotiation, consultation and autonomy of EU Social Partners – 20 years of the 
Social Partners' Agreement celebrated two decades of European social dialogue since the European 
Social Partners' Agreement of 1991. It reviewed the process which led to the integration of the 
Maastricht Social Protocol into the Amsterdam Treaty (currently Arts 154 and 155 TFEU) and 
placed it in the current context. The aim of the conference was to assess the changes that have been 
brought about by European Social Dialogue in EU primary and secondary law, how the consultation 
and negotiation process between EU social partners has evolved, and the concrete results of this, in 
order to evaluate the current state of European social dialogue. The event allowed an exchange of 
views among social partners, Member States and other participants on the way these provisions 
function and likely future developments. 
The aim was thus not only to commemorate past achievements, but also to look forward. It was not 
the purpose to take decisions with immediate effect but rather to introduce, test and debate ideas for 
the way forward. 
The conference was organised in Warsaw on 24-25 November 2011 in cooperation with the Polish 
Presidency – which was represented by the Minister and Deputy Minister for Employment and 
Social Affairs – and brought together high-level representatives of the cross-industry and sectoral 
social partners at European and national level, as well as representatives of Member States, EU 
institutions – including Commissioner Andor– and academics.  
In the different sessions of the conference, several examples of outcomes of European social 
dialogue, both at cross-industry and sector level, were presented. These presentations, as well as the 
panel discussions and exchanges with participants, provided insights into the challenges that the 
European social dialogue is facing as well as in the joint and divergent views of the two sides of 
industry. 
Both sides strongly emphasised the importance of respecting the autonomy of the social partners, 
both as regards fixing their agenda for discussion and – where appropriate – the negotiation and 
implementation of their agreements. They agreed that care should be given to the choice of the 
appropriate type of instrument, depending on the objective pursued. 
The importance of taking ownership for social dialogue outcomes was emphasised. This does not 
only concern autonomous agreements, but also agreements implemented by EU Directive, where 
the social partners should also take responsibility for promoting and implementing the agreement at 
national level. The Directive on sharps injuries in the hospital sector was mentioned as a positive 
example of this continued engagement of the social partners. 
This ownership also includes a willingness to regularly assess existing agreements and, if necessary, 
to revise them. Trade unions in particular voiced concerns about the quality of implementation of 
European social partner agreements at national level, in particular the autonomous agreements that 
are implemented “in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and the Member States”. The impression is that there is a trend to consider the autonomous 
agreements as allowing for an optional implementation. Both sides nevertheless confirmed their 
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commitment to the aim of full implementation of agreements. The debate on how implementation 
can be strengthened will need to be continued. 
Without wanting to question the social partners’ autonomy, some Member States voiced concerns 
about the added value and quality of social partner agreements, calling for an “impact assessment-
like” process when social partners on their own initiative decide to enter into negotiations that could 
lead to agreements, in particular when these are to be implemented by way of Council Decision. In 
cases where the Commission formally consults social partners on a social policy issue in accordance 
with Article 154 TFEU, it already produces an analytical document that underpins the second stage 
consultation. 
 
The vitality of European social dialogue is also demonstrated by a continuation of the trend that has 
already been identified in the previous edition of Industrial Relations in Europe: once again, the 
past two years have seen the signature of an unprecedented number of binding agreements signed 
between EU social partners. The agreements in the inland waterways transport, professional 
football, hairdressing and sea fisheries sector are testimony to the fact that social partners are 
making increasing use of the negotiating space provided to them by finding tailor-made solutions to 
particular problems affecting their specific sectors. At the same time, the overall number of texts 
signed in the preceding two years has continued its downward trend, despite the increase in the 
number of committees: 65 social partner texts were concluded since the summer of 2010, which 
was the lowest during the past decade (see chart 7.1). It will become clear in the coming years if 
these developments are just a coincidence, or whether they are part of a long-term maturation of 
European social dialogue outcomes towards fewer documents overall, but more binding 
agreements.  
At the same time, the challenges for European social dialogue are now perhaps greater than they 
ever were in the past 20 years. Divergences of opinion between social partners about the causes of 
the crisis and the measures needed to overcome it are placing a strain on several social dialogue 
committees, especially at cross-industry level. Trust between employers and trade unions is a key 
ingredient in successful social dialogue, but in the current conflictual circumstances trust is 
anything but a given.  The lack of a social partner agreement on the revision of the Working Time 
Directive after one year of negotiations illustrates these difficulties. The open question of the 
involvement of social partners in the emerging macroeconomic governance at EU and Euro area 
level is a further issue that will potentially redefine the role of the European social partners (see box 
7.5). 
The EU Treaty provisions give an important role to social partners, as legitimate representatives of 
management and labour at EU level, both as actors and as stakeholders in the law-making process. 
The social partners are formally consulted twice by the Commission before it proposes social policy 
initiatives, and on each occasion the social partners have the option of entering into bipartite 
negotiations on the subject. This particular role, far more important than in many national 
constitutional orders, reflects the widely shared perception of social partners as those who know 
best the world of work, and are best-placed to develop feasible solutions to problems affecting 
employers and workers in their daily professional lives. Due to their expertise in many policy areas, 
the EU cross-industry and sectoral social partners have an increasing role as consulted stakeholders 
in the preparation of legislative or strategic proposals at EU level.  This is also the reason why 
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public opinion and institutional actors are increasingly looking at EU social dialogue for credible 
advice or potential win-win solutions that can make a difference in fighting the most serious labour 
market and social problems of today. 
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Table 7.1: European sectoral social dialogue committees 
Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees (SSDC) 
Creation  
Sector  Employees Employers  Joint 
(advisory) 
Committee  
Informal 
working 
group  
SSDC  
 
1951  2006 Steel  industriAll Eurofer  
1952  2002 Extractive Industries  industriAll APEP, EURACOAL, 
Euromines, IMA-
Europe, UEPG 
1964  1999 Agriculture  EFFAT GEOPA/COPA 
1965  2000 Road Transport  ETF  IRU 
1967  1999 Inland  Waterways  ETF  EBU, ESO 
 1969 1999 Sugar  EFFAT  CEFS  
1972  1999 Railways  ETF  CER, EIM  
1974  1999 Sea Fisheries  ETF  Europêche/ 
COGECA  
 1982 1999 Footwear  industriAll  CEC  
 1983 1999 Hotel and Restaurant EFFAT  Hotrec  
 1985 1999 Commerce  UNI Europa  EuroCommerce  
 1987 1999 Insurance  UNI Europa  AMICE, BIPAR, 
Insurance Europe 
1987  1999 Maritime Transport  ETF ECSA 
 1990 2000 Civil Aviation  ETF, ECA  ACI-Europe, AEA, , 
ASA Europe CANSO, 
ERA, IACA 
 1990 1999 Telecom-munications UNI Europa  ETNO 
 1990 1999 Banking  UNI Europa  EACB, EBF-BCESA, 
ESBG 
 1992 1999 Construction  EFBWW  FIEC  
 1992 1999 Industrial Cleaning UNI Europa  EFCI  
 1992 1999 Textile and Clothing  industriAll  Euratex  
 1992 1999 Private Security UNI Europa  CoESS  
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1994  1999 Postal Services UNI Europa  PostEurop  
 1994 2000 Woodworking EFBWW  CEI-Bois  
 1996 2004 Local and Regional 
Government 
EPSU  CEMR 
 1996 2000 Electricity industriAll Eurelectric  
 1998 1999 Personal 
Services/Hairdressing  
UNI Europa  Coiffure EU  
 1998 2007 Contract Catering EFFAT FERCO 
 1999 2001 Tanning and Leather IndustriAll  COTANCE  
  1999 Temporary Agency Work UNI Europa  Eurociett 
  1999 Live Performance  FIM, FIA, UNI-MEI Pearle*  
  2001 Furniture  EFBWW  UEA, EFIC 
  2003 Shipbuilding IndustriAll CESA  
  2004 Audiovisual EFJ, FIA, FIM, UNI-MEI  ACT, AER, CEPI, EBU, 
FIAPF  
  2004 Chemical Industry industriAll ECEG 
  2006 Hospitals and Healthcare EPSU  HOSPEEM  
 2006 2010 Metal industry industriAll CEEMET  
  2007 Gas  industriAll, EPSU  EUROGAS  
  2008 Professional Football ECA, EPFL  FIFPro  
 2008 2010 Central Government 
Administrations 
TUNED EUPAN  
  2010 Education ETUCE  EFEE  
  2010 Paper Industry industriAll CEPI  
  2012 Food and Drink Industry EFFAT  FoodDrink Europe  
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Table 7.2: European social partner joint texts, 2010 – 2012 
 
Title Topic 
European social 
dialogue committee 
Type Date 
Multi-sectoral guidelines to tackle third-party violence 
and harassment related to work 
Harassment Multisectoral Guidelines 30/09/2010 
Promoting Social Dialogue in the Audiovisual industry. A 
joint declaration of the European social partners of the 
Audiovisual sector 
Social dialogue Audiovisual Declaration 01/10/2010 
Towards a New European Energy Policy 2011-2020  
Draft report of MEP Lena Kolarska-Bobinska 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Electricity Joint opinion 13/10/2010 
EFBWW-FIEC joint statement on third-country 
contractors and workers in the EU 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Construction Joint opinion 19/10/2010 
Competitiveness and Employment in a Globalised 
Economy 
Employment Metal Declaration 02/12/2010 
Education and Training 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Metal Declaration 02/12/2010 
Joint EFFAT-HOTREC Statement on Undeclared Work 
in the European Hotel and Restaurant Sector 
Undeclared work Horeca Declaration 03/12/2010 
Review of the Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Shipbuilding Joint opinion 08/12/2010 
The contribution of culture in combating poverty and 
social exclusion. A joint statement on behalf of the 
European sectoral social partners 'live performance' in the 
framework of the European Year for Combating Poverty 
and Social Exclusion 2010 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Live performance Joint opinion 10/12/2010 
Joint position on smart meters 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Electricity Joint opinion 14/12/2010 
European Sectoral Social Dialogue Local And Regional 
Government joint statement to the European Council 
meeting 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Local and regional 
government 
Joint opinion 15/12/2010 
Common opinion from Geopa-Copa and EFFAT on roll-
over protection structures for narrow-track wheeled 
tractors 
Health and safety Agriculture Joint opinion 16/12/2010 
Joint letter to the Netherlands 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Live performance Joint opinion 05/01/2011 
Investing in the future - A joint declaration on education, 
training and research 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Education Joint opinion 18/01/2011 
Joint Guidelines on Trans-regional cooperation in 
Lifelong Learning among education stakeholders 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Education Guidelines 18/01/2011 
General remarks on the Green Paper towards adequate, 
sustainable and safe European pension systems" of the 
European Commission 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Chemical industry Declaration 31/01/2011 
EFBWW-FIEC position on the proposal of a Directive on 
"Conditions on entry and residence of third-country 
nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer" 
("ICT") COM(2010)378 
Working conditions Construction Joint opinion 16/02/2011 
Employability in the face of demographic change - 
prospects for the European rail sector 
Working conditions Railways Tool 24/02/2011 
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Eighth Implementation Report (2010) on the Code of 
conduct on Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSR - Corporate 
social responsibility 
Sugar 
Follow-up 
report 
28/02/2011 
Joint declaration on Good Practice Guidelines "Good 
Work - Good Health: Improving the mental wellbeing of 
workers within the telecommunications sector" 
Health and safety Telecommunications Guidelines 02/03/2011 
Attracting people to the educational pathways 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Metal Tool 14/03/2011 
Professional qualifications 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Hospitals Joint opinion 23/03/2011 
Statement on the revision of the ground handling directive 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Civil aviation Joint opinion 07/04/2011 
European Framework Agreement on Competence Profiles 
for Process Operators and First Line Supervisors in the 
Chemical Industry 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Chemical industry 
Framework of 
actions 
15/04/2011 
Industrial Policy for the globalization era 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Metal Joint opinion 15/04/2011 
Mobility information services for artists and culture 
professionals - Culture Council 19-20 May. A joint 
statement on behalf of the European social partners of the 
"Live performance" sector 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Live performance Joint opinion 28/04/2011 
The EC Guide on Socially Responsible Public 
Procurement(SRPP) 
Public procurement 
Local and regional 
government 
Joint opinion 01/06/2011 
Joint Position on the Social Security Regime applicable to 
Air Crews 
Mobility Civil aviation Joint opinion 08/06/2011 
Joint statement on parking along Europe's road transport 
network 
Working conditions Road transport Joint opinion 05/07/2011 
Opinion on the problems currently facing the fishing 
industry in Europe 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 09/09/2011 
Position - Reinhard Butikofer report 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Extractive industry Joint opinion 09/09/2011 
Professional qualifications 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Hospitals Joint opinion 20/09/2011 
Joint opinion on the Agenda for new Skills and Jobs Employment Commerce Joint opinion 20/10/2011 
Report on the Implementation of the Joint 
Recommendations from 
2003 signed by ETF and UITP, IRU and supported by 
CER and 
CEEP 
Working conditions Road transport 
Follow-up 
report 
20/10/2011 
Crisis Statement 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Local and regional 
government 
Joint opinion 21/10/2011 
Framework of Actions on Gender Equality Gender equality Audiovisual 
Framework of 
actions 
27/10/2011 
Permeability between vocational eduction and training 
(vet) and higher education 
Training/lifelong 
learning 
Metal Joint opinion 27/10/2011 
Joint statement on the role of the European social 
dialogue in the implementation of the Single European 
Sky 
Social dialogue Civil aviation Declaration 17/11/2011 
Joint Position of the European Social Dialogue for the 
Furniture Industry on the New Community Strategy on 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Health and safety Furniture Joint opinion 22/11/2011 
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Recovering and strengthening competitiveness and 
safeguarding sustainable employment 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Metal Tool 30/11/2011 
Security and safety in the nuclear industry Health and safety Electricity Joint opinion 06/12/2011 
Contribution regarding Energy Roadmap 2050 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Gas Joint opinion 09/12/2011 
Towards equal pay between women and men Gender equality 
Central Government 
Administrations 
Joint opinion 20/12/2011 
Proposal for a directive on « Intra-corporate transfers » (« 
ICT ») 
EFBWW-FIEC joint position paper in support of the 
compromise Amendment 24 adopted by the EMPL 
Committee (« Jaakonsaari Report ») 
Working conditions Construction Joint opinion 16/01/2012 
Budapest III declaration on Coal Policy 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Extractive industry Joint opinion 27/01/2012 
European agreement concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time in 
inland waterway transport 
Working time Inland waterways 
Agreement 
Council 
decision 
15/02/2012 
Joint declaration on CAP and sugar reform – towards 
2020 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Sugar Joint opinion 28/02/2012 
Joint EFFAT-CEFS position on EU Trade policy 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Sugar Joint opinion 28/02/2012 
Ninth Implementation Report (2011) on the Code of 
conduct on Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSR - Corporate 
social responsibility 
Sugar 
Follow-up 
report 
28/02/2012 
Joint statement on the proposal of 22 June 2011 for a 
directive on energy efficiency 
Sustainable 
development 
Chemical industry Joint opinion 20/03/2012 
Statement on the amendments of the Professional 
Qualifications Directive 
Mobility Education Joint opinion 28/03/2012 
European Commission's Green Paper Restructuring and 
anticipation of change: 
what lessons from recent experience? 
Restructuring 
Central Government 
Administrations 
Joint opinion 29/03/2012 
CEMR-EPSU joint response to the European 
Commission's 
Green Paper COM (2012) 7 final 
Restructuring and anticipation of change: what lessons 
from recent experience? 
Restructuring 
Local and regional 
government 
Joint opinion 30/03/2012 
Follow-up of the Joint Recommendations 'Better 
Representation and Integration of Women in the Railway 
Sector' - Implementation - Evaluation - Review 
Gender equality Railways 
Follow-up 
report 
30/03/2012 
New Joint Declaration on Postal Sector Evolution Restructuring Postal services Declaration 18/04/2012 
Agreement regarding the minimum requirements for 
standard player contracts in the professional football  
sector in the European Union and in the rest of the UEFA 
territory 
Working conditions Professional Football 
Autonomous 
agreement 
19/04/2012 
Contribution of the social partners for commerce 
regarding consensus social issues for the Retail action 
plan 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Commerce Joint opinion 24/04/2012 
Declaration of the European social partners on health and 
safety in the hairdressing sector 
Health and Safety Personal services Declaration 26/04/2012 
European framework agreement on the protection of 
occupational health and safety in the hairdressing sector 
Health and Safety Personal services 
Agreement 
Council 
decision 
26/04/2012 
Agreement on the work in fishing Working conditions Sea Fisheries 
Agreement 
Council 
decision 
21/05/2012 
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Joint position on the revision of the public procurement 
directive  
Public procurement Private security  Joint opinion  25/05/2012 
Joint Statement on the Free Trade Agreement between the 
EU and Ukraine 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Tanning and leather Joint opinion 29/05/2012 
Joint Statement on the Ban of Cr VI in Leather and 
Leather Products 
Health and safety Tanning and leather Joint opinion 29/05/2012 
WIR - Women In Rail - Good Practices and 
Implementation Guide 
Gender equality Railways Tool 14/06/2012 
Guidelines for Consultation arrangements for Functional 
Airspace Blocks 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Civil aviation Tool 21/06/2012 
Joint opinion on the modernisation of EU public 
procurement policy  
Public procurement Pluri-sectoral  Joint opinion  28/06/2012 
Joint Statement on the CAP reform 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Food and drink industry Joint opinion 19/07/2012 
Project report "Women Employment in Urban Public 
Transport Sector" 
Gender equality Road transport Tool 30/08/2012 
Use and implementation of the EPSU-HOSPEEM Code 
of Conduct 
on Ethical Cross-Border Recruitment and Retention in the 
Hospital Sector. Joint Final Report by EPSU and 
HOSPEEM 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Hospitals Joint opinion 05/09/2012 
Use and implementation of the EPSU-HOSPEEM Code 
of Conduct 
on Ethical Cross-Border Recruitment and Retention in the 
Hospital Sector 
Ageing workforce Hospitals 
Follow-up 
report 
05/09/2012 
Joint statement on the further improvement of the working 
conditions and 
occupational health of employees in the extractive 
industries 
Health and safety Extractive industry Joint opinion 06/09/2012 
Joint declaration on Somail piracy Health and safety Maritime transport Joint opinion 07/09/2012 
Joint opinion on the matter of the European Audiovisual 
Observatory 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Audiovisual Joint opinion 10/09/2012 
Joint opinion on the revision of the IORP directive  
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Pluri-sectoral  Joint opinion  27/09/2012 
Joint Statement on the 2011 Transport White Paper 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Road transport Joint opinion 24/10/2012 
Conclusions and recommendations of the STARTS 
(Skills, Training and the Road Sector) project 
Training Road transport Joint opinion 24/10/2012 
A European Project by ETUCE and EFEE: “Recruitment 
and retention in the education sector, a matter of social 
dialogue” – Joint recommendations to the ESSDE 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Education Declaration 08/11/2012 
Promoting Social Dialogue in the Audiovisual Industry – 
Tallinn Declaration 
Social dialogue Audiovisual Declaration 22/11/2012 
Joint FIEC-EFBWW proposed amendments on the 
proposal for a Directive on the enforcement of Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services [COM(2012) 131] 
Working conditions Construction Joint opinion 29/11/2012 
Promoting security and the feeling of security vis-à-vis 
third-party violence in the European railway sector - 
Recommendations of the European railway sector social 
partners 
Working conditions Railways Joint opinion 05/12/2012 
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Joint position regarding the European Commission 
proposal for a draft directive on the enforcement of the 
Posting of Workers’ directive {COM (2012) 131final} as 
well as the draft report of Mrs Danuta Jazłowiecka 
(2012/0061(COD)) 
Working conditions Industrial cleaning Joint opinion 06/12/2012 
Joint statement on the further opening of the EU road 
haulage market 
Social aspects of EU 
policies 
Road transport Joint opinion 07/12/2012 
Open letter from International Cultural Industry 
Associations on VAT increase in Spain   
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies 
Live performance Joint opinion 07/12/2012 
Framework agreement for quality service Restructuring 
Central Government 
Administrations 
Framework of 
actions 
12/12/2012 
Joint opinion of EFBWW and FIEC on the new 
Community strategy on health and safety for 2013-2020 
Health and safety Construction Joint opinion 17/12/2012 
Framework of action on restructuring Restructuring 
Local and regional 
government 
Framework of 
actions 
18/12/2012 
Joint recommendations on temporary agency work 
facilitating transitions in the labour market 
Employment Temporary agency work Declaration 19/12/2012 
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Chapter 8: Review of European labour legislation 2010 – 2012 
 
 
During the period 2010-2012, European legislative efforts focused on evaluation and 
review of the current labour law in line with the Europe 2020 strategy and 'smart' 
regulation principles, with new processes such as 'fitness checks' taking place for the first 
time. The European health and safety strategy was subject to a comprehensive evaluation 
process. 'Soft' instruments, such as guidelines or best practices, were also promoted in this 
area. A number of negotiated social partners' agreements were successfully concluded. 
Important legislative initiatives included the proposals for an Enforcement Directive 
(Posting of workers) and for minimum health and safety requirements as regards exposure 
of workers to electromagnetic fields. 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In line with its Europe 2020 strategy, the Commission set out its priorities in the employment 
field in its "Agenda for new skills and jobs" flagship105: A better-functioning labour market; 
a more skilled workforce; better job quality and working conditions; and stronger policies to 
promote job creation and demand for labour. Whilst acknowledging that the working 
environment plays a crucial role in enhancing the potential of the workforce and is a leading 
competitiveness factor, the Commission pointed to the mixed results on job quality across the 
EU over the past decade. In particular, working conditions have deteriorated during the crisis. 
 
The Commission response consisted of a number of interlinked activities. It is reviewing EU 
legislation and promoting 'soft' instruments; developing a smarter EU legal framework for 
employment and health and safety at work; and focusing on a strategic approach based on 
'soft' instruments and on close involvement of the social partners. 
 
Within this context, the Commission announced that it would review the working time 
Directive and make a legislative proposal aiming at improving the implementation of the 
posting of workers Directive. In the area of health and safety at work, it will undertake the 
final evaluation of the EU Strategy 2007-2012, and on this basis propose a follow-up strategy 
for the period 2013-2020. In addition, it will review the effectiveness of EU legislation in the 
area of information and consultation of workers, as well as the EU Directives on part-time 
work and fixed-term contracts.  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the developments at EU level in the fields of 
labour law and health and safety at work during the past two years. It highlights legislative 
                                                          
105
 COM(2010) 682 final  
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developments, explains the Commission's activities and summarises key Court rulings 
relating to the rights of Europeans at work. 
 
8.2 Labour law 
8.2.1  Posting of workers 
 
The issue of the relationship between protecting workers' rights and promoting the freedom to 
provide services and the freedom of establishment has continued to cause debate and 
controversy. With the aim of re-launching the Single Market106, restoring confidence among 
all stakeholders - businesses, consumers and workers – and increasing their support and 
commitment to the objectives of the Single Market, the Commission launched on 21 March 
2012 two legislative initiatives concerning the posting of workers. The carefully balanced 
"Posting of workers package" included a proposal for an Enforcement Directive107 aimed at 
improving the implementation, monitoring and compliance with the current Directive on the 
posting of workers and a proposal for a Regulation108 aimed at clarifying the relationship 
between the right to strike and the freedom to provide services and of establishment (the so-
called Monti II Regulation). For more details, see box 8.1 below. 
 
 
Box 8.1: The Posting of workers package – Content and objectives 
 
The Enforcement Directive aims to improve the way the posting of workers Directive is 
implemented, applied and enforced in practice across the European Union, without modifying 
its provisions. It is expected to facilitate cross-border provision of services, prevent abuses 
and contribute to fairer competition and a more level playing field for companies, including 
SMEs, whilst enhancing transparency with regard to the rights and obligations of companies 
and workers.  
 
The proposed Enforcement Directive clarifies the elements of "posting" in order to avoid 
abuse through the use of "letter-box companies" (ie companies that just maintain an address in 
a location rather than being based there), establishes clear rules for administrative cooperation 
and provides a legal base for effective information exchange between the competent 
authorities through the Internal Market Information (IMI) system. It defines the control 
responsibilities and possibilities of national inspections, and provides for cross-border 
enforcement of administrative fines and penalties.  
 
The proposal also introduces a system of joint and several liability for wages. The provision is 
limited to direct subcontracting in the construction sector, and liability is suspended if a 
                                                          
106
 COM(2011)206 final 
107
 COM(2012) 130 final 
108
 COM(2012) 131 final 
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contractor has undertaken due diligence. Member States can, however, provide for more 
stringent rules and extend them to other sectors. 
 
The Monti II Regulation addressed the concern often voiced by trade unions that, as a result 
of the 2007 Viking Line and Laval rulings, economic freedoms established in the Treaty were 
given primacy over fundamental social rights such as the right to strike. The proposed 
Regulation confirmed that there is no primacy of the freedom to provide services or of 
establishment over the right to strike, while recognising that situations may arise where these 
freedoms and rights may have to be reconciled in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality.  
 
It introduced an alert mechanism in order to provide other Member States and the 
Commission with timely and transparent information on serious acts or circumstances 
affecting the effective exercise of the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide 
services.  A similar mechanism (Monti I) was established in 1998 in the field of free 
movement of goods109, under which Member States should provide for existing alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms to cover cross-border situations.  
 
 
Both proposals were transmitted to the other EU institutions as well as to the national 
Parliaments of the Member States. The Council started discussions on them. The European 
Parliament organised a hearing on 18 September 2012. However, 12 national Parliaments 
adopted reasoned opinions110 expressing concerns related, among others, to the added value 
of the draft Monti II Regulation, the choice of its legal basis and the EU competence to 
regulate this matter.  
Although the Commission was of the view that the principle of subsidiarity had not been 
breached, it nevertheless recognised that its proposal for Regulation was unlikely to gather the 
necessary political support within the European Parliament and Council to enable its adoption. 
Consequently, it withdrew this proposal on 26 September 2012 hoping that this would 
facilitate a rapid negotiation of the other part of the package, namely the proposal for an 
Enforcement Directive.  
8.2.2  Working time Directive 
 
Work continued during 2011–2012 on the review of the working time Directive 
(2003/88/EC). The aim of this review is to ensure that EU working time rules can meet the 
needs of employers and workers in the 21
st
 century, while securing effective protection of 
workers' health and safety.  
                                                          
109
 Council Regulation of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free 
movement of goods among Member states, OJ L337/8, 12.12.98. 
110
 On the basis of Protocol N° 2 to the EU Treaties on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
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The review is based on consultation of the social partners at EU level under Article 154 TFEU 
and on impact assessment work by the Commission. In December 2010, the Commission had 
launched its second-stage consultation of the social partners111 on the review of the Directive. 
This second-stage consultation paper112 brought together the main results of the first-stage 
consultation of European social partners (launched in March 2010), and presented the main 
trends and patterns on the evolution of working time in the EU and the results of the latest 
impact assessment studies. It also set out a number of questions regarding the possible scope 
of a review, and possible options for change, on which social partners were asked to 
comment.  
 
At the same time, the Commission published a report on the implementation of the working 
time Directive113 and its preliminary studies on the economic and social impact of the 
Directive114.  
 
Following this second-stage consultation, the main cross-sectoral social partners at EU level 
(BusinessEurope, CEEP, UEAPME and ETUC) jointly informed the Commission, in 
November 2011, that they wished to enter into negotiations on the review, with a view to 
concluding an agreement which could be implemented by a Council Directive under Article 
155 TFEU.  The negotiations began in early December 2011, and were extended to 31 
December 2012, based on a joint request by the social partners in July 2012, which indicated 
that their talks were making progress.115  The Commission has indicated that, respectful of 
the social partners' autonomy, it will not put forward its own legislative proposal during the 
period foreseen under the Treaty for their negotiations. However, the negotiations ended 
without agreement in December 2012. 
8.2.3  Maritime transport, inland waterways and fisheries  
 
Working time in inland waterways transport  
Social partners in the inland waterways sector signed on 16 February 2012 an agreement laying 
down specific rules for working time on passenger or cargo transport ships in inland waterways 
across the EU (see chapter 7).  
Currently the Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) lays down common minimum rules at EU 
level for workers in inland waterways transport. However, it allows for more specific rules 
suited to particular activities. Similar specific EU working time rules have already been agreed 
                                                          
111
 The first stage of consultation (COM (2010) 106, of 24 March 2010) is reviewed in the 2010 IRR.   
112
 COM(2010) 801 final of 21.12.2010 and accompanying document SEC(2010) 1610 final of 21.12.2010 
113
 COM(2010) 802 final of 21.12.2010  and accompanying document SEC(2010) 1611 final of 21.12.2010 
114
 In particular, the preliminary impact study regarding further action at EU level regarding Directive 
2003/88/EC (December 2010). All studies are published at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&langId=en&newsId=964&moreDocuments=yes&tableName=ne
ws. 
115
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-903_en.htm?locale=en  
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by the European social partners for mobile workers in civil aviation, in cross-border rail 
transport, and for seafarers. 
The social partners' agreement on working time for mobile workers in inland waterway 
transport, based on Article 155(1) TFEU, is designed to take account of the distinctive working 
conditions in this sector, while ensuring a high level of protection for these workers' health and 
safety. On 16 March 2012 the social partners asked the Commission to implement the 
agreement by a Council Decision according to Article 155(2) TFEU. The Commission is 
currently considering this request.  
 
Review of the regulatory social framework – exclusion of seafarers 
 
The second stage consultation of the social partners on the review of the exclusion of 
seafaring workers from the personal scope of application of a number of EU labour law 
Directives116, was concluded in December 2009. The Commission is currently finalising its 
impact assessment and considering a proposal regarding follow-up initiatives in this area.  
 
Maritime Labour Convention (ILO, 2006) – follow-up  
 
Directive 2009/13/EC, which implements the social partners’ agreement on the Maritime 
Labour Convention and was adopted on 16 February 2009, has not yet entered into force. This 
will  happen simultaneously with the entry into force of ILO's 2006 Maritime Labour 
Convention on 20 August 2013.  Subsequently, Member States will have one year to 
implement the Directive in their internal legal systems.  
 
With a view to ensure the enforcement of the aforementioned Maritime Labour Convention, 
the Commission adopted on 23 March 2012 a proposal for a Directive concerning flag State 
responsibilities117 and a proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2009/16/EC on port 
State control118.  
 
Work in Fishing Convention (ILO, 2007) – follow-up 
 
On 7 June 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/321/EC authorising Member States to 
ratify, in the interests of the European Community, the Work in Fishing Convention 
concluded in 2007 by the International Labour Organisation (Convention 188). The Decision 
also calls on the Member States to ratify the convention as soon as possible, preferably before 
the end of 2012.  
 
The social partners at European level, recognising the importance of the Convention in 
improving the working conditions on board of fishing vessels in areas such as health and 
safety and medical care, rest periods, protection by a work agreement and social security, 
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 See, in this regard, Industrial Relations in Europe 2010.   
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 COM (2012) 134 final. 
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concluded on 21 May 2012 a European Agreement implementing a substantial part of its 
standards. 
 
For more details on developments in the European social dialogue, see Chapter 7 of this 
report. 
 
8.2.4  Employer's Insolvency Directive 
 
As a follow up to its Green Paper on Pensions, issued in July 2010, the Commission issued a 
White Paper ("An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions") in February 
2012119. With regard to the employer's insolvency Directive, the Commission stressed its 
commitment to ensure a more effective enforcement as far as the protection of supplementary 
pensions is concerned. 
 
 
8.2.5 Employee involvement 
Recast European Works Councils Directive 
 
The recast European Works Councils (EWCs) Directive 2009/38/EC120, which adapted the 
previous legal framework to changes in the legislative, economic and social context and 
clarified the pre-existing rules, was due to be transposed into national law before 6 June 2011. 
By that date, Directive 94/45/EC was repealed and replaced by the recast Directive. However, 
national implementing rules are maintained after 6 June 2011 to cover the cases where the 
new obligations introduced by Directive 2009/38/EC do not apply. 
 
Review of the European Company (SE) Directive 
 
The Commission had identified several potential problems with the operation of Directive 
2001/86/EC121 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the 
involvement of employees. These concern a) the complexity of the procedure for employee 
involvement; b) the lack of legal certainty concerning certain aspects of the negotiation 
procedure and c) the concern that the use of the SE form could have an effect on the rights to 
employee involvement granted by national or EU law. 
 
In order to obtain the views of the social partners on the advisability for and possible direction 
of European Union action, the Commission launched a first phase consultation of the 
European social partners on 5 July 2011. They were asked whether a) the issues identified by 
the Commission are the main issues raised by the operation of the Directive; b) the Directive 
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should be amended; c) other non-legislative measures at EU level would merit consideration 
and d) they would initiate a negotiation under Article 155 TFEU. 
 
On the employers' side, virtually all the respondents consider that a review of the SE Directive 
is not advisable or necessary despite acknowledging that the procedure for employee 
involvement might be cumbersome. They do not see that there is a lack of legal certainty nor 
a risk that the SE legal form is used to weaken employees' involvement rights. On the 
employees' side, the respondents consider that the complexity of the procedure is not a 
problematic area of the SE Directive, i.e. they do not see any need for simplification. 
Nevertheless, they see a risk that the SE legal form may be used to weaken employees' 
involvement rights. 
 
European Private Company Statute 
 
The Commission adopted on 25 June 2008 a proposal122  for a European Private Company 
(SPE) Statute, which has been discussed in the Council without any final outcome.  Member 
States cannot agree notably on allowing SPEs to separate their registered office and 
headquarters and the regime for employee participation. For this reason, the Commission 
included in its consultation on the future of European Company Law questions relating to 
next steps regarding the SPE statute 123. This consultation was closed on 14 May 2012.  
 
Transnational company agreements 
 
Transnational company agreements have gained significance over the decade since the first 
initiatives in 2000. By early 2012, 224 such agreements were recorded in 144 companies, 
mostly headquartered in Europe, covering over 10 million employees.  
 
Following its 2008 Staff Working Document124, the Commission set up an expert group on 
transnational company agreements, the task of which was to monitor developments and 
exchange information on how to support the process underway.125 The expert group, bringing 
together experts from Member States and the EU social partners, academics and researchers, 
representatives of European institutions and the International Labour Organization as well as 
company actors, held several meetings between 2009 and 2011.  
 
The expert group issued a report in early 2012, which contains a wealth of information on the 
phenomenon of transnational company agreements including concrete examples, reviews the 
main open issues and sets out options to address them.  
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Furthermore, studies were commissioned to clarify the rules of international private law in 
connection with transnational texts in 2009 and to review the legal effects produced by 
company agreements in 2011. A searchable online database of agreements was set up in 
2011126.  
 
The Commission will develop further action to disseminate good practice and promote debate 
with respect to transnational company agreements.127 
 
8.2.6 Facilitation of transposition and monitoring of implementation in the Member 
States 
 
Facilitation of transposition 
Temporary agency work 
 
Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work128 was due to be transposed into national 
law by 5 December 2011. Member States were also under a duty to report by the same date on 
the results of the review of restrictions and prohibitions on the use of temporary agency work.   
 
An expert group composed of representatives of national governments assisted the Member 
States in their transposition of the Directive. It held several meetings in 2010 and 2011. A 
report129 on its work was published in August 2011.  
 
The European Commission also published a leaflet130 to inform stakeholders of the main 
provisions of the Directive.  
 
European Works Councils Directive 
 
Another expert group was set up in order to assist Member States in transposing the recast 
Directive on European Works Councils 2009/38/EC (see above). The group met several times 
in 2009 and 2010 to exchange information and coordinate implementation in Member States. 
It published its final report in December 2010.131 
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An updated leaflet on the recast Directive was published in 2011132. 
 
Monitoring the implementation of Directives  
 
EU labour law Directives often provide for their review some years after their transposition. 
Furthermore, in line with 'smart' regulation principles, the Commission assesses their 
operation and effects with a view to evaluating whether they are ‘fit for purpose’ or whether 
they need to be updated or clarified. In the labour law area, a first 'fitness check' is currently 
being carried out in the area of information and consultation of workers at work. 
 
Review of the application of Directives 
 
The following reviews of the application of Directives have been carried out over the past two 
years: 
 
Review of the Directive on involvement of employees in European Cooperative Societies 
(ECS). In accordance with Article 17 of Council Directive 2003/72/EC133, the Commission 
adopted in 2010 a report on the application of this Directive134. It found that its evaluation 
was considerably hampered by the very low number of European Cooperative Societies 
having been set up in accordance to Regulation 1435/2003 on the Statute of ECS. It 
considered further that the complementary nature of the Directive, which is coupled with the 
aforementioned Regulation, needed to be taken into account before launching any future 
revision process. On 23 February 2012 the Commission issued a report on the application of 
Regulation 1435/2003135. Subsequently, the Commission consulted stakeholders in 2012 on 
whether and how to simplify this regulation.  
Report of 27 October 2010 on the application of Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of 
young people at work136. 
Report of 21 December 2010 on the implementation by Member States of Directive 
2003/88/EC on the organisation of working time137. 
Report of 22 July 2011 on the implementation by Member States of Council Directive 
91/383/EC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health at work of workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a 
temporary employment relationship138. 
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Report of 26 October 2012 on the implementation of Directive 2005/47/EC on working 
conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable in cross-border railway services 139. 
Communication on review of the operation of the provisions with regard to workers on board 
seagoing fishing vessels contained in Directive 2003/88/EC140.  
Table (2011) on the implementation of Article 4 of Directive 2008/94/EC on insolvency141. 
General Table (2012) on national implementing measures of Directive 2009/38/EC on 
European Works Councils142 
 
Fitness check –Evaluations of Directives 
 
In line with its 2010 work programme, the Commission is currently reviewing EU legislation 
in selected policy fields through ‘fitness checks’. The goal is to identify excessive burdens, 
overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and/or obsolete measures which may have appeared over time. 
The purpose of the fitness check is not deregulation or less regulation, but rather better / smart 
regulation and making EU legislation more responsive to current and future challenges. 
 
In the labour law area, it was decided to submit to the fitness check exercise a family of three 
Directives on information and consultation of workers (ICW) at national level143: 
 
● Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies. 
● Directive 2001/23/EC on transfers of undertakings, focusing on Article 7. 
● Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework relating to information and    
consultation of workers in the EC. 
 
The fitness check relies on an evidence-based approach and integrates legal, economic and 
social effects of the existing legislation. There is already an extensive set of studies in this 
area, including those undertaken by Eurofound. A study was commissioned to an external 
contractor to review and complement the existing research.  
 
The Commission closely associated relevant stakeholders in this process, notably by setting 
up a working group on ICW (hereafter WG), bringing together representatives from EU/EEA 
governments and the European social partners. The results of the fitness check will be 
presented together with the key conclusions and future steps in due course.  
 
In line with its smart regulation policy, the Commission launched an evaluative study of 
Directives 1997/81/EC and 1999/70/EC on part-time work and on fixed-term employment, 
respectively. The purpose is to evaluate ex-post the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, as 
well as the lasting nature (sustainability) of the impact of these Directives. 
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Interpretation of Directives 
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) had the opportunity144 to interpret a number of 
provisions of EU Directives in the field of labour law in several judgements rendered between 
March 2010 and May 2012. These judgements were delivered following preliminary 
questions submitted to the ECJ by national courts. The ECJ had also the opportunity to 
interpret provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular 
Article 31 on working conditions and working time. 
 
Five cases were decided by the ECJ relating to Directive 2001/23/EC (Transfer of 
undertakings). The aim of this Directive is to protect employees in the event of a transfer of 
undertaking from an employer (transferor) to another employer (transferee), and in particular 
to safeguard their rights.  
 
In Case C-151/09145 the ECJ interpreted the notion of 'preservation of the autonomy' of the 
entity transferred by deciding that it existed when the powers to give orders and instructions, 
to allocate tasks to employees of the entity transferred and to determine the use of assets 
available to this entity remained essentially unchanged within the organisational structure of 
the transferee.  
In Case C-242/09146 the ECJ decided that in the event of a transfer of an undertaking 
belonging to a group to an undertaking outside that group, it is also possible to regard as a 
‘transferor’ the group company to which the employees were assigned on a permanent basis 
without however being linked to the latter by a contract of employment.  
In Case C-386/09147 the ECJ held that the non-renewal of a fixed-term employment contract 
that ended, due to expiry of its term, on a date prior to the transfer of the activity to which the 
temporary worker was assigned, does not disregard the prohibition of dismissal on grounds of 
a transfer provided by the Directive.  
In Case C-463/09148 the ECJ decided that a municipal authority undertaking itself, with new 
staff, a cleaning service previously contracted out to a company did not amount to a transfer 
within the meaning of the Directive.  
In Case C 108/10149 the Court decided that the takeover by a public authority of staff 
employed by another public authority and entrusted with the supply of services including, in 
particular, tasks of maintenance and administrative assistance, constitutes a transfer where 
that staff consists in a structured group of employees who are protected as workers by virtue 
of the domestic law; it also decided that the length of service with the transferor should be 
taken into account in order to prevent a substantial loss of salary by reason of the transfer. 
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Six judgments were delivered relating to Directive 97/81/EC (the part-time work 
Directive), one of the Directives based on a European social partners' framework agreement. 
This Directive ensures that workers undertaking part-time work receive comparable treatment 
to full-time staff.  
 
In Joined Cases C-395/08 and 396/08150  the ECJ decided that the Directive precludes 
national legislation which, for vertical-cyclical part-time workers (they work only during 
certain weeks or certain months of the year, on full or reduced hours), disregards periods not 
worked in calculating the period of service required to qualify for retirement pensions, unless 
such a difference in treatment is justified on objective grounds.  
In Case C-486/08151 the ECJ decided that the Directive precludes a national provision under 
which, in the event of a change in the working hours of a worker, the amount of leave not yet 
taken is adjusted in such a way that a worker who reduces his working hours from full-time to 
part-time suffers a reduction in the right to paid annual leave that the worker has accumulated 
but not been able to exercise while working full-time.  
In Case C-151/10152 the ECJ decided that the Directive does not preclude national legislation 
which makes employers responsible for the obligations of retention and publication of the 
contracts and work-schedules of part-time workers.  
In Case C-349/11153 the ECJ ruled that obligations for retaining and publishing contracts and 
work-schedules of part-time workers may be compatible with the Directive if there is no 
difference in treatment or if such a difference in treatment is justified on objective grounds 
and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives pursued.  
In Case C-393/10154 the ECJ decided that part-time judges could be excluded from the 
protection of the Directive if the relationship between them and the Ministry of Justice is, by 
its nature, substantially different from that between employers and their employees falling, 
according to national law, under the category of workers; it also decided that a distinction 
between full-time judges and part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid basis cannot be 
made for the purpose of access to a retirement pension scheme.  
In Case C-385/11155, the ECJ had the opportunity to interpret the notion of 'pay' for the 
purpose of the directive; it ruled that a 'first-pillar pension' (a contributory retirement pension) 
was not part of this notion. 
 
In relation to Directive 96/71/EC (posting of workers), two judgments are worth 
mentioning. This Directive aims at removing the uncertainties and obstacles impeding the free 
provision of services by increasing legal certainty and making it easier to identify the working 
conditions which apply to posted workers in the Member State to which the worker is posted.  
                                                          
150
  Judgment of the Court of 10 June 2010. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) 
151
  Judgment of the Court of 22 April 2010. Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols v Land Tirol 
152
  Order of the Court of 7 April 2011. Dai Cugini NV 
153
 Order of the Court of 9 December 2011 - Yangwei 
154
  Judgement of the Court of 1 March 2012. Dermod Patrick O’Brien v Ministry of Justice. 
155
 Judgment of the Court of 22 November 2012, Isabel Elbal Moreno 
  
 
 
 
321 
In Case C-515/08156 the ECJ decided that EU law precludes national legislation requiring an 
employer posting workers to the territory of another Member State to send a prior declaration 
of posting under certain conditions; it also ruled that, during the posting, a Member State may 
require the employer to keep available to the national authorities copies of documents 
equivalent to the social or labour documents and also to send those copies to the authorities at 
the end of that period. 
In Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09157 the ECJ clarified the notion of the hiring-out of 
workers: it is a service provided for remuneration in respect of which the worker who has 
been hired out remains in the employ of the undertaking providing the service, no contract of 
employment being entered into with the user undertaking. In the context of the Directive it is 
characterised by the fact that the movement of the worker to the host Member State 
constitutes the very purpose of the provision of services effected by the undertaking providing 
the services and that that worker carries out his tasks under the control and direction of the 
user undertaking. 
 
In relation to Directive 1999/70/EC (fixed-term work), the Court rendered 14 judgements. 
This Directive establishes minimum requirements relating to fixed-term work, in order to 
ensure equal treatment of workers and to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive 
employment contracts or relationships of this type.  
 
In Case C-98/09158 the ECJ decided that the Directive does not preclude domestic legislation 
which merely provides that fixed-term contracts must be in writing and must indicate the 
reasons for the use of those contracts without the need to indicate in fixed-term contracts 
concluded for the purpose of replacing absent workers, the names of those workers and the 
reasons for their replacement.  
In Case C-273/10159 the ECJ decided that the restriction, without any objective justification, 
of the right to receive a seniority bonus to university lecturers on permanent contracts, 
excluding lecturers on fixed-term contracts is contrary to EU law.  
In C-486/08160, the ECJ condemned the exclusion from the protection of the national law 
implementing the Directive of workers employed under a fixed-term contract of a maximum 
of six months or on a casual basis.  
In Joined Cases C 444/09 and C 456/09161, the ECJ ruled that fixed-term workers may 
contest treatment which, with regard to payment of the increment for length of service, is less 
favourable than that which is given to permanent workers in a comparable situation and for 
which there is no objective justification.  
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In Case C-3/10162, the ECJ ruled that national rules prohibiting the conversion of abusive 
successions of fixed-term employment into permanent employment (in the public sector) were 
compatible with the Directive, if other effective measures to limit and if necessary punish 
abusive successions of fixed-term employment are in place and if these satisfy the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence.  
In Case C-20/10163, the ECJ ruled that national rules that do not require the indication of 
objective reasons for a first fixed-term employment, ie. when it is not a case of a renewal of 
such employment, are compatible with the Directive. 
In Case C-109/09164, the ECJ ruled that where national provisions require a 'close objective 
connection between a fixed-term contract and a prior permanent contract with the same 
employer', such a link also exists in cases where there is an uninterrupted succession of fixed-
term contracts; the last fixed-term contract in such a chain therefore has such a link, even if 
the preceding permanent employment ended some years ago.  
In Case C-177/10165, the ECJ decided that the Directive precludes any difference in treatment 
as between career civil servants and comparable interim civil servants of a Member State, 
based solely on the ground that the latter are employed for a fixed term, unless different 
treatment is justified on objective grounds; it also ruled that it precludes account not being 
taken of periods of service completed as an interim civil servant in a public administration for 
the purposes of permitting such a person, who has subsequently become a career civil servant, 
to obtain an internal promotion available only to career civil servants, unless that exclusion is 
justified by objective grounds.  
In Case C-251/11166, the ECJ ruled that Member States must ensure that the conversion of 
fixed-term employment contracts into an employment contract of indefinite duration is not 
accompanied by material amendments to the clauses of the previous contract in a way that is, 
overall, unfavourable to the person concerned when the subject-matter of that person’s tasks 
and the nature of their functions remain unchanged.  
In Case C-157/11167, the ECJ decided that the relationship between socially useful workers 
and the public authorities for whom they carry out their activities may be considered by a 
Member State as outside the scope of the protection of the Directive.  
In Case C-586/10168, the ECJ ruled that a temporary need for replacement staff may 
constitute objective reasons justifying successive renewals of fixed-term employment 
contracts, even if this need for replacement staff is recurrent or even permanent in nature; 
however, all the circumstances of the case, including the number of renewals and the 
cumulative duration of fixed-term employment with that employer, need to be considered. 
In Case C-272/10169, the ECJ ruled on the legality of imposing time limits for introducing 
requests to convert undue successions of fixed-term contracts into permanent employment. 
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In Case C-556/11170, the ECJ ruled that the non-discrimination requirement did not allow the 
refusal to pay a six-yearly continuing professional education increment to fixed-term 
professors, when their work was not different from that of professors having a civil servant 
status. 
In Joined Cases C-302/11 to C-305/11171, the Court ruled that the non-discrimination 
requirement prohibits rules that prevent relevant periods of service of fixed-term staff from 
being taken into account when that staff becomes part of the permanent staff, unless there are 
objective grounds for doing so. 
 
In relation to Directive 2003/88/EC (working time), nine rulings were issued by the ECJ. 
This Directive lays down minimum general safety and health requirements for the 
organisation of working time.  
 
In Case C-243/09172, the ECJ decided that the Directive precludes national rules which allow 
a public sector employer to transfer a worker compulsorily to another service on the ground 
that he had asked that his average required weekly working time should comply with the 
maximum limit (48 hours) laid down in the Directive.  
In Case C-428/09173, the ECJ underlined that the minimum daily and weekly rest periods laid 
down by the Directive must apply to all workers, including persons employed under 
'educational commitment contracts', carrying out casual and seasonal activities in holiday and 
leisure centres, who were outside the scope of national rules transposing the Directive.   
In Case C-429/09174, the ECJ clarified the conditions under which a worker can seek 
reparation from a Member State for infringement of the Directive.  
In Case C-258/10175, the ECJ clarified the need of physical presence of the worker and their 
availability to their employer for purposes of the qualification as working time.  
In Case C-519/09176, the ECJ confirmed that the concept of ‘worker’ includes an employee 
of a public law body who is subject to the rules applicable to public servants.  
In Case C-155/10177, the ECJ clarified which components of  a worker's remuneration have 
to be taken into account for the purposes of calculating payment during annual leave.  
In Case C 214/10178, the ECJ ruled that where a worker has been unfit for work due to illness 
during several consecutive years, the Directive does not preclude fixing limits to the 
accumulation of his rights to carry over paid annual leave in respect of those years, subject to 
specified conditions.  
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In Case C 282/10179, the ECJ decided that the Directive does not permit national rules 
whereby a worker who is unable to work due to illness throughout a calendar year loses her 
entitlement to paid annual leave unless she completes a minimum period of ten days’ or one 
month’s actual work during the reference period. 
In Case C-337/10180, the ECJ held that the Directive precludes national rules which limit the 
carryover period for minimum paid annual leave to nine months, if their effect is that a worker 
who is absent from work through illness during two successive years loses his rights without 
having any effective opportunity to take the leave in practice or to receive payment in lieu.  
 
In Case C 78/11181 the ECJ decided that the Directive precludes national provisions under 
which a worker who becomes unfit for work during a period of paid annual leave is not 
entitled to take the missed paid annual leave (the days which coincided with the period of 
unfitness for work), at another time. 
In Joined Cases C 229/11 and 230/11182 the ECJ decided that it is not contrary to Article 
31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7(1) of 
Directive 2003/88/EC for an undertaking and its works council to conclude a social plan 
providing for paid annual leave entitlements to be reduced pro rata during a period of short 
time working where the worker's obligation to work was entirely suspended and the worker 
could effectively use the time to rest or engage in recreational or leisure activities. In these 
circumstances, the worker's situation is comparable to that of a part-time worker rather than a 
worker who is incapacitated by illness, and application of the pro rata temporis principle is 
appropriate.  
 
In relation to Directive 2008/94/EC (insolvency of the employer), three judgements were 
rendered. This Directive aims to protect workers in case of insolvency of the employer by 
requiring Member States to establish institutions that guarantee the payment of unpaid 
salaries.  
 
In Case C-30/10183, the ECJ ruled that an employee who, alone or together with close 
relatives, within the six months preceding the application for a declaration of insolvency, was 
the owner of an essential part of the undertaking or business concerned and had a considerable 
influence on its activities, may be excluded from the protection of the Directive. 
 In Case C-477/09184, the ECJ ruled that according to Directive 80/987/EEC (the Directive 
abrogated by Directive 2008/94/EC which was in force at the time of the events), in a case of 
cross-border insolvency, the guarantee institution responsible for the payment of the 
employee's outstanding claims was that of the Member State where the employer was 
established and towards the financing of which the employer contributed.    
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In Case C-435/10185, the ECJ decided that the Directive precludes a national rule which, in 
order to benefit from the intervention of the guarantee institution, obliges employees to 
register as job-seekers in the event of the insolvency of their employer. 
In relation to Directive 2002/14/EC (information and consultation of employees), the ECJ 
delivered one judgment. This Directive establishes a general framework setting out minimum 
requirements for the right to information and consultation of employees in undertakings 
within the Community.  
 
In Case C-405/08186, the ECJ decided that, provided that the protection against dismissal 
granted to an employee representative by a collective agreement is not lower than that granted 
by the national legislation implementing the Directive, the Directive does not require that all 
employees' representatives be given the same protection against dismissal.  
In relation to Directive 98/59/EC (collective redundancies), the ECJ delivered two 
judgements. This Directive requires employers to consult staff representatives in the case of 
collective redundancies. It specifies the issues which these consultations must cover and the 
information which the employer is required to provide during the consultations. In addition, 
the Directive establishes the procedure and practical arrangements for collective 
redundancies.  
 
In Joined Cases C 235/10 to C 239/10187, the ECJ ruled that the Directive applies to a 
termination of the activities of an employing establishment as a result of a judicial decision 
ordering its dissolution and winding up on grounds of insolvency, even though, in the event of 
such termination, national legislation provides for the termination of employment contracts 
with immediate effect; it also ruled that in that event, the obligations imposed by the Directive 
must be fulfilled by the management of the establishment (if it is still in place) or by the 
liquidator.  
In Case C 583/10188, the ECJ ruled that it does not have jurisdiction to reply to the 
preliminary question referred by the UK Court of Appeal. The ECJ decided that civilian staff 
of a military base is excluded from the scope of application of Directive 98/59/EC since the 
latter does not apply to workers employed by public administrative bodies or other equivalent 
bodies which include armed forces. 
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8.3 Health and safety of workers  
 
8.3.1 Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Strategy 
 
On 27 April 2011, the Commission adopted a staff working paper ‘Mid-term review of the 
European strategy 2007-2012 on health and safety at work’189. This mid-term review 
confirmed the continuous need for action to protect Europe’s workers: according to the 
available data from 2007, more than 5,500 workers die every year in the EU due to work-
related accidents. Almost 3% of workers had a serious accident at work, and 8.6% of workers 
– 23 million people across the EU – reported a work-related health problem. This resulted in 
around 450 million lost working days due to accidents and work-related health problems. The 
mid-term review showed clearly that the priorities of the strategy remain broadly appropriate. 
On 15 December 2011, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on this mid-term 
review, with a number of recommendations and proposals for the Commission, Member 
States and social partners190. It underlined the importance of continued action to improve 
health and safety at work at EU level. 
 
As regards the final evaluation of the current strategy and the preparation of possible EU 
priorities in this area, both the Advisory Committee on Safety and Health at Work and the 
Senior Labour Inspectors' Committee have adopted opinions on the strategic priorities for the 
period 2013 – 2020. 
 
 
8.3.2 Ex-post evaluation 
 
In accordance with Article 17a (2) of Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures 
to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, as modified by 
Directive 2007/30/EC, the Commission adopted on 20 December 2011 a Decision on the 
structure and a questionnaire for the single report to be submitted by the Member States on 
the practical implementation of the EU Directives on safety and health of workers191. 
 
Under a newly established five-yearly exercise, by the end of 2015 at the latest, the 
Commission will produce a report based on a comprehensive review of the EU health and 
safety Directives. The report will be based on the above-mentioned national reports and a 
report by an independent external contractor. In addition, the Commission will use the 
experience it has gained from monitoring the transposition and application of the Directives in 
the Member States. The Commission report will contain the results of the evaluation and, if 
necessary, any initiatives to improve the operation of the regulatory framework. 
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8.3.3 Electromagnetic fields  
 
On 14 June 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal192 to replace the current Directive 
2004/40/EC193 on minimum health and safety requirements regarding the exposure of 
workers to the risks arising from physical agents (electromagnetic fields). Since the adoption 
of the Directive and prior to the original deadline for transposition into national law, concerns 
had been expressed by stakeholders, in particular the medical sector, using the magnetic 
resonance imaging technique, as they believed that some of its provisions, in particular those 
relating to the exposure limit system, would unduly hamper their activities. In preparing the 
proposal, the Commission examined the situation, carried out stakeholder consultations and 
took account of the latest scientific recommendations. 
 
As the discussions on the proposal by the European Parliament and the Council are still on-
going, on 19 April 2012, the co-legislators adopted Directive 2012/11/EU postponing by one 
and a half years, until 31 October 2013, the deadline for the transposition of Directive 
2004/40/EC to allow more time to finalise the legislative process194. 
 
8.3.4 Classification, labelling and packaging of chemical substances 
 
On 18 January 2011, the Commission launched the second-stage consultation of the social 
partners at EU level on the need to adapt EU Directives to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 on 
classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures. This Regulation lays down 
new requirements aiming to implement, within the European Union, the United Nations 
Globally Harmonised System for chemical classification and labelling.  
 
Five EU Directives on health and safety at work refer to chemical classification and labelling 
requirements. It is necessary to amend these five Directives to ensure that the current level of 
worker protection is maintained. The Directives are Directive 98/24/EC (chemical agents), 
Directive 2004/37/EC (carcinogens and mutagens), Directive 92/58/EEC (safety signs), 
Directive 92/85/EEC (pregnant workers) and Directive 94/33/EEC (young people at work). 
 
The adoption of this initiative is likely to take place at the end of 2012 or the beginning of 
2013. 
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8.3.5 Exposure to asbestos 
 
Practical guidelines for the information and training of workers involved with asbestos 
removal or maintenance work have been published by the Commission services. The aim of 
these guidelines is to raise awareness among employees and employers to the risks related to 
the handling of asbestos-containing products in their daily working environments and to 
motivate them to take preventive action to protect themselves and the environment from the 
risk related to asbestos fibres. 
 
 
8.3.6 Musculo-skeletal disorders 
 
The Commission is pursuing its work to address all significant ergonomic risk factors at work 
for the protection of workers in all sectors of activity from work-related musculoskeletal 
disorders (WRMSDs). 
 
WRMSDs are one of the major safety and health problems facing the European Union today. 
They affect both women and men and all sectors of activity across the EU. According to 
information from Eurostat195, work-related MSDs are the main work related-health problem, 
accounting for 60% of all work-related diseases in the EU-27. 
 
 
8.3.7 Environmental tobacco smoke 
 
The Commission had launched on 10 December 2008 a first stage consultation of the social 
partners at EU level on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to 
environmental tobacco smoke at the workplace. This consultation of the social partners 
regarded the possible direction of an EU initiative. Following an analysis of the responses 
received, an analytical document is being prepared to accompany the second stage 
consultation of the social partners. It is expected that this consultation will be launched at the 
end of 2013. 
 
 
8.3.8 Agriculture 
 
A non-binding guide to best practice with a view to improving the application of related 
Directives on protecting the health and safety of workers in agriculture, livestock farming, 
horticulture and forestry was been published in June 2012196. The guide is designed to assist 
the land workers to better understand their role and responsibilities in complying with the 
health and safety Framework Directive 89/391/EEC and a number of individual Directives. 
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8.3.9 Extractive industries 
 
A study is underway since January 2012 to update the information contained in the 
Commission Report on the practical implementation of Health and safety Directives 
92/91EEC (mineral extraction through drilling) and 92/104/EEC (surface and underground 
mineral extraction)197. Final results are expected by February 2013. 
 
The study intends to review the provisions and the application of Directive 92/91/EEC, in 
particular the provisions on offshore oil and gas activities. It is related to the Commission 
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore 
oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities198. 
 
The study aims to indicate whether changes to the Directive are required, particularly as 
regards extraction by drilling in the offshore industry. 
 
 
8.3.10 Hairdressing sector 
 
On 26 April 2012, representatives of the European Union's employers and trade unions in the 
hairdressing sector signed an agreement on health and safety of workers in this sector which 
builds on existing national best practices in the Member States that are effective in reducing 
occupational health risks. It addresses, in particular, specific risks such as the use of materials, 
products and tools to protect the skin and respiratory tract and the need for sufficient space 
and ventilation in salons where chemical substances are transferred or mixed.  
 
For more details on this agreement and on developments in European social dialogue, see 
Chapter 7 of this report. 
 
 
8.3.11 Statistics 
 
On 11 April 2011, the Commission adopted Regulation (EU) No 349/2011 implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1338/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community 
statistics on public health and health and safety at work, as regards statistics on accidents at 
work199. The Regulation specifies that Member States must transmit to the Commission data 
on persons who had an accident in the course of work during the reference period. This legal 
act replaces the collection of data on accidents at work from administrative sources carried 
out so far on the basis of gentlemen's agreement. It is accompanied by Commission Decision 
2011/231/EU granting derogations to certain Member States with respect to the transmission 
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of data due to the need for major adaptations to national administrative and statistical systems 
in order to comply in full with Regulation (EC) No 1338/2008200. 
 
As regards the survey data collection on health and safety at work, on 16 March 2010 the 
Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 220/2010 defining the programme of the Labour 
Force Survey ad hoc modules for 2013 to 2015201. For the reference year 2013, the 
programme includes a module on accidents at work and other work-related health problems. 
 
 
Box 8.2: Significant judgements regarding EU legislation in the field of health and safety 
at work in 2010 - 2012 
 
Nussbaumer202: in a ruling on national legislation which provided for a derogation from the 
requirement to appoint a coordinator for private construction works not subject to planning 
permission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), interpreting Article 3(1) of the Construction 
Sites Directive 92/57/EEC, confirmed that a coordinator for safety and health matters must 
always be appointed for a construction site on which more than one contractor is to be 
present, irrespective of whether the works are subject to planning permission. Such a 
coordinator is to be appointed at the project preparation stage or, in any event, before the 
works commence. 
 
In addition, while national legislation as regards private construction works not subject to 
planning permission required the coordinator to draw up a safety and health plan only for such 
sites where more than one contractor is engaged, the ECJ held that, pursuant to Article 3(2) of 
the Directive, prior to the setting up of a construction site, a safety and health plan must be 
drawn up for any construction site on which the works involve particular risks, such as those 
as listed in the Directive, the number of contractors present on the site being irrelevant in that 
connection.  
 
Barcenilla Fernández203: In a case concerning workers working on a stone-cutting machine 
with a noise level exceeding 85 dB(A), the ECJ declared that, pursuant to the Noise Directive 
2003/10/EC, it is not sufficient for an employer merely to provide the workers with individual 
hearing protectors reducing the noise level to below 80 dB(A). The Directive instead requires 
employers to implement a programme to reduce noise exposure if the noise level exceeds 85 
dB(A), measured without taking account of any individual hearing protection. Only if such a 
programme does not reduce the noise levels is there an additional obligation for the employer 
to provide individual hearing protection to workers. 
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Kolbeinsson204: This interpretative ruling of the EFTA Court regarded a workers' claim for 
compensation after having been injured following a fall on a construction site where no 
measures had been taken by the employer. The Court first confirmed that Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC establishes the principle that the employer bears the main responsibility 
for safety and health in workplaces. Interpreting the Framework Directive and the 
Construction Sites Directive 92/57/EEC, the Court further held that, in a situation where an 
employer does not on their own initiative comply with rules on health and safety at the 
workplace such as protection against falling from a height, the worker cannot be held liable 
for all the losses suffered as a result of an accident at work, even if they were partly at fault. 
This is different if there are exceptional circumstances such as when the worker has caused 
the accident wilfully or by acting with gross negligence. Finally, the Court ruled that, under 
certain conditions, Member States may be held liable if these do not respect these employer-
worker liability rules. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
 
 
During the period 2010-2012, emphasis has been placed on the evaluation and adaptation of 
the legislative framework in line with 'smart' regulation principles and the Europe 2020 
strategy. This work led to the presentation of the legislative initiatives in the area of posting of 
workers. The proposal for an Enforcement Directive aims to improve the implementation, 
monitoring and compliance with the current Directive on the posting of workers whilst the 
proposal for a Regulation aims to clarify the relationship between fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Following reasoned opinions of the national Parliaments of 12 Member States, the 
Commission withdrew the latter proposal, considering that it is unlikely to gather the 
necessary political support within the European Parliament and Council to be adopted. 
 
During 2010-2012 the Commission started also work regarding the ex-post evaluation of the 
EU health and safety Directives. For the first time, a whole area of social policy will be 
evaluated. In this context, the Commission laid down in 2011 the structure of the national 
reports which have to be submitted in preparation for this evaluation. 
 
Evaluation work is also ongoing on the Directives on information and consultation of workers 
at national level to ensure that they are fit for purpose ('fitness check'). Evidence-based 
research and consultations with stakeholders are expected to inform the Commission’s 
assessment on the effectiveness of these instruments, in particular against the background of 
the current crisis. Studies have been also commissioned regarding the operation, application 
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and effects of the EU Directives on part-time and fixed-term work, in order to underpin the 
Commission’s evaluation of these acts. 
 
The social partners at European level have been very active in concluding several European 
agreements (in particular on working conditions on board of fishing vessels and of passenger 
or cargo transport ships in inland waterways). A further European agreement was concluded 
by the European social partners regarding health and safety in the hairdressing sector. These 
examples illustrate the important role which social partners can play in designing working 
conditions which are well-tailored to the specificities of particular sectors. The European 
cross-industry social partners were also negotiating on the review of the working time 
Directive; however those negotiations ended without an agreement at the end of 2012. 
 
In the field of health and safety in the workplace, the Commission continues its work on the 
evaluation of the European strategy in this area in preparation of the new strategy covering the 
period 2013-2020. It pursues its efforts aiming at adapting the existing legislative framework 
to emerging or specific risks (electromagnetic fields; musculo-skeletal disorders; 
andenvironmental tobacco smoke). It prepares practical guides for better information and 
application of the relevant legislation (exposure to asbestos; and agriculture).   
 
In the coming months, the Commission will further pursue its proposals which are currently 
pending before the EU legislature. It will also continue to closely involve the European social 
partners. Finally, it will also continue its efforts to monitor the effective implementation and 
enforcement of EU labour legislation. All this work is guided by the overall goals of the EU's 
social policy: the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions and 
proper social protection. 
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Annex: Transposition of European directives on employment 
 
DIRECTIVES AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
1. LABOUR LAW
Directives in force:
91/383 - temporary employment OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
91/533 - written statement OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
94/33 - protection young people at work OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
96/71 - posting of workers OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
97/81 - part-time work (98/23-UK) OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK NA
98/23 - extension 97/81 to UK NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA OK
98/59 - collective redundanies (codification) OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
99/63 - working time of seafarers OK OK EX EX EX OK OK EX OK OK OK OK EX OK OK EX OK EX EX OK EX OK EX OK EX EX OK
99/70 - fixed-term work OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
00/79 - agreement on working time civil aviation OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
00/34 -certain aspects of the organisation of working time to cover 
sectors and activities excluded from that Directive
OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
01/23 - transfer of undertakings (codification  77/187 et 98/50) OK OK EX EX OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK EX OK OK EX OK EX EX OK EX OK EX OK EX EX OK
01/86 - involvement employees - statute European company EX OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK EX OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK EX EX OK EX OK
02/14 - information and consultation of employees  OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
02/74 -  protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of 
their employer
OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX
03/72 - cooperative societies OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
03/88 - working time OK OK EX OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK EX OK OK OK EX OK OK OK OK
05/47 - european railways CP EX OK NA CP EX OK OK EX EX EX EX EX EX EX EX OK EX NA OK OK EX OK OK OK OK CP
05/56 - cross border mergers OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
08/94 - insolvency employer (codification 80/987) OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NC OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
08/104 - temporary agency work CP OK OK NC OK OK NC OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NC OK OK OK
09/38 - European Works Council OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NC OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
Directive whose implementation deadline has not yet expired
09/13 - agreement Maritime Labour Convention (amending 99/63)
TRANSPOSAL OF EUROPEAN  DIRECTIVES EMPL - December 2012
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DIRECTIVES AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
2. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
Directives in force:
98/49 - supplementary pensions rights OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
DIRECTIVES AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
3. HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK
Directives in force:
83/477 - asbestos  (to be repealed 04/01/2011) OK OK OK NA NA OK OK NA OK OK OK OK NA OK OK NA OK NA NA OK NA OK OK OK NA NA OK
89/391 - framework directive health and safety at workplace OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
89/654 - work places OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
89/656 - personal protective equipment OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
90/269 - manual handling of loads OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
90/270 - display screen equipment OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
91/322 - chemical, physical and biological agents OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NA NA OK NA OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NA OK NA OK OK OK OK OK
91/382 - asbestos (amending 83/477) (to be repealed 04/01/2011) OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
92/104 - mining OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
92/29 - medical assistance on board of vessels OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
92/57 - construction OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
92/58 - health and safety signs OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
92/91 - drilling OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
93/103 - work on board fishing vessels NA OK OK OK NA OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NA OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NA OK
98/24 - chemical agents 5 OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
99/92 - explosive atmospheres OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
00/39 - chemical agents OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
00/54 - biological agents [codification ] OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
02/44 - vibration OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
03/10 - noise OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK CP OK OK OK OK
03/18 - asbestos (amending 83/477) (to be repealed 04/01/2011) OK OK OK OK OK OK OK CP OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
04/37 - carcinogens OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
04/40 - electromagnetic fields (deadline: 30/04/2012) EX NC NC NC EX NC NC EX NC NC NC NC NC NC EX EX NC EX NC NC NC NC NC NC NC EX NC
06/15 - occupational exposure (deadline: 01/09/2007) CP OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
07/30 - practical implementation reports OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK NA OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
06/25 - physical agents (deadline: 27/04/2010) OK OK OK OK OK OK OK CP OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
08/46 - amending 04/40 electromagnetic fields OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK
09/104 - work equipment (codif 89/655) (no time limit for transpos.) EX EX NC NC OK OK EX NC OK OK EX NC NC NC NC NC NC OK NC NC NC NC NC NC NC EX NC
09/148 - asbestos (no time limit for transposition) EX NC NC OK OK OK NC NC NC OK NC NC NC OK NC NC NC OK NC NC EX NC NC NC NC OK NC
09/161 - 3rd list exposure limit values (deadline 18/12/2011) CP EX EX OK OK EX EX EX OK EX EX OK EX EX EX EX EX EX OK EX EX OK OK EX EX EX CP  
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Directive whose implementation deadline has not yet expired
10/32 -  prevention from sharp injuries in the hospital and 
healthcare sector (deadline 11/05/2013)
12/11 - minimum health and safety requirements regarding the 
exposure of workers to the risks arising from physical agents 
(deadline 31/10/2013)
Partial communication CP
Notification ongoing; examination by the service responsible EX
Not applicable to the Member State NA
No communication of national legislation NC
Communication complete C  
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